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Abstract 
 
Hizb ut Tahrir (HT) is a rapidly growing trans-national Islamic movement which aims to revive 
the classical Islamic Caliphate. Consequently, it has come under increasing international focus as 
a result of its rapid expansion beyond its traditional heartland of the Middle East into Central 
Asia, South Asia and Europe, in turn eliciting diverse reactions from governments, ranging from 
it being constructed as a threat to the state, to its political acceptance and even protection. 
 
This study evaluates the discrepancy in this treatment under diverse political contexts. It argues 
that differing government responses to HT are premised on subjective political and security 
considerations, and not on the objective reality of HT’s political programme and history of 
activism.  
 
HT specifies the area in which the Caliphate is to be revived (the majaal, or location of power) 
as the Arab Middle East. HT maintains that Arab-speaking societies must be the basis of a 
revived Caliphate because of the inseparable link that exists between Islam and the Arabic 
language. HT therefore does not constitute an existential threat to states ruling over non-Arab 
speaking Muslim societies. HT’s political programme and history of attempted coup d’états 
attests to its challenge to states in the Arab Middle East; but no such precedent exists outside of 
that region.  
 
This thesis provides an explanation for the government responses to HT outside the Middle East 
through the theory of securitisation and the securitisation model developed by the Copenhagen 
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School. This model looks at the construction of security as a subjective phenomenon, primarily 
through the medium of the ‘speech act’ which is designed to convince audiences to accept the 
mobilisation of ‘special measures’ in order to deal with constructed threats. In support of this 
argument the study provides a series of comparative case studies of HT under differing political 
contexts which includes the Arab Middle East, Uzbekistan, Indonesia and the UK.  
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Chapter 1 
Hizb ut Tahrir: Issues concerning its Securitization 
 
This dissertation studies the Islamist group Hizb ut Tahrir (Party of Liberation) (HT) in the 
Middle East, Uzbekistan, Indonesia and the Britain. It explores the differences in the approach to 
the movement by the host country and external actors and the relationship this has with HT’s 
ideological and political programme. Its specific focus is the manner in which, and the reasons 
why, the movement has been securitized and treated by the governments of each of the states 
highlighted in the case studies. The core questions this thesis addresses are (1) to what extent is 
the coherency of HT’s ideological theory and of its political programme for achieving power in a 
given country reflected in its treatment by the local actors concerned; (2) does HT’s quest for 
power in a specified location determine whether a unified consensus exists among all actors in 
regard to its securitization?; (3) what explains variations among governments with regard to their 
treatment of HT in locations where it does not target power? To address these questions, an 
understanding of the relationship between HT’s ideological theory and political objectives and of 
the interests of the securitizing actors is essential.  This  contributes to an understanding not only 
of HT’s activism in the specific cases identified for study, but also of the interests and contexts 
involved in its securitization by various other actors. 
 
The purpose of this research is to provide academics and policy makers with the tools to develop 
a more nuanced and contextualized understanding of HT’s political programme and activism 
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globally. This provides both a basis for developing a concrete evaluation as to whether HT 
constitutes an ‘existential’ threat to the stability of a state or regime and guidance in how to read 
its activism. The clarity this provides will enable academics and policy makers to evaluate the 
nature of the different responses that have been made to HT and determine the reasons for the 
differences in the measures applied (security or political) towards the movement by various 
governments. 
Whether the threat is perceived or actual, traditional security paradigms have been unable to 
explain how governments and regimes as securitizing actors have been able to subjectively 
securitise actors and move them from the realm of the political towards mobilizing and enacting 
security measures against them. This is particularly pertinent in the case of studying political 
Islam, where there exists a state of tension between governments and various Islamic movements 
and actors. The originality of the thesis resides within two areas. Firstly, it anchors HT’s activism 
to a conceptual platform rather than trying to derive an understanding of its objectives in each 
region through merely case-specific observation alone; and, secondly, through an original 
application of the Copenhagen Schools’ securitization model to political Islam via the case study 
of Hizb ut Tahrir, it provides a framework through which anomalous responses to Islamist actors 
by various regimes in the Muslim, as well as in the non-Muslim world can be understood and 
explained. 
  
1.1 Political Islam: Islamism and Neo-Fundamentalism 
In the early 1990s, Olivier Roy, a leading French analyst of political Islam, distinguished 
between two tendencies: Islamism and neo-fundamentalism. While Islamist movements are 
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interested in seizing political power and Islamizing society by autocratic fiat from the top down, 
neo-fundamentalist movements aim primarily at Islamizing society from the bottom up (Roy, 
1994: 75-78). According to Roy, a schism has emerged between mainstream Islamist groups like 
Hezbollah and Hamas which call for the establishment of an Islamic state on the national 
Lebanese and Palestinian soil respectively, and uprooted and de-territorialized neo-
fundamentalist groups that strive to establish an imaginary universal Islamic state, not embedded 
in any particular society or territory (ibid, 63:238). Within the broader context of transnational 
Islamic mobilization, HT falls, rather ambiguously, under the category of the neo-fundamentalist 
camp as opposed to the Islamist camp. HT rejects the idea of seizing the state and then forcing 
society to accept Islam; rather it prefers to persuade society to accept its ideas, which it is 
assumed, would then lead inevitably to a change in regime. Accordingly, it considers the jihadist 
methodology of using militaristic means to achieve power without establishing a popular base as 
contrary to the manner in which the Prophet Mohammed established Islamic rule (Nabhani 
1953). This is also the case with the ‘reformist’ approach of changing individuals only without 
concentrating on the state as well as the ‘gradualist’ approach which seeks to work through 
societal and state institutions.1  
 
HT understands Islam as a coherent political ideology which rejects democracy on the basis of 
‘sovereignty’ as defined in Western theory, arguing that in Islam the notion of the human will is 
not independent of the Sharia (Islamic law) (Nabhani, 1953b:43). Therefore, since democracy 
posits sovereignty in context of the human mind it is inconsistent with the understanding of the 
                                                          
1 Ibid. For an overview of Islamist movements and their method of activism see Gilles Keppel (2006) Jihad, The 
Trail of Political Islam, London: IB Tauris, Khalid Hroub (2010)  Political Islam – Ideology and Practice, London: 
Saqi Books and Peter Mandaville (2007) Global Political Islam, Oxford: Taylor and Francis 
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Qur’an as an inexhaustible source of laws for the state, individual and society, understanding of 
the classical legal schools and the life of the Prophet Mohammed in his capacity as a political 
and military leader (ibid). The group's perception of the inseparable link between Islam and 
politics represents a critical voice questioning the organizational structures of societies, power 
relations in and between states as well as secular norms and values. As a result, HT is often 
discussed as the “Other”; as a phenomenon utterly and completely incompatible with secularity, 
democracy and the nation state.  
 
1.2 Why is Hizb ut Tahrir Unique? 
The failure of movements and states in the Islamic world to challenge and provide an alternative 
to global capitalism has been a central factor in the tendency to dismiss the Islamic movement as 
a serious contender to the current political order.2 Academics such as Fred Halliday, Olivier Roy 
and Roger Owen amongst others have argued that the experience of Islamism in the form of the 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt and Jordan, Khomeini and the Iranian revolution, the 
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria, the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) in Pakistan, the National 
Islamic Front (NIF) in Sudan, the Refah Party and the Ak Parti (AKP) in Turkey, the Taliban in 
Afghanistan, and Al Qaeda (AQ), provide ample evidence of a failure by these organizations, 
states and regimes to present clear and original Islamic models which can override the modern 
nation state and/or the Western based secular economic and political systems. Instead, it is 
argued they have adapted their notion of Islamic politics and policies to the precepts of the 
modern secular nation state and the norms of international order. As Roger Owen points out 
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‘[f]or all their engagement with modernity, men with a basically religious world view’ have 
found ‘it difficult to translate their theological principles into concrete programmes for creating 
institutional structures markedly different to those of the secular nation state’(2004:155).These 
shortcomings have led to the understandable conclusion that despite the religious rhetoric, in 
reality movements, states and regimes in the Islamic world have neither clashed with nor 
substituted the principles of the international structure rooted in Western political practice. As 
Halliday argues; 
 
[w]e are not dealing with a world of contrasting political traditions; the very terms 
in which European power and values have been challenged are ones taken from the 
European tradition – the state, the nation, rights, independence, sovereignty, 
democracy. Just as international economic competition concerns disputes over 
trade, investments, profits within a global system created by the European powers, 
so the political argument concerning the ‘West’ versus the ‘rest’ turns out, on 
closer examination, to be a conflict between two different interpretations and 
variants of the Western political tradition itself (1995:5)  
 
Olivier Roy in The Failure of Political Islam (1994) asserts that the failure of Islamism to project 
power or to construct a political model in line with the prophetic one has led to an abandonment 
of the state project. Instead we have now entered a ‘post-Islamism’ or ‘neo-fundamentalist’ 
phase in which political trans-nationalism has given way to a localized a-political Islam more in 
tune with building sharia law and morality in society compatible with national customs and 
experiences rather than a  preoccupation with states and state systems. Roy is not arguing that 
17 
 
Islamism has disappeared or has stopped seeking power; rather it has accepted its limitations and 
morphed into a ‘socio-democratic’ project. He states; 
 
It (Islamism) no longer offers a model for a different society or a brighter future. 
Today, any Islamist political victory in a Muslim country would produce only 
superficial changes in customs and law. Islamism has been transformed into a type 
of neo-fundamentalism concerned solely with re-establishing Muslim law, the 
sharia, without inventing new political forms, which means that it is condemned to 
serving as a mere cover for a political logic that eludes it – a logic in which we 
ultimately find the traditional ethnic, tribal or communal divisions ever ready to 
change their discourse of legitimization, hidden beneath the new social categories 
and regimes (1994:4) 
 
This conclusion, although correct in relation to the movements which have been the main focus 
of Islamism in academic discourse, is, however, premature and incomplete; for the body of work 
from which it derives has categorically and inexplicably ignored any engagement with the 
ideological literature of HT. In doing so it has overlooked the fact that since 1952, HT has 
forwarded new and original paradigms on the theory of knowledge, the human condition, 
ideology, politics, law, economics, society and state, all of which form the basic ingredients of 
competing modern world views such as liberal capitalism and communism. More specifically, 
HT has put forward a coherent and detailed understanding of an Islamic state, its political, 
economic, social and legal constitution as well as the political programme required to establish it 
through a methodology in sync with the classical Islamic legal method. As David Commins has 
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observed, HT has produced ‘an elaborate and detailed program for instituting and managing an 
Islamic state. The writings of Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, its founder and chief ideologue, lay out a 
blueprint for reviving the Islamic state’.3 
 
As to why such a remarkable oversight has occurred regarding the ideology of HT is open to 
question, especially since it has been nearly two decades since Suha Taji Farouki’s ground-
breaking work on the movement entered the academic fray after the publication of her PhD 
thesis in 1996 entitled ‘Hizb al Tahrir – In Search of the Elusive Caliphate’.4 Emmanuel 
Karagiannis provides one explanation rooted in the limitation of the theoretical tools developed 
in Western discourse to understand political movements, that of Social Movement Theory 
(SMT). Karagiannis5 contends that the primary reason why HT’s ideology has been ignored is 
because SMT has evolved around movements in secular liberal societies and not religious based 
movements looking to establish religious power. Quentin Wicktorwicz’s attempts to bring 
Islamic activism under the fold of SMT in his edited work ‘Islamic Activism: A Social Movement 
                                                          
3 (1990:194) The main two movements and thinkers in relation to political Islam have been Hasan al Banna, founder 
of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Syed Ala Mawlana Maududi, founder of Jamaat e Islami in Pakistan. 
Although, both presented conceptions of an Islamic state, unlike Nabhani, neither were trained jurists which 
influenced enormously their ability to apply ijtihad – process of deriving law – on new realities. Richard Mitchell in 
his seminal work on the MB, The Society of Muslim Brothers (1993) pp.209-259, focuses on the reason as to why 
there was a failure to articulate a detailed discourse under al-Banna whilst Barbara Zollner in The Muslim 
Brotherhood, Hasan al Hudaybi and Ideology (2009) pp.50-145, concentrates on its failure under its leadership after 
al-Banna. Maududi articulated a wider discourse on the idea of state, capitalism and communism, but a coherently 
detailed blueprint of the state and its systems was not forthcoming. Instead there was confusion in the relationship 
between Islam, capitalism and communism evidenced in the notion of ‘Theo-democracy’ or a religious based 
democratic political idea. The same was the case with concepts such as nationalism, social justice, and economy etc, 
Vali Nasr (1996), Maududi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism pp.80-106. For a discussion on the concept of 
state between various Islamic thinkers and reformists see Reza Pankhurst’s article Muslim Contestations of Religion 
and State in the Middle East (2010) pp.826-825.    
 
4 The thesis was published without much alteration, see Suha Taji Farouki (1996)  Hizb al Tahrir, The Quest for the 
Elusive Caliphate, London: Grey Seal 
 
5 For an evaluation of Hizb ut Tahrir’s activism in Central Asia according to social movement theory see Emmanuel 
Karagiannis (2010), Political Islam in Central Asia, The Challenge of Hizb ut Tahrir pp.73-102 
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Theory Approach’ (2004), fails to address these shortcomings because it limits itself to the 
conventional actors such as the pragmatism of the MB or violence of AQ where ideology plays a 
superficial role in defining the organization. More crucially it sidesteps the vagueness over the 
meaning and role of ideology in SMT primarily because no clear understanding of the concept 
has emerged in Western political thought.6 As Karagiannis points out, this lack of clarity over the 
concept of ‘ideology’ becomes critical when analyzing HT, not only because the movement 
provides its own original and coherent understanding of the term, but also because of its claim 
that the core of its intellectual existence and political programme is premised upon its unique 
theory of ideology and through it, the demonstration of Islam as a modern world view. In fact 
according to its own theory of political and social movement detailed in its book ‘Party 
Structuring’ (2001), HT believes the failure of Islamic movements to crystallize Islam as a 
distinct and comprehensive ideology is the central cause for their failure (p.1). 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
6 For an overview of the debate concerning ‘ideology’ and its role in social movement theory Pamela Oliver and 
Hank Johnston (2000) What a Good Idea, Ideologies and Frames in Social Movement Research, Mobilization 5(1) 
pp.37-54 and Benford, R. and Snow, A. (2000) Clarifying the Relationship between Framing and Ideology in the 
Study of Social Movements: A Comment on Oliver and Johnston,” Mobilization 5:1 pp.55-60 
 
 
Figure 1.1 The nucleus of ideology in HT from party 
to state 
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In the absence of such inquiry, analysis of the movement has focused exclusively on its political 
actions within the standard Western geopolitical security framework. For this reason, the bulk of 
the literature on HT, which is largely a post-9/11 phenomenon, tends to reflect either the success 
of its activism within closed societies such as those in Central Asia, in unstable theatres such as 
nuclear Pakistan or its engagement with Muslim communities and the media in open societies, 
such as the UK, US and Europe. The post-9/11 discourse on HT is symptomatic of this 
environment. Pre-occupied with HT as a potential terrorist threat, the party’s revolutionary 
ideological base has been ignored and overlooked. It was Lenin who aptly said, ‘there can be no 
revolutionary movement without revolutionary theory’.7 Hizb ut Tahrir provides the requisite 
revolutionary theory and this is what distinguishes it from all other Islamist movements. For this 
reason, the chapter on HT (chapter 2) departs from the standardized background coverage in the 
literature by concentrating on its ideology. It is the first time that HT’s theoretical material has 
been systematically presented.  
 
 
1.3 Studies on Hizb ut Tahrir 
There are three strands of literature which address HT: 
The first strand is what can be termed the historical-hermeneutical approach which empirically 
charts the evolution of HT and draws upon some aspects of its activism (Cohen 1980, Commins 
1990, 1991, Farouki, 1994). This research provides the detail required for understanding HT’s 
                                                          
7 See Vladimir, Ilych Lenin (1902), What is to be Done? The Burning Question of Our Time, Marxist.org, [online]. 
Available at; http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1901/witbd/i.htm [accessed 13.07.12] 
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ideology, organization and political activism in specific cases of HT’s majaal8 (area targeted for 
the establishment of the Caliphate) such as Jordan as well as beyond the Arab world. The 
majority of the work on HT consists of policy related analyses and discussions of radicalization 
tendencies, security threats and failed integration of Muslims in the West (Whine 2004, Sinclair 
2010). In the US, the policy work focuses more specifically on the effect of HT on US strategic 
and energy concerns in Eurasia (Baran 2004a, 2004b, 2005, Cohen 2003, ICG 2002, 2003, 
Khamidov 2003, Mayer 1994).In Europe it relates more to the discussions concerning the 
implication of Islamic radicalism on multi-culturalism and Muslim integration. This work is 
contextualized within certain ideological positions, primarily the war on terror (WOT) and 
domestic security concerns aiming to produce specific debates as to whether HT should be 
categorized as a terrorist organization. The third strand looks to analyze HT through the social 
movement theories (SMT) such as resource mobilization, structural-functional theory, political 
opportunity structure and frame analysis (Karagiannis 2005, 2006a, b, c, 2007, and 2010). This 
study provides important insights and analysis concerning the relationship between socio-
economic, ideological and political factors with HT’s activism. However, the study has so far 
been restricted to the analysis of HT in Central Asia and highlights a weakness in the SMT 
approach in that all the theories share a secular framework of perception and tend to ignore the 
inseparability of religion and politics in Muslim societies. SMT also downplays and is perplexed 
somewhat concerning the role of ideology in mobilizing collective action (Karagiannis and 
McAughley 2006). This is especially important as regards HT because as has been discussed 
above, it uniquely structures itself around a specific concept of ideology which in turn affects 
every aspect of its theory and activism (Nabhani, 2000:1).  In my work, I intend to draw upon the 
                                                          
8 Linguistically, majaal means domain or scope of thought, knowledge and activity or an area of operation or 
activity amongst other close meanings. It is derived from the root word Hakal. 
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historical-hermeneutical approach regarding HT’s ideology and activism as well as some of the 
SMT research in order to evaluate the movement through the securitization model developed by 
Barry Buzan and Ole Waever in what is termed the Copenhagen School. 
 
1.4 Existing Research Gaps 
In general all strands of the academic literature on HT tend to assume a robust trans-national 
coherency between HT’s theory on changing society and taking power and its political 
programme. The standardized conception asserts that HT is globally pre-occupied with questions 
concerning state building and the re-establishment of the Caliphate. Therefore according to 
Karagiannis and Baran, this explains its securitization in the specific geographical context with 
Baran also arguing that it should be an explanation as to why it needs to be securitized in the 
general case (2005). However, a universal position concerning its securitization does not exist, 
and the relationship between the nuances in its global activism and the schism between 
governments over the movement’s treatment in those countries it does not target power is not 
explained by the literature. Moreover, wider political factors concerning the securitization of HT 
which help to explain the puzzle of the difference in its treatment remains widely un-researched. 
In taking HT’s three stage methodology as a universal standard the literature has been unable to 
explain the differences and contradictions in the movement’s activism outside of its majaal(area 
allocated to target power) and therefore the reasons as to why its treatment by local and external 
actors has not been uniform. 
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Suha Taji Farouki: A Fundamental Quest, Hizb al Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic 
Caliphate (1996): Is the only detailed academic study on HT undertaken so far. The research not 
only transcends the narrower focus on HT activism prevalent in the wider literature, but provides 
an original synopsis of the movement that is invaluable for academic and policy research. The 
study draws upon an extensive range of HT literature, as well as the intelligence files belonging 
to the Jordanian and Egyptian governments. Farouki managed to fill a considerable vacuum 
which existed in relation to understanding the movement’s organizational structure, literature and 
political work. Unfortunately, the broadness of the study precluded an in-depth analysis of the 
movement’s theoretical premises and the timing of her work occurred just before the rapid 
expansion and international focus on HT in Central Asia and Indonesia. Farouki’s empirical 
research concentrates primarily on the evolution of HT in the Middle East. Her chapters entitled 
The Origins and Development of the Movement (1996:1-36) and Islamic Party into Islamic State 
(ibid: 76:113) charts the connection between HT’s theory of movement and its evolution of 
activism in the Middle East. There is a brief synopsis of HT’s expansion in her chapter entitled 
Islamic Internationalism (ibid: 153-187) but no attempt is made to analyze it according to HT’s 
theory. My thesis attempts to fill this gap. By drawing upon Farouki’s empirical work on the 
fluidity of HT’s dogmatic theory and practice in the Middle East or majaal, I will highlight the 
confusion and contradiction in applying its theory to theatres outside of the majaal.  
 
Emmanuelle Karagiannis (2005, 2006, 2007, and 2010) concentrates on the emergence of HT in 
the Central Asian region and its analyses from the viewpoint of social movement theory (SMT). 
Evaluation concerning the historical, political and cultural environment in which HT operates in 
Central Asia is covered and HT’s activism through structural functional theory, political 
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opportunity theory, resource mobilization and frame theory. The research provides important 
insight into the manner in which HT interfaces with the political, social and economic dynamics 
of Central Asian states. However, very little of HT’s movement theory is analyzed which 
inevitably results in a confusion concerning the theoretical position of HT’s activism in Central 
Asia. This is reflected in the failure to distinguish between the majaal and non-majaal in HT’s 
political programme and the idea that HT is applying its three stage approach to the Central 
Asian theatre. The atomized nature of the work separates it from the broader analysis of HT’s 
position in the geopolitics of the region.    
 
1.5 Hypothesis and Methodology 
Against this background the hypothesis is that HT’s theory on transforming society and taking 
power only applies to a select number of countries (majaal), primarily in the Middle East. The 
empirical findings show very little evidence that it has a linear follow through from its ideology 
to its political programme in those countries where it does not seek power. Instead the findings 
highlight a lack of uniformity and confusion in its objectives and activism outside of the majaal. 
Consequently, the findings also show that space exists to influence the movement when national 
and regional contexts emerge to shape the individual branches and where members are equally 
influenced by their national and local contexts. Subsequently, I argue that the struggle between 
countries to securitize and de–securitize HT does not occur within some standardized conception 
of its political programme. Rather it responds to an incoherency and confusion in its activism 
primarily outside of its target area for power (majaal) and inadvertently to the absence of a threat 
to the state and the interests of various countries. With no immediate threat to the states outside 
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of its majaal, the movement remains suspended in a vacuum, unable to take society forward 
which according to its three stage methodology requires a political struggle by the masses and 
the party leading them to regime change. Consequently, HT becomes the object of other interests 
targeted by the states which in turn may lead to conflict between them over the treatment of the 
movement. Therefore in some cases HT has been securitized whilst in others efforts have been 
made to de-securitize it. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Linking the Majaal and non- Majaal case studies with securitization 
 
The methodological approach will be a combination of theoretical studies and empirical analysis. 
Firstly, I have studied HT’s ideological text corpus as well as all written material accessible from 
the web pages and internal files in English and Arabic (translated). Secondly, I will be analyzing 
HT patterns of activities in Britain, Indonesia, Uzbekistan and the Middle East and the positions 
taken up by the local powers and outside actors.  
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I have chosen the theory of securitization or the Copenhagen school model because it allows 
movement away from an analysis of objective security to one of subjective security via the use of 
the ‘speech act’. Through its concept of ‘securitization’ which looks at the processes by which 
issues are either ‘securitized’, ‘politicized’ or ‘de-securitized’, I will be able to explain the 
anomalies in the treatment of HT in the varying contexts highlighted by the case studies. 
1.51 Primary Sources and Analytical Tools 
This study primarily draws on a content analysis of the major publications of HT (official) in 
addition to the Dausia (unofficial internal files) which provide more detail on the ideas 
enunciated in the official publications. The primary publications include Nidham al Islam (The 
System of Islam), Mefaheem Hizb ut Tahrir (The Concepts of HT), Takkatal Hizb (Party 
Structuring) and Dawla Islamia (The Islamic State). Using these sources has two advantages. 
Firstly, is their currency: they represent the official position of HT’s conceptualisation of where 
to assume power; and, secondly, they clearly articulate the methodology of its non-violent 
activism and its political means of achieving power. Understanding these are essential to 
confirming the observation that HT has been subjectively securitised as an ‘existential threat’ in 
locations within which it neither looks to undermine the stability of the regime or replace it, as is 
the case in Uzbekistan, Britain and Indonesia. Similarly it provides the intellectual foundations 
for understanding the differences in its activism within the majaal (location suitable for assuming 
power), in Muslim countries outside of the majaal, and in non-Muslim countries. 
These  general  publications  are  consolidated  by regional  publications  such  as  the  Al-Wa‟ie 
(Monthly magazine) and Al-Islam (Weekly bulletin) in Indonesia as well as Al-Fajr (The Dawn) 
and the Khilafah Magazine/ www.hizb.org.uk website in the UK.  These publications provide an 
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understanding of HT’s country specific activism. Using the official publications as a barometer, 
the country specific publications provide the necessary material in understanding, firstly, the 
importance of location to HT’s goals and, secondly, the possible reasons for HT’s vulnerability 
where it pursues a high level of activism despite having no clear objective and, consequently, 
becomes the object of securitisation and manipulation by the state as, this study will argue, is the 
case of HT in the UK. 
In addition to these publications, HT has set up a myriad of local websites for Pakistan, 
Indonesia, and other countries, and web-based local media outlets for countries such as Syria, 
Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Yemen, Pakistan, Indonesia, Egypt, all of which are accessible from 
HT’s official website www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org. There are also other publications by publishers 
that are not officially affiliated to HT but who propagate HT‘s ideology and political 
propaganda. The most productive of them, for the purposes of this thesis, is Al Wa’ie (Arabic). 
 
1.52 Secondary Sources 
In addition to the official books of HT and the localised material this study also makes use of 
other internal sources of HT including books, press releases, intelligence files on HT activism in 
Iraq, and leaked UK government emails on HT’s proscription in the UK. It also makes use of 
external sources such as news agencies that covered the activities and statements of HT. Wider 
literature on Middle Eastern, Indonesian and Uzbek politics and Islamic political affairs is also 
essential in supplying information about the context of HT’s activities. Understanding the 
context of HT’s character is particularly important in understanding the impact of the 
environment on the strategic choices of HT in each case study. 
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In order to gain direct interaction and clarification about HT in the different regions, I also 
conducted a series of semi-structured interviews and informal discussions with senior HT 
members in Jordan, Lebanon and the UK. In the UK, I met leaders at central and local levels, 
former members, relevant Muslim actors, participated in some of HT‘s workshops, seminars, 
rallies and took a series of personal sessions on HT ideology with a senior member of HT in the 
UK. However, after writing a blog in 2007 which critically assessed the relationship between HT 
in Britain and the British government, HT members in the UK and abroad became divided in 
terms of their co-operation with me. For this reason most of the interviews became loosely 
structured with those co-operating preferring to remain anonymous. As a result my strategy 
centred around convincing the senior members whom agreed with my article that the intention 
was not an attack on the movement but a critical appraisal. My critique of HT’s former members 
such as Majeed Nawaz and Mohammed Hussein who were co-opted by the British political and 
media establishment seemed to convince those who were not anatogistic towards me that there 
was merit in my research. As a result some of the senior members remained engaged albeit from 
a position of anonymity. 
 
The discussions with senior HT members were primarily aimed at revealing their interpretation 
of key events in conjunction with the doctrines of HT. The informal interviews with outsiders 
(former members and Muslim leaders) were focused on clarifying and investigating the claims of 
HT activists. This fieldwork took place over a period of three years wherein I travelled to 
  
Lebanon and Jordan due to their position as the ‘home’ of HT worldwide and the consideration 
of Jordan by Nabhani to be the most suitable location to form the capital of a future Caliphate 
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emerging in the Middle East. As a consequence of my blog, the interviewing in the UK proved 
more problematic because of the hostility of the leadership committee towards any member 
communicating with me. As a result, members provided interviews on the basis of anonymity. 
Due to financial constraints, a field trip was not possible to Indonesia although there were a few 
HT activists of Indonesian background in the UK with whom I had informal discussions. A field 
trip to Uzbekistan was not possible due to the security situation concerning HT and the potential 
threat from the state and security services to anyone researching the movement. During the 
period of the PhD, Urunboy Usmanov, a BBC reporter was jailed in Tajikistan (a country with a 
similar position as Uzbekistan towards HT) in 2011 for complicity in ‘extremist activities’ after 
interviewing HT members. Usmanov was later released after pressure by the BBC. However, 
attempts were made to interview Uzbek embassy officials in the UK but without success. 
Interviews conducted by other researchers and academics during earlier less repressive times as 
well as HT leaflets produced by the HT Uzbek branch provided a crucial insight into HT’s 
securitisation and its response on the ground. Most helpful was the interviewing and research 
carried out by international human rights organisations. 
 
Similarly, gaining a UK governmental perspective on HT proved problematic. The nature of my 
research on HT in the UK meant that only a select number of individuals within the political 
establishment were privy to the discussions on HT. Informal discussions with senior political 
figures did not yield much success whilst key ministers such as Charles Farr, the head of 
counter-extremism in the UK Home Office declined an interview on the basis that the minister 
did not give interviews to researchers which clearly indicated a strong rebuke. For this reason I 
had to rely on sources such as informal discussions with people working on government counter 
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terrorism projects, primary official documentation and media leaks of key ministers’ emails and 
private conversations etc. 
 
1.6 Case Studies 
The object of this study is HT due to its trans-national presence as well as its unique non-violent 
but radical political programme which governments around the world have had difficulty in 
categorizing and coping with in terms of a coherent analysis and response. The case studies were 
chosen based on HT’s activism under different types of regimes as well as inside and outside of 
its majaal in order to demonstrate the difference in its objectives as well as the disparity in its 
treatment by local and external actors. It illustrates the complex relationship of HT with the 
local, national, international and/or transnational. Hence, comparing activities in four distinct 
branches Britain, Uzbekistan, Indonesia and the Middle East serves to emphasize the mentioned 
similarities (ideology and organizational structure) and differences in the process of 
securitization (localized politics, external interests and HT’s objectives). The case studies 
demonstrate the vast difference in the securitization and clarity of activism where the movement 
intends to establish the Caliphate as compared to those where it seeks merely to establish a 
presence. Consequently, they highlight the vulnerabilities outside of the Middle East context as a 
reason for the differences in the securitization approach and treatment of HT by the local regimes 
and external actors.  
 
The Middle East was chosen because it is the realm which defines the core area of HT’s quest 
for the Caliphate and where historically there has been a demonstrable coherency between its 
theory and activism. Although its influence and activism has fluctuated over the decades, the 
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Middle East is the only known place where HT has attempted to take power through military 
coups in 60s and 70’s and possibly 80’s. Due to this existential threat, it has remained highly 
securitized and proscribed in the region. Despite its non-violent activism, its members have been 
routinely arrested and tortured by the local security services. All attempts by the local regimes to 
securitize and eliminate the movement have been conducted in silence and away from any public 
discourse. External actors such as the US and the UK have also maintained silence on HT’ s 
treatment despite not proscribing the movement themselves as have the non-state actors such as 
the human rights organizations. The position of the external powers in considering it a security 
threat to their interests in the Middle East is explicit through their silence concerning its handling 
in the region.   
 
The case study of Uzbekistan was chosen to demonstrate the contrast in HT’s treatment by the 
local regime, as well as the manner of its securitization by external non-state actors (NSA). HT 
emerged in Uzbekistan after the collapse of the Soviet Union and quickly filled in a vacuum left 
by the collapse of Communism and the elimination of all political opposition by the Uzbek 
regime. As a result the party was singled out publicly as a threat to the regime and banned 
immediately. The regime adopted a zero tolerance approach to the party through imprisoning, 
torturing and even killing its members as well as those who supported it.  However, the 
securitization and threat assessment by the regime did not match the objectives of the movement. 
HT did not declare Uzbekistan or any other country in the Central Asian region to be majaal. 
Instead, the securitization of the movement as an existential threat to the state has been largely a 
manufactured one on the part of the authoritarian regime for political ends. This focused 
international attention on the movement as its activism fell into a hotly contested theatre of 
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geopolitical rivalry, primarily between the US and Russia. Consequently, unlike the Middle East, 
external powers and non-state actors did not provide a unified silence but took distinct positions 
on the movement as well as publicly discussing its securitization. Whilst Russia proscribed HT, 
the US resisted, although pressure was applied by US think tanks to ban the movement on the 
grounds that it fostered terrorism and its goal of establishing a Caliphate threatened US interests 
in the region (Baran 2004a, 2004b, 2005, Cohen 2003, ICG 2002, 2003, Khamidov 2003). The 
de-stabilizing effect of HT in the region at large may provide some explanation as to the puzzle 
over the US position. The nature of the Uzbek regimes response to HT has somewhat deformed 
its activism. Unwilling to move towards seizing power whilst being forced to address the 
crackdown by the regime through public instead of private means, it has left the movement 
somewhat theoretically suspended in terms of its objectives. As a consequence, political space 
has become available for its vulnerability to manipulation in the wider geopolitical context.  
 
The case study of Indonesia was chosen to highlight the treatment and process of HT’s 
securitization by a democratic Muslim regime where Islam and Islamic movements play a 
pivotal role in state and society. It also demonstrates the different manner in which it is viewed 
by securitizing actors such as the US based liberal foundations who have a strong relationship 
with civil sectors in Indonesia and who consider the country to be of vital strategic interest in the 
Asia-Pacific region. The public emergence of HT in Indonesia (HTI) is a recent phenomenon. 
HT has not declared the country majaal despite it being the largest Muslim country in the world 
in terms of population. Serious international focus on HT in the country ignited when it 
successfully held a conference on the Caliphate in 2007 at the HGelora Bung Karno stadium in 
Jakarta, drawing in a full capacity crowd of 100,000 with allegedly thousands more wanting to 
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attend. The conference although organized by HT, was in alliance with some of the official 
Islamic groups such as Muhammadiyya, whose membership comprises in the millions and 
numerically are considered to be the largest Islamic organizations in the world. Despite, the 
official ideology of the Indonesian state being that of Pancasila (the philosophy of the 
Indonesian state modeled on Buddhist conception of ethics the principles of which are set forth 
in the preamble of the 1945 Indonesian constitution) which rejects the idea of a Caliphate, HT’s 
call to bring a Caliphate in Indonesia did not bring about any major response from the 
government or the US. No external pressure was exerted on the Indonesia government to have 
the conference or the group banned and no policy think tanks rushed to label it a threat to US 
interests although the general argument of extremism remained. Very little public debate has 
been generated concerning its securitization and no state crackdown has occurred on its members 
activities. Again not being instructed to prepare the society to assume power, HT remains 
suspended and its activism has demonstrated incoherence with its theory and organization. 
Therefore space has developed in order to influence it which may explain the puzzle related to its 
non securitization as the groups who partnered HT at the 2007 conference were also involved 
heavily with US outreach programmes aimed at strengthening the forces of moderate Islam 
(Rabasa, 2007:139).  
 
The case study of Britain was selected to demonstrate the treatment of HT outside of the Muslim 
world. Britain was also chosen because despite it being the second country within which HT 
expanded beyond the Muslim world, it has the largest body of activists and from where HT 
receives its widest international coverage. However, the absence of clear understanding of its 
role outside of the Muslim world has consistently led to confusion amongst analysts as well as 
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amongst its own membership and activism. This is largely because HT emerged in the West 
accidentally and not by design. Without a clear mandate to work towards the establishment of the 
Caliphate outside of the Muslim world or even to prepare the society generally for its expected 
appearance, it has struggled to define a  clear  connection with the work in its majaal. Instead it 
has slowly defined itself in the national context and mired itself in a defensive struggle to avoid 
its securitization as a movement which influences terrorism. As with its activism outside of the 
Middle East, HT’s confusion and vulnerability becomes clear when it becomes the subject of a 
unofficial battle for its de-securitization and removal from public discourse in order to serve 
interests related to societal security in Britain.  
 
1.7 Theoretical Issues: The Securitization Model of the Copenhagen School 
The CS emerged primarily from the writings of Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde 
(BWW) at the Conflict and Peace Research Institute (CPRI) in Copenhagen looked to rethink the 
traditional concept of security in the post Cold war era by widening the concepts through notions 
of ‘securitization’ and ‘de-securitization’. The CS’s theoretical arguments are presented together 
in Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998) where BWW maintain the security- survival 
logic defined in the traditional context by asserting that ‘Security is about survival. It is when an 
issue presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object (traditionally, but 
not exclusively the state, including government, territory and society)’ (1998:21). However, they 
extended the security – survival logic beyond military security to four other categories including 
environmental, economic, societal and political security.  
 
35 
 
With the collapse of Communist movements in general along with the dismissal of Islamist ones 
for failing to deliver alternative political and economic paradigms whilst in power, very little 
seemed available as alternate ideological paradigms capable of forming existential threats to 
states and societies. Instead, with the emergence and global focus on violent trans-national 
jihadist movements such as Al Qaeda in the post 9/11 period, the role of systems and 
programmes within Islamist ideology became submerged under the securitization of the physical 
act of terrorism. Consequently, the analysis of HT in the post 9/11 period was greatly influenced 
by the terrorism discourse with think tanks in the US pushing for its proscription as a terrorist 
organization and states in Central Asia such as Uzbekistan actually categorizing HT as such and 
employing extra-ordinary security measures designed to eliminate the movement.  
 
The CS argues that based on the manner in which governments have securitized these issues; 
states have legitimized the extraordinary use of force in order to respond to ‘existential threats’ 
through the mobilization of special powers.  Effectively by utilizing the concept of the speech 
act, the CS attempts to explain how lines can be drawn between the politicization of issues and 
their move towards securitization. Through the social construction of security (who and what is 
being secured and from what) and the employment of what in language theory is called the 
‘speech act’, issues become ‘securitized’ or successfully recognized and treated as representing 
an existing security situation. The significance is not in the reality of the act rather the utterance 
itself is the act. ‘By saying the words, something is done’ (ibid: 26). However, it not merely by 
the use of the word security by which the security speech act is defined, rather it is the 
characterization of an issue as requiring special designation and special measures and its 
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acceptance by a significant segment of the audience, although in instances it can be merely 
institutionalized (ibid:27). 
 
The theory is not presented as an objective evaluation of what pertains to the quality of an actual 
security or ‘existential’ threat; rather it is an inter-subjective assessment of the processes between 
politicization and securitization since it is not a ‘universal standard based in some sense on what 
threatens human life’ (BWW, 21:1998). As Waever surmises that; 
 
What then is security? With the help of language theory, we can regard “security” 
as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to 
something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done 
(as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering “security” a state 
representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby 
claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it (1995:55) 
 
Looking at the wider security question, what then do the terms ‘existential threat’ and 
‘emergency measures’ mean? And on what basis can the line between the processes of 
politicization and those of securitization be drawn? According to Waever, “Traditionally, by 
saying ‘security’, a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to 
use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development” (1988, 1995b). The CS 
asserts that in this instance each category of security is determined by securitizing actors and 
referent objects. The former being defined as ‘actors who securitize issues by declaring 
something a referent object, existentially threatened (1998:36) and can be expected to be 
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‘political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists and pressure groups’ (ibid:40). Referent 
objects are ‘things that seem to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to 
survival’ (ibid: 36). However, the referent objects as well as the type of existential threats that 
are presented can vary across the security sectors. For instance referent objects can be the state 
(military security), national sovereignty or an ideology (political security); collective identities 
(societal security), national economies (economic security); species or habitats (environmental 
security) (ibid). Hence NSA’s also become very important players in the securitization model 
although Ralf Emmers points out that the process is dominated by powerful actors such as the 
state and elites whose power and influence is usually revealed once the move towards 
securitization has been made (2007:112)   
 
The CS draws upon a two stage process in order to explain acts of securitization whereby matters 
are non-politicized, politicized or securitized. Those issues which are not a matter of state 
concern and are not included in the public debate are non-politicized. They only become 
politicized when governments begin to address them through the political system as they become 
‘part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, 
some other form of communal governance (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998:23). The issue only 
moves from the gamut of politicization to that of securitization when emergency action is 
sanctioned beyond what would be considered ‘normal politics’ and the standard realm of 
political operation and hence BWW argue that securitization ‘is the move that takes politics 
beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics 
or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as more an extreme version of politicization’ 
(1998:23). Conversely, the reverse process can also occur whereby issues become ‘de-
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securitized’ and shift ‘out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the 
political sphere (ibid: 4). The spectrum of securitization is captured by the following diagram 
developed by Ralph Emmers (2007:112). 
 
Figure 1.3 Spectrum of securitization (Emmers, 2007:12) 
This thesis asserts that outside of its majaal, this process explains why in some countries HT has 
been securitized and in others either politicized or even de-securitized.  It will further argue that 
the process highlighted in the diagram above is employed to influence HT’s behavior and to 
serve other objectives because of the movement’s confusion and vulnerability in its political 
programme outside of its majaal. It helps to explain the extreme variance in the securitization 
and de securitization of HT by different governments. Therefore the invocation of the speech act 
does not reflect an objective case concerning an existential threat to the security of states outside 
of HT’s majaal. In contrast, HT’s history of ideological engagement and coup attempts in its 
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majaal presents an existential threat to the political security of the state in terms of its traditional 
constituting principle of ‘sovereignty’ or that of the ‘ideology’ of the state (ibid:22). Sovereignty 
is threatened because HT’s activism in the second stage of its political programme attempts to 
move the society to question the recognition, legitimacy or nature of governance of the ruling 
authority. HT is a threat to the political security of the states in its majaal because as Buzan 
points out;  
 
Political threats are aimed at the organizational stability of the state; their purpose may 
range from pressurizing the government on a particular policy, through overthrowing the 
government, to fomenting secessionism, and disrupting the political fabric of the state so 
as to weaken it prior to military attack. The idea of the state, particularly its national 
identity and organizing ideology, and the institutions which express it are the normal 
target of political threats. Since the state is an essentially political entity, political threats 
maybe as much feared as military ones. This is particularly so if the target is a weak state 
(1991:118) 
 
The securitizing actor will normally be governments which in the case of weak states will be 
tempted to invoke the survival of the state as its main security argument. As we shall see, even in 
the case of Uzbekistan which is not targeted for power, the consistent and extensive challenge to 
the ideology, legitimacy and authority of the government by HT systematically invokes appeals 
for the survival of the state. This can be contrasted with the case of stronger states where except 
in the cases of extreme terrorism, no such appeals to state survival are proclaimed because of the 
assumption that governments act as legitimate agents of the governed. The fact that in 
representative states, the governed have the option of rejecting the speech act and therefore the 
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attempt to frame an issue as an existential threat raises an interesting question as to whether acts 
of securitization are more likely to be successful in authoritarian states where the military plays a 
central and significant role in the politics of state. It is interesting to note that in the case of the 
Middle East where HT identifies its location for Caliphal power (see chapter 5), the military 
forms a central role in the governance of largely authoritarian states and consequently HT has 
been securitized and banned from its inception. Moreover, the decision towards HT’s 
securitization by the state has occurred largely in secret (in contrast to Uzbekistan and Central 
Asia in general) and without recourse to the public or even the speech act. Emmers argues that in 
order to maintain their grip on power, political, bureaucratic and military elites in authoritarian 
states often abuse the securitization or de-securitization of political matters and are able to resist 
social pressures by excluding the wider population in the decision making process (2007:113). 
This is not to suggest that abuse cannot occur in representative governments for as Emmers 
points out, security services, governments and the media in these countries also have the 
capability to construct threats and manufacture consent amongst the general populace (ibid:115). 
The CS however, does not regard the securitization move as a positive development or 
something necessary to address certain issues. Instead societies should conduct their affairs as 
much as possible within the realm of ‘normal politics’ and re-introducing matters through the 
process of de-securitization, for as Buzan and Waever point out, ‘risks to society and abuse of 
authority can be prevented by de-securitizing an issue and re-including it into the political 
domain’ (ibid). 
 
This raises some critical questions concerning the role of academics and analysts when studying 
a securitization move. Are they advocates of the move making them securitizing actors in their 
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own right or mere observers? This thesis aims to divorce itself from the securitizing act and does 
not seek to take the role of a securitizing actor. It merely aims to highlight the processes of 
securitization invoked by the case studies and other actors. However, as Emmers suggests, the 
distinction can and has been blurred by a variety of factors notably in the post 9/11 environment 
under the so called ‘war on terror’. According to Emmers, 
 
 Ever since the terror attacks in the United States on 11 September, 2001, terrorist experts 
have been widely present in the media and sometimes even in contact with intelligence 
agencies. It can be argued therefore that such repeated interventions blur the distinction 
between academic analysis and politics and transform the analyst into a separate and 
influential securitizing actor that is part of the securitizing move (ibid:117)    
 
Indeed this is exactly what has occurred in the case of HT. In the post-9/11 period the study of 
HT became embedded within and somewhat dictated by the WOT. Consequently, think tanks 
and academics themselves became securitizing actors in a bid to define HT as an existential 
security threat based on a manufactured paradigm of terrorism. In doing so, focus was moved 
away from any objective study of the movement and the causes of its securitization, especially in 
those areas where HT does not seek regime change.  
 
1.8 Critique of the Securitization Model 
Although the CS has been credited with a broad and powerful research agenda in the field of 
security studies it has attracted a varied, substantial and an increasing range of criticism. 
Securitization theory has been labeled as “socially untenable” (McSweeny, 1996; 1999), as 
‘‘encapsulating several questionable assumptions’’ (Knudsen, 2001: 358), and morally 
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ambivalent verging on politically irresponsible (Erikson, 1999). Knudsen argues that the sole 
consideration of threat as fears expressed on the behalf of security actors by the CS, actual (real) 
threats which may pose an existential danger to the survival of the referent object maybe ignored 
(2001:359). Balzacq supports this argument, and suggests that ‘language does not construct 
reality; at best, it shapes our perception of it’ (2005:181). Moreover, despite the 
acknowledgement of the role of non-state actors (NSA) such as NGOs, civil society actors as 
possible security actors, the CS has been heavily criticized for ignoring this area and maintaining 
an ‘inherent bias’ towards the state as the securitizing actor. According to Barthawal, ‘The 
resulting analysis replicates the state security agenda rather than also considering security threats 
perceived by other actors’ (2009:278). As will be discussed later, this thesis identifies NSAs’ as 
key security actors in certain contexts.  
 
The most fundamental critique of the Copenhagen School is that despite its own appraisal of the 
realist schools anchoring in the ‘Westphalian straight jacket’, it too has been guilty of 
universalizing as normative the conceptions of the Western state and society because of its 
‘Euro-American’ conceptualization of the securitization context. As a result, identifying the 
security actors, securitization moves and the conditions for successful securitization become 
problematic when applying the securitization theory outside of the Euro-American state and 
political models.  As this thesis highlights, this is especially the case in relation to states with 
authoritarian forms of governance where a ‘linear’ process of securitization does not necessarily 
occur as in the case of Western democracy and where the primacy of the speech act is 
undermined by other forms of securitizing action. Therefore, arguably it produces a Westernized 
description of a particular situation which the CS needs to overcome. According to Wilkinson, 
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‘these issues must be addressed if the CS wishes to change from being a theoretical tourist to a 
traveler able to cope sensitively with local conditions’ (2007:22).  
 
1.81 Limitations of the Speech Act 
The core explanation of securitization theory that security must be understood as a ‘speech act’ 
has come under intense scrutiny, in relation to the medium as well as its role in the linear process 
of securitization. Williams (2003) argues that shifting structures of communication, such as the 
visual medium in the modern era, underlines the narrow construction of ‘security’ as being 
embedded within a reliance on discursive action. According to Williams; 
 
 At the heart of these issues is the question of whether a theory so closely tied to speech 
for its explanatory and ethical position is capable of addressing the dynamics of security in 
a world where political communication is increasingly bound with images and in which 
televisual communication is an essential element of communicative action. As an 
increasing number of analyses have argued, and as events in the world of security seem 
daily to demonstrate, modern media is a central element of security relations (2003:524). 
 
Williams argues that as the communicative medium broadens the role of imagery in the 
construction of security in whole or in part cannot be ignored.  The impact of the images related 
to 9/11 and the securitization of migration in Europe are provided as key examples. Moreover, 
the move by governments and military structures to avoid releasing images of killing and 
casualties in war provides further weight to the securitizing impact of visual communicative 
mediums. In terms of the thesis this has implications as to the impact on securitization based on 
44 
 
who controls the communicative media. So in the case of both democratic and absolute regimes, 
the construction of a threat through imagery (such as the securitization of terrorism through 
images of bomb blasts) along with the discursive medium, forms a key part of the securitization 
or de-securitization process.        
 
In line with the notion of institutional control by the securitizing actor, Hansen (2000) in her 
critique on the absence of gender in securitization theory draws attention to the idea that 
exclusive focus on the verbal act of speech makes it difficult for the theory to comes to terms 
with ‘the security of silence’ whereby the potential subject of securitization has ‘no or limited 
possibility of speaking its security problem’ (2000:294).  In such cases it is up to the subject to 
develop its own securitization which may however paradoxically activate other threats to the 
subject (ibid).  
 
Whilst Hansen also confirms the importance of the ‘visual’ in relation to non-verbal 
communication, especially that of the mass media and the internet, it is the question of whether 
speech and the body line up in an unproblematic manner which she finds more challenging for 
securitization theory i.e. ‘can the body speak security even when the word/text does not? (ibid: 
301). This implies that even in the case of verbal silence security might be spoken through the 
body such that ‘none security speech’ is complemented by the ‘excessive speech’ of the body 
(ibid).  Hansen argues that the introduction of the bodily aspect of the speech act allows a 
theoretical reassessment of those situations where speech act and ‘state performance’ do not line 
up in a linear manner as implicitly assumed by the CS (ibid:302).  
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It is the contention of this thesis that such a non-linear securitization of HT exists in relation to 
the actions of governments in the Arab world and Middle East (see chapter 2) whereby there 
occurs a ‘security of silence’ and where governments have moved to mobilize emergency 
measures exclusively through the performative actions of the body.  
 
 
1.82 Conditions for Successful Securitization 
The Copenhagen school has not clearly articulated as to what exactly constitutes successful 
securitization. This is problematic when dealing with political systems outside of the liberal 
democratic context, especially since they constitute the primary political reality of the majaal for 
HT. It argues that the ‘securitizing act is negotiated between the securitizer and the audience’, 
but if the audience accepts the argument being made ‘the securitizing agent can obtain 
permission to override rules that would otherwise bind it’.  What condition defines a successful 
act of securitization remains a bone of contention between securitization scholars. This is 
because according to the theory, successful securitization can take place without actually 
mobilizing emergency measures. Again this puts focus onto the speech act and concentrates on 
the discursive aspect rather than what is being done (Barthawal 2012, 10). Moreover, since the 
CS argues that securitization studies is concerned with ‘who securitizes, on what issues (threats), 
for whom [. . .] why, with what results, and, not least, under what conditions [. . .] (Buzan, 
1998:10), unless the speech act is transcended in order to ascertain whether or not the act 
(speech) led to the mobilization of emergency measures then the evaluation cannot be fully 
completed as it cannot confirm as to why measures are implemented in certain contexts and not 
others (Barthawal, 2010:11 ). 
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This raises questions concerning the nature and reality of the ‘audience’, as to how an analyst 
can determine whether or not a securitizing move has been accepted by the audience or not. 
Barthawal argues that the Copenhagen Schools use of the term ‘a sufficient audience’  is 
‘ambiguous’ and  fails to identify the parameters on how sufficiency is to be measured (ibid). 
She raises further questions as to ‘who constitutes the audience? Is it anyone who listens or is it 
the group towards which the securitization is targeted in order to produce a particular response 
from them? ... is it in fact the group which is in control of the emergency measures?’ (ibid).  The 
central problem lies in ascertaining the success of a securitizing move if no emergency measures 
are taken irrespective of appeals made for securitization. An audience could have accepted the 
securitization ‘outside’ of the realm of the securitizing actor.  
 
More pertinently, Hayward argues that the ‘suppression of dissent’ when applied to the context 
of authoritarian regimes reveals an important shortcoming in securitization theory as regards the 
concept of consent (2011:9). Since securitization can be a tool of political legitimization how can 
it be determined that the breakings of rules have been consented to when there exists no dissent 
because of the threat of coercion or violence. There exists no proof that the rhetoric of ‘false 
consciousness’ perpetuated by the elite has been internalized by the populace (ibid: 10). 
Therefore in such political systems ‘the natural interplay between consent and coercion 
envisaged by the CS is distorted’ and normal securitization through the breaking of rules cannot 
occur (ibid). In this regard, one cannot talk of a ‘securitization’ on the behalf of such 
governments but only a ‘securitizing move’ (ibid).  
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It is the contention of this thesis that in case of authoritarian regimes such as in the Arab world 
and Central Asia, the audience is not necessarily the citizens but the security apparatus and the 
success of the securitization is measured through the application of the emergency measures by 
the security services. The evaluation of the success of the securitization is assessed through the 
loyalty of the security apparatus to which the securitization is targeted rather than the securitizing 
moves aimed to garner consent from the general public where consent of the audience cannot be 
measured .  
 
1.9 Organization of the Thesis 
Chapter Two provides an original appraisal of HT based on its theoretical premises. In doing so 
it puts forward the case as to why HT cannot be understood without recourse to its ideology and 
why it is unique amongst all Islamist movements   Chapter Three analyses the case of HT in the 
Middle East. It explores HT’s concept of majaal and how its specific history in the region leads 
to its securitization and why it differs from other areas. The role and position of local actors as 
well as external ones towards its securitization will also be discussed   Chapter Four looks at 
the case of Uzbekistan where HT has been singled out publicly as an existential threat by the 
regime. The chapter will analyze the nature of this defined threat and the reality of its 
securitization. It will explore the question as to why its activism outside of its majaal has 
resulted in its securitization within the local and geopolitical context.  Chapter Five analyses the 
case of Indonesia as study of HT’s activism in a Muslim democratic country. It will explore the 
manner in which its activism has responded to the national context and why it has not been 
securitized by the local regime but by internal and external NGOs   Chapter Six analyses the 
case of HT in Britain and the issue concerning its securitization outside of its majaal and even a 
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Muslim country. It will look at the debate and struggle between the UK Home Office (HO), 
interest groups and the major political parties concerning its politicization and securitization.  
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Chapter 2 
Origins, Ideology and Strategy of Non-Violent Revolution 
 
Subsequent chapters will discuss the securitization of HT by different political actors and 
governments and the manner in which HT has responded to them. HT prides itself on the basis of 
its rigid ideology as well as the coherence of its global strategy. In order to fully appreciate and 
evaluate the accuracy of these claims it is essential to understand the nature of its ideology and 
the manner in which it influences its political programme. . Based on the literature published by 
the central leadership and discussions with members of HT in Britain (HTB), this chapter 
elaborates on the original ideology of HT, including its theory and strategy for change, and 
shows the unique radical ideology but non-violent nature of its methods. The first section will 
concentrate on HT’s objective of ‘resuming’ the classical model of the Caliphate (in Arabic 
Khilafah) and its scriptural justification, the second section looks at the qualifications and 
capabilities of HT’s founder and the Islamic foundations of HT, the third section focuses on the 
manner in which HT constructs its objectives in relation to resuming the Khilafah, the fourth 
section discusses the manner in which HT theorizes its political programme to change society, 
the fifth section analyses HT’s strategy of mass mobilization and the seventh section illuminates 
the manner in which HT looks to transfer power.  
 
2.1 Classical Tools, Modern Ideology 
Hizb ut Tahrir was born out of events which ensued from the creation of Israel and the partition 
of Palestine in 1948. Founded in Jerusalem in 1952, by a Palestinian Islamic scholar and 
intellectual, Sheikh Mohammed Taqiudine an Nabhani (1905-1978), the movement provided a 
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framework of activism that represented a rival to that of the larger Muslim Brotherhood (MB), 
which had dominated the region in this respect since 1928. The core problem of the Muslim 
world was analyzed by HT as ‘the absence of the application of Islam comprehensively 
throughout state and society’ resulting from the collapse of the last Caliphate in Turkey in 1924 
(Nabhani, 1953:1). The incremental growth of foreign influence during the development and 
expansion of Islam had, according to HT, affected the purity of Islamic thought and had led 
inevitably to its decline (ibid). These influences included foreign philosophies (Hellenic, Persian, 
Christian, Hindu and European), the displacement of the Arabic language under the Ottomans 
and the dismantling of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 and the subsequent colonization of the 
Islamic world by the Western powers (ibid). The aim of HT was to reverse this decline through a 
comprehensive analysis of the prevailing reality, whilst drawing upon the Prophet Mohammed’s 
example in Arabia in matters concerning the establishment of a political movement, interaction 
with society, gaining power and founding an Islamic state (Nabhani, 1998).  
 
Based on his reading of the Islamic sources, Nabhani rejected the methodologies of other Islamic 
movements, such as those of the reformist, gradualist and jihadist (militarist) movements as 
contrary to the method adopted by the Prophet Mohammed, and therefore in contravention of the 
prescription ordained by Islamic law. HT’s method of activism, although non-violent, brought it 
into direct political conflict with state authorities because it considered all governments in the 
Islamic world to be creations and clients of Western (neo) colonialism (Nabhani, 1998: 1-3). 
Moreover, their systems of government, their economics, their constitutions, were deemed to 
have been modeled on those of the secular nation state and consequently, in direct violation of 
systemic rules exclusive to Islam (ibid). 
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Considering nationalism and the nation state to be a source of division, and thus antithetical to 
Islam’s concept of a unitary ummah (borderless community), a theory and a systematically 
detailed account of an Islamic ‘state’ was presented based on the classical trans-national model 
of the Khilafah (Islamic state).9  The geographical expansion of the movement developed in line 
with this trans-national perspective starting from its inception in Palestine in 1952, then moving 
throughout the Middle East and the Arab world in the 1960s and 1970s, finally extending to 
Central and South Asia in the 1980s and 1990s. It is now active in over forty two countries, and 
also has a presence in the Western hemisphere. This last development occured according to 
Farouki, more out of accident than design, as a consequence of Arab members travelling to the 
Western region for education as well as to escape persecution in their countries (1996:171). 
  
 
 
 
                                                          
9 Nabhani’s understanding  rejects the dichotomy between the Khilafah and the Islamic state put forward by the 
controversial Egyptian scholar, Ali Abdel Raziq (d.1966) in his book,  ‘Al-Islam Wa Usul Al-Hukm, Islam and the 
Foundations of Governance’ (1925) which forms the thrust of contemporary Western academia on the subject see 
Abdul Wahab El Affendi, (1991). ‘Who Needs and Islamic State’, (London: Grey Seal, 1991) and Noah Feldman, 
‘The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State, (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008) .Through his book ‘Nizam ul 
Hukm fi Islam, The Ruling System in Islam’ (1953b), Nabhani refutes Raziq’s arguments that the Islamic sources do 
not establish the requirement for a Caliphate and also that there exists no system of governance in Islam and hence 
other forms of political organisation other than the Caliphate can be adopted. Nabhani does not present new ideas 
but principles already existent in the Qur’an, hadith and the books of classical Sunni scholars. The originality is in 
the development of political theory and the compilation of primary sources to articulate a detailed political system or 
system of governance. Nabhani provides theoretical detail and systemic rules to the main classical Sunni texts on 
Islamic governance such as Muhammad Al Mawardi’s (d.1058) ‘Ahkam Al Sultaniya ‘(Rules of Governance),) 
(London:Taha Publishers 2003) edn and Muhammad Ibn Khaldun’s (d.1406)  ‘Al Muqadimmah, An Introduction to 
History’ , (Princeton: Princeton University 2005 edn) 
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Figure 2.1 The expansion of Hizb ut Tahrir (1952-2000) 
 
Nabhani considered the Khilafah as central to Islamic revival, not only because it was obligated 
by Islam but also because without it, he argued, the majority of Islamic rules pertaining to 
government, the economy, the penal code, the social system, etc. could not be practically 
manifested. For this reason the Islamic Khilafah was a permanent requirement and feature of 
Islam. This was included in his definition of the Islamic state according to which;  
 
The Islamic State is a Caliph implementing the Islamic law. It is a political and an 
executive body entrusted with the duty of implementing and executing the laws of Islam, 
and of conveying the Islamic Message to the world by means of da’wah and jihad. It is the 
only method that Islam has laid down to implement its systems and general laws in life 
and society. It is the soul of the existence of Islam in temporal life, for without it, Islam 
would completely recede from being an ideology and a system of life and it would be 
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confined to merely being a host of spiritual rites and moral values. Therefore the state is a 
permanent body and not a temporary one (1999:18) 
 
 
2.2 Qualifications and Usool (Foundations of Jurisprudence) 
Nabhani focused explicitly on the details of the structure and constitution of the Islamic state. 
The distinguishing factor which enabled Nabhani to articulate a detailed Islamic blueprint was 
his specialist training as a legal jurist and his competency in interpreting Islam law (Farouki, 
1:1996). Nabhani gained this training from the classical seat of Islamic learning, Al Azhar, in 
Cairo. More critically, on political issues on which Al Azhar was largely silent, he was schooled 
by a family of scholars, including his mother and his uncle, Yusuf an-Nabhani, who, as a strong 
supporter of the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II was commissioned as a judge in the Imperial 
Ottoman courts (Farouki, 1996:1-2). 
 
Scholarship and employment of the classical tools of Islamic jurisprudence has, in fact, been a 
defining characteristic of HT’s central leadership and the hallmark of its body of literature.  Not 
only Nabhani, but also his successor Abdal Qadeem Zallum (d. 2002), was a qualified jurist 
(Baran, 2004:15). Along with his intellectual approach and wide reading of Islamic and Western 
(including Marxist) philosophy, Nabhani’s employment of ijtihad (the process of extracting rules 
from Islamic texts) for contemporary socio-economic and political realities had a profound effect 
on understanding and approach to Islam as both a spiritual and political concept (Farouki, 
1996:55). The practical manifestation of this translated into his confidence in Islam’s 
54 
 
embodiment of self-sufficient principles which do not require adoption from modern ideological 
systems such as liberal capitalism and communism in order to address the contemporary world.   
 
Nabhani sought to bridge past and present through ijtihad  and the articulation of his own usool ( 
foundational principles of jurisprudence) which was based on the same premise as that of the 
four main classical Sunni schools of thought but which, Nabhani argued, was methodologically 
stronger (Farouki, 1996:55-62). Nabhani asserted that since the function of the tools and 
methodology of ijtihad were designed to identify as accurately as possible the Divine revelation, 
only those sources which could establish this as a matter of certainty could be adopted in forming 
the basis of the usool. According to Nabhani, these could only be the Qur’an, the Sunnah 
(defined by HT as ‘the actions, speech and silence of Mohammed’) and, the Ijma as-Sahaba 
(consensus of the disciples of Mohammed) and Qiyas (divine analogy) (ibid).   
 
  
Figure 2.2 Nabhani's usool -primary and secondary sources 
 
Along with new intellectual paradigms, this usooli approach enabled Nabhani to fashion classical 
Islam into a modern ideology, designed to provide a global alternative to capitalism and 
communism, both doctrinally and systemically. For example, his works, Nidham al Hukm fi 
Islam ( The Islamic Ruling System (1953b) and Nidham al Iqtisad,(The Islamic Economic System 
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(2000), provide a refutation of the principles of capitalist and communist political and economic 
thought, while challenging the dominant Western discourse, which holds that Islam does not 
contain within it a theory and structure of political organization, and that the systems and rules of 
governance, economics etc., currently found in the Muslim countries are a synthesis of western 
models of democracy, capitalism and socialism/communism. However, it is Nabhani’s original 
theory of the mind and that of knowledge which stands out as the basis of his most potent 
critique of Western thought (capitalism and communism) and the demonstration of Islam as an 
intellectually based commensurable worldview.10 
 
However, there are internal inconsistencies in his writings which are generally attributable to his 
a priori conviction that Islam is the only valid thought system, resulting in a lack of genuine 
interest in other thought systems and general issues.  His treatment of these is typically 
superficial, and there is often an attempt to tailor the ostensibly general discussion to the 
demands of the a priori conviction, the assumptions of an Islamic worldview, from the starting 
point. Nabhani’s concern to underscore the authenticity of his Islamic ideology is evident in his 
declared vigilance against the penetration of alien notions and his engagement in ‘anti-
apologetics’ (Sivan, 1990:71).  
                                                          
10 Nabhani’s theory responds to the key assumptions and premises of the empirical/positivist understanding which 
had the greatest influence on the development of Western philosophy and more specifically on Marxism and 
Capitalism. In his book ‘Tafkeer’ (Thinking, 1973), Nabhani claimed to be the first person in history to articulate a 
clear and coherent conception pertaining to the elements of the mind and a theory which purports to solve the age 
old mind-body puzzle and its relationship with the human condition (more on this below). Understanding the exact 
reality of the mind, its location and how it works has baffled scientists and philosophers throughout the ages and 
continues to do so. Known as the mind-body enigma, although theories on the process of thinking have been put 
forward by Greek, Indian, Western, Muslim and Marxist thinkers, there still exists no clear understanding of the 
mind, its elements or the process of thought production in the established scholarship. For a general discussion on 
the contestations over the understanding of the mind see Chalmers D. ‘Philosophy of Mind – Classical and 
Contemporary Readings’, (Oxford: OUP, 2002), Shear, J. Explaining Consciousness - the ‘Hard Problem’, 
(Cambridge: MIT , 1997) and Blackmore, S. ‘Consciousness, A Very Short Introduction’, (NY:OUP, 2005) and 
Grega Repovs, ‘’Cognitive neuroscience and the ‘mind-body’ problem’’, Horizons of Psychology, 13:2 (2004), pp.9-
16. 
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However, although he insisted that Islam does not require justification based on Western values 
or according to the criteria of modernity, there is nevertheless evidence that he himself engaged 
in apologetics of a sort. As will be discussed below, he was at pains to demonstrate that Islam is 
a comprehensive ideology like other modern ideologies, and that sharia can meet the 
requirements of modernity. Such apologetics, which center on an endeavor to demonstrate the 
adequacy of Islam, suggest a modernist undertone in his intellectual position. Unlike the radical 
ex - Muslim Brotherhood thinker, Sayid Qutb, who thought it futile to concentrate on the Islamic 
state and concentrated instead on the sovereignty of God and the rejection of modernity, 
Nabhani’s quest for Islamic authenticity did not impel him to reject modernity, his treatment of 
Islam clearly betrayed an attempt to make it sit more comfortably in a modern world dominated 
by the Western intellectual tradition.  
 
The incorporation of quasi scientific notions for example (see Nabhani, Al Tafkeer), revealed a 
desire not only to persuade Western - educated Muslim skeptics but also to impress the non-
Muslim western reader. It could be argued that although he consciously rejected the Western 
ideological currents that were at their most influential in the region during the formative years of 
his thought and expressly sought to purge the Islamic tradition of their contaminations, at some 
level Nabhani sought to reconcile these two opposing intellectual poles. While the resulting 
apologetics can hence partly be attributable to internal inconsistency, it also highlights the 
heterogeneous character of his theoretical position, reflecting a complex and seminal moment in 
the political evolution of the Arab world in the immediate post World War II period. His 
conceptions of Islam and the world view it informs thus straddles features of the defensive 
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apologetic modernism of Islamic reform as well as aspects of the confident, authenticity- 
orientated ethos of an incipient radicalism. 
 
His traditional beginnings which account for the essentially neo-traditional thrust of his theology 
and legal theory, informed Nabhani’s concern to reassert the supremacy of revelation over reason 
in order to restitute a pristine Islam, one cleansed of both the deviations from reason and the 
Western contaminations that had encouraged these.  
 
However, the Azharite alim scholar had gradually emerged as a revolutionary Islamist, bringing 
into the market place of modern political ideologies an Islamic ideology that overshadowed that 
of Qutub or any other Islamic political reformer. The ideology was to form the basis of a 
systematic bid for power. 
 
2.3. The Objective: Reviving the Transnational Rule of Khilafah 
Although the concept of Khilafah has become synonymous with HT, in the strict sense, the party 
has always advocated the ‘resumption of Islam’ as an inseparable thought and system as the 
fundamental objective and the Khilafah as merely an executive entity. For this reason, the 
emphasis for HT as this chapter points out, is the societal adoption of Islam as a prerequisite to 
the establishment of the Khilafah. That said, the ultimate goal of HT is to establish a Khilafah 
government in a Muslim country that adheres to no law except the Sharia, leading eventually to 
the resumption of Islamic rule throughout the Islamic world which it claims lasted from the time 
of the prophet Mohammed until the abolishment of the Ottoman Empire in 1924. This would 
lead to the second phase of ‘resuming’ Islamic rule in the wider Islamic world as well as 
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expanding its influence globally through the mechanism of the state. According to HT’s 
understanding, since the majority of Islamic rules pertaining to the judiciary, economics, tax, war 
and society require the existence of the political and executive entity of the Khilafah; the Islamic 
way of life cannot be adhered to in its absence (HT:1990). 
 
Moreover, it sees the Khilafah as an institution that protects Islamic rule, its citizens and lands 
from physical as well as intellectual invasion and hostility. It believes that the fall of the Khilafah 
has had a direct role in the decline of Islamic supremacy, and in its colonization and subsequent 
division. In order to support its argument, HT provides an historical analysis pertaining to the 
decline of the Islamic civilization. Its fundamental claim, elaborated in the books ‘The Islamic 
State’ and ‘How the Khilafah was Destroyed’ asserts that the failure of the West to defeat the 
Ottoman’s militarily, led to an evolution in its strategy aimed at targeting the state’s intellectual 
foundations. Western forces targeted these foundations as a way to control the Muslim world. To 
achieve this goal, the West started with attacking the intellectual foundation or ideology of Islam 
that supports the establishment of a ruling state. This is premised on an original and universal 
conception of ‘ideology’ as a theoretical tool to explain Capitalism, Communism and Islam.11 
Nabhani applies this to an understanding of Islam that connects the idea (doctrine and systemic 
rules) with the practical mechanism of how to manifest the idea practically termed the method 
                                                          
11 It is the claim of HT that Nabhani presents the most comprehensive and coherent theory of what constitutes an 
ideology. The reality of ideology in Western academic literature remains ill defined, vague and deeply contested see 
M. Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach, NY: OUP, 1998), T. Eagleton, , Ideology: An 
Introduction,( NY: Verso, 1991) and J.Larraine, The Concept of Ideology, (London: Hutchinson Group, 1997). 
Based on his theory, Nabhani considers capitalism, communism and Islam as the only comprehensive ideologies. In 
his view, there can be no co-existence between the three ideologies, as they differ radically on the fundamental 
questions of life and the source of their systems. Furthermore, since all three require a state to practically manifest 
their ideologies, they are inevitable competitors in the global arena. However, since the collapse of the Ottoman 
Caliphate in 1924 and the Soviet Union in 1989, only capitalism is considered to be represented in state form whilst 
Islam is carried only by nations and peoples. On this basis Islam forms the sole ideological challenge to capitalism 
in the contemporary global order. 
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(tariqah) which in reality constitutes the mechanism of state. The separation between the two is 
the critical reason as to why that Muslims fail to understand the necessary linkage between 
Islamic rules and their implementation by the state, confirming that Islamic law could not be 
implemented without the state (Nabhani 2001a: 5). 
 
He argues that the West was fully cognizant that the power and vitality of Islamic ideology was 
located in the homogenous link between its thought and method. Having rebelled against 
Christian rule and adopted secularism, the West launched a cultural and missionary invasion in 
order to introduce its own ideology of separating state and religion. Such an assault contended 
Nabhani was aggravated by the gradual intellectual decline of the ummah whereby scholars and 
thinkers throughout Islamic history had accommodated Hellenic, Persian and Hindu ideas and, 
by default, weakened Islamic thought. This was further exacerbated by the replacement of 
Arabic with Turkish which, in turn severed the link between the Islamic sources and society. 
Consequently, according to Nabhani, Ottoman decline was inevitable because unlike their Arab 
predecessors they relied overwhelmingly on their military strength, which although substantial, 
was hollow without ideological power. Military achievements had distracted the attention of the 
Caliph from Muslim intellectual decline. Furthermore, with the loss of Arabic, the Ottoman’s 
closed the door for ijtihad (juristic reasoning) in the 10th century fomenting the decline of 
creative and dynamic thinking among Muslim scholars and intellectuals. As a result, they tended 
to understand Islamic laws in accordance with the claims of Western discourse. For Nabhani, 
‘Islam is understood in a way that satisfied the accuser [the West] (2001a: 10). Under this 
assault, scholars and intellectuals attempted to reconcile two exclusive doctrines and systems by 
adopting principles which were influenced by the Western way of thinking such as ‘it is not 
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prohibited to change the rules according to the changing of the time’ and ‘Tradition is the 
arbiter (which means Islamic law should be implemented in accordance with local tradition’ (al-
Nabhani 2001a: 6). This flexible but ‘weak’ way of thinking, for Nabhani, set the standard for 
the success of the Western intellectual attack that led to Muslim neglect of the importance of an 
Islamic state (al-Nabhani 2001a: 11). 
 
In HT‘s view, the Western intellectual invasion was followed by a series of political invasions 
using primarily the tool of nationalism.12 In his book, How the Khilafah was Destroyed (2000), 
which provides a detailed account of the process toward the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Abdul 
Qadeem Zallum argues that after weakening the ideological base of Islam the West incited 
separatist political tendencies in the territory of the Khilafah. Provinces (under the Ottoman 
Empire) like Turkey, Lebanon and some areas in Europe (Balkans) served as the gates of 
Western political invasions. The West supported separatist movements in states like Serbia and 
Malta and then exported that strategy to Arab countries. In 1798, through its agent, Muhammad 
Ali Pasha (also known as Mehmet Ali Pasha), who was the governor of Egypt, France succeeded 
in invading Egypt and marched into Palestine, Lebanon and Syria (Zallum 2000: 5). HT argues 
                                                          
12 Due to the contestations in Western political literature concerning the concept of ideology and that of nationalism, 
the question as to whether or not nationalism constitutes a distinct ideology becomes problematic for Nabhani and 
HT. For a conceptual appraisal of this subject see Michael Freeden, ‘Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?’, Political 
Studies, 46:4 (September 1998), pp.748-765, also Ernest Gellner (2006) Chapter 9, Nationalism and Ideology in 
Nations and Nationalism, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp.118.130  and Barbara Jackson (1966) Nationalism and 
Ideology, London: W.W. Norton and Company. Based on intellectual and scriptural grounds, Nabhani rejects the 
proposition that nationalism is an ideology. Nabhani brings forward scriptural evidence to argue that Islam rejects 
any political association based on nationalism, tribalism etc. He asserts that from the time of the Islamic state under 
the Prophet Mohammed till the end of the Caliphate in 1924 only the Islamic creed was deemed legitimate as a basis 
of political association. It is pointed out that even under the Ottoman’s, the ‘Ottoman Law of Association’ prohibited 
any political entities based on ethnic or national lines. It is argued that the colonial powers used the tool of 
nationalism to foment the break-up of the Ottoman Caliphate from the Balkan’s to Lebanon to the Arab revolt and 
its Turkish counterpart. The forced carve up of the Middle East etc is cited as proof of the alien conception of 
nationalism to the political organisation stipulated by Islam  Therefore the Caliphate is conceived to be unitary and 
its projected expansion premised on the rejection of nationalism and the nation state. 
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that in the 19th century France extended its occupation to Africa. Britain and France divided 
Muslim lands in the secret agreement named Sykes-Picot. The pact granted Britain control over 
Haifa and France gained parts of Turkey, Northern Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. It believes that it is 
this agreement that established the current borders of the Middle East (HTI, 13 July 2007).  
 
HT‘s argument about the role of the Western intellectual invasion in destroying the Khilafah 
provides a critical footnote for the association of Islamic fundamentalism and the Islamic puritan 
movement, Wahabism. HT claims that Wahabism was part of the Western conspiracy to create 
division in the Khilafah government. It argues that the founder of Wahabism, Abdul Aziz Ibn 
Muhammad ibn Saud, was a British agent who assisted the British force in its attack on the 
Khilafah from within. Wahabism is also seen as a part of the Western support for tribal leaders 
like ibn Saud in his effort to establish an Islamic state within the Khilafah (Zallum, 2000: 5). 
 
Zallum argues that the success of the West in dismembering the Khilafah government relied on 
the influence of missionary groups and the founding of secret organizations to raise the sentiment 
of nationalism within the Khilafah territories. Central in these operations were the cities of 
Istanbul and Beirut, which stood at the heart of the Khilafah government. In Istanbul, France 
supported the founding of a nationalist organization named ‘Young Turks’. The group‘s success 
in mobilizing nationalist sentiment among the people caused a major blow to the government of 
Khilafah. A key leader who was born within the group was Mustafa Kemal. Irrespective of 
Kemal‘s role in the Turkish struggle against the British, Zallum believes that history shows the 
clear motivation of Kemal. He was a traitor to the Khilafah (ibid: 90). 
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Zallum claims that Kemal was actually a Jew13, who served as an agent for the British. In its 
official publications, HT provides no direct evidence to support its claim that Kemal was an 
agent of Britain. Rather it is inferred firstly by the actions of Britain in building the rapid profile 
of Kemal which Zallum claims it did through its campaign in Gallipoli whereby he asserts that 
Britain provided an unexplained but tactical retreat which had the effect of catapulting and 
strengthening Kemal’s position amongst the armed forces sector of the Ottoman army. This was 
considered by Zallum to be more important to Britain than the Arab chieftains who although 
having revolted against the Ottoman’s, were considered not to possess the material power to 
effect real change in the political and military status quo in the Ottoman Empire. Zallum in his 
historical treatise on the demise of the Khilafah ‘How the Khilafah was Destroyed’ (2000) 
claims; 
 
Mustafa Kemal was a little known junior officer when the war broke out, though he was 
known for his Western thoughts and his rebellion against the Islamic thoughts, and for his 
inclination towards the British and his hatred for the Germans. It was only after his 
participation in the battle of Ana Forta that his name became known and celebrated. Since 
that time, he acquired a wide publicity, his name became celebrated and he became 
famous…On 15th April 1915, the British attempted to mount a huge offensive, being 
adequately prepared for battle. They entered the battle and the British troops managed to 
reach Gallipoli and succeed in dispersing the Ottoman troops. As a result General von 
Sanders was forced to dismiss the commander in charge of the battle and he replaced him 
with Mustafa Kemal, who at the time was still a colonel. Mustafa Kemal assumed the 
                                                          
13 This claim is not restricted to HT. Many of his Islamist opponents’ primarily Sufi orders in Turkey also believe 
this to be the case. They consider him to be Doenmeh (crypto-Jewish) origin as he was also from a Jewish quarter in 
Salonika, contemporary Greece.   
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command of the Ottoman troops near Ana Forta, one of the most sensitive areas near the 
Dardanelles. The battle was being waged over a valley with the Turks occupying its peak 
and the British down below trying to occupy it. The battle went on for several days with 
neither of the two warring factions gaining the upper hand. The status quo remained with 
the Ottomans holding on to their positions and the British holding on to theirs as the 
fighting between them continued. This went on for several months when suddenly on the 
night of 15th December, in an atmosphere shrouded in total secrecy, the British evacuated 
from the position they had occupied along the coast of Gallipoli. The warships set sail 
after having been loaded in an astonishing hurry. It was that evacuation that ended the 
battle… Mustafa Kemal returned from the battle that he had led and from which he had 
emerged victorious to arouse people as doubts about the State’s ability to fight the British, 
and to generate the idea of the State withdrawing from the war and signing a unilateral 
peace treaty with the British. He returned to initiate a domestic battle with the State in 
order to make her forsake the Germans and side with the British. (ibid:79-83) 
 
Similarly, it was also argued that Kemal went to Syria with a goal of fighting the British forces, 
instead he betrayed Syria which fell into the hands of the British by pulling his troops from 
Anatolia (ibid: 90). For HT, this is not a surprise because according to Zallum, Kemal repeatedly 
stated his intention to separate Turkey from the government of the Khilafah (ibid). The alliance 
between Kemal and Britain is also based on a frequently cited statement, which according to HT, 
was made by Kemal in the Turkish Parliamentary chamber and corresponds to British designs of 
fragmenting the Khilafah. The statement says: ‘Was it not because of Khilafah, Islam and ulama 
that Turkish farmers went to war and died for centuries? It is time for Turkey to take care of its 
own affairs and ignore the Indians and the Arabs. Turkey has to separate itself [from Khilafah] to 
64 
 
lead Muslims’ (ibid). With the help of Britain, Kemal assumed political power in Turkey and 
officially abolished the Khilafah government (ibid).  
 
HT’s evaluation of the ceaseless political and ideological role of Britain, France and to a certain 
degree Russia in bringing down the Khilafah informs its belligerent position towards these 
countries. HT considers these countries to be perpetual enemies of Islam and according to what it 
has adopted in its draft Islamic constitution for a future Khilafah, ‘States with whom we do not 
have treaties, the actual imperialist states, like Britain, America and France and those states that 
have designs on the State, like Russia are considered to be potentially belligerent states. All 
precautions must be taken towards them and it would be wrong to establish diplomatic relations 
with them.’(Article 184, x: x) Amongst the Europeans, Britain is particularly singled out as 
maintaining a venomous position towards Islam referring to it as the ‘head of the snake’ which 
continues to perpetuate its historical war against Islam and the Muslim world. Nabhani charges 
that; 
 
 The crusader hatred harbored by the Westerners, especially in Europe and more so 
by Britain, and their deeply rooted animosity and wicked malice was the cause of 
our eventual humiliation in our homeland. ..This malice and hatred has existed 
ever since the days of the crusades and it is still perpetuated today. What we face 
in terms of oppression, humiliation, colonization and exploitation - in addition to 
the political aspect - is in fact an act of brutal revenge on the Muslims…In the 
wake of the First World War; the allies occupied all the lands of the Islamic State. 
Their main aim was to destroy the State for good and then ensure that it would 
65 
 
never rise again. Once they had destroyed the Islamic State, they set about making 
sure that the Islamic State could not be re-established in any part of its lands. They 
designed several plans and used several methods to make certain that the Islamic 
State would never return to existence, and they are still working towards that 
objective (Nabhani, 1997:98)  
 
On the basis of this analysis, HT contends that although the core of the Islamic decline was 
intellectual, the key factor for the loss of its unity and supremacy was the division of Muslim 
lands and societies by the West based on the imported and imposed idea of nationalism and the 
nation-state system. Therefore, in order to rectify this position, HT asserts that both rationally 
and textually, the objective of re-establishing universal Islamic governance modelled on the 
Khilafah must be the primary goal of the Islamic struggle. As mentioned above, the 
establishment of the khilafah is categorized as a matter of life and death because it is considered 
the only political institution that can ensure the implementation of Islamic laws, revive the 
ummah and establish the supremacy of Islam over all other belief systems.  Zallum states that; 
 
Establishing the khilafah is conclusively a vital issue, because in addition to being 
a method to transform our lands from Kufr homeland into an Islamic homeland, its 
establishment is also aimed at destroying the Kufr systems (2000: 202) 
 
For this reason, HT elevates the work to establish the Khilafah as one of necessity which moves 
from the category of a communal obligation (fard kifayah) where the individual sin is absolved if 
some members of the ummah take up the work to one where each individual Muslim is in sin 
66 
 
unless the obligation is not discharged with its establishment.   Like other Islamists, HT draws on 
the verses in the Qur‘an about the obligation for Muslims to implement God‘s laws (see Quran. 
5: 48-49). However, HT interprets this command with reference to the post-Muhammad era 
when the executor of God‘s laws was a Khalif (Caliph). Using the basic principle in Islamic 
jurisprudence (ushul al-fiqh) that ‘what is required for implementing a duty (wajib) is by itself a 
duty (wajib)’ (ma la yatim al wajib illa bih, fa hua al-wajib), HT argues that the establishment of 
the Khilafah is necessary to implement God‘s laws (Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain, 2000: 
27). This argument is also supported by HT‘s understanding of the doctrines of bay’ah 
(allegiance) and imamah (leadership), which are based on several sayings of the Prophet 
(hadiths). Two of the most frequently cited hadiths are;  
 
Whosoever takes off his hand from allegiance to Allah, will meet him on the Day 
of Resurrection without having any proof for him. And those who dies without any 
bay‘ah (allegiance) on his neck (to a Khalifah) he dies a death of jahiliyah 
(ignorance) 
 
and, 
 
He who pledges allegiance to an Imam giving him the clasp of his hand and the 
fruit of his heart shall obey him as long as he can, and if another comes to dispute 
with him you have to strike the neck of the man (Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in 
Britain 2000: 25-26): 
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For HT, the obligation to have a bay’ah refers to the practice of bay’ah as a mechanism in 
political succession in the Khilafah era, which was practiced by the Prophet‘s companions after 
his death. The first thing that the early generation of Muslim did after the death of the Prophet 
was to appoint Prophet Muhammad‘s closest companion, Abu Bakr, as Khalif. This story, for 
HT, indicates a political leadership (imamah) interpreted by HT as Khilafah as a crucial matter, 
the criticality of which was confirmed according to HT by the fact that the burial of the Prophet 
Mohammed was delayed for three days and two nights by the companions in order to elect a 
Khalif contradicting the Islamic injunction which requires a Muslim to be buried immediately 
(ibid).  Despite the suspicion that these stories were cited to support political establishment in the 
Khilafah period, HT claims that establishing a Khilafah government is a communal duty (fard al-
kifayah), a consensus of Sunni ulamas (mu’tabar ulama). 14 
 
Further, HT believes that the return of Khilafah is divinely destined because this is the promise 
of God. It suggests that the Prophet Muhammad foretold the return of the Khilafah after its 
destruction, suggested with reference to the following hadith: 
 
Prophethood will last with you for as long as Allah wants it to last. Then He will 
end it if He wishes to end it. Then there will be Khilafah according to the method 
of prophet hood, and things will be as Allah wishes them to be. There will be a 
                                                          
14 In support of this view, amongst other widely accepted classical Sunni scholars HT quotes the following citation 
from the scholar Imam al-Qurtubi‘s interpretation of a Qur‘anic verse (2: 20) on the matter of imamah …this verse 
states that having an imam and Khalifah (caliph) to be heard and obeyed and to reconcile opinions and implement it, 
through Khilafah, and the laws on Khilafah. There is no dispute on this obligation among the ummah and the imams 
except what was narrated by al-Asham…’ He said, ‘if the necessity to have an imam is not a duty for the Quraysh 
and others, why was there discussion and debate about imaamah? Indeed people would say: Imaamah is not a duty 
for Quraysh and others, why did unnecessarily you debate on something that is not a duty? He then said, ‘Therefore 
it has been decided that imamah is a duty based on sharia, not logic. And this is very clear. (HT, 20 June, 2009)   
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hereditary rule, and things will be as Allah wishes them to be. Then He will end it 
if He wishes to end it. Then there will be an oppressive rule, and things will be as 
Allah wishes them to be. Then he will end it if He wishes to end it. Then there will 
be khilafah according to the method of prophet hood (ibid 2000:116). 
 
In reference to this hadith, HT asserts that oppression against the da‘wah movements is 
indicative of the near coming of the khilafah. It holds the belief that the Prophet has foretold that 
there will be a period of hereditary or tyrant rule before the return of the Khilafah.  Further, it 
cites messianic prophecies mentioning that the Khilafah will return before the end of the world 
as a culmination of the battle between the followers of God and Disbelievers. More specifically it 
believes that the Prophet predicted that the Khilafah will arise again from Bait al-Maqdis (al-
Quds) in Palestine (Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain 2000: 117). 
 
Answering those who downplay the Khilafah ideal as utopian, HT claims that the inevitable 
return of the Khilafah is not only recorded in prophecies, but has also has been admitted by 
Western scholars and intelligence agencies. It repeats arguments about the endless effort of the 
West to destroy and prevent the return of Khilafah as an indication of their fear of its return to 
revive Muslim dominance. After the fall of communism, HT accuses the West of seeing the 
return of the Khilafah as the most serious threat to Capitalism. HTB’s most recent argument to 
justify this claim refers to a report of the US-based National Intelligent Council (NIC) which 
discusses the return of a new caliph as a scenario for a future world.15 
                                                          
15 The report says the rise a new caliph‘ is one of four worst scenarios in 2020, including the expansion of US-
dominated world (Pax-Americana), a world led by China and India, and a world dominated by the proliferation of 
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To strengthen this cause, HT argues that Islam has provided a complete political order to replace 
democracy and other secular systems. HT proposes a draft constitution for a Khilafah state that 
adopts the principles outlined in al-Nabhani‘s book ‘Nidhaam al-Islam’ (The System of Islam, 
2002). It also published books about different aspects of the Khilafah system. 
 
While the Khilafah message is the hallmark of HT, it is not the only unique character of HT. It is 
also unique in that it offers a revolutionary strategy that it claims is an alternative to the failure of 
Islamic movements.  
 
 
2.4. The Theory of Change: Reviving Islam as a Political Ideology 
Nabhani's theory of change underlies the profound roles of Muslim intellectual stagnancy and 
corruption leading to the fall of the Khilafah. This intellectual problem takes the form of the 
Muslim inability to understand the nature of true Islamic thought (fikrah), methods to implement 
this Islamic thought (tariqah) and the interconnection between them. The fikrah is a 
comprehensive description of the relations between life, the universe and God. Such an 
understanding necessitates the view that all aspects of life are controlled and directed by the laws 
of God. The true Islamic fikrah will show that the laws of God provide extensive solutions for all 
the problems of humanity. The tariqah is the method of implementing the laws of God in 
managing human life. The combination of fikrah and tariqah forms ideology (mabda).16 Based 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
weaponry and terrorism. Although, the report does suggest that in any of these scenarios the US will remain 
dominant (National Intelligence Council: 2004: 83). 
 
16 HT‘s translation of ‘mabda‘ into ideology is similar to the popular concept of ideology as a comprehensive set of 
ideas, worldview or goals of how society should work and provides foundations for political and social action 
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on this argument, the task of HT is to rehabilitate the true understanding of fikrah and tariqah, 
signify their interconnectedness and their combination as an ideology (Nabhani 2001b: 4).  
 
Underscoring the cultural authenticity of Islam thus ‘ideologized’, Nabhani consistently referred 
to it by the Arabic term ‘mabda’, repudiating the Arabic version of the European term 
(idiyulujiyya). His exposition of this ideology nevertheless betrayed the influence of Western 
rationalist, materialist and scientific traditions. The entire exposition assumed a syllogistic 
framework, with the definition of what constitutes a correct ideology prefacing the discussion of 
Islam and its rivals; the inference being that Islamic ideology is uniquely correct. 
 
As noted above, understanding Islam as an ideology is crucial to HT‘s narration because it sees 
the Western intellectual and cultural invasion as a ‘war of ideas’ that succeeded in stealing the 
ideological character of Islam. This ‘de-ideologsized’ Islam takes the form of a partial 
understanding of Islam, which separates religion from the state.17 As a part of the Western 
offensive against Islam, Muslims are driven to accept the division between an Islamic court 
(sharia) that deals only with family issues and a civic court (nizami) that administers all other 
aspects of life. Islam as a complete system manages all affairs of human life is erased from the 
Muslim mind. The ummah is taught to see Islam only as a religious or spiritual matter. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(Blackburn 2005: 178) . By using this conception, HT draws Muslim attention to Islam as a political ideology, rather 
than as merely spiritual and social teachings.  
 
17 Nabhani criticised the West for erroneously characterizing and generalizing all religion and Islam in particular 
based on the very unique experience of Christianity in Europe (ibid: 38-45). Nabhani concluded that for this reason 
although the European nations embraced Christianity it was unable to unify them because it lacked a system. Rather 
it was the ideology of capitalism which unified them. However, it (Capitalism) was not a derivative of Christianity 
even though the European nations had embraced it. (2002:38:45) 
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ideological perspective, seen as the élan vital of Islam, is buried by the corrupted ideas of an 
anti-Islamic colonial power (Nabhani 2002: 58). 
 
To deal with this intellectual invasion, the task of HT is therefore to assume the intellectual 
leadership of Islam (al-qiyahad al fikriyah fi al Islam) by reviving the understanding of Islam as 
an ideology (Nabhani 2002: 33). In other words, HT works on the ‘ideologization‘ of Islamic 
knowledge or the Muslim understanding of reality, and this is to teach the ummah that the 
establishment of the khilafah is a vital issue and work towards its realization is therefore urgent. 
Al-Nabhani therefore emphasizes the role of HT as an intellectual leader of the masses. Most 
commentators such as Farouki identify this as similar to Lenin‘s theory of change, Taji-Farouki 
asserts that; 
 
Al-Nabhani used the metaphor of fusing in a crucible ‘to describe how the party would 
purge the ummah‘s intellectual make-up and make it one with the party ideology. The 
early Leninist notion of the party as the elite, vanguard, educator of the masses and an 
organization of professional revolutionaries echo throughout his discussions of the 
character and role of Hizb al-Tahrir (Taji-Farouki: 1994: 372). 
 
It is further argued by some commentators such as Farouki, that Nabhani's past experience with 
the Ba‘ath party was influential in shaping this vision and that is apparent in his familiarity with 
the vanguardist model of movement reflected in the theory of change that he set out in his book 
‘Takat al-Hizb‘(Structuring a Party) that centres on the idea of ‘kutla’ (cell structure) (Nabhani 
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2001b).18 His central concern was to legitimate in Islamic terms a strategy for fundamental 
political change through the efforts of a revolutionary vanguard that originated more in his 
idealist assumptions and the conceptual world of the new generation of secular-cum 
revolutionary mass parties than in the prophetic precedent. The early Baath, with which Nabhani 
was personally acquainted, in many ways typified these new parties. The incompatibility of their 
ideological parameters notwithstanding , there are striking parallels between the strategies and 
objectives of this movement and those proposed by his own , most evident in the nature and role 
of the ‘vanguard’, and the repudiation of reform and evolution as a threat to the achievement of 
the final goal. Within a few years of his involvement in the Baath group, Nabhani seems to have 
graduated from the dominant ideology of Arab nationalism and Pan Arabism to a radical pan 
Islamism  
 
He argues that raising the awareness of the ummah requires a group of committed individuals 
(vanguard) who will work as a group or party. The vanguard will form a first cell that will 
assume an intellectual leadership in the ummah by moulding public opinion in favour of the 
party ideology. The primary character of the vanguard is the ability to understand and present 
realities from an ideological perspective a commitment to maintain the purity of the party 
ideology, and sensitivity to the potential of foreign to pose obstacles to the realization of the 
                                                          
18 HT members dismiss the claim that Nabhani’s ideas on structuring were influenced by Baathism or Leninism. 
Instead they point out that there are some universal principles concerning what is society, its change and the nature 
of its structure which are apparent in the political programme of the Prophet Mohammed from which the ideas are 
sourced. They contend that the understanding of these stages is not particular to HT as they can be found in the 
classical biography of the Prophet Mohammed See Ibn Ishaq ‘The Life of Mohammed (translated by A, Guillame, 
2002edn), S. Mubarkpuri, S. ‘Ar-Raheeq al Makhtum’, ‘The Sealed Nectar Salam’ (2002). However, the specific 
‘ijtihad’ which allows for HT’s adoption of the Prophet Mohammed’s seerah is the understanding that after the 
collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate, Islam ceased to exist as a society, system and state which made the reality 
analogous to the time of the Prophet Mohammed. HT argues that since Islam has obligated Muslims to follow the 
example of the Prophet Mohammed, his actions pertaining to changing society and establishing a state are no 
exception; See Nabhani, T. Dawla Islamiya (1998). 
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party’s objective. Called fi’a muhtara mumtaza (most highly sensitive group), this vanguard 
needs the ability to present a clear elaboration of the party‘s ideology. With commitment, 
consistency, and ideological purity, the vanguard forms the first cell (al-khalqah al-ula) which 
will develop into a party (al-kutla al-hizbiyah). Al-Nabhani believes that the multiplication of 
this process will eventually create a new awareness in society that will challenge the legitimacy 
of the existing order. He suggests that like a living organism this process will eventually develop 
into an embryonic force that cannot be blocked even by a powerful and repressive regime (an-
Nabhani 2001b: 26-32). 
 
Fig.2.3 Heriachical structure of HT’s organization  
 
The focus on this task of preparing vanguards is important for the future mobilization that will 
the movement to seize power and initiate total change. The movement should not be distracted 
with attempts at making gradual or partial changes; it only accepts a comprehensive and 
immediate application of Islamic law, and without delay, postponement or graduation. HT argues 
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that a, ‘gradual implementation contradicts the rules of Islam totally, and it renders those who 
implement some of the rules and abandon some of the rules, sinful before God, whether they 
were individuals, groups or a State (Hizb ut-Tahrir 2001: 268.) 
 
Arguing against a gradual approach to change, Nabhani sees the problem faced by Muslim 
societies as fundamental and therefore the only solution is a fundamental or systemic change 
(inqilab shamil). He believes that the change toward the revival of the ummah must start from 
changing the present system of unbelief. As cited by Taji-Farouki (1996: 76), Nabhani proposed 
this revolutionary vision as a critique to the reformist movements in Muslim societies. He wrote: 
 
The Islamic world today is a Domain of Unbelief, having abandoned Islamic 
government. Consequently most Muslims view it as corrupted, and hold that it is 
in need for reform. However, reform signifies eliminating corruption from 
prevailing situation. This is inappropriate because the Islamic world really needs a 
comprehensive and radical transformation (inqilab shamil) that will eradicate the 
rule of unbelief and strive to establish Islamic government: reform actually 
perpetuates the corruption‖ (al-Nabhani, 1953: 45). 
 
Al-Nabhani sees the state and its system as an entity that consists of various elements; and 
therefore efforts to oppose the system should be carried out by an equal entity – by society as a 
whole.19 He believes that it is a change of society that will change the individual, not the reverse. 
                                                          
19 Nabhani rejects both communist (materialist) and capitalist (individualist) conceptions/definitions of society as 
accruing from their specific ideological premises and not from rational observation. He argues that in order for a 
society to come into existence and separate it from a group of individuals, there must be the following elements (1) a 
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In his words, ‘Reforming the society will lead to reform of the individual constantly’ (Nabhani 
2001a: 61). To illustrate the primacy of society in his theory of change, al-Nabhani uses a 
metaphor of a boiling kettle: 
 
Society is similar to water in a large kettle; if anything that causes the temperature 
to drop is placed beneath the kettle then the water freezes and transforms to ice. 
Similarly, if corrupted ideologies are introduced into the society then it would 
freeze in corruption and continue in deterioration and decline. However, if a 
contradictory ideology were introduced into society, then contradictions would 
appear in it, and the society would struggle with these contradictions and 
instability will prevail. However if flaming heat was put under the kettle, the water 
would warm and then boil and effuse an intense stirring vapor. Similarly, if the 
correct ideology was introduced into the society it would be a flame whose heat 
would transform the society to boiling point and then to a dynamic force… 
(Ideology) is the fire and light which will burn and enlighten, know that society is 
in a state of transformation and it will definitely reach boiling point and the points 
of movement and dynamism (an-Nabhani 2001a: 62). 
 
Even though the role of the masses is important, HT is aware it cannot move a large mass of 
people because this limits its role to that of a ‘political educator’ rather than a social activist. HT 
therefore seeks to bypass the road toward mass influence by approaching elites within Muslim 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
collection of individuals (2) collective thoughts and emotions (public opinion) and (3) a system. If any of these 
elements are missing then the group is merely a collection of individuals with no permanent relationships which 
cannot constitute a society (2002:49). Therefore the individual was part of a whole which not only influenced it but 
checked its behavior. 
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societies. Once HT has gained the leadership of the elite then it seeks to draw the masses into its 
ideology and programmes until it is ready to explode; HT will then lead a revolutionary 
movement to establish the Khilafah. 
 
 
2.5. The Strategy for Change: Mobilizing Political Detachment 
HT‘s heavy emphasis on intellectual struggle is not without practical outcomes. The significance 
of intellectual work to educate the ummah lies in the goal of creating a political instability that 
will justify HT‘s campaign for systemic change. The education of the people is part of the goal 
of undermining the legitimacy of the existing political order. To achieve this goal, HT rejects 
violent methods and instead advocates the strategy of political detachment. 
 
This orientation is encapsulated in several key concepts on the conduct of the relationship with 
the state, including ‘kasyf al-khuttath, ‘(exposing the failures of the rulers) (Nabhani 1958: 5), 
‘dharb al-„alaqah’ (attacking existing bonds in societies and between societies and the state) 
(ibid: 3-5) and ‘mufaroqoh‘(separation [between societies and government]) (Al-Wa'ie 6: 12-16). 
These doctrines are based on an understanding that a society consists of ideas (mafahim), rules 
(maqayis) and a submissive attitude toward rules (qan’aat). The combination of these three 
elements forms a system, which requires implementation by a ruler and submission from the 
people. It is believed that the key to destroying the system is therefore eliminating the consent or 
submission (wal’a) of the people to the other two elements of the state, the political system and 
the ruler (Al-Wa’ie 58: 42). The following paragraph in HT‘s training manual, Dukhul al-
Mujtama (Entering Society) (Hizb ut Tahrir 1953), elaborates this strategic vision: 
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[the activities of the party are aimed at] attacking all forms of interaction in 
societies in order to influence their relationships is not enough; but all interactions 
between rulers and their people have to be shaken with a full strength...in this way 
it can influence all forms of relationship in societies...as long as the hand that hold 
power to rule societies is not beaten in full strength and in a continuous way, 
societies will not understand their failures and the necessity for 
changes...Therefore it is imperative for party members to focus on attacking all 
forms of relationship between rulers and their people (Hizb al-Tahrir 1958: 3). 
 
More practically this vision is further elaborated in a book published by HT that equals Lenin‘s 
‘What is To Be Done’ entitled ‘The Method of Hizb al-Tahrir for Change’. The central themes of 
the book include the principles of non-cooperation and non-participation. 
 
The strategy of non-cooperation is reflected in HT‘s emphasis on political activity and its 
principle of rejection to undertake social activities because they are seen as strengthening the 
legitimacy of the existing system. HT criticizes Islamic movements that focus on social and 
spiritual goals (Hizb ut Tahrir 1999: 31). This refers to groups that aim to improve the status of 
Muslim societies in non-political areas like education, social service, morality, and spirituality. 
Although this argument does not make reference to specific Muslim groups, this characterization 
could be applied to Muslim social organizations. These include, for example, the Salafis' and 
Wahabis who focus on reforming Muslim belief (aqidah) and Muslim social organizations like 
Ikhwan al Muslimeen in Egypt, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah in Indonesia that operate 
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in spiritual, social and educational domains. For HT, the absence of political orientation makes 
them uncritical of the established non-Islamic system. It sees Muslim activities in these non-
political sectors as not helpful in uprooting the existing secular system. This is reflected in its 
policy not to help them to create economic, educational, social or moral reforms. This is because 
to provide this type of service is a form of support to tyrants and helps prolong the life of their 
corrupt and un-Islamic system (Hizb ut Tahrir 1999: 31). 
 
Parallel with this non-cooperation doctrine, HT advocates the path of non-participation in both 
government and parliament. Even though HT declares itself to be a political party, its opposition 
to the present system leads to non-parliamentary activism. It considers participation in a non-
Islamic system as a trap that will only strengthen the status quo. Except in a few cases in its early 
stage when a few HT leaders ran for parliamentary elections in Jordan, extra-parliamentary 
activism has been a dominant feature of HT. The book that specifically elaborates this strategy of 
the organization clearly sets out this principle, ‘The party also does not accept participation in the 
ruling system of the government, because it is based on the ruling of Kufr (disbelief), and this is 
a matter that is forbidden for Muslims (ibid 1999: 23). 
 
Likewise, participation in elections and the legislative process are considered a justification of 
the existing infidel system. A book on the method of HT published by HT in Britain states that; 
 
 [i]t should be clear that any attempt at utilising the democratic structures that currently 
exist either through holding ministerial posts in governments that ruled by Kufr would be 
prohibited…Similarly putting forth bills that attempt to apply some aspects of the Sharia 
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rules and then voting on them would definitely be prohibited as this would be making the 
decision of man sovereign over the Hukm (law) of Allah (ibid 1999: 23) 
 
To implement these principles, Nabhani emphasized the importance of an uncompromising 
stance in order to maintain the purity of ideology. Any slight deviation is considered dangerous 
for the movement. Such a stance is essential because, in HT‘s view, the influence of the Western 
intellectual and cultural invasion into the Muslim world is acute. The most serious threat to the 
purity of its ideology, according to Nabhani, is the argument coming from those who claim to 
work for the application of Islamic laws but have fallen into the trap of the reformist approach 
promoted by the enemies of Islam. HT sees the temptation to adopt this reformist approach as an 
intellectual corruption planted by the West to detract Muslim attention from its most important 
goal of resurrecting the Khilafah (Nabhani 2002: 74). 
 
A helpful way to understand this confrontational principle is to compare it to the theory of 
‘minority influence’ proposed by social psychology theorist, Serge Moscovi. In contrast to the 
conformist view that influence flows from majority to minority, Moscovici argues that a 
consistent or uncompromising stance has the potential to exert influence on the majority. The 
minority group has the ability to change the majority group if members of a minority group have 
an agreed viewpoint (synchronic consistency) and maintain this in a determined manner. By 
being active and vocal, the minority group makes its presence felt and by being visible with an 
uncompromising stance it will create instability and conflict. The majority, faced with this 
‘stubborn ‘radical minority, will inevitably realize the necessity to negotiate with the minority in 
an effort to maintain harmony and stability. However, a consistent stance by the minority will 
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block the effort for negotiation. In this situation, Moscovici argues that restructuring the majority 
view in conformity with the minority group will take place. Members of the majority will make 
an unconscious shift toward the minority side (Moscovici: 1976). 
 
Parallel with Moscovici‘s notion of synchronic consistency, Nabhani uses the term 
‘stubbornness’ to describe the characteristic of HT activists, especially in dealing with opposing 
groups. This paragraph from Nabhani clearly commands a non-compromising stance: 
 
It is obligatory that the da‘wah be open and challenges everything, the customs and 
traditions, the incorrect thoughts and the distorted concepts; challenging even the public 
opinion if it is wrong, even if it has to struggle against it; challenging the false creeds and 
the false deens (ideologies) regardless of the stubbornness and bigotry of their adherents. 
Therefore, the da‘wah based on the Islamic aqeedah, is distinguished by frankness, daring, 
strength, thought and the challenge to everything that disagrees with the Fikrah and the 
Tareekah and exposing their fallacy, irrespective of the consequences and circumstances 
and of whether the ideology agrees or disagrees with the masses, and whether the people 
accept, reject or oppose it. The carrier of the da‘wah does not flatter the people, nor 
compromise with them. He does not praise the ruler or influential people in the society, 
nor does he court them, rather he adheres to the ideology and to it alone, without giving 
any account for anything else (Nabhani 2002: 74). 
 
Nabhani warns HT members that temptation to compromise can come from two factors; first the 
desire for security in relation to the ruler, both in the effort to avoid repression or to satisfy 
worldly interest, and second, to pursue gradual or partial change. He reminds his followers that 
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HT will only be satisfied by the immediate and total transformation of the secular system into an 
Islamic system. Nabhani teaches that: 
 
Delivering the da‘wah requires a concern for a complete implementation for the rules of 
Islam without the slightest concession. The carrier does not accept any truce nor 
concession, negligence or postponement. Instead, he maintains the matter as a whole and 
definitely settles it immediatel[y] (ibid 2002: 75-76) 
 
He is aware that this uncompromising stance will potentially cause tension not only in relation to 
the state, but also in relation to society. In relation to society, he anticipates two difficult options: 
consistency in facing the anger of the ummah or deviation to avoid this anger (Nabhani 1953: 50-
51). Nabhani argues that both options are dangerous and suggests dealing with the situation by 
holding onto the ideology of HT alone: 
 
It is imperative for the hizb members to adhere to ideology alone even though the hizb will 
be subject to ummah‘s resentment. But this resentment is temporary; the hizb’s 
consistency will win the ummah. There should be no deviation, even slightly. Ideology is 
the life of the hizb and its guarantor of survival. (The party) always make the hizb’s points 
clear, exposing the colonialist plots, and remain populist (Nabhani 2001b: 48; see the 
Arabic version in Nabhani 1953: 51). 
 
2.6. Actions toward Change: Six-fold Agenda 
HT sets out a framework of action that categorizes its activities into six objectives; 
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1. Concentrated education (tathqif murokkaz), which is aimed at recruiting new members 
(shabab). This programme is carried out through study circles or training programmes that target 
limited audience from Muslim communities. 
 
2. Educating the masses (tathqif jam’a) to create public awareness of the necessity of the khilafah 
and to develop sympathy with the organization. 
 
3. Intellectual struggle (shir al-fikr) to challenge ideas or thoughts in society that are deemed 
harmful to the goal of resurrecting the khilafah. 
 
4. Political struggle (kifa siyasi) to undermine an un-Islamic system both in kufr or Muslim 
countries. This political struggle is not limited to challenging the intellectual aspect of the state, 
but also refers to challenging military, economic and political structures. 
 
5. Caring for the affairs of Muslim societies (tabanni masalih al-ummah), which means 
presenting Islamic solutions on issues of the interests to the ummah in a way that confronts them 
with the policies of the existing government. 
 
6. Seeking support (thalab al-nusrah) that is aimed at securing political support and protection 
from powerful men, including elites in societies and most prominently military when they are 
opposed to the ideology of HTI (Hizb ut Tahrir 1999: 29-35) 
 
83 
 
This six fold agenda serves the double moves envisaged in Nabhani‘s notions of ‘dharb al-
‘alaqah‘(literally’ breaking the relationship‘) (Nabhani 1958: 3-5) and ’kasyf al-
khuttah‘(challenging the rulers) (al-Nabhani 1958: 5).’ Dharb al alaqah’ can be considered 
moves towards society aimed at breaking their loyalty to the state and the kasyf al-khuttath 
represents the move against the state in the form of exposing the inherent failures of the 
government and the political structure in general. 
 
The relationships between these double moves with the above six categories or agendas are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive; they overlap and are interconnected. Nonetheless, this 
categorization gives a perspective for understanding the roles of the different types of HT’s 
activities in the ‘majaal’ (area of seeking power, see Chapter 3). In this picture, the agendas of 
concentrated education (tathqif murakkaz), public education (tathqif jama) and caring for the 
issues of the ummah (tabanni masalah al-ummah) primarily serve the move toward social 
mobilization against the state (dharb al alaqah) while intellectual struggle (shira al-fikr) and 
political struggle (kifah siyasi) are primarily aimed at attacking the legitimacy of the state (kasf 
al-khuttath). Both of these moves are mutually interdependent. At the intersection between these 
double moves lies the endeavour to seek support (thalab al-nusrah) from elites in society and the 
leadership of the state (ahl al-quwah). Success means gaining support from elites in societies that 
may foster mass mobilization. Support from elites in the state would deter the ability of the state 
to repress the opposition and eventually start a political crisis. Figure 2.4 below illustrates the 
places of HT‘s plan of action in its strategy. 
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Figure 2.4   HT‘s Plan for Revolutionary Action 
 
This outcome is similar to what Charles Tilly calls ‘revolutionary situations,‘ which are 
characterized by three conditions: the appearance of contenders competing to control the state, 
commitments to the claims by a significant section of the population, and the inability of the 
state to deal effectively with the first and second conditions (Tilly 1978: 192). HT seeks to create 
these situations by uprooting the legitimacy of the established political system, mobilizing non-
participation, and presenting itself as a legitimate and potential contender. In the process of 
creating these revolutionary situations, HT seeks to secure political support or protection from 
powerful elites (ahl al-quwwah), especially from the military to back the force of change. 
 
Each of the six agendas of HT has its role, which can be categorized into two aims. The first aim 
includes programmes to educate the people that consists of public education (tathqif jama‟i), 
intellectual opposition (shira al-fikr), political opposition (kifah siyasi), and using key social 
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issues to demonstrate government failures (tabanni masalih al-ummah). These endeavors may 
bring about (a) mass opposition against the system and (b) political detachment (non-
participation and non-cooperation). The second aim includes programmes that target a specific 
audience and include concentrated education (tathqif murakkaz) that can (c) increase the number 
of members and therefore strengthen its role as the leader of political contention; and seek 
support (thalab al-nusrah) for the purpose of (d) mobilizing backing from powerful leaders. In a 
situation of political crisis resulting from the existing system, HT seeks to play a leading role in 
initiating a political transition from democracy to khilafah. Figure 2.4 above illustrates the roles 
of HT‘s plan of action in promoting a revolutionary change. 
Figure 2.5 HT‘s Plan of Action for Promoting Revolutionary Change 
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2.7. The Process of Change: Nusrah and Non-violent Transfer of Power 
HT sets out three stages of change. It starts with the formative period (tathqif) in which it 
produces core activists. The main agenda at this stage is running unpublicized or clandestine 
study circles. After gaining sufficient activists, HT moves toward an open campaign or public 
education (tafa’ul ma’a al-ummah). The objective in this period is to encourage the public to 
oppose the existing system and enable HT to establish an influential position in society and to 
secure support or protection from powerful elites. In the final stage, HT looks to seize power. It 
believes that in revolutionary situations when the established political system has lost legitimacy 
and political crisis is taking place, power-holders will voluntarily submit to the force of change 
led by a popular political leadership (HT), which is supported by the masses and backed by 
powerful elites, especially the military. In this way a political transition toward the installation of 
the Khilafah (istilam al-hukm) can take place in an extraordinary (extra-parliamentary) process 
like the Egyptian revolution in February 2011. 
 
This idealistic vision has however not materialised leading to some changes in practice without a 
change in the theory (see Chapters 3 and 4). The leaders of HT had attempted to bypass this long 
process by inviting individual Muslim regimes to establish a khilafah government in their 
respective countries, and eventually serve as a point of expansion. This strategy was used in 
1979 when the party leadership proposed a caliph position for the Iranian leader Ayatollah 
Khomeini who ignored the offer (Taji-Farouki: 1996: 31). HT also attempted to persuade Libya‘s 
leader, Mu‘ammar Qadafi, to adopt the Khilafah but he responded to the call by sending HT 
activists in Libya to prison (see Chapter 3). 
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There is some confusion amongst commentators on HT concerning the possible form of political 
transition sought by HT through a coup. This is reflected in HT‘s emphasis on thalab al-nusrah 
(seeking support from powerful elites) as an ideal process for political change. This vision is also 
confirmed by the fact that al-Nabhani has taken part in several coup attempts during his life, 
including plots to overthrow the Jordanian regime in 1968, 1969 and 1971 and against authorities 
in Southern Iran in 1972 (Taji-Farouki: 1996: 27-28, see chapter 3). Nabhani added this as a 
parallel dimension to the idealist people’s revolution because he argued that the military were in 
actual fact the real power in the Middle Eastern countries. Without this, any attempt to seize 
power would be unsustainable and, more critically, would likely lead to a rupture between the 
military and civilians leading to possible civil war as in the case of Algeria in the 1990s’ and the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s experience in Egypt after the removal of President Morsi in 2013.  While 
the options for the process of political transition can be postponed until the movement is ready to 
launch an attempt at seizing power, the focus of HT at this time is on creating the prerequisites 
for revolutionary situations, as discussed above. 
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Figure 2.6 HT's three stage programme of societal transformation 
 
Conclusion 
HT is overwhelmingly the chief global carrier of the revolutionary doctrines of Taqiudine an-
Nabhani. The foremost revolutionary character of HT is its call for the establishment of a 
universal government of khilafah. This represents HT‘s challenge to other Islamists movements 
that participate in the existing ‘un-Islamic’ system. HT opposes a reformist or (islahi) or a 
gradual (tadarruj) approach for change. Its doctrine teaches that only an immediate and total 
change (inqilab shamil) is acceptable. 
 
HT‘s strategy for revolution is however dissimilar to the conventional model of revolution that 
advocates the use of violence to bring the state down. As an alternative to violence, HT focuses 
on the strategies of non-cooperation and non-participation in order to uproot the existing political 
system and to undermine the state. For this purpose HT applies a double-move strategy. On the 
one hand, it works to educate the masses about the failures of the state and provoke political 
opposition and detachment (dharb al-alaqoh). As an integral part of this move, HT seeks to 
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establish an influential position in society to prepare a future role in political mobilization. On 
the other hand, HT works to undermine the legitimacy of the state by exposing its failures and 
danger (kasyf al-khuttath). 
 
HT‘s theory of change emphasizes the importance of changing societies — rather than changing 
individuals – in order to delegitimize the existing system. It assumes that by provoking mass 
opposition it will be able to persuade the power-holders to co-operate with the demand for 
fundamental change. HT envisages a revolution from above. At the end of the day, it believes 
that it will be powerful people who will play the critical role in facilitating fundamental change. 
Therefore, HT emphasizes the agenda of thalab al-nusrah (seeking support) to find a political 
patron and secure backing from elites in society and the state, especially the military. This vision 
by implication leads to the coup model for political change. However, HT believes that by 
combining social mobilization against the existing political system and securing support from 
powerful elites it can achieve a peaceful transition toward the establishment of the khilafah. 
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Chapter 3 
The Majaal: Understanding and Locating the Existential Threat 
 
This chapter examines HT’s conception of the majaal or the place where it targets the immediate 
establishment of the Caliphate and therefore forms an immediate and existential threat to the 
political security of these countries. In contrast to the non-majaal areas discussed in chapters (3, 
4 and 5), the securitization moves against HT in these countries have been a direct response to 
the existential threat posed by HT’s strategy to mobilize a popular base and actively attempt 
military coups or popular revolutions in order to overthrow the prevailing system and its 
leadership.  Therefore in order to understand the nature of HT’s securitization outside of its 
majaal as discussed in the subsequent studies, this chapter provides HT’s framework for 
allocating its majaal and the reasons as to why only in this domain it forms an ‘objective’ 
existential threat to state and sovereignty.   
This chapter breaks from the conventional literature on HT which fails to highlight the critical 
difference between the objectives of HT in the majaal and non- majaal and consequently mis-
reads its global activism through a blanket application of its three stage approach (see chapter 1) 
onto the non-majaal areas. Accordingly, the framework allows us to also explore and analyze the 
effect on HT and the security environment ensuing from the historic changes in the Middle East 
in 2011, popularly known as the Arab spring. 
The study of HT’s securitization in the Middle East prior to the Arab spring provides a unique 
but difficult case study in that the ‘speech act’ has been absent on the part of the regimes in the 
region despite the movement’s proscription. Instead the regimes chose to keep the discussion of 
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HT out of the political debate and avoided the use of the speech act. The authoritarian nature of 
the regimes meant that legitimacy was largely derived from the military and security forces, 
which, as the actual power base in the Middle Eastern countries communicated their agreement 
with the regime through the security apparatus and applied via the securitization of the body (see 
chapter 1).20 Therefore the securitization ‘move’ against HT is derived largely from the actions 
taken to proscribe, imprison, torture and attempted elimination of the members and the 
movement. Also because of a virtual media blackout of HT’s activism in the Middle East pre-
Arab spring by local, Western and other media concerns, the material is largely derived from the 
field work and internal documentation published by Suha Taji Farouki and from HT’s own 
sources and accounts. 
 
The referent object in the case of the majaal is what Buzan, Waever and Wilde (BWW) term as 
‘political security’ (see chapter 1). This refers to the organization stability of social order (s) the 
core of which consists of non- military threats to state sovereignty (1998:141). Political threats 
are essentially about endorsing or denying legitimacy, support or recognition and hence why it is 
possible to identify threats which are purely political in nature as opposed to military, economic 
or environmental etc. As we shall see, in the case of HT’s conception of the majaal the threat is 
very much to the organizational stability of the regimes with a history of using military means 
                                                          
20 The robust nature of authoritarian control in the Middle East and North Africa was defined largely by the totality 
of state and elite control over the economy, security apparatus and the weakness of civil structures. At the time of 
writing this chapter, the events of the Arab pring remain in flux and the transitions in the countries remain mired in 
the legacy left by the previous regimes. For an understanding of the legacy see Eva Beilin, The Robustness of 
Authoritarianism in the Middle East- Exceptionalism in Comparative perspective, Comparative Politics, 36:2, (Jan. 
2004) pp.139-157, Stephen, J. King, Sustaining Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa, Political 
Science Quarterly, 122:3 (Fall 2007), pp433-459, Stephen, J. King (2009) The New Authoritarianism in the Middle 
East and North Africa, Indiana: Indiana Press and Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michele Penner Angris (2005) 
Authoritarianism in the Middle East-Regimes and Resistance, US: Lyn Reinner Publications. 
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(coup d’état) in weak states. Prior to the Arab spring in 2011, the governments being largely 
authoritarian in nature did not succeed in the securitization of HT through normal politics as in 
democratic societies because its discussion was kept out of the political domain and popular 
legitimacy for the securitization move was not provided. Despite this, the securitization moves 
were successful outside of ‘normal politics’ because of the legitimacy conferred to the regimes 
by the support of the security services and armed forces.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Securitization model for HT in the Middle East pre- Arab spring 
 
With the rise of Islamist forces in Palestine (Hamas)21 and their dominance in the post Arab 
                                                          
21 Hamas or Islamic Resistance Movement is a branch of the MB and emerged in Palestine during the intifada 
(uprising) against Israeli occupation in the 1980s. In 1996, Hamas won the elections in the Palestinian territories but 
due to their refusal to drop the method of violence and its opposition to the existence of Israel embedded in its 
charter, the elections results were not recognised by the international community. Instead, Fatah formerly the 
Palestinian Liberation Movement (PLO) has been instituted as the official interlocutor for ‘peace’ talks with Israel. 
Consequently, tension has remained high between Hamas and Fatah with clashes between their supporters 
frequently breaking out resulting in a division of governance with Hamas occupying Gaza and Fatah the West Bank, 
see Shaul Mishal and Avraham Seal (2006) The Palestinian Hamas- Vision, Violence and Coexistence, 
NY:Columbia University Press, also Khalid Hroub, A ‘New Hamas’-Through its New Documents, 35:4 (Summer 
93 
 
spring (MB in Egypt22 and the Enahda party23 in Tunisia), although the essence of the security 
threat has not changed, it remains to be seen as to whether the Islamist dominated regimes who 
have largely rejected HT’s Caliphal objectives in Egypt and Tunisia will move HT into the 
political domain and attempt a successful move towards the party’s securitization through 
popular legitimacy. Or, will they fall back on the security services, the precedent for which as the 
chapter will discuss has been set by Hamas and Fatah in the Palestinian territories because of the 
threat to their legitimacy as a consequence of their converging position towards relations with 
Israel and the deliverance of Islamic governance. 
 
The first section of this chapter will discuss HT’s conception of what constitutes the majaal. Due 
to the confusion in the discourse over the original theory of majaal especially in relation to HT’s 
activism in countries outside of the Middle East in the post Nabhani era, the ideas of HT will be 
referred to as Nabhani’s as he is listed as the original author. The second section will look at the 
development, activism and securitization of HT in the Middle East pre-Arab spring 2011. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2006), pp.6-27, Muhammed Maqdsi, Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) of Palestine, Journal 
Palestine Studies, 22:4 (Summer, 1993), pp122-134. 
 
22 In post Hosni Mubarak Egypt, the MB has emerged as the strongest and most organised movement with its 
unofficial candidate in the MB backed Freedom and Justice Party achieving victory in the first elections held since 
the transition in June 2012. However, the Egyptian military refused to relinquish power and dissolved Parliament.  
At the time of writing this chapter, the political programme of the MB influenced Mohammed al Morsi remains 
unclear and the situation between the Egyptian Military and the MB remains tense and unresolved, for an 
understanding of the transition see Muhammed Zahid (2012) The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s Succession 
Crisis- The Politics of Liberalisation and Reform in the Middle East, London: I.B.Tauris and Tarek Osman (2011) 
Egypt on the Brink – From Nasser to Mubarak, US: Yale University Press.  
 
23 Enhada or Renaissance Party emerged in Tunisia in 1989 under the leadership of Rachid al Ghanoushi. Although 
various commentators have tried to label it as extremist etc, the stated position of its leadership is ardently secular. 
During the process of coming to power on the wave of the Arab spring in 2011, Rachid Ghanoushi confirmed his 
opposition to the Caliphate and the role of sharia in state and society. The goal was for Tunisia was to be a ‘civic 
state not a religious state’. For an analysis of Enahda’s ideas and transition to power in post Ben Ali Tunisia see 
Alfred Stepan, Tunisia’s Transition and the Twin Tolerations, Journal of Democracy, 23:2 (April 2012) pp.89-103 
and Fatima El-Issawi (May 2012), After the Arab Spring: Power  Shift in the Middle East?- The Tunisian 
Transition: The Evolving Face of the Second Republic, LSE Ideas, pp18-22  
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third section will look at the changes in the Palestinian territories as a possible indicator of HT’s 
securitization in other Middle Eastern countries in the post Arab spring.  
 
3.1 Defining the Majaal – Linking Ideology with Geography  
The majaal is technically the society, area or region originally allocated by HT as the most 
suitable for establishing the Islamic Caliphate. The significance of the majaal resides in the fact 
that it is the only place where the three stage process is applicable and the realm in which power 
is sought by HT in its final stage of interaction (see chapter 1).  However, the three stage process 
is not repeated in every country of the majaal. Only one or two countries are required to meet the 
criteria for fulfilling the final stage of interaction i.e. leadership over the society in terms of its 
name and ideas, and therefore military coups can be mounted in any other area which fulfils the 
conditions of the majaal (depending on the specific plan of connecting various territories 
together), even if the interaction stage (leadership of society) has not been completed in them 
(Takkatul – Party Structuring 1952).    
 
Figure 3.2 HT’s majaal and its periphery 
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The official arguments for what constitutes the majaal are laid out in HT’s book, Takkatul Hizb, 
(Party Structuring, 1952). The inseparable link between the Qur’an and the Arabic language in 
Islamic theology forms the basis of defining what is and is not the support point or the place 
where the Caliphate can be immediately established (Nabhani, 1953a).  This connection between 
language and ideology is central to HT’s formulation concerning the suitability of the society as 
well as the site for the geography pertaining to the establishment of the Caliphate. The medium 
of the Arabic language is not only deemed essential for accessing the Qur’an and other Islamic 
sources, but is also judged necessary to comprehend the nature of the Islamic message (ibid: 1). 
It is argued that the absence of the Arabic language would deprive the society access to Islam 
without which the Islamic revival cannot correctly proceed. Therefore, the work in the Arab 
speaking world is not only considered the fastest way to achieving this revival but also one 
where the Caliphate would be built on solid foundations (ibid).  
 
Figure 3.3 HT’s theory on the role of Arabic in the process of Islamic revival  
 
This ideological connectivity is not unique to HT, but is a confirmation of the classical 
theological position concerning the pivotal role of the Arab language in Islam.  Albert Hourani in 
his tract The History of the Arab Peoples (1991), demonstrates that the classical Sunni jurist 
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Muhammed ibn Idrees as Shafi (767 AD- 820 AD)24, highlighted the knowledge of Arabic as a 
fundamental precondition to understanding Islam. According to Hourani, 
 
[S]hafi quoted passages in the Quran which mentioned the fact that it had been revealed in 
Arabic: ‘We have revealed to thee an Arabic Quran…in a clear Arabic tongue’. Every 
Muslim in Shafi’s view should learn Arabic25  
 
Similarly in his book on usool (tools for extracting Islamic law), Shakhsiya Islamiya (The 
Islamic Personality Vol.3, 1963), Nabhani demonstrates in considerable detail his argument as to 
why access to the Islamic thought cannot be gained without recourse to the Arabic language, and 
why it is a fundamental condition for jurists in order to perform ijtihad (legal extraction).26 The 
pivotal role of the Arabic language to Islam was fully elaborated by HT in its communiqué to the 
Jordanian government in 1953 where it states; 
 
Regarding the Arabic language, it is a vital ingredient in Islam and is a prerequisite for 
understanding Islam. The Arabic language has the same momentum as Islam does. Its lies 
                                                          
24 Muhammad Ibn Idris as Shafi (767AD- 820 AD) was the founder of legal method in Islam and the first formal 
school of Islamic thought in Sunni Islam. The rules and tools of ijtihad or legal extraction are contained in his book, 
Ar Risala, Treatise on the Foundations of Islamic Jurisprudence (translated by Majid Khaduri, 2007). 
 
25 (1991:68). For a further understanding of the Arabic language and its relationship to Islam and the Arabs see E. 
Shouby, The Influence of the Arabic Language on the Psychology of the Arabs, Middle East Journal, 5:3 (Summer, 
1951), pp.284-302, Anwar G. Chejne (1969) The Arabic Language – Its Role in History, Minnesota: Minnesota 
Press pp.3-84, and Anwar.G. Chejne, Arabic-Its Significance in Arab-Muslim Society, Middle East Journal, 19:4 
(Autumn, 1965), pp.447-470  
 
26 Nabhani in Mefahim HT (1953a) and Shakhsiya Islamiya Vol.1 (1963) follows the understanding that classical 
ijtihad was stopped in the 10th century A.D under Ottoman rule and as a consequence juristic innovation halted and 
subsequent scholars confined themselves to taqleed (imitation) of the previous four Sunni madhab (schools) of legal 
thought. Also see Hallaq, W.B. Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed? International Journal of Middle East Studies, 16:1 
(Mar, 1984), pp3-41, for various viewpoints on whether or not ijtihad was stopped see Al Alwani T.J. The Crisis in 
Fiqh and the Methodology of Ijtihad, The American Journal of Social Sciences, 8:2 317 (1991) pp.332-335 
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in its ability to influence people, a very rich language that is able to encompass new 
words, furthermore the language has the quality of derivation. All such qualities such as 
being influential, rich and expansive exist in Islam as well. Consequently, the Arabic 
language has to be mixed with Islam... The Arabic language is a vital element in the 
da'wah. Its sciences such as grammar, morphology and eloquence are considered part of 
the Islamic culture as Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), Tafsir (commentary on the Qur’an) 
and Hadith. (HT, 1953) 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Nabhani's theory on the complementary characteristics of Islam and Arabic 
 
The inevitable conclusion for Nabhani was that the Arabic speaking world was exceptional 
because it was where Islam had naturally taken its strongest root in the past and would again do 
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so in the future.27 Therefore, priority had to be given to this region in targeting the location for 
the Caliphate. The critical point to note here is that unlike the ideological connection with the 
Arabic language, the geographical application of this link is exclusive to HT. It states; 
The entire world is suitable for the Islamic da’wah (Islamic work); however, since the 
people in the Islamic lands are Muslims, the da’wah must start there. Also, since the 
people in Arab territories (being part of the Islamic world) speak Arabic, and since 
Arabic is an essential part of Islam and its culture, the priority must be given to the Arab 
territories (2001:6)  
 
The literature refers to the place of establishment of the state as the nuqTat el-irtikaz (support 
point)28, the rationalization and practical expression of which was provided by HT in its 
communiqué to the Jordanian government in 1953. In the explanation, the specificity of the Arab 
world is categorical. HT states that; ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir makes the starting point the Arab land as 
part of the Muslim land and views the Islamic State in the Arab land as a nucleus’ (HT 
Communication, 1953). Again in the book Concepts of HT (Mefahim HT, 1953a), Nabhani 
states; 
 
Carrying the Islamic da’wah and the political struggle for its cause can be undertaken only 
                                                          
27 Nabhani in Mefahim HT (1953a) and The Islamic State (Dawla Islamiya, 1998) laments the loss of the Arabic 
language under Ottoman rule describing it as probably the key factor which leads to the Islamic world’s decline. 
Similarly in his book How the Caliphate was Destroyed (2000), Abdul Qadeem Zaloom puts forward an analysis of 
Ottoman expansion (especially in Europe) as over reliant on the material factors such as military force. He 
considered this to be ideologically disastrous as it had no regard for the weak application of Islam in those territories 
as a consequence of not enforcing the Arabic language. This is in comparison to the strength of Islam in those 
countries such as in the Middle East, where the Arabic language was applied. 
 
28 The conceptual discussion of HT’s methodology is discussed in the books Mefahim HT (1953a) and Takkatal Hizb 
(2001). The phases of the party’s political evolution and interaction with society are termed the  ‘nuqTat el-ibtidaa’ 
(starting point), nuqTat el-inTilaq (departure point) and nuqTat el-irtikaz (support point)  
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in the society which the party has defined as its area for activity (majaal). Hizb ut-Tahrir 
considers the society in all the Islamic lands to be one society because its entire cause lies 
in one case, Islam. However it takes the Arab lands that are a part of the Islamic Lands as 
a starting point. It considers the establishment of an Islamic state in the Arab countries as a 
nucleus for the Islamic state as a natural step (1953a:73) 
 
It is important to note that HT distanced itself from the idea of Arab nationalism in its argument 
concerning the Arabs, the Arabic language and the Arab world. Although this point has been 
addressed conceptually throughout HT’s literature, it was particularly instructive in its 
communiqué in 1953. HT asserts that nationalism is an alien phenomenon to Islam as it had been 
prohibited by the Prophet Mohammed in his saying, ‘leave it assabiya (nationalism), it is rotten’ 
and ‘Arabs have no superiority over Arabs but by Taqwa (piety)’ (HT Communiqué, 1953). HT 
further states that not a single ahadith (sayings of the Prophet Mohammed), which purports to 
‘praise and glorify the Arabs’ is ‘authentic’ as all of them were ‘fabricated’ when the call for 
Arab nationalism started  in the Islamic world having been implanted by the Western powers in 
order to destroy the Caliphate (ibid).  Therefore mixing the Arabic language with Islam had 
nothing to do with Arab nationalism but ‘with Islam and Islam only’.29 Cohen’s summarizes 
                                                          
29 (ibid). In the communiqué, HT argued that the idea of nationalism and in this case Arab nationalism was a 
supremacist and imperialist concept which had been used by the West to provoke Muslims to separate from the 
unitary ummah (community) under the authority of the Ottoman Caliphate. HT qualified its own understanding of 
nationalism as consistent with the classical jurists and the history of Caliphate by arguing that in order to counter 
Western efforts, the Ottoman State as ‘the Islamic State’ had banned any call for nationalism. HT argued that this 
was evident in Article III of the Ottoman Association law which had outlawed the establishment of any society or 
association based upon nationalism. According to HT, ‘[t]his article was explained in Article IV that it is unlawful to 
form political associations based upon ethnicity or race’ (ibid). For a historical perspective on the Ottoman Empires 
position on nationalism see Makkdisi, U. After 1860-Debating Religion, Reform and Nationalism in the Ottoman 
Empire, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 34 (2002), pp.601-617. In terms of the development of 
nationalist thought see Bassam Tibi (1997) Nationalism- Between Islam and the Nation State, London: Macmillan 
Press, see also Nikkie Keddie, Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism, The Journal of Modern History, 41:1(Mar, 
1969),pp.17-28. 
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HT’s position by stating that;  
 
The embryo of it (the Caliphate) was in the Arab countries, and therefore most attention 
should be directed at them. One should thus avoid any reference to the existence of 
various Arab peoples: ‘the Jordanian People’ or a ‘Palestinian People’ were all parts of an 
encompassing identity – Islam. The concept of Arab nationalism was an imperialist 
creation, an innovation antithetical to the very spirit of Islam (Cohen, 1980:228) 
 
Instead the state was defined in relation to the Dar (land), language, societal conviction in Islam and the 
belief of those providing the security. According to the understanding, it did not matter whether the 
majority of the people were Muslim or not as long as the system applied was Islamic and those protecting 
the state were Muslim.30  
 
 
Figure 3.5 HT’s Criteria for the Khilafah 
 
                                                          
30 (HTUK, 2000). This understanding is derived from the classical Sunni Hanafi school of thought and specifically 
its founder Abu Hanifa who classified Islamic society as Dar al Islam (House of Islam) for which two criteria were 
required (1) the application of the Islamic system and (2) those holding the security were Muslim. It did not matter 
whether the Muslims were in the majority. HT argues that this principle is also established by analysing the Prophet 
Mohammed’s assumption of power in Medina where the Muslims comprised a minority (ibid).  
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The ultimate objective proposed by HT is the creation of a post-national global Caliphate with 
the dominance of Islam throughout the globe. Although HT has constructed Islam as universally 
applicable, for practical reasons it has argued that, ‘Islam should be propagated universally while 
working to implement it must be confined to one or several countries until it becomes firmly 
established’ (2001:6). This premise negates what HT terms the idea that the work to revive Islam 
can be conducted globally at once; rather it must have a starting point and a specified societal (in 
practical terms geographical) focus (ibid). The work to establish the Caliphate has to be 
concentrated in a specific contained location. His restriction of this space is not absolute as it 
forms the first phase in the eventual globalization of Islam through the mechanism of the 
Caliphate. Nabhani states; 
 
Once established, the Islamic State would naturally grow until it encompasses all the 
Islamic countries. Then the state would propagate Islam to the rest of the world, because 
the Islamic State must convey the Islamic da’wah (message) as an eternal and universal 
message for all mankind (Ibid) 
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Figure 3.6 HT's conception of how the caliphate will expand 
 
The military and technological gap between the Islamic world and that of the big powers did not 
factor into Nabhani’s original conceptualization of where the actual power of the state would 
reside. This is because more than material factors, the strength of the Islamic doctrine is deemed 
sufficient for its appearance and construction (see also Nabhani’s concept of the rise and fall of 
nations Chapter 2). According to Nabhani; 
 
The establishment of the Caliphate is not like building a house, measuring and judging 
according to the material possibilities. In contrast, the Caliphate is a political entity resting 
on an intellectual basis. Wherever this entity matures it will arise naturally and inevitably, 
regardless of the site or the material conditions of the location. 31  
 
This point is instructive as regards the confusion over the widening of the majaal in the post 
                                                          
31 (HT: 1962, quoted in Farouki, 1996:103). Farouki claims the Nabhani had subsequently conformed to a more 
practical position by accepting that in addition to the ideology, the required location must possess human, military 
and economic resources, adequate enough to defend the newly established state in the event of a war of intervention 
aiming to destroy it. For this reason Jordan was initially identified as the starting location in the Arabic world, but 
due to its structural weakness, the immediate annexation of stronger Arab countries such as Syria and Iraq were 
deemed essential for the Caliphate’s survival (Farouki 1996:103). 
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Nabhani era to non-Arab countries such as Pakistan. Although, according to former members, 
HT targeted Pakistan from the 1990 onwards, because of its nuclear status and conventional 
military strength, the suggestion that HT was targeting the country as a starting point or core 
state for the Caliphate is a critical mis-reading of HT’s core philosophy on the issue despite the 
high profile activism amongst the Pakistani armed forces.32 As an example Nabhani is his book 
Mefahim Hizb ut Tahrir (1953a) asserted that the reason why the Ottoman Caliphate had 
declined was not because of technological or military inferiority.33 These were merely symptoms 
of its reliance on military power over ideological clarity brought about by the weakness in the 
                                                          
 
32  The role of Islam in Pakistan’s political apparatus remains a source of tension between those who see it as the 
natural outcome of Pakistan’s creation as an exclusively Muslim state after division from predominantly Hindu India 
in 1947 and those who claim that the founder Mohammed Ali Jinnah envisaged it as a secular entity, see Stephen P. 
Cohen (2004) The Idea of Pakistan, NY: The Brookings Institution.  Islam continues to play a major role as a 
unifying element in what is otherwise an ethnically fractious terrain. In 1979, the army staged a coup under General 
Zia-ul Haq, who set about Islamising the armed forces and society. The influence of Islam exponentially increased 
especially with the armed forces whose rank and file derive from very conservative regions. This has led to concerns 
in Western and other quarters as to the stability of the armed forces which have ruled Pakistan for most of its history 
and form the outright power in the state. As a result, the armed forces have not been immune to the influence of 
actors who desire Pakistan to be a Caliphate.  The first attempt in the army occurred in 1995, under Major General 
Zaheer ul Abbassi who attempted an overthrow of the army leadership and the elected but avowedly secular position 
of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. In the post 9/11 period, fears have grown that with the dominance of ant- 
American sentiment in the army, the influence of radical movements have also grown. It is this environment which 
HT sees as most conducive to its goal. For an understanding of the relationship between Islamic radicalism, the 
military and the state in Pakistan, see Hassan Abbas (2002), Drift into Extremism – Allah, the Army and America’s 
War on Terror, New Hale CT:Yale University Press and Zahid Hussain ( 2007) Frontline Pakistan – The Struggle 
with Militant Islam, NY: Columbia University Press. For an appraisal of HT’s development in Pakistan see Simon 
Ross Valentine, Fighting Kufr and the American Raj: Hizb ut Tahrir in Pakistan, Pakistan Security Research Unit 
(University of Bradford), 56 (12 Feb, 2010) , see also Muhammed Amir Rana, Hizb ut Tahrir in Pakistan: Discourse 
and Impact, Pak Institute for Peace Studies, (October, 2010), pp1-16 and  Masee Sharma, S. 2011. Hizb ut Tahrir 
Penetrates Pakistan Army, South Asia Tribune, [online] 11 Oct. Available at: http://southasiantribune.com/hizb-ut-
tahrirs-penetrates-pakistan-army/  [accessed 25.05.12]    
 
33 Many arguments were put forward by Muslim thinkers as to why the Caliphate had declined under the Ottoman’s. 
The gulf in military power, industrial and scientific advancement with Europe had become apparent. The reasons 
and prescriptions ranged from going back to the roots of Islam in order to revive Caliphal power to embracing 
European enlightenment. The premise of this debate and the permeation of European thought in the Muslim mindset 
are covered by Albert Hourani (1993), Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. One of the key Muslim thinkers quoted on the subject is the controversial  Jamal ad Din Afghani, 
see Nikkie Keddie (1980), An Islamic Response to Imperialism – The Political and Religious Writings of Jamal ad 
Din Al Afghani, Berkley: University of California Press, see also Nikkie Keddie, The Pan-Islamic Appeal: Afghani 
and Abdul Hamd II, Middle Eastern Studies, 3:1 (1966), pp.46-67 and Ahmed Akunduz, The Reasons of Rise and 
Decline of Ottoman State, Journal of Islam in Asia 6:2 (2009), pp.87-102. For the primary orientalist text on the 
general historical understanding of demise see Sir William Muir (1924) The Caliphate: Its Rise, Decline and Fall, 
Edinburgh: T.H. Weir. 
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Islamic thought as a consequence of severing of the Arabic from state and the adoption of the 
Turkish language in the 7th century A.D (Nabhani, 1998: 169). Unless the Arabic language along 
with the ideology was firmly rooted in the society and state, the emergent Caliphate would 
inevitably face the same outcome. Nabhani states; 
 
The reason for its (Caliphate’s) decline is due to one single factor, the severe weakness 
that destroyed the ability of the minds in understanding Islam. The cause for this weakness 
was the detachment of the capacity of the Arabic language from the capacity of Islam 
when the Arabic language was ignored both in understanding and carrying Islam from the 
beginning of the seventh century onwards. Accordingly, unless the capacity of the Arabic 
language is mixed with the capacity of Islam by making the Arabic language the language 
of Islam as a fundamental and inseparable part of it, the decline will continue to drag the 
Muslims down (Nabhani 1953: 3) 
 
 
Figure 3.7 HT's theory of the relationship between Islam and Arabic in decline and revival 
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Moreover, the necessity to establish the Caliphate in the Arab world is driven by the notion that 
perpetual expansion of Islam has to occur through the medium of the Arabic language due to the 
characteristics of both outlined above (Nabhani, 2001:6). Nabhani predicted that the Caliphate 
would initially sweep through the Arab territories in the Middle East, Gulf and North Africa 
before attempting to merge with the non-Arab Islamic world whose purity in comprehending 
Islam had been compromised by neglecting the Arabic. According to his vision; 
 
Furthermore, combining the power of the Arabic language with that of Islam is necessary, 
because each has the ability to influence, expand and propagate. Therefore, it is only 
natural for the Islamic State to be re-established in the Arab territories, so that it will serve 
as a nucleus for the Islamic State which will encompass all Islamic lands (ibid) 
 
Despite Nabhani’s dogmatism on the Middle East or Arab world, he professed that HT was not 
averse to a situation where the nusrah (material help) or support point could be achieved outside 
of its domain of influence or strategy, because ultimately it was in the hands of God. This is 
because Nabhani argued that the support point was not dependent on the strength of the Islamic 
work in any location but on the readiness of the society in terms of its adoption of the Islamic 
thought and the Caliphate. In comparing this to the Prophet Mohammed’s example, he states; 
 
The Islamic da’wah (propagation) in Makah was strong, and although it was the starting 
point (nuqTat el-ibtidaa) for the da’wah, and was also suitable to become a departure 
point – where the da’wah launched - yet it was not suitable to become a support point. 
Rather, it was Medina which became the support point (nuqTat el-irtikaz) to which the 
Messenger migrated after being satisfied with the situation in the society there. There he 
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established the state, which conveyed the strength of the da’wah to the different regions of 
the Arab peninsula and later on to the different parts of the world (1953:63) 
 
Figure 3.8 HT's correlation of its method with each stage of the Prophet’s mission 
 
Although this implies that Nabhani was open to the idea of gaining support outside the Middle 
East and Arab world, in actuality it would seemingly occur only as an accident and not as result 
of a deliberate goal or policy. According to Nabhani, ‘[w]e can say that the carriers of the 
da’wah will not know the place which would be suitable…to become a support point, nor would 
they be able to identify it, regardless of their intelligence and analysis. Only Allah is aware of 
[t]his’ (1953:64).  
 
Such a situation was presented to it in 1979. Spurred on by the events of the Iranian revolution, 
HT made an approach to Iranian leader Ruholla Khomeini. HT had seized upon the opening in 
Shiaism provided by Khomeini in his book, The Islamic Government (1983), where he 
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apparently challenged the very basis of the Shia doctrine34 and thereby accepted the possibility of 
a Caliphate. According to Khomeini; 
 
From the time of the lesser Occultation down to the present (a period of more than twelve 
centuries that may continue for hundreds of millennia if it is not appropriate for the 
Occultated Imam to manifest himself), is it proper that the laws of Islam be cast aside and 
remain unexecuted, so that everyone acts as he pleases and anarchy prevails? Were the 
laws that the Prophet of Islam labored so hard for twenty three years to set forth, 
promulgate and execute, valid only for a limited period of time? Did God limit the 
validity of his laws to two hundred years? Was everything pertaining to Islam meant to 
be abandoned after the Lesser Occultation? (Khomeini, quoted in Al Fajr 1989:3) 
 
 
Figure 3.9 The criteria for leadership in orthodox Sunnism, Shiism and the Wilayat ul Faqih 
                                                          
34 In his book Islamic Government (1983), Khomeini’s theological ijtihad (legal exertion) known as Wilayat ul 
Faqih (rule of the jurist) questioned the role of leadership in the absence of the Twelfth Imam whom like the Imams 
before him had been from the direct lineage of the Prophet Mohammed and therefore was the only one  who had the 
legitimacy to rule. However, since the Twelfth Imam had absented himself from the physical plane in the year 872 
A.D, followed seventy years later by a greater absence or occultation. The question related to what was to be done in 
his absence. The question of the Wilayat ul Faqih remains a contentious theological issue in Shiism see David 
Menashri, Shi’ite Leadership: in the Shadow of Conflicting Ideologies, Iranian Studies, 13:1-4 (1980), pp.119-145, 
for a more particular appraisal of Shia theology and Khomeini’s concept see Hamid Mavani, Ayatullah Khomeini’s 
Concept of Governance (wilaya-tul-Faqih) and the Classical Shi’i Doctrine of Imamate, Middle Eastern Studies, 
47:5(2011) pp.807-824 and for a general overview of the Iranian Revolution see Fred Halliday, The Genesis of the 
Iranian Revolution, Third World Quarterly, 1:4 (1979), pp.1-16. 
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As a result, HT sent a delegation to Khomeini while he was in exile in Paris and twice when he 
came to power in Iran (ibid). The emerging political space in Iran seemed a readymade scenario 
for the attempt at establishing direct power.35 The popular base for Islam seemed to be secure as 
there was widespread sentiment for Islam and a clear leadership candidate in the form of 
Ayatollah Khomeini. In April-May 1979, the delegation met with Khomeini and the Council of 
Experts to establish an Islamic constitution. However, it seemed that either Khomeini had no 
intention of accepting HT’s approach or was constrained by the orthodox Shia doctrine and the 
influence of the ayatollahs. HT expressed its anger when it realized that despite the Council of 
Experts having expressed agreement in their meeting, the document they published did not 
conform to what had been agreed. In response, HT published a point by point refutation of the 
new Iranian constitution laying out the reasons as to why it was not in conformity with Islam.36 
HT declared; 
 
In spite of discussing and convincing the Council of Experts to establish an Islamic 
constitution, the constitution that was finally published, on the instruction of Ayatollah 
Khomeini, contradicted Islam and the ideas put forward by the Party on a number of 
counts (Al Fajr 1989:3)  
 
Khomeini seems to have either capitulated to the orthodox Shia theological doctrine, or realized 
                                                          
35 According to HT member Fareed Kassim (11th November, 2007), one of Iran’s senior clerics and key personalities 
of the Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Beheshti had been introduced to HT whilst he was in Germany during the 
1970’s. It is claimed that Beheshti had agreed with the ideology of HT and on his return to Iran, he became 
extremely pro-active in promoting HT to other senior personnel in particular the Islamic constitution it had drafted. 
HT members also claim that it is because of Beheshti’s support for HT and its constitution that he was assassinated 
by the Iranian regime under Khomeini.   
 
36 According to Al Fajr (1989:3) HT provided a detailed article by article refutation of the Iranian constitution which 
was published in the Lebanese newspaper al-Safir. 
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that his political position would have been tenuous had he rejected the support of the grand 
Ayatollahs and the Shia population at large by co-opting Sunni’s and abandoning the Shia 
conception of the Twelfth Imam in favor of a Caliph.37 This is also suggested by the former 
leader of HT in the UK, Omar Bakri Mohammed who confirms that ‘ at that time most senior 
Shia leaders, people like Ayatollah Al-Kho’e, rejected the principle (Wilayat-al Faqih) and this 
undermined its potential  (Bakri interview with Ebbedin, Jamestown: 2003). However, the key 
question relates to the basis of the approach itself. Why did HT consider Iran and break 
Nabhani’s isolation of the Arab world, especially when the history and doctrine of Iran and 
Shi’ism under the Safavid dynasty was clear evidence of enmity towards the Sunni world and the 
conception of a Caliphate? How did the Arabic language fit into the equation?  
 
In actuality HT’s approach to Iran was consistent with its literature and does not violate the 
understanding relating to the Arab world. This is because the arguments pertaining to 
                                                          
 
37 The rejection by Khomeini spurred HT to release its political communication which analysed the revolution in 
Iran to have been manufactured by the US in order to wipe away Britain’s influence and replace it with a covert 
arrangement with Khomeini. It was claimed that there was a secret understanding between Khomeini and US 
Republican Party during the hostage crisis in 1979 when students ransacked the US embassy in Tehran and held 
embassy staff. Jimmy Carter, US president at the time was unable to secure the release of the hostages after a 
disastrous air rescue attempt by the US armed forces which resulted in the death of US armed personnel and lost 
Carter the general election. Ironically, the hostages were released by Khomeini on the day of the US election which 
Republican candidate Ronald Reagan won. HT’s analysis was given impetus by former Iran’s first prime minister 
after the revolution, Bani Sadr, who fell foul of Khomeini but managed to defect to the US carrying with him a stash 
of secret US and Iranian documents endorsing the covert relationship between Khomeini and the Republicans see 
Abol Hasan Bani Sadr (1991) My Turn to Speak – Iran, the Revolution and Secret Deals with the US, US: 
MacMillan Press. The Republican – Khomeini deal as regards the hostages came to be known as October Surprise 
because of the month the US elections were held in. This was also the title of the book by Gary Sick, US national 
security adviser under Carter who also claimed that there existed a secret arrangement whereby the Republicans also 
shipped illegal arms to Iran, which later came to be known as the Irangate affair, see Gary Sick (1991) October 
Surprise – America’s Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan, London: I.B. Tauris. The US 
involvement in Iran from the attempted coup of Mossadegh in 1951 to Khomeini forms the narrative of the book by 
Stephen Kinzer (2003), All the Shah’s Men – An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, US: Wiley. 
Although, HT disagrees with the conventional analysis that the Shah of Iran was influenced by the US and evaluates 
him to have been a firm client of Britain till the end until the US overturned his reign and that of Britain through the 
covert backing of the revolution and Khomeini. 
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establishing the Caliphate in the Arab world are not definitive Sharia conditions but are reasoned 
formulations particular to HT. Where and by whom the success will ultimately be achieved is 
understood to only exist within Divine knowledge and HT is therefore open to all approaches 
outside of its specific strategy and geography. The de-fault position however is that HT’s work 
undertaken in the non-Arab Islamic countries is considered fruitful only from the perspective of 
easing the expansion of the future Caliphate; Nabhani was adamant that the starting point would 
remain the Arab countries wherein he states that,  ‘The work must be carried out in the Arab 
territories to re-establish the Islamic State, then the State will grow and encompass the 
neighboring territories, regardless of whether they consist of Arabs or not (2001:7). 
 
As mentioned above, under Nabhani’s leadership, HT focused its activities exclusively in the 
Middle Eastern societies with the explicit aim of destabilizing the states institutions, 
undermining the legitimacy of its governments and replacing the system, wherein the core of 
Nabhani’s policy centered on Jordan, Syria and Iraq. The existential threat posed by HT to these 
regimes culminated in a brutal crackdown on the party and its members, a closing of the political 
space and its virtual elimination in countries like Egypt and Libya. However, despite the 
expansion of the majaal in the post Nabhani era, in recognition of the fact that the Middle East 
societies were not responding to HT, the basic premise of the majaal in HT’s literature remained 
undisturbed as did the stationing of the Arab leadership in the Middle East. At the point of 
writing this chapter HT’s official website under the heading ‘The Place of HT’s Work’ clearly 
asserts that; 
 
The Arab countries are the most suitable location to start carrying the da'wah because 
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these countries, which constitute part of the Muslim world, are inhabited by people who 
speak the Arabic language, which is the language of the Qur'an and hadith, and is an 
essential part of Islam and a basic element of the Islamic culture (www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org ) 
 
This confirms the fact that the Middle East remains the epicenter of HT’s quest for the Caliphate. 
It also presents a quandary for the Islamist parties in the post Arab spring who have largely 
adhered to the secular conception of state and society. It is therefore instructive to look at the 
development of HT in the Middle East, its attempts to overthrow the regimes and the emergency 
measures taken against them without recourse to the speech act.  
 
3.2 HT as an Existential Threat  
3.21 De-stabilizing the Society and System 
In order to chart the development of HT in the Middle East and to understand its explicit aim of 
destabilizing the organizational stability of the regimes and taking power, it is essential to locate 
its activism within the conventional understanding of its  three stages (technically two as will be 
discussed later) of its programme (see chapter 1). The stages are derived from the life of the 
Prophet Mohammed from the start of his mission in the Arabian city of Mecca to his taking the 
seat of power in another Arabian city, Medina. HT’s understanding of how the stages correspond 
to the Prophet Mohammed’s mission is detailed in the book  Dawla Islamiya (The Islamic State, 
1958). The steps taken by the Prophet Mohammed are considered by HT to be the only sound 
theological evidences available to bring about a change in society and establish an Islamic state. 
The steps are also considered rationally universal and therefore the structuring and process of 
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political movement and change is theorized in the book Takkatul Hizb, which was published in 
1952 and remains the framework for HT’s programme.  
The three stage process has been largely misunderstood and misapplied in the discourse on HT. 
The procedure applies to the development of the party as a whole whereby the movement moves 
onto each stage as a complete unit after it has fulfilled the requisite conditions. This means that 
when the party is at the last stage of looking for power, it does so irrespective of the differences 
in its situation in different societies, as long as it has achieved the required objectives internally 
and externally in the society in which it wants to consolidate power (Takkatul Hizb, 1952). 
 
Figure 3.10 HT's movement as a unit at each stage of its political method 
 
For HT, the core of the majaal has been Jordan and the Palestinian territories due to the positive 
nature of the response and the depth of its penetration within society. Other areas of the majaal 
such as Iraq, Syria, Egypt and even Turkey, have been strategized as necessary attachments after 
being evaluated as being more robust entities and having a stronger military capability to defend 
the intended Caliphate.38  
                                                          
38 Samuel Huntington in his infamous but controversial tract, The Clash of Civilisations (1996) in order to support 
his theory as to which country is most suitable for the resumption of the core state in the Islamic civilisation, he 
provides an empirical analysis based on certain indicators such as economic, military and development 
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Due to the initial existence and rapid expansion of HT’s membership, Jordan was seen as the 
natural starting point for the party and later on the ideal society to establish the Caliphate. 
According to internal sources, with Jordan as the epicenter of HT, the wider Middle East strategy 
is aimed at gradually destabilizing and eventually overturning the sovereignty, state and systems 
of the region. Consequently, HT has been considered an existential threat by most of the regimes 
in the Arab world and particularly the Middle East.39 
 
The Jordanian regime moved to proscribe HT in 1952 after it applied for official political party 
status. The West Bank, Jerusalem and many other territories in Palestine were at this stage under 
Jordanian rule. HT’s attempts to gain legality by applying for a license on November 17th 1952 
was declined on two occasions despite adhering to the provisions of the new constitution and 
despite support from the governor of Jerusalem and his intervention to the interior ministry on 
HT’s behalf. The reasons given for declining the application were that HT’s platform was in 
contradiction to the basic precepts and articles of Jordanian statehood and the constitution and 
therefore posed an existential threat to the identity and unity of the state. According to Farouki; 
 
It singled out its rejection of Arab nationalism and its emphasis on the Islamic bond as the 
basis of social solidarity, thus creating divisions amongst Jordan’s citizens along religious 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
infrastructure. He looks primarily at Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan, concluding that Turkey is the best suited for 
the resumption of Islamic power. In doing so Huntington also argues that in order to do so, Turkey will have to 
shake off the ‘legacy of (secularism) Ataturk more thoroughly than Russia has removed Lenins ’in order to cease 
being what he terms a ‘torn state’. Huntington considers the important role of the Arabic language and for this 
reason dismisses Iran because of primarily being Shiite and secondly the Persian language. However, unlike HT 
however, he does not consider the role of language as a central concept linked to ideology and the state (Islam); see 
Samuel Huntington (1996), The Clash of Civilisations and the remaking of world order, NY: Simon and Schuster 
pp.174-179.   
 
39 See Taji Farouki, A Fundamental Quest pp1-114 and Amnon Cohen, Political Parties in the West Bank under the 
Jordanian Regime 1949-1967pp. 
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lines. The party’s explicit rejection of the principle of succession was furthermore 
interpreted as evidence that it hoped to overthrow the monarchy. Accordingly, the 
government construed HT as a potential cause of civil strife. It claimed that it was obliged, 
in the interests of law and order, to refuse to authorize its activities (ibid: 6-7) 
 
HT’s internal memoirs consider the imperative to proscribe the party came primarily from 
Britain whose ‘colonial’ representative John Pasha Glubb was effectively considered Jordan’s 
‘viceroy’ and the Jordanian Monarchy a client regime. 40 The memoirs recount a meeting 
between King Hussein of Jordan and a delegation from HT lead by Nabhani. According to the 
narrative, after a very stormy meeting, King Hussein realized that Nabhani was a real danger to 
the Kingdom and asked for his hand in loyalty. Nabhani refused saying that he has already given 
his loyalty to ‘God and Mohammed’. In turn, Nabhani was imprisoned for a few weeks in the 
desert prison of Al Jafer ‘upon the orders of the real ruler of Jordan and the leader of the army, 
Britain’s John Glubb Pasha’.41 
 
                                                          
 
40  John Baggot Glubb known amongst the Arabs as Glubb Pasha was head of the Arab Legion in British controlled 
Transjordan which was effectively staffed by British officers and financially supported by Britain. He was 
instrumental in forging what is now the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan see Glubb, B.J. (1948) The Story of the Arab 
Legion, London: Hodder and Stoughton and Glubb, B.J. (1957), A Soldier with the Arabs, London: Hodder and 
Stoughton. For a wider perspective of Glubb’s role in British policy see Karl E. Meyer and Shareen Blair Brysac 
(2008), Kingmakers – The Invention of the Modern Middle East, NY: Norton & Norton Inc, pp. 260-292. 
 
41 (ibid, 83:83).  HT maintains that Jordan remains a client state of Britain arguing its deep loyalty to the British 
establishment. In terms of the literature, there is a general understanding that the Hashemite Kingdom fosters a 
client-patron relationship, however, there is disagreement as to whether the US replaced Britain as the primary 
influence over the Hashemite Kingdom with its entrance into the Middle East post WWII see Douglas Little, A 
Puppet in Search of a Puppeteer? The United States, King Hussein and Jordan 1953 -1970, The International 
History Review, 17:3 (1995), pp.512-544 and Stephen Blackwell (2009) British Military Intervention and the 
Struggle for Jordan, King Hussein, Nasser and the Middle East Crisis 1955-1958, NY:Routledge, OR Britain 
retains its influence, see Nigel, J. Ashton, A ‘Special Relationship’ sometimes in spite of ourselves- Britain and 
Jordan 1957-1973, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 33:2 (2005), pp.221-244. 
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The period between the establishment of HT in 1952 and 1954 is termed the first stage of the 
party i.e. nuqTat el-ibtidaa’ (starting point). In this stage total emphasis was given to building the 
membership of the party, developing its organization and maturing its members through the 
education and indoctrination of its particular ideological programme (Al Fajr, 1990:9). The 
emphasis at this stage was largely insulated from any high profile political action.  
 
Between 1954 and 1960, HT started to prepare the ground for an open engagement with the 
society and confrontation with the ruling authorities. In order to achieve this it had to be 
confident that its cadres and the organization had matured in relation to its ideology and the aims 
and objectives had become widespread throughout the society. HT’s evaluation suggests that this 
situation was achieved in 1954 where according to Farouki; 
 
[t]he leadership was satisfied that the movement was by now established, its cadres 
having been successfully built up. They were also convinced that it had generated 
a respectable scale of awareness, both of its presence and of its goals. The time had 
arrived to launch its quest, by embarking on a more public dissemination of its 
ideology (ibid: 11) 
 
The subsequent period witnessed an immense confidence in the movement with rapid progress 
and an expansion of its activities into Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq and Kuwait. The primary 
success in Jordan had been achieved as a consequence of utilizing public platforms such as 
mosque sermons. Fearing the impact of HT’s confidence, public profile and anti-regime politics, 
the Jordanian government on January 1955 introduced the Law of Preaching and Religious 
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Instruction, according to which no sermonizing was allowed in mosques without first obtaining a 
permit from the Chief Justice (ibid:12). Quentin Wicktorowicz in his article State Power and the 
Regulation of Islam in Jordan, 1999, points out that all Middle Eastern regimes including Jordan 
have been involved in a battle to define Islamic meaning and legitimacy. Historically, the 
mosque and the Friday sermon has been the pivot of Islamist challenges to the state and hence 
the regulation of these institutions has been central to Jordan’s quest for legitimacy. He states; 
 
Because of Islam's importance for society and for the royal family's power, ample 
attention is given to the regulation and control of religion in the kingdom. The 
state has effectively co-opted religious institutions through the expansion of its 
apparatus into religious space. Through its control of religious institutions, the 
state attempts to monopolize sacred authority--the right to interpret Islam on behalf 
of the community. By regulating the institutions charged with defining Islam and 
Islamic symbols, religious space is closed to opposition elements. Since the 
symbolic meaning of Islam is important for regime legitimization, the state 
carefully supervises the institutions capable of disseminating this meaning in a 
manner that reifies state interests. The struggle over Islamic discourse has become 
central to the political scene in the Middle East (1999:681) 
 
According to HT’s memoirs, Abdul Qadeem Zaloom challenged the law openly as did many 
other activists by ‘giving sermons against it at the Al Ibrahimi mosque in Amman’ (Awadallah, 
1983:89). Many of the members were subsequently arrested for violating the new law and many 
of them were refused permits (Cohen, 1982:212-15). Without recourse to the speech act, and 
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without much public debate, the Jordanian security services and the police continued its 
crackdown on HT activists where according to Farouki, ‘reports in Jordan from throughout 1958 
and 1959 tell of large numbers of activists being obliged to confirm their presence daily at police 
stations and to pay sums of money as bail. The police chased anyone discovered distributing the 
movement’s leaflets and broke up its meetings and study circles’ (1996:22).  
 
In 1958, Nabhani made an assessment that it was time to test the initial building work of the 
party and  its presence in society by what he termed ‘knocking on its door’ (HT, 1958:27). It is in 
this period, HT members claim that an offer of leadership by the Iraqi army was offered but 
refused on the grounds that the HT’s had not built the required popular base and taken the 
necessary leadership through its ideology and subsequently the society was not ready to shoulder 
the burden of governance (Al-Fajr 1990:12). This is also confirmed by Farouki, who states; 
 
[a]t some point during 1958 it received ‘an offer to run the government’ in one country in 
its sphere of action, the implication being that this was Iraq. It turned this down, however, 
on the basis that preparation necessary for the successful assumption of power and the 
establishment of a viable state were not yet complete (1996:19) 
 
However, by 1960, HT had considered the process to have been completed and the readiness of 
the party to fully engage with society in what was termed the strategy of ‘interaction’ or the 
second stage, whereby the party would attempt to engage in a struggle, politically, with the 
Middle Eastern regimes and endeavor to wrest leadership for the party and its ideology on the 
route to assuming power (Farouki, 1996:22). This readiness was confirmed on the basis that the 
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masses in Jordan had responded enmasse to HT and its ideology by backing a demonstration in 
Amman against the proposed visit of the Pope to Jerusalem (Farouki, 1996:25). Hence, 
according to the evaluation, HT had successfully matured into a political party and established 
itself amongst the society. It was now in a position to enter into a full blown political struggle 
against the authorities in order to undermine their connection with the masses and replace it with 
the leadership of HT (ibid). It was according to the assessment of this stage that HT proceeded to 
seek protection from influential elements in society (nusrah), fully aware of an anticipated 
backlash from the authorities.42  
 
This confrontational manner of the second stage, threatened the authority of the regimes and as a 
result the securitization moves against HT were enhanced throughout the Middle East and 
emergency measures were taken against the party and its members. As an example, according to 
the memoirs, the Jordanian government came close to internal rupture after HT released in one of 
its weekly ‘Political Commentaries’ in July 1966, an analysis exposing a secret agreement by 
King Hussein to fabricate a war with Israel in order to facilitate a ‘Jewish’ occupation of the 
West Bank.43 The memoirs state that HT had met with Jordan’s Prime Minister Wasfy al Tal, 
                                                          
42 Based upon the evaluation by HT that the Prophet Mohammed had approached powerful tribes and even rejected 
their conditions on the basis that the complete authority to Islam was not being given, HT adopted two criteria for 
accepting help. Firstly the people recruited or approached must have complete belief in Islam and the purpose of 
HT. Secondly, that the people being sourced for support actually hold the real reins of power in society (HT, 
1999:38-39) 
 
43 (Awadallah, 1983:186). In addition to HT’s view that Jordan was a client state of Britain, in its political 
communications HT has maintained that the Hashemite Kingdom also had a secret relationship with Zionists and 
has been instrumental in consolidating Israel as a state in the region. HT has maintained his position since its 
inception and used it as a basis to analyse Jordanian inaction in the Palestinian territories vis-a-vis Israel. This 
understanding has however now become more widespread in both the academic and policy literature. William 
Haddad and Mary Hardy for instance argue that due to the secret understanding between King Abdullah I and the 
Zionists, the idea of a Palestinian state had been dropped in favour of a division of Transjordan and the West Bank. 
Although this point is well documented, Haddad and Hardy argue that King Hussein maintained Abdullah’s legacy 
until his death in 1999 which endeared him to the Israeli’s but isolated him from the other Arabs, see William H. 
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who denied that such a plan existed, but instructed the arrest of HT members for distributing the 
leaflet (ibid). HT felt the capitulation of Jordan in the 1967 war with Israel and the subsequent 
Israeli occupation of Jerusalem and the West Bank confirmed its analysis which was distributed 
widely in another leaflet attacking the ‘treachery’ of the Jordanian monarchy (ibid).  
Consequently, the brutality of the response increased not only from the Jordanian government 
but also from those of Iraq, Syria and Egypt where the actions of the second stage were being 
carried out even though the same level of support did not exist in those the societies.  
 
This is demonstration that each stage of the process was not atomized to the circumstances of 
each country but applied to the party as a whole. One example of this was HT’s campaign 
against Gemal Abdel Nasser in Egypt at the height of his popularity in the 1960s. Despite its lack 
of influence in Egyptian society and against the advice of its members, HT chose to confront 
Nasser by attacking him as an American client44 who had manipulated public opinion in order to 
promote the ‘evils’ of nationalism, secularism and by establishing relations with the West. In its 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Haddad and Mary M. Hardy, Jordan’s Alliance with Israel and its Effects on Jordanian-Arab Relations, Israel 
Affairs, 9:3 (2003), pp.31-48, see   Moshe Zak, Israeli-Jordanian Negotiations, The Washington Quarterly, 8:1 
(1985), pp.167-176, see also Reuven Pedatzur, The Jordanian Civil War, a Retrospective Analysis: The Rescue of 
King Hussein’s Regime, Civil Wars, 10:3 (2008), pp.294-318 and Yehuda Lukacs (1997) Israel, Jordan and the 
Peace Process, NY: Syracuse University Press.    
 
44 At the time, HT was the first to suggest that Gemal Abdul Nasser was working closely with the US as part of its 
plan to reconstitute the Middle East according to US designs by using Nasser and anti-imperialist socialism to 
uproot Britain and prevent the Soviet Union from expanding into the region. In Political Concepts 1967, HT 
elaborates on its analysis that the Middle East from the time of Nasser became embroiled in a bitter Anglo-American 
struggle for control of the region. HT’s bold analysis seen as conspiratorial at the time and against the tide of global 
analysis was given impetus by the memoirs of the architect of US intelligence and its leading operative in the 
Middle East, Miles Copeland. Copeland was the key handler of Nasser and recounts the targeting of the military 
class in order to overthrow the monarchical structures set up by Britain in the post Ottoman carve up and the role 
played by the CIA in fomenting coups in Syria in his book (1970) The Game of Nations, The Amorality of Power, 
NY: Simon and Schuster and a detailed account of his relationship and prepping of Nasser in (1989) The Game 
Player- confessions of the CIA’s original political operative, London: Aurum Press. Copeland’s views, the transition 
of Middle Eastern militaries and the Anglo-American conflict in the region were further elaborated on by Said K. 
Aburish (1997), A Brutal Friendship, The West and the Arab Elite, London: Indigo, see also Douglas Little, Mission 
Impossible-The CIA and the Cult of Covert Action in the Middle East, Diplomatic History, 28:5 (Nov. 2004), 
pp.663-701.     
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widely distributed political communication, HT stated; 
 
The Arab people were one and all without the slightest doubt that Jamal ‘Abdal Nasser 
was a great savior sent by God to this umma to rescue it from colonialism. Consequently, 
everyone was devoted to him, with the exception of one group – Hizb ut Tahrir – which 
enjoyed no influence in society, but attempted without effect to expose him  (HT: 1980) 
 
Even after Nasser, HT struggled to establish a presence in Egypt due largely to the success and 
resistance from the MB and the brutal manner in which the security services pursued its 
members. Also, critically, the rise and popularity of Nasser had an immense impact on the 
membership of the party with many of them disagreeing with the intensity of HT’s attack on 
Nasser and where according to the memoirs 75% of its membership was lost in probably the 
severest ever test to its survival as a movement (Awadallah, 1983:160). 
 
It’s ideology however, seems to have found no ground between the polarized support for the 
pragmatic MB and the jihadism of Qutbists.45 Essentially, the conditions for HT’s assumption of 
                                                          
 
45  Sayid Qutb (1906 -1966), after whom the jihadists are being referred to is generally considered to be the founder 
of the jihadism movement and his ideas to be the basis for the emergence of Al Qaeda. Qutb was a member of the 
MB during the 1950’s but got disgruntled with the movement due to its moderate stance towards the Egyptian 
regime. His ideas took a more radical tone especially after he was imprisoned along with other MB members in 
1954 for an alleged coup attempt against Gemal Abdul Nasser, who initially had a close relationship with Qutb but 
after his refusal to endorse his socialist nationalist regime was subsequently considered a threat. It was whilst in 
prison that he wrote his most famous tract Ma’alim Fi-l- Tariq (Milestones), which provides a critique and rejection 
of Western civilisation and its manifestations amongst the Muslims, especially Egypt based on the purity of the 
Islamic doctrine. As a result of his thoughts he was executed by the Nasser regime in 1966. The most potent ideas 
which emerged were that of Jahilliya (state of ignorance), Jihad (physical struggle) and   Hakimiyya (sovereignty - 
of God). Qutb’s ideas were in part influenced by the South Asian reformist Mawlana Maududi, especially on the 
concept of Hakimiyya. Essentially Qutb argues that since sovereignty belonged to God alone in all dominion 
including legislation and authority, those who were governing and living their lives outside of this dominion had 
reverted to the days of jahiliyya (pre-Islam). In order to correct his situation a vanguard needs to emerge which 
employs jihad until the situation is rectified and Islamic governance in state and society is resumed, see Qutb, S. 
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societal leadership under Nabhani did not exist in Egypt.  Despite this, HT was implicated in 
planning an insurrection in 1974, wherein Islamic revolutionaries were arrested after attempting 
to seize weapons from the Egyptian Military Technical College in Heliopolis (Khairallah, 
1974:87-95). HT’s assumed participation in this incident is based on the alleged role of 
Palestinian born Iraqi citizen Salih Abdallah Sirriya, who it is claimed had been a former 
member of HT in Palestine and then Iraq (ibid). This along with a brief statement by the 
Egyptian Interior Ministry (Al Majalla 183, 13-19th August 1983 quoted in Farouki) forms the 
basis of the link through which HT is implicated in the plot. However, relying on statements 
linking HT with Sirriya’s similarly named group, The Islamic Liberation Organization (ILO – 
Munazamat al-Tahrir al Islami), by the Egyptian interior minister at the time, Wilhelm puts 
doubt on whether HT members were involved in the coup plot at the time despite further 
attempts by the Egyptian Ministry to further its conclusions after the discovery of a HT cell in 
1974 (1984:74). This conclusion is also arrived at by Farouki according to whom; 
 
Whatever, the precise composition of the group referred to by the interior ministry as the 
ILO; its conclusions in this respect require substantiation given HT’s declared policy of 
refusing to establish coalitions with other Islamist groups (Farouki 1996:168) 
 
In Egypt the party was virtually eliminated as a consequence of the campaign against Nasser, 
whilst in 1963, HT announced its first casualty in Iraq, Abdul Ghani Al Mallah who was tortured 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(2005), Milestones, US: American Trust Publications see also Syad Khatab, Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyya in the 
Thought of Sayid Qutb, Middle Eastern Studies, 38:3 (2002), pp. 145-170, see also Sayad Khatab (2006) The 
Political Thought of Sayid Qutb: The Theory of Jahilliya, NY:Routledge and  Sayad Khatab (2005), The Power of 
Sovereignty: The Political and Ideological Philosophy of Sayid Qutb, NY:Routledge. For a more descriptive 
understanding of the emergence of jihadism in Egypt see Gilles Keppel (2005), The Roots of Radical Islam, London: 
Saqi books. For an understanding of the influence of Sayid Qutb’s ideas on jihadism and jihadist movements in 
general see  Fawaz Gerges (2009) The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, NY:Cambridge University Press, pp.43-
79 and Jason Burke, Al Qaed:The True Story of Radical Islam, London: I.B. Tauris, pp.7-49. 
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to death by the Baathist regime (Al Fajr, 1990:10).   For this reason in 1962, HT opened up a 
new tract aimed at securing the protection and support of these powerful elements especially in 
Syria and Iraq, citing the level of oppression which the party had experienced from the Arab 
regimes46. According to HT; 
 
When in the mid-sixties, the persecution intensified against the Party and the societies 
where the Party worked were not prepared to move with any Islamic movement , Hizb ut 
Tahrir decided to move to the next phase of the da’wa (Islamic work),namely, the 
seeking of support (Al Fajr, 1990:11) 
 
3.22 Targeting Power 
In Takkatul Hizb (1953), Nabhani had theorized a bottom up approach wherein the masses would 
initiate a revolution under the leadership of HT. Theoretically, this was the natural outcome of a 
successful ‘interaction stage’. There was no mention of a military coup in the theory. This is 
because HT considered the armed forces as part of the fabric of society and not a separate entity. 
However, in the 1960s with the height of oppression against the party, Nabhani added an extra 
emphasis on contacting the people of nusrah (influence and power) which in the case of the 
majaal constituted primarily the armed forces, since, after the military coups in Egypt, Syria47 
                                                          
46 Support also entails seeking protection from the people of influence in order that the party’s work is not affected. 
This is based on the understanding that the Prophet Mohammed was given protection by his uncle in Mecca due to 
the custom which provided him amnesty as a result of his position as an elder of the ruling tribe (HT, 1999:38-39) 
47  In Political Concepts (1967) HT analyses the coups in Syria as part of the Anglo-American struggle for control in 
the Middle East. It analysed the Husni Zaim coup in 1949 as the first fruit of US policy in the region and the counter 
coup by Colonel Sami Hinnawi in 1949 as being British supported. The 15 coups which subsequently followed until 
Hafiz al Assad (also American) took power in 1972 were also analysed as part of the struggle.  The view is 
supported by the personal memoirs of CIA Middle East operative Miles Copeland in his book, The Game of 
Nations- The Amorality of Power (1970) and by Tabitha Petran (1978) Syria: A Modern History, London: Ernest 
Benn, wherein she states; ‘on 29 March 1949, Colonel Zaim seized power, ousted and exiled President Quwatly, 
dissolved Parliament, and established military rule. This first overturn in the Arab world after the Palestine war was 
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and Iraq48 during the 60’s and 70s they had formed the actual material power in the Middle 
Eastern countries. This did not however constitute a separate stage, but it was referred to as such 
in order to avoid confusion. A theological precedent for this was located in the life of the Prophet 
Mohammed, where according to HT’s understanding; he had taken power in the Arabian city of 
Medina not only on the basis of popular support but a secret coup d’état organized by the two 
major tribes of city Bani Aws and Bani Khazraj.  HT states; 
 
Hizb ut Tahrir considers this process of seeking support to be the last phase of the public 
da’wa (prosthelytizing) rather than a stage in itself. Nusrah is defined as the backup 
necessary for the Party to achieve political authority, through which the Islamic state-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
engineered by the American embassy in Damascus’ (p.96). According to Copeland, a ‘political action team’ 
systematically developed a friendship with Zaim, then chief of staff of the Syrian Army, suggested to him the idea of 
a coup d’état, advised him how to go about it, and guided him through the intricate preparations in laying down the 
groundwork for it (pp. ) see also Douglas Little, Cold War and Covert Action – The United States and Syria, 1945-
1958, Middle East Journal, 44:1 (Winter, 1990), pp.51-75. Andrew Rathmell provides a critical counter narrative to 
Copeland and dismisses the idea that the US or Britain had much involvement in Husni Zaim’s or any other coups in 
Syria, see Rathmell, A. Copeland and Zaim- Re-evaluating the Evidence, Intelligence and National Security, 11:1 
(1996), pp. 89-105 and Rathmell, A. (1995) Secret War in the Middle East – The Covert Struggle for Syria, 1949-
1961, NY: Tauris Academic Studies.     
 
48 The literature on this period generally posits the coups in Iraq within the context of the changes happening within 
Syria and Egypt, especially the formation of the Socialist Arab nationalist Baath Party and Gemal Abdul Nasser’s 
push to form a united Arab state which he temporarily succeeded in doing under the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 
1958 in which he was elected president.  However, the role of Britain and the US in the coup d’états in Iraq remains 
a source of controversy. According to HT, Iraq under King Farouk and then Nuri Said was a British client state and 
was now being targeted by the US which in turn sparked struggle, instability and coup d’états (Al Khilafah, October 
1999). With the UAR union, Syria once again came under US control after which it started to eliminate British 
influence over Iraq. Abdul Karim Qasim’s seizure of power and the removal of Nuri Said’s regime were evaluated 
as the US putting an end to a pro-British regime (ibid). In turn Britain pulled off a coup on the 26 September 1961 in 
order to remove the US backed regime (ibid). In 1963, the US struck back by using the Baath Party to bring down 
the pro British government of Abdel Karim Qasim. As evidence, HT also quotes Jordan’s King Hussein when 
interviewed by the ‘Ahram Weekly Supplement’ on the 27th of September 1963 states that the CIA had a direct hand 
in the coup (ibid). Said K. Aburish’s account of the 1963 coup also corresponds to HT’s analysis. In his book A 
Brutal Friendship (1997), Aburish bases his analysis on extensive interviews in senior Iraqi military and political 
figures at the time and details the role of US intelligence and specifically that of assistant military attaché William 
Lakeland at the US embassy in Iraq as the chief planner in bringing Saddam Hussein to power (pp.138-141) see also 
Aburish, A.K. (2000) Saddam Hussein- The Politics of Revemge, London: Bloomsbury Publishing, pp.38-66 and  
Patrick Cockburn, Revealed : How the West  set Saddam on the Bloody Road to  Power, The Independent, 29th June, 
1997 [online]. Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/revealed-how-the-west-set-saddam-on-the-
bloody-road-to-power-1258618.html [accessed 08.07.12]. HT’s initial analysis on Saddam was that he remained in 
the British camp although later serious differences emerged internally as to whether Saddam had switched to being a 
US client.  
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government can be established and maintained. Hizb ut Tahrir looks for this support from 
those sources in the society capable of providing it (1990:11)    
 
As a consequence of HT’s attempts to mobilize the nusrah, the referent object of securitization 
and that of political security moved from the legitimacy of the systems and regimes to state 
sovereignty and survival.  A number of attempted military coups were mounted by HT in Jordan, 
Syria and Iraq. Again there was a total silence by the regimes on the attempted coups as they 
succeeded in keeping the issue out of the political debate. However, with the existential threat in 
mind, extra-ordinary measures designed to eliminate the members and the movement was 
initiated without recourse to the speech act. Knowledge of the coup attempts only came to light 
as a result of revelations by HT and later through access to internal documents by Farouki and 
Cohen. 
 
In 1968 and 1969 two attempted coup d’états were foiled in Amman, Jordan (Farouki, 1996:25).  
Internal sources have confirmed what was discussed above in that these coups were planned 
simultaneously with members of the armed forces in Syria and Iraq.  Farouki claims that the 
failure occurred because HT had overestimated the response from the society and the necessary 
protection and assistance from the powerful groups was absent. The Iraq-Jordan-Syria triangle 
was explicitly confirmed by HT in its literature, although it seems to refer to the sequence of the 
coups as three separate attempts. HT states;  
 
In the sixties however, with the groundwork prepared the party asked its people who held 
the nusrah (power) to remove the government of Iraq and to hand the power to the Party. 
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However, the attempted coup détat failed. Further, attempts were made to take power in 
Syria and Jordan, all of which failed (Al Fajr, 1990:11)  
 
With the absence of accurate open source information, the actuality of the coups and the dearth 
of data to evaluate the readiness of the stated societies remains a grey area of understanding. In 
relation to the 1969 coup, one of HT’s founders Ahmad Daour and 19 others were sentenced to 
death by the Jordanian authorities (Awadallah, 1983:192). According to Farouki, internal sources 
confirmed a third coup in Amman in 1971 which the external sources had corroborated, but the 
authorities neither announced nor divulged any information about it (Farouki 1996:23). Farouki 
contends that this time the leadership had been extremely confident as to its chances of success. 
So much so, that they had prepared audio messages for release to the media announcing the 
installation of a Caliph in Jordan (ibid). Despite these early failures, the party reiterated in 1970 
that it had secured a popular response and all that was needed was the presence of a sufficient 
physical force capable of taking power – the party should continue seeking nusrah and nothing 
else. As a result, according to internal sources and Farouki, a further coup was attempted in 
southern Iraq in 1972.49 
 
By this point Nabhani’s health had deteriorated and some activists suggest that the desire to see 
the emergence of the Caliphate and the fruits of his work during his lifetime may have been the 
underlying imperative for his obsession with the military coups. Internal sources concede that 
Nabhani’s overzealous pre-occupation with mounting coup attempts during this period had been 
at the expense of working on the support base. The members also waited for the victory in turn 
                                                          
49 ‘Uslub li-Kasb al-Umma wa Akhdh Qiyadatiha’, Hizb ut-Tahrir Leaflet, 14 January 1980, cited in Taji-Farouki, A 
Fundamental Quest, p.167: see also pp.27-28  
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neglecting their fundamental activities. As a result some members lost their zeal, while others 
argued that the entire movement should focus on contacting the members of the armed forces 
and other people of influence so that power could be assumed quickly. Unlike the optimism of 
the 1960’s and 70’s, this period reflected a period of stagnation which lasted until the next 
decade ultimately laying the foundations for its expansion outside of the Middle East.  
 
On the 20th of June 1977, Nabhani passed away and was succeeded by one of the co-founders, 
Abdul Qadeem Zaloom. Having been close to Nabhani during the period of stagnation and the 
shock of the failed coup in 1971, Zaloom finally admitted in an internal communication to the 
rank and file, the failure of the party’s attempts at gaining leadership in the current majaal. 
Zaloom stated; 
 
[B]ut the ummah was overwhelmed by despondence and despair. She has lost hope in 
everything and lost confidence in everyone after they had deliberately placed her in certain 
conditions in order to make her reach saturation point so that she would lose her hope and 
attain a state of despair and submission, thus she would be easy to control and they (the 
regimes) could pass anything upon her, without her being able to lift a finger once her 
sensation became slothful and once she lost all hope and vigor… they looked to the level 
that the ummah had reached in terms of stagnation, indifference and despondence which 
have almost reached the point of despair, submission and loss of confidence and hope in 
everyone, and no matter how hard they attempt to move her, she would not respond nor 
reac[t ] (HT, 1998) 
 
After this a major shift seems to have occurred in Zaloom’s thinking on the strategy. The most 
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fundamental change was a transfer from a bottom up approach towards a top down one. The 
direct achievement of power was now being targeted over and above the hard graft of leading the 
society through intellectual revolution. The material factor rather than the ideology became the 
underlying imperative with the appearance of the least common denominator in the form of raw 
Islamic emotions and sentiment deemed sufficient indicators for society to shoulder the burden 
of the Caliphate. This pursuit of power however continued within the bounds HT’s conception of 
the Middle East.  
 
With little success in Syria and Iraq, attention also descended upon Tunisia and Libya as other 
possible links to Jordan. Like Iraq and Syria, the public speech act was largely absent in the 
securitization of the movement as well as the public announcement concerning the mobilization 
of emergency measures against it.  In 1978, there was an official approach by HT to Gaddaffi 
after he had declared in his 1973 ‘Cultural Revolution’ speech the philosophy of his socialist 
Green Book (1973) as supreme, renouncing the hadith or Sunnah (the traditions of Mohammed) 
as a source of Islam.50 According to orthodox Islamic doctrine this placed him categorically 
                                                          
50 (Al Fajr 1990:10). On 1st September 1969, a small group of junior military officers led by Colonel Mammar 
Gaddafi staged a bloodless coup d'état against the British installed King Idris while he was in Turkey for medical 
treatment. His nephew, the Crown Prince Sayyid Hasan ar-Rida al-Mahdi as-Sanussi, was formally deposed by the 
revolutionary army officers and put under house arrest; they abolished the monarchy and proclaimed the new Libyan 
Arab Republic. HT put themselves on an inevitable path of confrontation with Gaddafi by not only questioning his 
Islamic position but also releasing their political evaluation that he had been brought to power by Britain. There is a 
general consensus in the wider literature that foreign powers were involved, however controversy remains as to 
which one. Support for HT’s evaluation does exist in the literature. In a secret US National Security Council Report 
entitled, ‘US Policy towards Libya’ (1960) the US considered the Idris government to be unstable and under threat. 
The report evaluates that ‘Although the British would be reluctant to intervene with force in Libya to maintain a 
regime favourable to their interests, they would probably do so if it seemed the only way to preserve their position’, 
quoted in Geoff Simms (1996) Libya – The Struggle for Survival, NY: St. Martin’s Press, pp.160-170. Britain’s 
support of Gaddafi is raised by questions concerning British knowledge of his anti British subversive activities (pro- 
Nasserist) and their failure to act. According to David Blundy and Andrew Lycett (1987) Gaddafi and the Libyan 
Revolution, London: Little Browne & Co, in 1966, after joining the Royal Military Libyan Academy Gaddaffi not 
only did the British a blind eye but Gaddafi was ‘protected’ at the academy and instead was sent on military courses 
in the UK at Beaconsfield and the Royal Armoured Corps headquarters in Bovington, Dorset (pp.33-35). It also 
suggests that the Peter Wakefield, British Consul knew of King Idrees’s decision to resign two months previous to 
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outside of the Islamic faith. For this reason HT sent a delegation to him in order to convince him 
to retract his position (ibid). However, despite distributing a statement outlining their success in 
convincing Gadaffi, his subsequent anger and brutal punishment of HT’s members for 
distributing the contents of the internal meeting proved otherwise. Gaddaffi dismissed allegations 
that he had capitulated to HT’s understanding. According to the narrative by HT; 
 
Gadaffi in particular has carried out a personal crusade against the Party ever since the 
Party sent a delegation to discuss with him his denial of the validity of the ahadith 
(narrations) of the Prophet Mohammed After four hours of discussion wherein they 
proved that the ahadith were a source of Sharia like the Quran, the Party distributed 
reports of the discussion. So incensed was Gaddaffi that he murdered thirteen members; 
they were hanged in universities and schools in front of their teachers, pupils and 
families. One of them was brought down still alive, he was hung a second time, then they 
tied his body to the back of a car which was driven in full view of his family and sons 
(ibid)  
 
Upon Saddam assuming the presidency of Iraq in 1979, according to HT a delegation was sent to 
Saddam in order to put forward the case for its ideology and the Caliphate as a replacement for 
the Baathist ideology and the Iraqi state (Al-Fajr 1990:10). The approach was categorically 
rejected with severe repercussions for the members and the movement. However, in the early 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the coup (ibid). Four months later a counter-coup was attempted by some senior officers, according to John Cooley 
(1982), Libyan Sandstorm – The Complete Account of Gaddafi’s Revolution, London: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 
points the finger at the CIA for tipping off Gaddafi. A second attempt in June, 1970 was also covered. A third 
attempt planned for March 1971 is described by Patrick Seale and Maureen McConville (1973) The Hilton 
Assignment, London: Maurice Temple and Smith. The book claims that the British intelligence intervened to prevent 
David Stirling, a former British army colonel and mercenary security firm from carrying out an assassination on 
Gaddafi after being hired by the former counsellor of King Idris.  
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1980s there is some evidence to suggest that HT had achieved a measure of success in 
penetrating the high ranking members of the armed forces and influential circles. In 1981, it 
seems a coup attempt was on the cards in Iraq involving amongst many others Lieutenant 
General Abdul-Aziz Ibrahim Al-Ali, commander of the 53rd battalion, Major General Abdul 
Wahid, Brigadier General Hashim Al-Haj Younis former minister Sadoon Gheedan, Tribunal 
Judge Farooq Al-Ni’aimi and many more. The planning was thwarted by the Iraqi intelligence 
services.51 Evidence of the Iraqi regimes measures against HT emerged again in 1990 when 
according to Farouki; eleven HT members were executed in 1990 for calling on Saddam again to 
forego Baathism and to adopt an Islamic state/Caliphate (1996:154). 
 
There was also some suspicion of a coup attempt in 1983, when within the space of six months; 
members of HT were rounded up in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt with the majority of the arrests in 
Tunisia emanating from the armed forces (Brandon, Jamestown :2006). Nineteen of the members 
arrested in Tunisia were military personnel (Al Fajr 1990:8). Again information was largely 
made available by HT according to which forty more members were arrested in Tunisia in 1988, 
the trials of whom were conducted in secret military courts as compared to the arrests of the 
Islamic Tendency Movement, which was allocated full public coverage (ibid). In 1991, HT 
announced further arrests in the Tunisian army, highlighting the possibility of another attempt.52 
                                                          
51 This is based on a internal Iraqi security document dated (19th March, 1983) obtained by the author which has 
been signed by an Iraqi civilian doctor who apparently acted as an agent for the Iraqi security services in collating 
information from an HT activist whom he had befriended. 
52 (Al Khilafah 1990:1) Internal sources however do not claim this to have been a coup attempt; rather a routine 
crackdown or what is termed amongst the HT members as routine and regular “grass cutting” in order to keep the 
growth of HT in check. In the case of the Tunisian officers, this has been explained as an anomaly by the members 
resulting from the unintended success of the movement in Tunisia as a consequence of some military officers taking 
it upon themselves to recruit and propagate amongst the armed forces having been impressed with the 
representatives of the movement through contact in Germany. In fact former members under Zaloom have claimed 
130 
 
According to HT; 
 
News has reached us of the arrest of over 300, including military personnel in Tunisia. 
Government sources made little of the arrests, other than to say they were inspired by 
Muslims wanting to put down the government and implement Islam (Khilafah 1990b:1) 
 
However, there exists some confusion over these attempts in Tunisia as internal sources maintain 
that the officers in Tunisia had links with HT but only as supporters and acted on their own 
initiative without sanction from HT.  Further arrests were made of the movement’s members in 
the Libyan armed forces and the execution of ten activists (of Libyan, Palestinian and Jordanian 
nationalities) on charges of plotting to overthrow the regime, with the deaths of three more under 
torture by the Libyan security police (Farouki, 1996:166).  
The increased efficiency and brutality of the Arab security services, the development and 
professionalization of the armed forces with better coup-proofing measures were key factors 
preventing HT from achieving success in its final stage.53 This does not imply that HT 
disappeared from the key countries. Rather HT seemed to be functioning but under extreme 
conditions. The nature of the environment in which HT was subjected to can be gauged from 
what has been highlighted by the London based Syrian Human Rights Committee (SHRC) in its 
eighth annual report in 2009. According to the report; 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
that the HT leadership had seriously neglected these officers and left them to their own devices (Kassim, interview, 
Nov. 18, 2007) 
 
53 For an evaluation of the coup proofing measures initiated by some of the Middle East regimes see James. T. 
Quinlivan, Coup Proofing – Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East, International Security, 24:2 (Fall, 
1995), pp.131-165. 
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Syrian authorities have outlawed religious activism. Anyone with religious leanings is 
subjected to persecution. Islamist detainees are tortured and punished with maximum 
sentences…Membership in HT is recognized as belonging to a secret society that 
endeavors to transform the social and economic landscape of the country. Outward 
religious observances or report from an informer about a religious individual are sufficient 
grounds for arrest, interrogation, torture, a prison sentence with hard labor and being 
stripped of all civil rights (www.shrc.org) 
 
The SCHR reported that the Syrian security forces launched an extensive campaign to arrest                  
members of HT, as a reaction to its distribution of literature implying a secret deal between the 
US and Syria over the Golan Heights. The wave of arrests continued between 2001 and 2002. 
The SCHR issued a list of those HT prisoners kept in the Sadnaya prison in Syria whose total 
reached a provisional figure of 60 prisoners (ibid). HT however claims that this number was 
actually over 800 (HT, 2000:126).  Also, according to the Jamestown Foundation, in 2006, HT 
members were arrested in Egypt, Sudan and Tunisia, with the regimes following a similar 
methodology of dealing with HT prisoners as Syria (Brandon, 2006). 
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 Figure 3.11 History of HT’s Activism 
 
3.3 The New Security Environment in the Post Arab Spring 2011 
Although the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a major loss for HT, being a key state for the 
establishment of the Caliphate, regional currents in Palestine and Lebanon provided a more 
relaxed and less repressive environment for the movement to operate. The election victory of 
Hamas (Resistance) in the Palestinian territories in 2006 and the support as well as legitimization 
afforded to Hizb Allah (Party of God) in Lebanon also introduced new realities for HT. Further 
dramatic changes occurred in what has come to known as the Arab spring, a popular revolt 
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against the authoritarian regimes which started in Tunisia and spread throughout the Middle East 
in 2011 to Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain and Syria. In Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, the Islamists 
were given a popular mandate to govern whilst in the other countries the Islamists remain the 
most significant elements in the resistance.  
 
The removal of fear and the dismantling of the repressive Mukhabarat (internal security 
apparatus), opened up the political space for HT.  For the first time since its establishment in the 
Middle East, the movement and its members were able to operate openly.  Other Islamist 
movements such as the MB in Egypt and An Nahda in Tunisia, who had also been proscribed 
and repressed, now found themselves at the helm of the political process. For HT, the core of its 
majaal had reopened for business and immediately it made its presence felt by ordering its 
members to fully back the popular demonstrations (www.hizb.org.uk). However, the case of HT 
was not straight forward and analogous to the other Islamist movements. Firstly, the level of 
repression against HT had left it severely damaged and weak in the Middle East and therefore it 
was unable capitalize on the popular revolt for its own objectives and secondly, no ideological 
affinity existed with the other Islamist movements now in power.  HT had consistently fallen out 
with the MB in Jordan and Egypt accusing it of political opportunism and despite its religious 
rhetoric, fostering secularism as a result of adopting Western ideas on political and economic 
systems (Cohen 1982, Farouki 1996). Internal sources have consistently maintained that the MB 
was initiated at the behest of Britain as a vehicle to deflect the Muslim masses away from the 
Caliphate in 1925 when it was established and this has been its mission ever since.54 Ihsan 
                                                          
54 HT’s analysis of the MB’s relationship with Britain has been given credibility by Mark Curtis’s published book 
Secret Affairs: Britain’s Collusion with Radical Islam (2010), wherein he demonstrates through recently released 
British foreign office correspondence, a direct and ‘loyal’ relationship between the MB and British policy in the 
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Yilmaz in his article The Varied Performance of Hizb ut-Tahrir: Success in Britain and 
Uzbekistan and Stalemate in Egypt and Turkey (2010), also argues that because the MB did not 
identify the Egyptian state as the enemy, and were willing to work with nationalist and secular 
parties, not only were they in a better position to survive the crackdowns but their depth of 
entrenchment formed a barrier for the Egyptian government against the spread of HT.  As a 
result the tensions and enmity between the two movements runs deep.55 In the memoirs, 
Awadallah (1983) accuses the MB members of having colluded with various regimes in Egypt 
and Jordan against HT and its members. As for An Nahda there was an absolute rejection of its 
leaders Rachid al Ghanouchi’s wholesale adoption of secularism and rejection of Islam’s role in 
state and legislation. Since both the MB and An Nahda have explicitly rejected the concept of a 
Caliphate and the full application of the Sharia, the programme and ideology of HT has provided 
a conundrum for both Islamist movements. At the time of writing this chapter HT’s  legal 
position in Egypt and Tunisia remains open and fluid, however as the chapter will highlight, a 
confrontational position towards HT is likely to appear and  get more intense as it capitalizes on 
the public space and puts the government under pressure on the issues of Sharia and relations 
with Israel. HT remains a political security concern as regards the organizational stability and 
legitimacy of the regimes. As long as the political space remains open for its work, it is most 
likely to fall back onto its theoretical position concerning a popular revolution rather than a 
military coup, although at the time of writing this chapter, HT’s situation remains unchanged in 
respect to regimes in Jordan, Egypt and Syria due to the continued role of the military as the 
defacto power.  One indicator of how HT may become securitized by the new Islamist 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Middle East.    
 
55 HT members are prohibited from openly pronouncing its evaluation that MB remains a British fostered entity in 
order to prevent it being pulled into a ‘fruitless’ public engagement.   
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governments in the Middle East is by looking at the experience of HT under the Hamas 
leadership in the Palestinian territories. 
 
3.4 Hamas and the Paradox of HT’s Securitization  
Up until the general election victory of Hamas in 2006, HT had been sympathetic to the 
movement on the grounds that it was modeled as an Islamic movement and a major force of 
resistance against Israel. Although HT did not adopt or involve itself in the military method of 
Hamas, since it argued that the solution to the Palestinian problem could only be achieved 
through the military strength of a state i.e. the Caliphate, it continued to provide moral support 
for its actions against Israel. On the other hand it had completely rejected the PLO as a secular 
tool of Western policy and this position intensified after the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1991, 
which HT considered a subjugation to the US and Israeli policy and a betrayal of the Palestinian 
and Islamic cause (AL Khilafah, 1991:1) 
 
The decision of Hamas to enter the political fray dramatically changed this relationship. As an 
Islamic movement, Hamas was now under HT’s radar concerning its relationship with the 
secular PLO (the only internationally recognized entity), the commitment to Sharia and most of 
all its position vis-a-vis Israel as per its charter which did not recognize the legitimacy of the 
Israeli state and considered any concession on territory as an act of apostasy.56   Moreover, 
isolated by the West, Hamas sought support and received it from the regimes in the Middle East 
such as Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and even Iran, considered by HT to be Western 
clients and enemies of the Muslims and the Islamic cause (see above). Consequently, despite rifts 
                                                          
56 see The Hamas Charter, 1988 [online] Available at; 
http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/www.thejerusalemfund.org/carryover/documents/charter.html [accessed 29.04.12]  
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and tensions with the PLO or Fatah, Hamas tried to put up a unified front as regards the peace 
process leading to a collision course with HT. In a leaflet attacking Hamas’s shift on Israel, HT 
states; 
 
Hamas accused Fatah of being nurtured by America and of conniving with the Jewish 
entity. But Hamas has now run its course and has also accepted the idea of having a 
Palestinian state within the 1967 territory along with the Jewish state over almost all of 
Palestine! Hamas, like Fatah before it, also extended its hands towards America to 
achieve this!... we are immensely pained to hear of Hamas's acceptance of this concept. In 
fact, we are even more severely pained now because while Fatah had ‘agreed' to this idea 
as a result of their ‘pragmatic' approach and not as a requirement under Islam. Fatah never 
once claimed to be an Islamic party, while Hamas is publicly regarded as an Islamic party 
and as such its acceptance of this proposal is fraught with dangerous consequence[s]57 
 
Frustration and despair with the peace process as well as the rivalry between Fatah and Hamas 
seems to have created the perfect storm for HT’s revival in the West Bank and Gaza. From 2007 
onwards, the Israeli, Palestinian and international media started to take notice of HT’s growing 
influence after a number of high profile demonstrations. On the 10th of August 10,000 supporters 
of HT marched through Ramallah, a Fatah stronghold, calling for the establishment of the 
Caliphate. According to the Jerusalem Post, ‘They are taking over Hamas estates on the West 
Bank...Hizb ut-Tahrir's rise symbolizes the fall of Hamas' brand of political Islam and Fatah's 
                                                          
 
57 see The Hamas Regime is Imitating the Fatah Regime at Every Step, HT, 26th June 2009. [online] Available at; 
http://www.khilafah.com/index.php/analysis/middle-east/6893-the-hamas-regime-is-imitating-the-fatah-regime-at-
every-step [accessed 20.04.12] 
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nationalist ideology...Palestinian despair is Hizb ut-Tahrir's tool’.58  Even though deep rifts and 
clashes had occurred between  Fatah and Hamas leading to the division of the territories with 
Fatah taking over the West Bank and Hamas consolidating its position in Gaza, HT’s position on 
the two state solution and the Caliphate became a problem for their legitimacy and a referent for 
securitization for both parties. Consequently, HT felt it had no option but to resist Hamas just as 
it was doing with Fatah, especially over its perceived capitulation to the two state solution. In 
another sense, HT considered Hamas to be more dangerous than Fatah because it being seen as 
an Islamic party, its actions were being construed as sanctioned by Islam. HT revealed that;  
 
We have advised them not to participate in elections under occupation and urged them not 
to become part of the ruling regime under occupation but they never heeded to our advice 
and continued to justify their treading of this deviant path!... recognition of the 2-nations 
within Palestine will not give the Jewish entity any legitimacy under Islam, since Fatah 
and Hamas do not represent either Islam or Muslims, but they are merely a part of the 
Islamic convoy deviated from the correct path.59 
 
Although, the proscription of HT has been extremely difficult because of its deep roots, influence 
and popular position towards Israel, both Hamas and Fatah have attempted to neutralize HT’s 
impact by denying it as much political space as possible. Permits for rallies and public lectures 
are consistently denied and public gatherings cancelled leading to clashes with Hamas in Gaza 
                                                          
 
58 see Kogan, A. 2007, .Hizb ut Tahrir’s Renaissance, Jerusalem Post.[online] 18th September.  Available at; 
http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=75656 [accessed 20.04.12] 
 
59 see The Hamas Regime is Imitating the Fatah Regime at Every Step, HT, 26th June 2009. [online] Available at; 
http://www.khilafah.com/index.php/analysis/middle-east/6893-the-hamas-regime-is-imitating-the-fatah-regime-at-
every-step [accessed 20.04.12] 
138 
 
and Fatah in the West Bank. Also, because HT’s traditional strength has been in the areas of the 
West Bank, the clashes with the Palestinian Authority (PA) has been more pronounced due to 
Fatah’s official status as negotiator in the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process. These clashes turned 
deadly when in November, 2007, the PA police force loyal to Mahmoud Abbas (Fatah leader) 
opened fire on demonstrators and shot dead a member of HT in Hebron, after it had mobilized 
large demonstrations across the Palestinian territories against the PA for its involvement in the 
US sponsored Annapolis summit on moving the peace process forward with the Americans and 
the Israeli’s. 60  At this stage Hamas was still openly hostile to the two state solution and to 
Fatah against which it brought out several thousand people against the demonstration.   
 
As Fatah and Hamas have moved towards reconciliation, HT’s argument that only the Caliphate 
and its army can liberate Palestine has become an existential threat to both the legitimacy of 
Palestinian governance and the peace process as despair increases amongst the Palestinians with 
no resolution in sight. The nervousness of Hamas and Fatah was evident when they mobilized 
the state security services in both Gaza and the West Bank to stop HT’s successive 
commemoration  of ’89 and ’90 ’ years of the fall of the Caliphate in 1924 (Ottoman) by force. 
The actions produced a sharp response from HT as well as the Palestinian Centre for Human 
Rights (PCHR) which condemned the extra judicial and physical nature of the crackdown. 
According to the PCHR, 
 
                                                          
 
60 see Kerschner, I. 2007. Palestinian Is Killed in Hebron as Police Disperse Protest over Mideast Peace Talks, New 
York Times, 28th November [online] 28th November. Available at; 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/28/world/middleeast/28palestinians.html?pagewanted=print [accessed 21.04.12] 
see also Pruscher, R.I, I. 2008. Hizb ut Tahrir New Force in the West Bank, Christian Science Monitor [online] 
January 22. Available at; http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2008/0122/p01s03-wome.html/(page)/3  
[accessed 21.04.12] 
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The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR) condemns restrictions and measures 
taken by the two governments in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank against activities 
organized by Hizb ut Tahrir. PCHR condemns all the arrests, firings and beatings that 
were documented against civilians this week. The Centre reiterates that the right to 
peaceful assembly is guaranteed by the Palestinian Basic Law and by relevant 
international instruments.61 
 
For Hamas to take such actions against fellow Palestinians let alone a ‘brother’ Islamist 
movement is not an easy or popular decision. Hamas and HT members share families and friends 
and on paper virtually the same outlook. There is more in common between HT and Hamas than 
with Fatah. For this reason, despite the actions against it, HT has attempted to capitalize on 
internal rumblings within Hamas and push it away from Fatah. In March, 2011 HT met with 
representatives of Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank and delivered to them a letter of advice 
concerning its move to form an interim government with Fatah in Ramallah. In the letter entitled 
‘Hizb Ut-Tahrir Gives Sincere Advice To Hamas In Relation To The Political Agreement With 
The Authority Of Ramallah’, HT reminded Hamas that when the fighting broke out between it 
and Fatah, it had intervened and helped to stop further bloodshed. However, it warned Hamas 
that in the deal with Fatah in Ramallah it was being used to show a false sense of reconciliation 
in order to re-start negotiations on the peace process and cover up its ‘treachery’ by providing the 
progression an Islamic seal of authority and approval. The letter states; 
 
                                                          
61 see PCHR Condemns Restrictions Imposed by the Two Governments in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank on 
Activities Organized by Hizb Ut Tahrir, PCHR, 14th July, 2010. [online] Available at; 
http://www.pchrgaza.org/portal/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6829:pchr-condemns-
restrictions-imposed-by-the-two-governments-in-thgaza-strip-and-the-west-bank-on-activities-organized-by-hizb-ut-
tahrir&catid=36:pchrpressreleases&Itemid=194 [accessed 21.04.12] 
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[i]f the reconciliation is upon the basis of continuing with the false solutions - and this is 
what is apparent - then it a preparation to resume the path of comprise and concession, 
which the PLO began and the PA continued, and we fear that Hamas join them in this.... 
We remind you in this respect of the statement of Sa'ib Erakat...and Mahmoud 
Abbas.These statements and the like indicate that Hamas will be used as the Islamic seal 
upon the wrongs of the PLO and the Authority of Ramallah. So would you be pleased that 
this be the harvest of your efforts and sacrifices?62 
 
The influence of HT in the Palestinian territories has always had a proportional effect on its 
position in Jordan because of the high percentage of Palestinians which make up the Jordanian 
population and its historical influence in the country. The Palestinian influence has always had a 
deep affect on Jordanian political scene demonstrable by events such as the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization’s (PLO) attempted coup against the monarchy in 1970 (known as Black 
September), the Palestinian based support for Hamas and the MB backed Islamic Action Front 
(IAF) in parliament, and consequently the deep seated opposition to the 1994 normalization 
treaty with Israel, known as the Wadi Araba agreement.   
 
Although HT has acted largely in opposition and competition to the government preferred MB in 
Jordan, its role has remained strong in influential sectors.  The level of its penetration in society 
was demonstrated in 1996, when the Jordanian government attempted to try members of HT 
under terrorism charges but the court threw out the charge after public anger against the assertion 
that HT was a terrorist organization and more pertinently after the intervention of some powerful 
                                                          
62 see Hizb Ut-Tahrir Gives Sincere Advice To Hamas In Relation To The Political Agreement With The Authority 
Of Ramallah , HT, 14 May, 2011. [online] Available at; 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/02/20122513407504737.html [accessed 21.04.12]  
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tribes who were linked to the defendants (ICG, 2005). Again, on the death of HT’s leader Abdul 
Qadeem Zaloom in 2002, some of the Jordanian press ran front page photos and obituaries as a 
mark of importance and respect for HT’s leadership. The depth of HT’s presence and influence 
provides an explanation as to why the government has not been able to undertake the level of 
extra security measures and severely degrade the movement as in the cases of Egypt, Syria, and 
Libya etc. Despite political peaks and troughs, internal sources concede that Jordan remains the 
heartland and future support point for the Caliphate. However, it requires other Arab or non-Arab 
countries which form the majaal, preferably those that surround it in order for the Caliphate to be 
a viable economic and military entity, because of the immediate threat from Israel and US forces 
in the region. For this reason internal sources claim that despite the Jordanian monarchy’s 
proscription and at times clampdown on the party, it has communicated to the government that it 
has had the potential to take power in Jordan on several occasions but has not availed the 
opportunities due to strategic reasons.  
 
No doubt, any splits within Hamas or Fatah or collapse of the peace process would benefit HT 
enormously and increase its effectiveness as an existential threat.  Although, the dramatic re-
appearance of HT in Palestine occurred prior to momentous changes in the Middle East in 2011, 
the centrality of the Palestinian question in the region has added enormous potential to HT’s 
ability to destabilize the new political orders, especially since the relationship between Islam and 
governance remains a source of conflict and potential instability in the post Arab spring. In 
Egypt the unpopular Camp David peace treaty with Israel has come under the spotlight and 
despite the assurances by the Egyptian military, the MB and the MB influenced Freedom and 
Justice Party (FJP), that they will honor the Camp David Treaty, growing conservative voices 
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and the precarious situation of Gaza vis-a-vis Israel threaten to ignite internal conflict.   
 
Conclusion 
The Arab world and more specifically the Middle East form the core of HT’s majaal or the place 
where it targets the establishment of the Caliphate. Jordan is where the party transferred its status 
from a group to a mature political party and where the society remains most agreeable to HT’s 
ideology and vision. With Jordan at the centre of attempted coup attempts in Syria and Iraq, HT 
has demonstrated in a clear manner the geography in which it forms an existential threat. 
Although, the silent securitization moves by the various Middle Eastern regimes severely 
degraded HT’s operational capability, it managed to withstand the storms and with the election 
of Hamas in the Palestinian territories and the advent of the Arab spring, the political space has 
seemingly opened for HT to capitalize on the wave of sympathy for Islamist parties and issues. 
However, as the experience with Hamas has demonstrated, the rise of the Islamist parties has 
brought about new challenges as well as security environment where a new referent of 
securitization has emerged, in that the Caliphal model of HT forms an existential threat to the 
legitimacy of the secular or civil state model adopted by the emerging Islamist parties in power. 
Hamas has established that Islamists are more than willing to revert to emergency securitization 
moves outside of the political process in order to combat HT’s rise and threat to the legitimacy of 
the ideology and stability of state and regime. 
 
 
 
143 
 
Chapter 4 
Manufacturing the Threat of Hizb ut Tahrir in Uzbekistan 
 
This chapter examines the moves made by the government of Uzbekistan to securitize HT which 
has largely been responsible for the internationalisation of the movement in the post 9/11 period. 
The case of HT in Uzbekistan enables us to observe attempts at securitisation through the speech 
act by an authoritarian regime outside of HT’s majaal. It also allows us to observe the central 
role played by domestic and foreign academics and non-governmental organisations as 
influential securitizing actors.    
 
Although, HT has spread throughout Central Asia, Uzbekistan constitutes its strongest and most 
securitised component and the reason for its selection as a case study. More than its size, it has 
been the speed of HT’s expansion within a very short span of time which has been the cause of 
widespread international and domestic attention. Even though, HT’s emergence in Central Asia 
coincided with the immediate vacuum left by the collapse of Communism in 1990, the majority 
of the literature analysing the movement has been led by US think tanks and contextualised 
within the securitized framework of the post 9/11 Global War on Terror (GWOT) (Baran 2004, 
ICG, Cohen 2003 and Rashid 2002). As a result, the debate has been ideologically influenced on 
whether or not HT can be categorised as a terrorist movement constituting an ‘existential threat’ 
to the stability of Uzbekistan’s regime and society. This is argued on the basis of it both 
condoning the violence of jihadist groups, and therefore constituting a ‘conveyor belt for 
terrorism’ (Baran, 2004), and/or having the propensity to turn to violence as a response to the 
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aggressive internal measures taken against its members (ICG 2002, Karagiannis 2006).    
However, the absence of any evidence either linking HT with jihadist movements and/or with 
any violent action has largely exposed this as a false debate and one at odds with both the 
movements canonical precepts and history of non-violent activism under equally repressive 
conditions in the Middle East (see chapter 2). Fundamental to the failure of the literature to 
provide a clear and coherent analysis of HT’s position in Uzbekistan and in Central Asia 
generally has been the absence, misunderstanding and misapplication of the movements 
dogmatic and empirically established position against the use of violence to achieve societal and 
structural change and more pertinently its understanding of where power should be targeted i.e. 
the majaal (see chapter 2).  
 
Due to the authoritarian nature of the Uzbek regime, it shares similarities with the Middle 
Eastern and Arab regimes (pre-Arab spring), in so far as a failure to securitize HT through 
‘normal politics’ and the seeking of legitimacy outside of the political sphere and through 
‘special politics’ i.e. from the security services and armed forces.  However, unlike those 
regimes, the Uzbek government has tried to utilise the speech act in order to make securitizing 
moves against HT on the basis that it threatens the political security (see chapter 1) of the state 
and secondly to mobilise legitimacy from the security sectors of state. Wider support for its 
‘securitization moves’ against HT in terms of domestic and international legitimacy has also 
been sought by the Uzbek regime through collaboration with Western academics and think tanks. 
The conventional literature on securitisation has not concerned itself with the evaluation of 
authoritarian regimes. Juha Vuori in his article ‘Illocutionary Logic and the Strands of 
Securitisation: Applying the Theory of Securitisation to the Study of Non-Democratic Political 
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Orders’ (2008) points out that this is because there exists a ‘democratic bias’ in the paradigm due 
to its traditional Eurocentric focus (see chapter 1). Therefore, securitisation has been understood 
as a means of naturalising politics and moving issues beyond the democratic process of 
governments. He argues that although the scholars intended the securitisation of language and 
politics to take account of all political systems, they did not articulate how this was to be 
achieved beyond an ‘abstract idea’ since authoritarian regimes did not require justification for 
the mobilisation of special measures. He states,  
 
The argument goes that totalitarian or other non-democratic political systems do not need 
political legitimacy in the way democracies do. The leaders of totalitarian systems can rule 
by force, without special justification. There is no need to move security issues away from 
the democratic process into ‘special politics’, as there are no democratic processes to 
begin with (2008:67)    
 
Security is an effective means of control and drastic measures are justified since it is primarily 
linked to the basis of survival. Authoritarian regimes exhibit what Vouri terms ‘the strand of 
securitisation for control’ which targets the speech act towards obedience to the directives of the 
securitising actor (2008:88). The aim of the speech act is to get the audience to act on the 
directives of the actor. In order for this to be achieved the actor has to have both ‘formal 
authority’ and a reason (threat in relation to a legitimate referent object) for his or her directive 
(ibid: 89). Therefore, the question in both democratic regimes as well as authoritarian ones is one 
of audience and legitimacy. Matti Wiberg (1988) points out that authoritarian regime require 
political legitimacy, as persuasion and coercion must be exercised by all governments if they are 
to survive (1988:120). Moreover, even though the majority of the securitisation literature 
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considers the audience of legitimisation as the electoral citizen, in authoritarian constructs the 
intended audience can be more specific such as the power elite or military depending on the 
outcomes required. According to Vouri, 
 
What could be said within the model is that the audience has to be such that they have the 
ability to provide the securitizing actor with whatever s/he is seeking to accomplish with 
the securitization, in the Wæverian model, legitimacy for actions that go beyond regular 
liberal-democratic practices of policy-making. (2008:69) 
 
This chapter argues that HT’s public securitisation as an ’existential threat’ by the Uzbek regime 
can be explained as the construction of a ‘discourse of danger’ which  has nothing to do with the 
use of statecraft to protect a population from objective threats, but rather to encapsulate it by 
creating a powerful authority to describe these dangers. Primarily, it corresponds with internal 
efforts to eliminate opposition to power by the Karimov regime in structuring the ‘discourse of 
danger’ around terrorism as a means to elicit support and legitimacy from primarily the security 
sectors of the state as well as foreign actors. The first section will chart the evolution of HT in 
Uzbekistan and the conditions which have fostered its growth. The second section will chart the 
Uzbek regime’s securitisation of political Islam in general; the third section will look specifically 
at the securitisation of HT and attempts to connect it to terrorism and violence, concentrating on 
the specific cases of the Tashkent bombings in 1998, 2004 and the Andijon massacre in 2006. 
The fourth section will demonstrate the manner in which Western think tanks and academics 
have become active securitising actors of HT on behalf of the Uzbek regime. 
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Figure 4.1 The securitisation of HT in Uzbekistan 
 
4.1 Uzbekistan in HT Strategy 
There is no clear understanding of when exactly HT originated in Uzbekistan. Ahmed Rashid 
argues that there was no public expression of HT in Central Asia at the time of the break-up of 
the Soviet Union nor was it part of the swathe of initial Asian and Arab missionaries who had 
travelled in order to islamise the region and procure new recruits (2002:120). According to 
Uzbek officials, the movement was not introduced into Uzbekistan until 1995, citing a Jordanian 
named Salahudin as the first cell along with two Uzbeks (ibid). Zeyno Baran also confirms the 
role of Salahudin in 1995 but argues that this was part of second wave of activity initiated by HT 
in 1992, the first being the dissemination of material in Uzbekistan in the 1970s by Jordanians 
and Palestinians studying at the higher education institutions (2004a:77). Therefore, even if the 
benchmark of 1995 is taken, it seems the removal of Communism and the Soviet state did not 
change HT’s secretive and non-confrontational modus operandi. This point is critical in that 
firstly it questions the assertion that the expansion into Uzbekistan was part of a deliberate policy 
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by HT, and secondly, it strengthens the argument that its public securitization was not a position 
it necessarily coveted because despite its perceived success it has not been allocated the status of 
majaal by its central leadership and therefore the establishment of the Caliphate is not an 
immediate aim of HT in Uzbekistan specifically or in the region as a whole.  
 
In fact in the early nineties, HT was conspicuously absent from the gaze of the regime. Instead 
the focus of Uzbek President Karimov was squarely on the threat posed by the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a jihadi outfit, whose leaders Tohir Abdoulhalilovitch 
Yudelshev and Juma Namangani had once been part of the official Islamic Renaissance Party 
(IRP) in Tajikistan, but left due to its moderate stance and alliance with the Tajik government.63 
Instead they turned their attention towards Islam Karimov and his regime, vowing like HT to 
establish a Caliphate but distinguishing itself from HT by proclaiming to bring it about by means 
of a Jihad and only in Uzbekistan (Rashid, 2002:137-155). HT is often incorrectly tied together 
with the IMU and many assertions are made without evidence that there exists collaboration 
between them. According to documents and a diary kept by an IMU jihadist obtained and 
translated by Bakhtiyar Babajanov and Martha Olcott, the IMU demonstrated considerable 
                                                          
63 Official estimates portray the emergence of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) around 1998. Its leader 
Jumaboi Ahmadzhanovitch Khojaev, had served in the Soviet army in Afghanistan, was a local Imam from the town 
of Namangan in Afghanistan and hence his title Namangani.  Until the 1990’s, Namangani had been part of the 
Uzbek branch of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP). He separated from the IRP when it decided to adopt a 
conciliatory position towards the governments in Central Asia, join the political process and oppose any form of 
terrorism. Namangan then proceeded to set up the Adolat, a vigilante group which looked to bring order and justice 
through the mercenary application of the Islamic sharia in the conservative but strategic mountain terrain of the 
Ferghana Valley.  Due to the nervousness of the Uzbek regime, Adolat was banned in 1992 and Namangan and his 
followers fled to Tajikistan and fought for the Islamic opposition during the 1992-1997 civil war. The movement 
maintained its fierce opposition to the Uzbek regime vowing to bring about a Caliphate in the Ferghana Valley. Post 
9/11 the movement the US put it on the list of terrorist movements because of its alleged links with the Taliban and 
Al-Qaeda with whom it was claimed to have trained in Afghanistan, see Richard Weitz, Storm Clouds over Central 
Asia: Revival of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)?, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 25 (2004), 
pp.505-530, see Vitaly, V. Naumkin, Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement in 
Uzbekistan, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post Soviet Studies, Working Paper Series, Spring (2003), pp.1-63.  
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sympathy and admiration for HT but were frustrated with its refusal to take up arms against the 
Uzbek government.64Therefore, as the table below demonstrates, with the apparent differences in 
their objectives in Uzbekistan, the requirements for public support and positions on the use of 
violence, the likelihood of an alliance would be highly unlikely.  
 
Uzbekistan Building a 
Popular Base 
Use of Violence Caliphate  Immediate 
Regime Change 
in Uzbekistan 
IMU - X X X 
Hizb ut Tahrir X - X - 
  
Figure 4.2 Comparison between HT and IMU objectives in Uzbekistan 
 
 
4.2 Misreading HT’s Objectives in Uzbekistan 
The literature is generally confused as to HT’s goals in Uzbekistan because it has incorrectly 
framed its activism and goals within the three stage programme of HT (see chapter 1and 2) as 
being applicable to territories outside of those allocated as the majaal. As is discussed in Chapter 
2 there is no conception of ‘stage(s)’ outside of the majaal. Therefore, since power is not 
targeted in the non-majaal, the activities in these areas are restricted to mass culturing, building 
cadres and avoiding a direct political struggle with the ruling circles (Nabhani, 1952). 
                                                          
 
64 See Olcott B. and Babadjonov B 2001. ‘The Terrorist Notebooks’, Willhartley [online] Available at; 
http://issuu.com/willhartley/docs/the_terrorist_notebooks [accessed 27.06.11] 
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Karagiannis and McCauley allude to this point from their observation of HT’s literature in 
Central Asia but fail to articulate a clear conception of its programme and activism when they 
state, ‘While HT does not explicitly mention anything about the current stage of its struggle in 
Central Asia, a careful reading of its leaflets indicates that the group sees itself in recent years in 
the second stage, that of building Islam within the ummah’ (2006:318). The predominant 
conception is highlighted by Rashid according to whom HT is duplicating its three stage 
approach in Central Asia. Rashid states; 
 
[the flight from Mecca to Medina of the Prophet Muhammad and his followers, a historic 
journey in Muslim history is described an-Nabhani as the moment when ‘the phase of 
inviting people to Islam’ moved to ‘the phase of establishing an Islamic society and state’ 
which was in turn followed by ‘the phase’ of expansion through jihad – a process that the 
HT plans to duplicate in Central Asia (2002:116).  
 
The immediate establishment of a Caliphate in Uzbekistan and Central Asia is categorically not 
an objective for HT and the failure to understand its basic precepts in its literature can have 
enormous ramifications concerning its understanding in the region. In addition to 
misunderstanding the application of HT’s three stage process in the contexts of the majaal and 
non-majaal, the absence of a clear conception between the actuality of HT’s position and that of 
its vision in Uzbekistan and in Central Asia generally has had significant consequences even 
amongst actors which have been critical of the Uzbek regimes deployment of emergency against 
the movement. This confusion and lack of clarity is apparent in the monographs commissioned 
by various US think tanks. For instance according to the Nixon Centre, in Central Asia, ‘HT has 
now entered the third stage in which they will try to overthrow governments’ (Baran, 2004a:87) 
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whilst under the heading ‘What HT Wants (in Central Asia)’ the International Crisis Group 
(ICG) states: 
 
Hizb ut Tahrir’s agenda in Central Asia largely reflects the broader goals and 
methodology of the party’s international network. Its literature in the region makes the 
same two central demands: creation of an Islamic society and the establishment of an 
Islamic state, the Caliphate (2003:25) 
 
 
Figure 4.3 HT's strategy in Uzbekistan 
 
Without a clear conception of HT’s theoretical basis for its activism, interpreting HT’s political 
objectives from its literature and actions can be very difficult and easily misread in the context of 
Central Asia. This is because; at times HT has been forced to issue public denouncements of 
Karimov’s violent posturing towards the movement and its members. As a result Karimov has 
been a consistent focus of attack for his authoritarian rule and the dire economic and social 
conditions in Uzbekistan under his leadership. As a result, HT has had to walk a fine line 
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between its non-majaal strategy of building its membership and educating the masses against 
that of agitating them against the regime.  The open and public nature of its leafleting campaigns 
addressing the relationship between the interests of the Uzbek people against that of the regime 
has forced a seeming anomaly in its activism and confusion as to its political position. This 
cannot be reconciled without recourse to its canonical guidelines on its political programme 
outside of its majaal (see chapter 2).  
 
Another confusion which exists is concerning its approach and relationship with the security 
services. The brutal nature of the Uzbek regimes crackdown and treatment of its members has 
forced it to seek protection amongst people in the state, security and army apparatus. In his 
interviews with HT members in Uzbekistan, Ahmed Rashid confirms both the policy and 
somewhat success of the movement in infiltrating the organs of state in that ‘HT leaders are 
confident that they are winning support from within Karimov’s inner circle, and they do have 
sympathisers in the army, the intelligence services and the upper echelons of the bureaucracy…’ 
(2002:124). Again, this aspect of HT’s work has been largely misconstrued as an attempt to 
influence support for the seizure of power. In an official response to the Uzbek regime, HT 
makes direct reference of its influence as well as a rejection against the allegation that its 
penetration of the state apparatus is designed to achieve such an objective through the removal of 
Karimov, stating that, ‘He can find from his security services that it is in our power to clamp or 
to liquidate him, should our chosen path allow us to act in this manner’.65   
 
                                                          
65 see Hizb-ut-Tahrir Explains its Position on Tashkent Bombings, 2004.  News Central Asia, [online] 22 
May. Available at; 
http://www.newscentralasia.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=775 [accessed 23.05.11] 
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The evolution and strategy of HT in Uzbekistan cannot be abstracted from its theoretical basis of 
what constitutes majaal and non-majaal. The mobilisation of extreme measures by the Uzbek 
regime, designed to eliminate the movement, have inadvertently forced it to respond in an 
unorthodox manner. However, its underlying strategy has not shifted and remains consistent with 
its position that Uzbekistan is not majaal and therefore not a target for power. Instead, moves to 
securitize HT corresponds to a wider policy initiated by Islam Karimov and the Uzbek regime 
designed to protect its monopoly on power by manufacturing a threat posed by political Islam in 
general. 
 
4.3 Islam Karimov and the Securitisation of Political Islam 
Since the eighth century, Islam has dominated religious practice in Uzbekistan. Also due to its 
location between Eurasia and the Silk Road as well the position the cities of Samarkand and 
Bokhara occupy in the history of Islamic intellectual tradition, it is the most important Islamic 
country in the region (Karagiannis, 2010:21). Rigorous attempts by the Soviet Union to eradicate 
Islam from Central Asia especially under Stalin in the 1950’s and 60’s proved futile as Islamic 
practices moved and flourished underground through official and unofficial mosques.66 It was 
                                                          
 
66  The Soviet takeover severely restricted the practice of the Islamic faith under its territories. From the 1920’s to 
World War 2 (WW2), interpretation of the traditional Hanafi madhab was severely curtailed. The majority of the 
Uzbeks follow a mystical form of Islam with a rich heritage of During WW2 the Soviets set up the Muslim 
Religious Administration in order to administer and monitor the Muslims under its territory. The situation was 
particularly grim under the rule of Stalin where many of the theologians were persecuted and their religious 
seminaries closed down. As a result, much of the Islamic instruction went underground until the easing of the 
situation in the 1980’s under Gorbachev’s reforms and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union. However, there 
remains a controversy as to the implementation of the reforms. Whilst glasnost was applied in the Soviet hierarchy, 
its implementation on the Central Asian states remained selective. During the Soviet period, many of the theologians 
either withdrew to the Ferghana valley whilst others adapted to the situation by moving to Tashkent. This had an 
enormous impact on the seminaries and position of Samarkand and Bokhari as the traditional heartland of religious 
instruction in Uzbekistan see Martha Brill Olcott and Diora Ziaeva, Islam in Uzbekistan: Religious Education and 
State Ideology, Carnegie Papers,  91 (July, 2008), pp.1-52, see Adeeb Khalid, A Secular Islam: Nation, State and 
Religion in Uzbekistan, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 4 (November 2003), pp. 573-598, see also 
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during Gorbachev’s glasnost period in the late 1980s, when restrictions on religious practice 
were loosened in Uzbekistan and both the government and private organizations became 
involved in frenetic activity to establish new mosques and madrassas (HRW, 2004).  
 
Islam Karimov came to power in March 1990 after being elected by the Uzbek parliament. In 
1995, Karimov extended his term by five years to 2000 through a referendum and in the same 
year he won the presidential elections through elections which were heavily criticized by the 
international community as being rigged. In 2007, Karimov won the presidential election after 
being virtually unopposed.  Ironically, despite being a major figure in the Uzbek Communist 
party at the end of the Soviet period, Islam Karimov had a large hand in bringing about the 
permissiveness towards Islam (Crosston, 2006:117) and was in part responsible for the re-
Islamisation of the Uzbek state (Karagiannis, 2006:264). His apparent philosophy was 
highlighted in his book, Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twentieth Century (1998), where 
Karimov argued that Uzbek identity could not be separated from Muslim identity, he wrote, 
'Islam is the religion of our forefathers, the substance and essence of the Muslims' daily 
existence' (1998:18). Moreover, in the 1990’s a number of initiatives were undertaken by the 
Uzbek leader to bolster his religious credentials. However, analysts have generally doubted 
Karimov’s motives for both the personal and societal Islamisation. According to Crosston, ‘He 
acted like the good Muslim when he assumed the presidency in 1991, he went on a pilgrimage to 
Mecca and symbolically placed his right hand on a copy of the Koran for his swearing in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
William Fierman, Policies Towards Islam in Uzbekistan in the Gorbachev Era, The Journal of Nationalism and 
Ethnicity, 22:1 (1994), pp.225-246 and Reuel Hanks, Repression as Reform in the Early Glasnost Period, Religion, 
State and Society, 29:3 (2001), pp. 227-239. For a more comprehensive history of the Uzbeks and the role of Islam 
in Uzbek identity and society see Edward A. Allworth (1990) The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to 
the Present, Stanford: Hoover Press, pp.141-155 
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ceremony’ (2006:117) whilst Karagiannis argues that, ‘the Karimov regime has attempted to 
utilize the Muslim religion as a tool in solidifying its monopoly on power, while fostering 
patriotism among ethnic Uzbeks (2006:264). Craig Murray, former UK ambassador to 
Uzbekistan and a harsh critic of the regime implies that for Karimov, Islam was essentially a tool 
for protecting his personal interests. He asserts; 
 
In 1991, when the hard-line communists launched a military coup against President 
Gorbachev, junior politburo member President Karimov of the Uzbek Socialist Republic, 
and the other Central Asian leaders within the USSR, supported the hard-line 
Communists. They were bitterly opposed to the break-up of the Soviet Union, which 
threatened their harsh and corrupt control over their fiefdoms (2006:36) 
 
Whatever the case, the events soon after independence seem to have convinced Karimov that 
involving Islam as a major component of strategy was counter-productive and could not be 
maintained. The civil war in Tajikistan in the early 1990s, between the government on one side 
and democracy advocates and Islamists on the other, added to the creation of fear in Karimov of 
domestic unrest and a challenge to his authority. Such was the anxiety that even after Tajikistan’s 
internal rupture had passed, Karimov continued to refer to it as a cautionary example for 
Uzbekistan arguing that if harsh measures against extremism were not taken, ‘Tajikistan will 
come to Uzbekistan  tomorrow’.67 Instead there was a renewed determination to maintain a strict 
secular division between Islam, state and society. In his book, under the chapter of ‘religious 
extremism and fundamentalism’ Karimov declares that those that have called for religions role in 
                                                          
67 As quoted in Uzbek radio second program, Tashkent, May 1, 1998, English translation in 
BBC Monitoring, May 5, 1998 
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society have been the greatest cause of its destabilisation because, ‘unfortunately, the history of 
mankind has many examples of people’s faith, a component of religious consciousness, being 
used not as a constructive power but as a destructive force, as fanaticism’ (1997:21). 
 
Karimov first realised the extent of the sentiment towards Islam’s role in public life and its threat 
to the secular constitution when he visited the deeply conservative region of the Ferghana Valley 
in 1991 where a local militia named Adolat (Justice), the precursor of the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU), had become very popular after virtually eliminating rampant crime and fear 
through a mercenary application of Islamic laws.  During his visit, Karimov was horrified to find 
that although Adolat was not a revolutionary movement aimed at taking over the country and 
creating an Islamic state, its call for official recognition, constituted a direct challenge to his rule 
and philosophy. According to Crosston, 
 
Their (Adolat) efforts at official recognition from Karimov gave them more than they 
bargained for. Karimov at first so supported Adolat that he visited Namangan in 1992. He 
was greeted however with crowds of Islamist supporters demanding Adolat’s legalisation. 
Karimov did not anticipate such passion. He thought he was entering the Ferghana Valley 
as an adored leader. Instead he left Namangan shaken and disturbed at no longer being the 
master across all of his own territory (2006:118)  
 
As a consequence of this feeling of personal humiliation and direct challenge to his authority a 
wave of repression and arrests descended not only on Adolat members but any Muslim 
considered politically active in dress or deed.   Consequently, the Uzbek leadership embarked 
upon a policy of eliminating independent Islamic groups which Akbarzadeh (2003) argues was 
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designed to eradicate their ability to launch Islamically inspired political initiatives and which 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2004) characterised as a fear of unsanctioned religious activity 
remnant of the Soviet legacy which in this instance was aimed at eliminating political Islam. 
Such was the totality of the thrust against ‘non-officialised’ Islam that even the most moderate of 
movements faced extinction, as Crosston states ‘ if they cannot be legally moderate then they 
will inevitably become illegally radical’ (2006:118).  
 
In, 1998, the totality of the oppression was stunning after Karimov instituted a wave of draconian 
laws against the political mobilisation of Islam in particular and that of political dissent in 
general. With the 1998 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations, the 
government signalled its intent on systematically annihilating such organised activity, including 
that of religious minority groups.68 The law went beyond targeting organised movements and 
included individual expressions of faith and extended the remit of guilt to friends and families of 
those accused.  
 
4.4 Emergency Measures Against HT 
The 1998 law categorically denied any tolerance of HT’s ideas and basis of association. Any 
notion of HT registering was not a viable option. However, it was Article 159 entitled 
‘Encroachment on the Constitutional Order of the Republic of Uzbekistan’ which proved 
instrumental in mobilising emergency measures against HT by establishing its ideology, activism 
and call for the establishment of the Caliphate (even the future vision of it in Uzbekistan) as 
constituting an existential threat to the state. According to the article; 
                                                          
68 The Norwegian based news service Forum 18 is dedicated to highlighting religious oppression. See 
www.forum18.org  
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Public appeals to unconstitutionally change the existing governmental system, to seize 
power to remove from office legally elected or appointed representatives, or to 
unconstitutionally disrupt the territorial unity of the Republic of Uzbekistan, as well as 
distribution of material with such content are punishable with a fine of up to fifty times the 
minimum wage of imprisonment up to three years (HRW, 2004) 
 
During the passage of the law, Karimov railed against the Islamists and consequently, a major 
crackdown occurred on all elements of society seen as participating, associating or supporting 
organised Islam in general and HT in particular (Rashid, 2006:125). As a result, there are more 
HT prisoners in Uzbekistan’s jails than from any other movement, including from that of the 
IMU (ibid: 115).  One of the most comprehensive studies undertaken on the Uzbek repression of 
HT was in 2004 by the US based Human Rights Watch (HRW) entitled ‘Creating Enemies of the 
State: Religious Persecution in Uzbekistan’ which not only confirmed the widespread onslaught 
against ‘unofficial Islam’ in the name of preserving secularism but also highlighted the specific 
targeting of HT. According to HRW; 
 
For the past decade, with increasing intensity, the government of Uzbekistan has 
persecuted independent Muslims. This campaign of religious persecution has resulted in 
the arrest, torture, public degradation, and incarceration in grossly inhumane conditions of 
an estimated 7,000 people…The most numerous targets were adherents of the nonviolent 
group Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation), whose teachings in favor of an Islamic state 
the government finds seditious. In the early and mid-1990s, the government justified the 
repression of independent Islam as an effort to preserve secularism (2004:1) 
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Estimates of political prisoners held by the Uzbek government vary considerably depending on 
the party concerned. The table below provides a selection of data concerning prisoner numbers 
between 2000- 2004, the years in which most NGO’s and other parties published their figures.  
 
Organisation Political Prisoners (Total) HT Members (of Total) 
Hizb ut Tahrir Uzbekistan 10000 4000 
Amnesty International 6000 4000 
Human Rights Watch 7000 4500 
Memorial 8000 - 
Independent Human Rights 
Organisation of Uzbekistan 
7600 5150 
US State Department 5500 4500 
 
Figure 4.4 Data on HT and other political prisoners in Uzbekistan 
 
The United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHCR) and all the human rights 
organisations working in Uzbekistan have been unified in their criticism of the Uzbek regimes 
widespread systematic repression and torture of political activists and civil society members.69 
The situation still persists. According to its 2011 World Report on Uzbekistan, HRW states;  
                                                          
69 Human Rights Committee Report, 2010. United Nations [online] Available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/hrct719.doc.htm [accessed 10.05.11]. 
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Uzbekistan's human rights record remains abysmal, with no substantive improvement in 
2010. Authorities continue to crackdown on civil society activists, opposition members, 
and independent journalists, and to persecute religious believers who worship outside 
strict state controls. Freedom of expression remains severely limited…The judiciary lacks 
independence, and the parliament is too weak to curtail the reach of executive power.70 
 
The nature of the torture reported is quite chilling, widespread and systematic. In addition to the 
torture documented by the international human rights organisations, Mukhammadsolykh Abutov 
published an autobiography detailing his eight and a half year internment at an Uzbek labour 
camp having been convicted for his religious beliefs.71 The most notorious acts of torture have 
been documented against HT members in 2002, that of being boiled alive. This was confirmed 
by a forensic report commissioned by the British embassy in Tashkent72 as well as by Galima 
Bukharbaeva in her report for the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) entitled ‘Uzbek 
Prison Brutality’ (2005) based on a visit to Jaslyk prison camp where the incident occurred and 
where many HT members were imprisoned. The report states, ‘The "religious" prisoners were 
mostly accused of being members of Hizb ut-Tahrir… Prisoners said that the brutality continued 
until August 2002, when two convicted members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, Muzaffar Avazov and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
70  Human Rights Watch, 2011. World Report 2011:Uzbekistan,  [online] Available at; 
http://www.hrw.org/en/world-report-2011/uzbekistan   [accessed 09.05.11] 
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71 MAbutov M. 2007, ‘A Brief Autobiography’, Human Rights in Ukraine [online] Available at: 
http://www.khpg.org.ua/en/index.php?id=1194285574 [accessed 27.06.11] 
 
72  see Walsh, N. 2003. ‘US Looks Away as New Ally Tortures Islamists’. Guardian, [online] 26 May. Available at; 
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Husniddin Alimov, died after having boiling water poured over them’.73 The HT leadership in 
Uzbekistan released a series of internal memos from time to time, distributed to its members 
worldwide wherein it highlighted the repression and torture not only amongst its own members 
but also that of other Islamic activists. The memos were subsequently publicised by its branch in 
the UK and used as a basis for internationalising the plight of HT members in Uzbekistan 
followed by a campaign against Karimov and his regime from London. In 2009 a memo was 
released by HT’ globally in which an urgent message was relayed by the leader of HT in 
Uzbekistan alleging that the repression of its members had been intensified and widened to 
include women and children. According to the memo; 
 
Notwithstanding the oppressive imprisonment of the Shabab (members and students), the 
corrupt regime has resorted to new tactics by imprisoning their relatives, some even under 
15 years old! They have also imprisoned some of the wives and daughters of the Shabab, 
Including some under the age 15! They have also imprisoned women whom their 
husbands are either already imprisoned or previously martyred.74 
 
The general view however concerning the repressive laws was that it had very little impact on 
curtailing the Islamic movements, especially the jihadist ones, as for the non-violent ones such as 
                                                          
73  Bukharbaeva G. 2005. ‘Uzbek Prison Brutality’. IWPR, [online] 21 Feb. Available at; 
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tortured in Uzbekistan see ‘The Persecution of Hizb ut Tahrir in Uzbekistan’ 2002. (unkown author) [online]. 
Available at  http://www.scribd.com/doc/19628454/Persecution-of-Hizb-ut-Tahrir-Uzbekistan [accessed 27.06.11] 
 
74 ‘Urgent Message from the Shabab of Hizb ut Tahrir in Uzbekistan 2009, HT [online] Available at; 
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HT it heightened their appeal and widened its support base (Rashid 2002, Crosston 2006, Hiro 
2009 and Karagiannis 2004). Bearing in mind that HT had very little exposure at this stage in 
Uzbekistan, the magnitude of the focus on the movement by the Uzbek government far 
outweighed its influence and contributed to the widespread understanding that Karimov’s 
securitisation moves against HT had more to do with manufacturing a threat in order to justify 
further repression, seek foreign support and legitimacy to neutralise pressure for reform. Murray 
asserts that consequently the threat of belonging to HT was yielded in an all encompassing 
manner upon activists and individuals from all political persuasions. He states; 
 
Karimov needs a radical Islamic enemy he can point to [in order to] justify continued 
repression and to frighten people with the bogey-man of the Taliban style 
government…HT fills this need and therefore HT leaflets are routinely planted on political 
dissidents of all persuasion (2006:225) 
 
It seems therefore that the securitisation move in the form of a deliberate provocation of HT had 
very little to do with the actual security threat posed by HT to the Uzbek government. HRW 
(2004) effectively argues that HT was deliberately provoked into a public response where none 
had existed before 1995. Rashid (2006) adds that the change in HT’s literature from the use of 
Arabic which had limited appeal to that of Uzbek was a key factor in upgrading HT’s threat 
perception by the regime. The literature became more relevant to the realities of Uzbekistan and 
the message started to have an immediate impact, evidenced by the sudden growth in its 
membership after the change in language (HRW, 2004:39). However, it was the pace of the 
growth rather than the potency of the message which seemed to have unnerved the Uzbek regime 
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and others in Central Asia, especially since HT had clearly not identified Uzbekistan as majaal 
and seemed disinterested in politically challenging the regime As Rashid observes; 
 
One of the most intriguing questions about Islamic movements in Central Asia is how a 
highly secretive, pan Islamic movement that originated in the Middle East and largely 
does not even address pertinent issues of public concern in Central Asia has become the 
most popular, widespread underground movement in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan (2006:115).  
 
In the mind of the regime, HT had become an existential threat and its movement to the apex of 
Uzbekistan’s security agenda was justified through the deployment of extraordinary measures 
and the public use of the speech act.  
 
4.5 Efforts to Securitize HT as a Terrorist Movement 
Beginning in 1998, the Uzbek regime started to combat political Islam by referring to the need to 
prevent terrorism, and today the government places the arrests of many firmly in the context of 
the global campaign against terrorism begun in response to the events of September 11, 2001 
(HRW: 2004).The thrust of the Uzbek regimes efforts to securitize HT have been linked to 
assertions of HT’s involvement in political violence and by extension efforts to categorise it as a 
terrorist movement. Stuart Horseman in his evaluation of ‘Themes in Official Discourses on 
Terrorism in Central Asia’ (2005) argues that the Uzbek government has developed a ‘discourse 
of danger’ under which terrorism has been used in an amorphous manner wherein the non-
violent ideology and goals of HT have been securitised under the definition of terrorism.  
Horseman states; 
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The debate over definitions has been most acute and illustrative in relation to the extremist 
group; HT. HT has been described as a terrorist organization by the regional governments 
for two reasons. First, it is claimed that HT has been involved in terrorist incidents in the 
region. Second, its ideology and ultimate goal, the establishment of a caliphate throughout 
the umma and not just Central Asia, fall into a wider definition of terrorism, based on 
intent and rhetoric and not necessarily the advancement of physical violence (2005:2002). 
 
The Uzbek regime makes no demarcation between the use of or the threat of violence, the 
promotion of non-violent but radical ideas, and between political violence and general 
criminality. Uzbekistan's 2000 draft Bill on Terrorism, for example, defined terrorism as 'socially 
dangerous wrong doing' while Article 244 of its Criminal Code draws together in its proscription 
'the activities of religious organisations, movements, sects and others which support terrorism, 
drug trafficking and organised crime' (ibid). The main arguments as to why Uzbekistan considers 
HT to be a terrorist organisation is in the document entitled ‘Materials on Religious-Extremist 
Organization "Hizb ut-Tahrir", With Proofs of its Participation in Terrorist Activity’ (undated) 
which was to be found on the website of its Consul in Athens, Greece. It charged HT with the 
following acts; 
 
Organization, programming, preparation and realization of terrorists acts; Instigation to 
terrorist acts, violence over natural persons or the organizations, destruction of material 
objects in the terrorist purposes; Organization of illegal armed bands, criminal 
communities and terrorist groupings, and participation in such actions; Recruitment, 
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support in ammunition, terrorists training; Financing of obviously terrorist organizations 
either terrorist groups or rendering other assistance to them.75 
 
The difficulty in finding internal and external legitimacy for a crackdown on ‘non-violent’ forms 
of activism essentially forced the Uzbek regime to make securitising moves against HT on the 
premise of it being a terrorist outfit. Efforts were made to link HT with a number of bombings in 
the capital and with violent uprisings against the state.  
 
The first step was taken after five car bombs exploded in Tashkent in 1999, killing 16 people and 
injuring more than 100 others. The bombs appeared to be aimed at government targets; one went 
off along the road used by President Islam Karimov to travel to work.76 Although there was no 
claim of responsibility, the primary focus descended upon Hezbollah (linked to Lebanese 
branch) and the IMU. HT was to the surprise of many also named by the Uzbek authorities as 
among the primary suspects77. The Uzbek authorities wasted no time in framing the assassination 
attempt under the general security paradigm of ‘religious extremism’.78 Karimov went onto state 
television and vowed to strike back at those responsible for the blasts and ‘cut off their hands’ 
whilst the head of Uzbekistan's National Security Service, Rustam Inoyatov, said that the 
explosions in Tashkent were the work of "foreign extremist and terrorist organizations and 
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people who have relations with them". 79 According to HRW, whilst previously scattered and 
selective, the arrests of HT members after the bombings occurred ‘enmasse’ (2004:26). The 
implication of HT’s involvement in a ‘violent’ act brought it into the sphere of clearer legislation 
concerning terrorism but no credible evidence has been forthcoming as yet by the Uzbek regime 
concerning a break in HT’s fifty year modus operandi. According to the Peimani at the John 
Hopkins Central Asia-Caucus Institute; 
 
The Uzbek government has yet to produce any concrete evidence to back its blaming the 
Hizb-ut-Tahrir for the terrorist acts. Unless the group has secretly changed its policy of 
non-violence, there are no grounds to charge Hizb-ut-Tahrir with masterminding the 
recent wave of violence.80 
 
Due to the secretive nature of the Uzbek regime very little official information is available 
concerning the bombings and instead alternative theories have emerged which indicate the 
bombings to have been the hallmark of an internal feud involving possible drug cartels and rival 
clans.81 This is purported to have been covered up and capitalized upon by Karimov as an 
opportunity to find legitimacy for his policy to further crackdown on Islamic parties and wider 
political dissent. The theories were fuelled by academic investigations, statements by the 
opposition as well as dissidents from the Uzbek security services.82 The overwhelming suspicion 
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over the credibility of the regimes position forced the security services into holding a special 
briefing in 2003, in order to dispel accusations of its complicity in the Tashkent bombings.83  
 
Yet, in spite of the criticisms and credibility of the government’s evidence concerning the 1999 
bombings, the Uzbek regime received a boost when its version of events concerning the 
involvement of the IMU was accepted and the US State department added the movement to the 
list of foreign terrorist organizations. According to the report, ‘The IMU primarily targeted 
Uzbek interests before October 2001 and is believed to have been responsible for several 
explosions in Tashkent in February 1999’.84 As for HT, the US resisted Uzbek pressure for its 
inclusion as a terrorist organization especially after the events of 9/11 and the subsequent US 
requirement for Uzbek strategic assistance for operations against the Taliban in order to step up 
its crackdown on HT. Karagiannis states, 
 
[the] Karimov regime has skillfully portrayed itself as a pro-Western bastion of secularism 
and democracy that is fighting its own ‘‘war on terrorism’’ against Islamic militants. With 
this framing, Tashkent has lobbied unsuccessfully for years to persuade Western 
governments to declare Hizb ut-Tahrir a terrorist organization (2006:328)  
 
The critical shift in Karimov’s securitization move against HT occurred on March 29th, 2004, 
when he directly linked the movement to another series of bombings, shootings and suicide 
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attacks in Tashkent. In the ruins, Uzbek police reported finding extensive traces of plastic 
explosives, aluminum powder, automatic weapons, a radio transmitter and HT literature.85 The 
Middle East Information and Research Project (MEIRP) reported that, ‘the explosions, and the 
alleged discovery of HT pamphlets at one bombed-out home, have provided the government with 
new "facts" revealing a link between the Islamist party and terrorism’. Interestingly, in the period 
before the attacks, the Uzbek government had embarked on a media campaign against HT 
spearheaded by Uzbek Youth Radio aimed at discouraging Uzbeks from joining the movement. 
According to a broadcast on March 8, ‘The wicked Hizb-ut-Tahrir, after entering our country, 
has been brainwashing our young people and hatching various plots to seize power by force.’ 
86This was followed by an editorial aired three days earlier purporting that HT endeavored to use 
jihad and by insinuation, terrorism in order to take power, ‘Hizb-ut-Tahrir members claim they 
are going to come to power by peaceful means. However, their leaflets call on their supporters to 
wage the holy war, jihad.’87    Yet despite this, the credibility of the government’s version of 
events was again questioned as were its motives. The points in question related to knowledge of 
the attacks held by the security services and the absence of any desire to provide credible 
evidence for their assertions. According to MEIRP; 
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During a TV appearance on March 29, Karimov stated that he knew that the "terrorist" 
actions had been plotted six months in advance...But Karimov's statement begged the 
question of why the government failed to prevent the incidents if they knew of the plots 
beforehand. In general, the Uzbek media, like regime officials, were very generous with 
their conclusions about the provenance of the explosions, but very miserly with supporting 
facts. Yet, the regime spokesmen were quick to name Hizb-ut-Tahrir, as well as the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and unspecified "Wahhabis," as the prime 
suspects in the violence.88 
 
Karimov’s intention of singling out HT exclusively as the primary security concern went a step 
further in July, 2004, after bomb attacks occurred outside of the Israeli and US embassies in 
Tashkent. Karimov’s single minded attempt to pursue HT became evident when he dismissed 
both the Uzbek prosecutor’s assertion that the bombings had been carried out by the IMU and 
ignored the claim of responsibility for the attacks from a new movement calling itself the Islamic 
Jihad Group of Uzbekistan (IJU) (which allegedly had also claimed responsibility for the March 
28 bombings),89 and instead assailed HT as the primary culprit for both the March and July 
attacks. In a televised speech on July 31, 2004, Karimov stated that, ‘they were organized by 
members of the same group, that they acted in accordance with one plan and that they were 
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pursuing the same aim’.90 He went onto question how it was possible for HT to fulfill its aims in 
Uzbekistan without violence, adding that; 
 
If the religious movement [Hizb-ut-Tahrir] intends to set up a caliphate in Uzbekistan, 
overthrow the current system, give up the modern style of life and create a state based on 
Shari'a [Islamic] law, then how will they be able to do this is a peaceful way.91 
 
HT, denied any responsibility for the attacks and retorted with a warning that it had the influence 
and the means to remove Karimov directly if it chose the path of violence but it had refused to do 
so and instead would wait for the establishment of the Caliphate elsewhere, confirmation that it 
was not targeting immediate change in Uzbekistan;   According to the statement: 
 
If we ever decide to include violence in our programme, we shall not blow up now here, 
now there; we shall go directly to his [Karimov’s] palace and liquidate him because we are 
not afraid of anyone but God Almighty. Karimov himself understands that we can do it. 
He can find from his security services that it is in our power to clamp or to liquidate him, 
should our chosen path allow us to act in this manne[r]92  
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Craig Murray questioned not only the veracity of the Uzbek accounts concerning the March 
bombings but the existence of the IJU citing both as creations of the Uzbek security services in 
alliance with German and US intelligence. Drawing upon his personal eye witness account of the 
bombings and the intelligence he received whilst he was UK ambassador in Uzbekistan, Murray 
alleges that, 
 
In fact, there were no bombs in Tashkent in 2004. I was able personally to inspect each of 
the alleged bomb sites within hours – and in one case minutes – of the alleged explosions, 
and there were no bombs…The purpose of the false bombing campaign was to provide 
cover for the shooting dead of several dozen dissidents, and more importantly to establish 
a new black ops “terror” group, the “Islamic Jihad Union”. This group, never heard of 
before, was immediately blamed by the Uzbek government for the “bombs”.93 
 
The evident problem therefore that Karimov seems to have been encountering in his attempts to 
push HT to the apex of his security agenda was related not only to the veracity of accounts 
related to the bombings but more succinctly on how to convince a domestic and international 
audience that HT was indeed a terrorist movement which had adopted violence as a means of 
toppling the government and establishing a Caliphate. Even though this had proven largely 
unsuccessful, especially amongst skeptical governments in the West and NGOs worldwide, the 
increase in the repression of HT members elicited a discussion as to what extent its membership 
will endure the onslaught and whether some members would become radicalized, break rank and 
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opt for a violent response. The efficacy of this debate will be discussed later, but in the context of 
Karimov’s securitization initiatives, a speculative article by Alisher Khadimov in 2003, based on 
information from Kyrgyz security forces and published by the national newspaper Vecherny 
Bishkek, alleged that evidence existed that HT in Central Asia was facing an internal split over 
strategy and tactics which could possibly lead to violent splinter groups. According to 
Khadimov, ‘Observers believe that factionalism within Hizb-ut-Tahrir could cause the 
organization to adopt more confrontational tactics, or result in the creation of new groups that 
embrace terrorist methods akin to al-Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.’94 Two 
such groups were promoted as offshoots of HT, Hizb un Nusrah and Akramiya. The ICG in its 
report, ‘IMU and Hizb-ut-Tahrir: Implications of the Afghanistan Campaign’ (2002) claimed 
that Hizb un Nusrah (HuN) had appeared in Tashkent in 1999 with Bakhtiar Babadjanov in his 
report ‘Islam in the Social and Political Life of Uzbekistan’ (2002), alleging that HuN had 
become disenchanted with HT’s passive leafleting campaigns and urged that more ‘radical 
efforts’ were required, although what this entailed was not substantiated by any evidence of 
structural etc links with HT.95  
 
In contrast to the HuN, global focus descended upon Akromiya after it was alleged to have been 
involved in an armed attack on a military unit and prison in Andijon between 13th-14th May 2005, 
followed by a mass gathering of unarmed civilians in the city centre, the seizure of the regional 
administration building and the holding of a number of hostages there, and culminating in a 
                                                          
 
94 see Khadimov, A. 2003. Hizb ut Tahrir Faces Internal Split in Central Asia.  Eurasianet.org, [online] 20 Oct. 
Available at; 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav202103.shtml [accessed 22.05.11] 
 
 
95 Ibid 
173 
 
disputed number of unarmed persons being shot dead by internal and external security forces as 
they departed the square and the city. Uzbek authorities refuted the allegations by human rights 
organizations and independent journalist that a massacre had been conducted by the Uzbek 
regime by putting the blame onto a newly cited group Akromiya, calling it a terrorist organization 
linked to HT which had fomented violence against the regime by using crowds as a cover, killing 
and wounding 10 government troops and many protestors. In a press conference held in Tashkent 
on the 14th of May, immediately after the events, Karimov stated; 
 
The organizers of the unrest were 'Akromites,' a new offshoot of the Hizb ut-Tahrir 
group. Its goals, which are unacceptable for us, are hatred and denial of the secular 
way of development…According to the information we have, they are 
brainwashing young people with ideas of creating a unified Islamic state.96 
 
HT dismissed these allegations and blamed Karimov for organizing a massacre in Andijon with 
the help of Russia and Kyrgyzstan. HT claims to have had insider knowledge that such an event 
was going to occur. In a leaflet distributed after the event entitled This is How the Butcher of 
Andijon Executed his Crime (2005), HT alleged that Karimov’s plan was to head off the prospect 
of any color revolution from spreading from Kyrgyzstan to Uzbekistan by inserting security 
services amongst the civilians and inciting them against the regime in order to identify the 
leaders of the opposition and then eliminating them along with their supporters through the use 
of 5000 Russian troops as the loyalty of Uzbek troops might falter and Russia considered HT to 
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Available at; http://reliefweb.int/node/173615 [accessed 23.05.11] 
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be a terrorist organization.97 HT’s account originated from its members, some of who were 
amongst the crowd whilst others were alleged to have been the first victims. As for Akromiya, 
HT did not provide much information on it except that it considered Karimov and not Akromiya 
to be behind the massacres. From the manner in which it referred to Akromiya it was unclear 
whether it was aware of the existence of such a movement or merely stating what Karimov had 
concluded, referring to it as a ‘small Islamic group’. According to HT; 
 
On Saturday evening, 14th May 6 pm local Uzbek time, Uzbek TV broadcasted a press 
conference by the butcher, Karimov. Karimov accused Hizb ut-Tahrir of being behind these 
events. Karimov accused a small Islamic group (Akromiyah) of attacking the prison, opening 
its doors and killing those prisoners who did not rebel with them, whilst it was Karimov’s 
group itself that killed the prisoners inside the prison and outside it and not Akromiyah.98  
 
The inability of observers to arrive at a clear understanding over both the event and Akromiya 
has been compounded by the Uzbek regime’s refusal to allow an international inquiry. However, 
critical questions have emerged as to why there was virtually no information on Akromiya before 
Andijon and why as the chapter will discuss later, some academics and think tanks in the West 
have taken the Uzbek official version of Akromiya and securitized its connection with HT.  
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4.6 The Question of Akromiya and Domestic Academics as Securitizing Actors 
The sudden appearance of Akromiya and startled nature of the responses has lead to extreme 
differences amongst academics, governments and policy makers as to the Uzbek regimes 
portrayal of Akromiya as a terrorist organization and its link to HT. There are two polarized set 
of opinions towards this group. According to one view which is mostly presented by the Uzbek 
government and some local experts, “Akromiya” is an extremist Islamic organization with links 
to HT and harbors an intention to overthrow the secular constitutional order of Uzbekistan. The 
other camp denies that such an organization even exists.  
 
The basic assumption upon which HT is linked to Akromiya is the allegation that Akrom 
Yoldashev, its purported founder is a former member of HT who shares the same goal of 
establishing a Caliphate throughout the Central Asian region. According to the version presented 
by Babadjanov, (an academic at the Institute of Oriental Studies at Tashkent University and 
whose views have largely been accepted as the Uzbek official version), Yoldashev was recruited 
by Qasimov, purported to be the first Amir (leader) of HT cells in Uzbekistan and a former 
colleague as a student at the Andijon Institute in Cotton Agriculture between 1985-1990. 
According to Babadjanov; 
 
By 1991 Kasimov persuaded Yuldashev to join Hizb-ut-Tahrir. According to Qasimov, he 
was impressed by Yuldashev’s skills as a speaker and as someone capable of leading the 
provincial intellectuals, who comprised the middle and higher ranks of the local Hizb- ut-
Tahrir group. Moreover, Yuldashev appeared to have some entrepreneurial skills as well, 
profitably investing funds of the local branch of the party treasury. In a little more than a 
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year, Yuldashev announced his departure from the Hizb-ut-Tahrir and established his own 
group, to be later known as Akromiya (other names –Iymonchilar, Khalifatchilar).99  
 
Babadjanov brings indirect evidence linking Akromiya not only to jihad but also to the political 
aims of HT. The main thrust of his allegation relates to a reading of a hand written forty four 
page theological tract written by Yoldoshev entitled ‘Yimonga Yul’ (The Straight Path) in which 
he sets forth his philosophy.100 The work has been widely recognized as an innocent piece on 
asceticism and existentialism, propounding people to the virtues of individual faith and self 
purification. Despite this, Babadjanov argues that behind the abstract is a hidden call for jihad. 
Babadjanov asserts that,’Yuldashev developed the idea of jihad, although in a veiled form, as 
early as in 1992, from the moment he wrote the Iymongayu'l essay and establishing the first cell 
of the Akromiya organization’.101 Babadjanov further alleges that in a supplement to the book, 
Yoldoshev puts forward a five point plan for the establishment of the Islamic state which is a 
mirror strategy of HT’s three stage approach (Ilkhamov, 2006:45].  
 
Babadjanov’s view has been heavily criticized by Alisher Ilkhamov in his study entitled ‘The 
Phenomenology of “Akromiya”:Separating Facts from Fiction’ (2006), where  he accepts the 
early connection of Yoldashev with HT but dismisses Babadjanov’s characterization of 
Akromiya as a jihadist outfit arguing that this has been incorrectly interpreted from  texts  which 
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Yoldashev has not articulated (2006:44).   Moreover, Ilkhamov questions as to why Babadjanov 
changed his conception of Akromiya believing it to be amateur and utopian prior to Andijon and 
extremist after the events (ibid). Ilkhamov further questions the authenticity of the supplement 
relied upon by Babdjanov as the basis for his claims that Akromiya comprised an extremist outfit. 
He cites critical weaknesses in Babadjanov’s account concerning the manner in which he 
obtained it and the methodology he employed to verify its authenticity. According to Ilkhamov; 
 
What is most striking is that neither Yuldashev, nor anybody else from his circle, ever 
recognized his authorship of the supplement. Moreover, Babadjanov in one online 
discussion which preceded the Andijan events stated two important facts: at the time when 
he first time wrote on “Akromiya,” there had been several versions of “Yimonga Yul” in 
circulation, some with and others without the supplement. Badadjanov surprisingly did not 
even question and elaborate on the authenticity of the version with the supplement he 
personally used subsequently when denouncing “Akromiya”. In the interview with Forum 
18, he also acknowledged that the supplement was brought to his office from the 
Prosecutor investigation office, and not obtained from “Akromiya” members themselves. 
This thus opens questions as to the authenticity of the supplement he refers to and the 
basis for his accusations against Yuldashev. (2006:46) 
 
The veracity of Babadjanov’s assertions came under further scrutiny when in an exchange with 
famed journalist Igor Rotar after the prosecutor’s office referred this supplement to the Institute 
of Oriental Studies for expert analysis in 1999 and just before the second court case against 
Akram Yuldashev, Babadjanov contradicted himself and fostered a completely different position 
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on Akromiya asserting that the movement was apolitical with no evidence of seeking power. 
According to Rotar, Babajanov told Forum 18 on 13 June 2005; 
  
It is simply impossible to establish whether this outline accurately reflected Yuldashev’s 
views. The Yimonga Yul pamphlet is a purely theological, if not very academic tract. It is 
true that it contains nothing about politics and or a call for the forcible overthrow of 
authority.102 
 
Moreover, Rotar confirmed that Yoshaldev had denied any links with HT  or violence which was 
further affirmed by Uzbekistan’s former chief Mufti, Muhammed Sadyk Muhammed according 
to whom, ‘Akromiya has nothing in common with Hizb-ut-Tahrir, and other radical political 
Islamic organizations…It is for entirely different reasons that I consider Akram Yuldashev's 
teaching a heresy’.103  The discrepancy in Babadjanov’s account led Sarah Kendzior, in her 
insightful study on Akromiya to question the very existence of the movement claiming it to be a 
creation of the Uzbek security services where, ‘The Karimov administration appears to have 
gone from inventing fictional allegiances to a real organization to creating fiction about an 
organization itself (2006:547). In her article ‘Inventing Akromiya: The Role of Uzbek 
Propagandists in the Andijon Massacre’ (2006), she criticizes the role of international media 
outlets as well as Western academics and policy makers for adopting the account of Akromiya 
without proper verification of the propaganda instituted by the Uzbek authorities, security 
services, media and academics. According to Kendzior, ‘Akromiya’s intentions have been voiced 
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only by those who renounce Akromiya—that is, the Uzbek government and certain members of 
the academic and policy communities who support the government’s portrayal of the group. 
(This is excluding “confessions” made by alleged Akromiya members after weeks of torture in 
Uzbek prisons) (ibid). The same is with the case of HT’s linkage with the movement which is 
dismissed by default on the premise that Akromiya is a creation as is the idea that Akromiya’s 
goal of establishing a Caliphate through a structured process mirroring that of HT is merely 
coincidental. Kendzior asserts that; 
 
The similarity of Hizb-ut Tahrir and questionable Akromiya documents and depictions of 
writings likely led many to believe Karimov’s widely echoed pronouncement that the 
latter is a more violent version of the former. Given that the basis of information about 
Akromiya is in great doubt, it seems more likely that Hizb-ut Tahrir’s writings proved 
inspirational for a creator of fictitious terrorist doctrine. Correspondingly, the association 
of Hizb-ut-Tahrir with Akromiya was strengthened, placing the nonexistent group on 
equal footing with one of the greatest perceived threats to Central Asian security 
(2006:557) 
 
Both Ilkhamov’s and Kendzior’s conclusions not only question the genuineness of Uzbek 
academics involved in legitimizing Karimov’s ‘discourse of danger’ over Akromiya but called 
into serious question the very basis upon which Karimov had securitized HT. Their conclusions 
received a boost when Ikrom Yakubov, a dissident major in the Uzbek National Security Service 
(SNB) in an interview with the Scotland Herald in 2008 alleged that Karimov himself had 
ordered the 2004 Tashkent Bombings, the creation of Akromiya as well as the slaughter in 
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Andijon.104 Other damaging allegations were also made including the complicity of Karimov in 
the murder of Britain’s Richard Conroy, UN co-coordinator in Uzbekistan and CIA involvement 
in the torture sessions in Uzbekistan.105 Murray confirmed the authenticity of Yakubov’s 
intelligence position in the Uzbek National Security Agency (SNB). According to Yakubov, the 
reason why the SNB under Karimov’s orders had carried out the 2004 Tashkent bombings was 
because, ‘the intention was to show the world and Uzbekistan that only Karimov could 
guarantee peace and safety. It helped him maintain power’ also adding that this policy also 
involved the SNB ‘setting up fake Islamic terror groups to keep public panic ramped up’.106 
Yakubov’s testimony corresponded with much of what Murray had investigated during his time 
as ambassador in Tashkent and detailed in his book. Yet as the chapter will discuss later, both 
Murray’s and Yakubov’s testimonies were deliberately ignored by scholars and policy advisors.  
 
This encapsulate an aspect of HT’s securitization which is very peculiar to the Central Asian and 
especially to the Uzbek context namely the central role played by some leading Western 
academics and policy think tanks in popularizing a post 9/11 discourse of violence on HT, both 
at odds both with the history of HT, the established academic work and the positions of their own 
governments. In this sense they have become critical securitizing actors on HT and a key source 
for the Uzbek regimes efforts to procure international and domestic legitimacy for its portrayal of 
HT as an existential threat.  
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4.7 The Securitizing Influence of Western Actors on HT in Uzbekistan 
Whilst many studies have been critical of Karimov’s ‘manufactured threat’ as regards HT 
(Karagiannis 2004, ICG 2002, Krauss, Mayer 1994 and  Kendzior 2006)  a close relationship 
fostered between some Western academics and think tanks with the Uzbek regime has provided 
broad legitimacy for the securitization moves against the movement. A major implication of this 
provocative and controversial relationship has been a success in positioning the terms of debate 
onto the question of violence and within the framework of terrorism and in turn consolidating 
Karimov’s discourse on danger. The dominant nature of this controversial analysis in the post 
9/11 terrorism framework has managed to hijack the established and more thorough academic 
discourse (Cohen 1980, Farouki 1996, Karagiannis 2006) which rejects the idea that HT has any 
links with political violence. The narrative has largely been driven by certain US think tanks 
under the rubric of furthering US geopolitical interests in Eurasia. As with Karimov’s ‘discourse 
on danger’, the narrative has been politically suspect, poorly researched and incredibly alarmist.  
 
In 2003, The Heritage Foundation instigated the first shot at HT with a backgrounder by Ariel 
Cohen entitled, Hizb ut Tahrir: An Emerging Threat to US interests in Central Asia (2003) 
recommending that the US ‘prevent HT from destabilizing Central Asia. In order to achieve this 
Cohen frames HT as a terrorist movement which threatens global security by looking to acquire 
weapons of mass destruction and therefore constitutes a critical security concern to US interests 
in the region (2003:6-9). On the basis of these unsubstantiated claims, Cohen provides a 
speculative warning that ’Hizb ut Tahrir may launch terrorist attacks against US targets and 
allies, acting either alone or in cooperation with other global terrorists groups such as Al Qaeda’ 
(2003: 10). The Brookings Institute also thrust itself into the debate by commissioning a 
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monograph from Alisher Khamidov, (an academic with John Hopkins School of Advanced 
International Relations (SAIS) and one of the primary sources for linking HT with Akramiya) as 
part of its project on ‘US Policy towards the Islamic World’ which produced a study entitled, 
Countering the Call: The US, Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Religious Extremism in Central Asia (2003). 
Khamidov provides an alarmist and unsubstantiated assessment in which he accuses HT of 
having ‘vast trans-national networks, underground organizational structure and financial and 
technical knowhow’, which rendered it attractive to terrorist organizations (2003:15).  
 
Although both the Heritage Foundation’s and the Brooking’s monograph’s are provocative  and 
clearly designed to promote a critical security debate as regards HT, there is no evidence of any 
direct influence or link with Karimov’s attempted securitization of HT. The evidence of such a 
connection is to be found with other US policy think tanks, the Hudson Institute, Nixon Centre 
and the Central Asia- Caucus Institute (CACI) linked to John Hopkins University.  Three key 
personalities have been at the forefront of legitimizing Karimov’s securitization moves against 
HT, Zeyno Baran from the Hudson Institute (chief architect of the ‘conveyor belt’ theory), 
Frederic Starr, director of  CACI and Shirin Akiner, an academic from the University of London 
and official investigator into the Andizon incident on the invitation of the Uzbek government.   
 
Zeyno Baran has been the most prolific advocate of HT’s securitization in Western circles 
having commissioned a series of monographs on HT in Central Asia by US policy think tanks 
such as the Hudson Institute and the Nixon Centre. Her main work is centered on policy 
prescriptions for US energy security as director for the ‘international security and energy 
programme’ at the Hudson Institute and the Eurasia project at the Nixon Centre. With the US 
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focus on the Caspian energy basin in Central Asia in the post- Soviet period and the strategic 
dilemma in respect to the post 2001 US Afghan invasion and the requirement for military bases 
to supply US and NATO troops in Afghanistan, Baran’s policy work has endeared her to develop 
a close relationship with the Central Asian regimes. She has also established a close connection 
with the US government, especially Mathew Bryza, former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for Energy Security in Europe and Eurasia to whom Baran is now married.  
 
For this reason, Baran’s close relationship with Karimov and the corridors of power in 
Washington has opened her up to close scrutiny as to the objectivity of her work on HT when 
according to her own admission in 2003, she had ‘began second-track American efforts to 
engage with the Uzbekistani leadership to come up with better strategies to combat HT’s hold in 
Central Asia’ (2004a:134). She went onto confirm her relationship with the regime and its 
delegates in Washington by stating that she has ‘enjoyed the cooperation of the Uzbekistani 
government in its efforts, particularly that of former Uzbekistani Ambassador to the US Shavkat 
Khamrakulov and his successor, former Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Komilov’ as well as the 
‘assistance of current Foreign Minister Sadik Safaev (who served in Washington from 1996 to 
2000) has also been invaluable’ (ibid: 105).  
 
Although Baran is critical of the Uzbek regimes socio-economic policies, she has largely 
dismissed the accounts of Human Rights organizations as to their allegations of brutality against 
HT members. Baran’s and that of the Nixon Centre’s advisory role with the Uzbek regime 
became more apparent when in September, 2004, they convened a conference in Istanbul, 
Turkey entitled, Deciphering and Combating Radical Islamist Ideology: Should the War against 
184 
 
Terrorism be Extended to Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT)? It was quite obvious from the theme and the 
carefully chosen panel of guests that the aim of the conference was to chalk out a common 
position of security towards HT. According to Baran; 
 
The workshop…brought together a small group of scholars, policymakers and law 
enforcement officers from a wide range of countries that focus on HT. By then, 
Kyrgyzstani, Tajikistani and Kazakhstani policymakers had begun to concentrate on the 
threat posed by the group, and all three presidents sent their representatives. At this 
workshop, Central Asian government representatives were able to learn from other 
countries’ experiences in dealing with HT, including about the activities of the Turkish 
Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) (ibid: 106) 
 
The papers presented provided very little in terms of original discourse and much was 
questionable as regards evidentiary proof concerning sensational links with Al Qaeda in Iraq and 
elsewhere. The primary aim of this closed session was to foster a common position and one 
which could overcome the US government’s resistance to proscribe HT with the hope of 
developing a closer and more co-operative relationship with the Uzbek regime. The specific 
agenda for the Istanbul conference was revealed in an article by Baran in the US publication, The 
National Review entitled, ‘The Road from Tashkent to the Taliban 
An Islamist Terror Group is Undermining a U.S. ally’ (2004). Due to the problem in dealing 
with HT’s non-violent approach, Baran advanced the ‘conveyor belt’ theory, according to which, 
HT acted as an ideological consultant for terrorist movements such as the IMU even if it did not 
engage in violence itself. Baran states; 
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Whether HT employs violence is of great importance in the context of the global war on 
terror… At a recent two-day workshop, the Nixon Center organized a focused discussion 
on HT. International experts and law-enforcement agencies agreed that HT is a "conveyor 
belt" for producing terrorists… In short, while HT may not be operational itself, it is 
superbly positioned to channel people into undertaking the mission of the day… HT 
increasingly looks like an ideological launching pad for Muslim believers toward terrorist 
organizations such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which appears on the 
U.S. State Department's list of foreign terrorist organizations…] 107 
 
The article received a swift rebuke in the form of an open letter to Baran from Dr. Abdullah 
Robin, member of the executive committee of HT in the UK. The letter indicated that Robin had 
met Baran in London and despite confirming HT’s rejection of terrorism as well as its history of 
non-violence specifically in the case of Uzbekistan. Robin claims; 
 
Furthermore, your visit to London a few months ago, where we met and discussed at some 
length, was an opportunity to assist you in arriving at informed opinions regarding Hizb ut 
Tahrir and the plight of thousands of our members in Uzbek torture camps…The second 
approach is violent insurrection against our rulers in Uzbekistan and other Muslim 
countries. This also we reject. They ought; however, to expect the experts from the Nixon 
Center to know Hizb ut-Tahrir's political philosophy before they seek to guide American 
foreign policy further into the abyss.108 
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On closer scrutiny, it would seem that even the papers selected from non-Uzbek authors for the 
monograph from Istanbul conference had close connections with the Uzbek regime. For 
example, Mateen Siddqui was at the time vice- president of the Islamic Supreme Council of 
America (ISCA), an organization with which Karimov was keen to foster a relationship with and 
promote in Uzbekistan as a front against HT because of its apolitical and aesthetic notion of 
Islam. The ICSA’s executive director Hedieh Mirahmadi a former top aide to the US embassy in 
Kabul and who had become a well known apologist for the Karimov regime, had formed a close 
relationship with Baran. In writing the Nixon Center monograph "Hizb ut-Tahrir – Islam's 
Political Insurgency" (2004), Baran acknowledges the ‘tremendous intellectual and personal 
support’ given to her by Mirahmadi. More significantly, both the ICSA and Baran were involved 
in back channel relations with Karimov.  
 
The convergence between Baran and the ICSA occurred due to their shared conception that the 
aesthetic form of Islam, Sufism, was Uzbekistan’s prescription against HT. This was the thrust of 
her monograph which is based on a conference organized by the Nixon Centre entitled 
‘Understanding Sufism and its Potential Role in US Policy’ (2004).  The aim of the conference 
was to discuss how the US government could help promote in Eurasia, one of the largest sufistic 
orders, that of the Naqshbandi, and of which Sheikh Kabbani was the deputy. Kabbani was 
invited to give a keynote speech and Mirahmadi was one of the panelists who argued that the US 
needed to assist the Uzbek government in preserving its Sufi heritage in the face of an on 
onslaught from Wahabists (a term Karimov also uses to attack HT and those involved in 
politicizing Islam).   
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The conference was part of an ongoing relationship and policy which had been instituted a few 
years earlier between the ICSA, Uzbek government and now the Nixon Centre and the Hudson 
Institute. On November 30th 1999, the National Press Club in the US, held a meeting on "The 
Rise of Radicalism in Central Asia" where Mirahmadi, Abdur-Rashid Qari Bakhromov, the 
government appointed Mufti of Uzbekistan and Sadik Safaev, the Uzbek ambassador made 
speeches confirming support for each other. The ICSA was subsequently invited to observe the 
Uzbek elections in 2000 which were lambasted by the Organization of Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE) as farcical and a foregone conclusion, since even the opposition candidate 
voted for Karimov. Despite this, the elections were described by the ICSA as Uzbekistan’s 
‘second democratic elections since its emancipation from communism’.109   On September 8, 
2000 after the United Nations' Millennium Summit for world leaders, Karimov met with ICSA’s 
chairman Sheikh Kabbani in a private meeting in New York along with Mirahmadi in order to 
discuss an agenda opposing all forms of 'radicalism', whether ideological, cultural or political.  
 
That the Nixon Centre and the Hudson Institute effectively became lobbyists and securitizing 
actors for the Karimov regime in Washington becomes apparent in Baran’s testimonies to the 
Senate and Congress in Washington DC where she provides a pitch for her conveyor belt theory 
on HT. In her testimony on June, 15, 2004 to the House Committee on International Relations 
Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia entitled ‘Uzbekistan: The Key to Success in 
Central Asia?’, Baran laid out her recommendations for why engagement with Uzbekistan was 
critical for US interests in the region and why it needed to be supported as a victim in its fight against 
radical Islam in general and HT in particular. HT was identified as an existential threat facing 
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Uzbekistan because it converged with violent movements on the ideological objectives and 
consequently should be treated within the US counter terrorism policy.  She argues; 
 
The group that most effectively employs Islam to achieve political ends is Hizb-ut 
Tahrir (HT)… Unlike many others, however, HT hopes to achieve this goal 
peacefully… While Islamic Jihad, another exported group from the Middle East, took 
responsibility for the spring attacks in Uzbekistan, and terrorist organizations such as 
Al Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) target Uzbekistan, I think 
HT, which is not considered a terrorist organization, is an even more dangerous long-
term threat, as it is the elementary school for the ideological training of many other 
groups. While HT’s denials of its involvement in the spring attacks are probably true, 
the identity of those who gave the orders is irrelevant since HT—intentionally or 
unintentionally—creates the ideological foundation for violence. In short, HT and the 
Islamic militants fighting in Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Iraq have different tasks to 
complete, but are moving toward the same objective. 110 
 
It is also worth noting that the premise of HT’s existential threat to Uzbekistan is also argued 
upon an inaccurate application of its three stage approach and the failure to distinguish between 
HT’s majaal and non-majaal in claiming that, ‘at the last stage, when a critical mass is created 
outside the government, and a sufficient number of people at key positions in the military and police 
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are on HT’s side, the regime is peacefully overthrown. I urge you to keep these stages in mind when 
analyzing developments in Uzbekistan’.111 At the same time contrary to the reports by HT and the 
Human Rights organizations, Baran exonerates the Uzbek regime against claims of repression 
(see above) and torture after the 2004 bombings claiming that Karimov heeded the advice of the 
US government not to respond. According to her testimony; 
  
Contrary to many Uzbek and Western analysts’ predictions, the Uzbek government did not 
use these attacks as an excuse for total crackdown and mass repression; instead, thanks to 
engagement with the U.S., key people in the government, and Karimov himself, 
understood that such a crackdown would backfire domestically and internationally.112 
 
In effect, what Baran has attempted to bring forth is a ‘successful securitization’ of HT by 
internationalizing her theory. The promotion of Sufism and the suggestion that it was advising 
the Uzbek regime in relation to responses seems part of the process. However, the authoritarian 
essence of the regime remains problematic as regards the dealing with HT through ‘normal 
politics’. In constructing HT as the primary existential threat for the Karimov regime, Baran also 
connects the movement’s future with the success of US interests in Central Asia. In order to 
tackle the thorny issue of HT’s non violence Baran adds HT’s ideology as a referent object for 
securitization in addition to the conveyor-belt theory on violence. The intention is to widen the 
discussion in order that it becomes more acceptable as a discourse and more in sync with US 
government thinking on dealing with the underlying causes of radical movements. This discourse 
is developed around the ‘war of ideas’ and the elimination of HT’s ideology as a pre-requisite for 
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a successful US policy in Central Asia. She concentrates on this aspect in the next installment 
commissioned again by the Nixon Center on HT entitled, Hizb ut Tahrir, Islam’s Political 
Insurgency (2004) where the key policy goal for the US should be, ‘to win the war against 
terrorists and the war of ideas…Understanding and subsequently defeating HT would be a good 
start’ (2004b:14). It seems to have had the required effect as the influential US Council on 
Foreign Relations published her article entitled ‘Fighting the War of Ideas’ (2005), in their 
international journal ‘Foreign Affairs’. The article concentrates solely on HT but in this instance 
acknowledges the impact of Karimov’s authoritarian policies to the growing strength of the 
movement.  Baran states that ‘The prize for HT in Central Asia is Uzbekistan… The greatest gift 
to HT in Uzbekistan has been the dictatorial rule of President Islam Karimov. HT is well 
positioned to exploit the country’s dangerous mix of corruption, poverty, drug addiction, and 
repression (2005:74). However, she remains opposed to Western critics of the regimes in Central 
Asia claiming that they had detracted from the threat of HT and radical Islamic ideology and 
unjustifiably concentrated their energies on the repressive policies, a focus which had become 
counter – productive. According to Baran; 
 
Ironically, HT has been able to advance its agenda in the region with help from groups in 
the West, by framing the Central Asian governments’ reactions to its activities as efforts to 
suppress religion and dissent rather than efforts to combat radical ideology. Instead of 
voicing concern over the potential impact HT infiltrators could have on local governments 
and populations, many Western organizations and governments have focused their 
criticism almost exclusively on the tough administrative measures taken by Central Asian 
governments to halt Islamist extremism (ibid) 
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The degree of support Karimov received in Western academic and think tank circles and the 
collaboration with Uzbek academics reached a crescendo after the events of Andijon and the 
harsh criticism bestowed upon the Uzbek regime from the US and other Western capitals. On 
May 16, 2006, the Hudson Institute convened a conference hosted by Professor Frederick Starr 
from the John Hopkins Central Asia – Caucus Institute (CACI) and Zeyno Baran. The main 
event was the screening of a video made available through the Uzbek embassy entitled, ‘Andijon 
Tragedy: The Course of Investigation’, which promised to uncover the truth about the events in 
Andijon.  The video ostensibly ‘demonstrates that the organizers of the uprising may not have 
been as some have claimed ‘peaceful Muslims’, but members of the ‘HT offshoot, Akromiya’.113 
The video included alleged members of Akromiya pleading with the government for forgiveness, 
interviews with alleged families of victims and an interview with the UK School of Oriental and 
African Studies  (SOAS) Central Asian expert Shirin Akiner, who had supported the Uzbek 
governments claim that the use of force was necessary whilst rallying against Akromiya 
(Kendzior, 2006:545). The fact that the veracity of the video was severely questionable, given 
that it was an English translation of a propaganda film known in Uzbekistan as Qabohat 
(villainy) and screened by Uzbek television repeatedly after the events in 2005, was not 
mentioned by the host or the co -host Zeyno Baran.   
 
Professor Starr, a former advisor to US President Ronal Reagan on Soviet relations has become 
known as a staunch lobbyist in Washington for all the Central Asian leaders and particularly 
Karimov. He appears regularly on Capitol Hill in testimonies supportive of the Uzbek regime 
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and works very closely with its embassy in Washington and the US embassy in Tashkent. The 
CACI which he founded in 1996 has sought and developed friendly relations with the regimes to 
the extent of being invited to write the preface for Karimov’s book, Uzbekistan on the Threshold 
of the Twenty-First Century (1998) in which he praises the Uzbek regime as being ‘consultative’ 
and ‘responsive’ whilst validating Karimov’s position in which he states, ‘until the population 
stops complaining about my leadership, reform is impossible and political repression required’ 
(ibid). Consequently, an investigative article on Starr and the CACI by Ken Silverstein of the 
Open Society Institute (OSI) in Harpers Magazine labeled Starr as the ‘Professor of 
Repression’.114 Starr has also worked closely with Baran, co-authoring with her a monograph 
entitled, Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucuses: Implications for the EU (2006), 
in which they accuse the Western NGO’s and governments of serious neglect in their failure to 
treat HT as an existential threat because ‘western observers are more concerned with the prison 
conditions of HT supporters than with the possibility of a successful coup d’état (2006:20).   
 
Significantly, Akiner’s report ‘Violence in Andijon: An Independent Assessment’ (2005), was 
sponsored by Starr’s CACI and conducted on the invitation and under the supervision of the 
Uzbek government (which had rejected an independent international inquiry). It was heavily 
criticized for both its academic credibility and its role as propaganda for the Uzbek regime 
because its findings were completely at odds with eye witness accounts collated by NGOs such 
as HRW as well as other independent journalists. The report prompted Craig Murray to write an 
open letter to the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) that Akiner be referred to the 
University ethics committee. Citing direct knowledge of the reason for Akiner’s invitation, 
                                                          
114 see Silverstein, K. 2006. The Professor of Repression. Harpers Magazine, [online] 24 May. Available at; 
http://www.harpers.org/archive/2006/05/sb-professor-repression-3284828 [accessed 25.05.12] 
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Murray claimed that she had been dishonest as to her relationship with the Uzbek regime and her 
invitation to Andijon had been designed to justify the massacre. Murray states; 
 
It is with a heavy heart that I write to you about the activities of Shirin Akiner in acting as 
a propagandist for the Karimov regime of Uzbekistan… Ms Akiner has lied about the 
origin of her visit to Andizhan as a guest of the Uzbek government. She claims she was in 
Tashkent anyway, and accepted an unexpected invitation issued on the spot. In fact the 
Uzbek Ambassador to London, Mr. Riskiev, had told a British businessman in London 
many days before this that the Uzbek government was countering the possible imposition 
of sanctions by sending Shirin Akiner to produce a report to give credibility to the Uzbek 
government’s version of the massacre.115  
 
The connection between officially sanctioned Uzbek academics with Western think tanks, and 
the promotion of the Uzbek regimes efforts to support securitization measures against HT 
following the Andijon incident, is further highlighted by a ‘special meeting’ hosted by the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) – Washington, in cooperation with Uzbek 
academic Bakhtiar Babadjanov (see above) on June, 22nd 2006, entitled ‘The Andijon Uprising, 
Akramiya and Akram Yuldashev’.  It is essential to note that Balbadjanov’s 2002 report entitled 
‘Islam in the Social and Political Life of Uzbekistan’ is the original source from which the 
history of the disputed existence of Akromiya and its link to HT has been taken and remains the 
official version adopted by the Uzbek regime. Babadjanov provided Carnegie with the same 69 
minute Uzbek propaganda video used by the CACI-Hudson Institute which along with Akiner’s 
                                                          
115 The letter can be found on Craig Murray’s blog, The Role of Shirin Akiner, October 1, 2005 [online]. Available 
at; http://www.craigmurray.org.uk/archives/2005/10/the_role_of_shi_1/ [accessed 23.08.12] 
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controversial report on the events in Andijon and Babadjanov’s disputed version of Yuldashev’s 
pamphlet (Kendzior, 2006) formed the thrust of the narrative put forward in the meeting. The 
host Martha Brill Olcott, a senior associate at Carnegie on the Russia and Eurasian programme 
although heavily critical of Karimov and his regime’s repression including the decision not to 
allow an independent international investigation into the events at Andijon, has worked closely 
with Babadjanov and because of his assurances, was authorized by the Uzbek regime to carry out 
field work on the IMU in the Fergana Valley. One explanation as to why the Uzbek regime has 
provided access to Olcott despite her criticism is because she has not only internationalized the 
‘terrorism threat’ to the regime from the IMU, but adopted and become a promoter of 
Babadjanov’s idea concerning firstly the ‘existence’ of Akromiya and secondly its ideological 
relationship with HT (Kendzior, 2006:548). A claim she put forward a year earlier in remarks to 
the Carnegie Moscow centre on Andijon entitled ‘The Impact of Current Events in Andijon’.116 
She claims,  
 
Little is known about the group, Akromiya, blamed by the government as the 
initiator of these events, save that it is a fringe group of the Hizb ut-Tahrir, which 
split from that organization as early as 1996 and favors an even more rigid kind of 
Qur’anic interpretation than the Hizb ut-Tahrir.117 
 
                                                          
116 see Olcott, M. B. 2006. ‘The Impact of the Current Events in Andijon’. Carnegie, [online]. Available at: 
http://carnegieendowment.org/experts/?fa=expert_view&expert_id=23 [accessed 06.06.11] 
 
117 ibid 
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The fact that the Uzbek regime has found co-operative friends in Washington and London to act 
as securitization actors is clear. However, the securitization moves against HT by the regime and 
the think tanks has not convinced the US or European governments, where apart from Germany, 
HT remains legal and efforts to proscribe it have been consistently blocked (see chapter 6). 
 
Despite the consternation of the Uzbek regime and Russia which banned HT in 2005 as a 
terrorist organization constituting a danger to domestic and regional stability118, the erection of 
HT as an existential threat to US geopolitical interests by US think tanks has not resonated with 
the US and other democratic governments. As to why this is the case remains a topic for further 
research, suffice it to say that in its criticism of the Uzbek regime over the events in Andijon, the 
US lost geopolitical advantage as Karimov cancelled the rights to a US military base in 
Khanabad and gravitated away from the West towards Russia and China.119 In this regard, 
although efforts at securitizing HT in Uzbekistan have been successful in relation to the security 
services, attempts by external security actors to do the same amongst friends in Washington and 
London seem to have failed.  
 
Conclusion 
The study of HT in Uzbekistan provides us with a vivid example of an authoritarian regime 
committed to securitizing the movement through the speech act and through the mobilization of 
                                                          
118 see Fagan, G. 2006. Russia: Ban on Hizb ut Tahrir not to be Challenged, Forum 18, [online] 10 April. Available 
at; 
http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=756 [accessed 06.05.12] 
 
119 see US asked to leave Uzbek Air Base, 2005. BBC, [online] 30 July. Available at; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4731411.stm  [accessed 06.05.12] also Shenker, S. 2005.Struggle for 
Influence in Central Asia. BBC, [online] 28 Nov. Available at;  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4467736.stm [accessed 06.05.12] 
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emergency measures. Since Uzbekistan does not constitute HT’s majaal, no attempt has been 
made by HT to mobilize the public or the security apparatus over which it claims to have some 
influence to push for the removal of the regime. In this vacuum, HT has found itself the object of 
securitization by a regime intent on framing it as a terrorist movement and an existential threat in 
order to justify repressive measures and maintain a monopoly on power. The discourse of danger 
developed by the Uzbek regime has found a receptive ear amongst academia and policy think 
tanks in Washington and London. Western intelligentsia’s close proximity to and its role as 
active securitization actors on behalf of the Uzbek regime confirms the multi-faceted policy of 
the regime in its securitization moves against HT. Geopolitical considerations on the part of 
Western think tanks concerning the potential threat of political Islam to Western interests in the 
Eurasian theatre provides a platform of convergence on the need to securitize HT.  However, 
fallout between Western governments and the Uzbek regime over the events in Andizon and the 
refusal of Western governments to proscribe HT has caused a conundrum as regards the 
terrorism narrative on HT fostered by Western think tanks, Russia, China and the Central Asian 
states. With the Uzbek regime having failed internally to mobilize public legitimacy for a 
successful securitization of HT, the efforts of Western think tanks to aid the regime in its 
endeavor seems also to have been unsuccessful due to the credibility of applying the terrorism 
narrative on HT.     
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Chapter 5 
Societal Security and Hizb ut Tahrir in Indonesia 
 
This chapter examines the rise of HT in Indonesia and its politicization in the post –Suharto 
(1998) era. The case of post-Suharto Indonesia enables us to observe HT activism in a Muslim 
country in which it uniquely enjoys considerable political freedom. This offers a contrast to the 
case explored in the previous chapter on Uzbekistan, in which HT was proscribed, its members' 
persecuted and extra ordinary security measures were taken against it by the state. It also enables 
us to explore the calculations of a government that, in contrast to Uzbekistan and the Middle East 
amongst others has opted for a policy of actively keeping HT within the limits of normal politics. 
Unlike Uzbekistan, where the government pursued a policy of active securitization against HT, 
the Indonesian government post-1998, has followed an engagement policy with non-violent 
Islamist groups in general refusing to even move HT’s case into the political debate. Instead the 
security role has been taken up by largely non-state US based and domestic civil-society 
foundations. However, unlike in Uzbekistan and the UK, the debate on whether or not HT should 
be proscribed as a terrorist movement because it acts as a ’conveyor belt’ for terrorist 
organizations has been completely absent.  Instead, the efforts of non-state securitizing actors has 
been to move the issue of the movement within the realms of political debate as constituting a 
threat to the pluralist identity of the Indonesian state encapsulated constitutionally under the 
principle of  Pancasila, which forms the modern foundation of the republic.120  
                                                          
120 Pancasila was the outcome of deliberations on state ideology by prominent political figures on the eve of 
Indonesian declaration of independence, August 17, 1945. Religious national figures or santri, such as Agus Salim 
and Wachid Hasyim demanded that Islam be adopted as the state ideology, whereas the nationalist figures or 
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Buzan, Waever and Wilde (BWW) refer to this as securitization of the ‘societal sector’, where 
identity forms the organizing principle in that ‘societal security exists when communities of 
whatever kind define a development or potentiality as a threat to their survival as a community’ 
(1998:119). Societal security is not about the conventionally held idea of ‘nations’ but instead 
that of ‘large, self sustaining identity groups’,  which do not have a standardized conception as 
empirically they differ in both time and place (ibid). This identity in Indonesia is expressed 
through the pluralist conception of Pancasila and although one way in which communities can 
react to such threats is at the state level i.e. through legislation, in the case of Indonesia, the state 
has largely withdrawn from this realm leaving the terrain for non-state actors to try to push the 
issue onto the political and possibly military sector by having the threat of HT placed on the state 
agenda. The conception of Pancasila corresponds to the referent object in that it commands the 
loyalty and devotion of large sections of society to an extent that it becomes what BWW describe 
as a ‘socially powerful argument’ where ‘we’ is threatened ‘as to its identity’ (1998:123). In the 
case of Indonesia, these non-state actors which attempt to move HT onto the state security 
agenda are primarily the US liberal foundations working in Indonesia with local secular civil-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
abangan such as Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta argued that such an exclusive ideology would not fit the multi-
religious makeup of the country. In the end a compromise was reached with the concept of Pancasila which literally 
means five tenets being adopted as the state ideology. The initial tenets of Pancasila were as follows: (1) Belief in 
one God with an obligation to follow Shariah for its adherents; (2) Just and civilized humanity; (3) The unity of 
Indonesia; (4) Democracy guided by inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations among 
representatives; (5) Social justice for the whole people of Indonesia. The mainly Christian and Hindu inhabitants of 
the eastern part of the Indonesian territory took issue with the initial draft and threatened to secede if the phrase in 
article 1, referred to as the  Piagam Jakarta (Jakarta Charter) , “with an obligation to follow Shariah for its 
adherents” was not removed. The phrase was removed after the representation of the santri backed down. The 
revised version remains the final version of Pancasila  see Darmaputera, E. (1988) Pancasila and the Search for 
Identity and Modernity in Indonesian Society, Netherland: E.J. Brill, pp.146.175, Bahtiar Effendy (2003) Islam and 
the State in Indonesia, Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies, pp.1-14. However, Pancasila has remained a 
basis of contention between the more orthodox and modernist Muslim thinkers and movements as a consequence of 
which Islam’s role in state, identity and society remains an open source of discussion in Indonesia at large, see 
Bernhard Platzdasch (2009) Islamism in Indonesia: Politics in the Emerging Democracy, Singapore: Institute of 
South East Asian Studies, pp.30-205 and Bolland, B.J. (1971) The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia, The 
Hague: Nijhoff. 
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state actors and the two official moderate Islamic groups, Muhammadiya121 and the Nahdlatal 
Ulama (NU)122. 
                                                          
121 The Muhammadiya (followers of Mohammed) Movement was established in 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan in the 
Indonesia city of Yogjarta. Dahlan who had studied in Saudi Arabia, was influenced by the modernist Islamic 
thinking of the Egyptian reformist Mohammed Abduh. The thrust of the Muhammadiyya exemplified this 
background with an emphasis on education and modernism by moving away from the traditional Islamic practices in 
Indonesia linked to the taqleed (imitation) of Hanafi fiqh, Sufism and other mystical practices as well as the 
absorption of Buddhist/animist ideas and culture amongst the Muslims. Instead he emphasized the role of 
independent ijtihad (modernist conception of legal reasoning) in the interpretation of the Qur’an and hadith. 
Although the movement attracted many Muslim intellectuals as a result, it did not formally establish itself as a 
political party choosing to concentrate on socio-religious and educational ‘awakening’ in Indonesia. It’s most 
controversial moment occurred in the 1965-66 political upheaval in Indonesia caused by Communist agitation 
whereby it (along with other parties) gave a religious edict on the extermination of the members of the 30 September 
party and the Indonesian Communist movement. Under Suharto the movement came under considerable strain 
because of his insistence on all movements adopting Pancasila. Muhammadiya’s response to the pressure neither 
confirmed the acceptance of Pancasila or its negation. What Jainurri (1992) terms the ‘adaptiveness’ of the 
movement emanating its reformist attitude. As a result some elements of the Muhammadiyya movement pushed for 
it to become a political party. What emerged was the National Mandate Party under Amien Rais, which followed the 
ideals of Muhammadiyya but professed no organisational or political connection with it. In 2006, its leader Din 
Siyamsuddin allowed members to associate themselves with other political parties as long as they conformed to the 
ideals of Muhammadiyya. Today the Muhammadiyya forms the second largest Muslim organisation in the world 
after Nahdlatal Ulema (NU) see below, with an estimated membership of 30 million, see Leslie H. Palmier, 
‘Modern Islam in Indonesia: The Muhammadiyya After Independence’, Pacific Affairs, 27:3 (Sept, 1954), pp. 255-
263, see Muhammed Fuad, ‘Civil Society in Indonesia: The Potential and Limits of Muhammadiyya, Journal of 
Social Issues in Southeast Asia, 17:2 (Oct, 2002), pp.133-163 and Achmad Jainurri, ‘The Muhammadiyya in 
Twentieth Century Indonesia: A Socio-Religious Study, (Masters Thesis) Toronto: McGill University (1998), pp.1-
67. 
 
122 The Nahdlatul Ulema (The Awakening of Islamic Scholars) (NU) was formed in 1926 as jam'iyah diniyah 
Islamiyah or 'Islamic religious association’ whilst under Dutch colonial rule. There is general agreement in the 
literature that the founders of the NU wanted to preserve the traditional form of Islam which had been practiced in 
Indonesia in the face of modernists and in particular the Muhammadiya. The traditional forms of Islam practiced in 
Indonesia known as the Sayaf’i reflected the teachings of the four classical Sunni schools, but in particular the 
Hanafi madhab. It also included the ascetic Sufi traditions and some more particular to the Indonesian culture. The 
modernists in contrast were seen as those influenced primarily from the Middle east and the Gulf. These included 
those influenced by Arab reformers such as Jamal al Din al Afghani, Mohammed Abduh and Rashid Rida. More 
pertinently it was the conflict with the movement of Wahabism which emerged in Hijaz (now Saudi Arabia) under 
the 17th century reformer Mohammed Abdul Wahab who rebelled against the Ottoman leadership (also Hanafi 
followers) for their ritual practices such as saintly and tomb worship, which also formed part of the NU traditions. 
Although it is now seen as one of the largest political parties in Indonesia there is disagreement as to whether it 
started off as a political party. Whilst some maintain that the NU had no association with politics others disagree 
arguing that the NU played a pivotal political role in the patriotic mobilization against Dutch rule see  Robin Bush 
(2009) Nahdlatul Ulema and the Struggle for Power Within Islam and Politics in Indonesia, Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, pp.24-40. However, the NU did take part in government after independence as part of the 
collective religious framework known as the Maysumi.It later split with the Maysumi in 1952 and in 1953 formed an 
alliance with secular and moderate parties. Its most famous leader was Abdurrahman Wahid also known as Gus Dur. 
Wahid became NU leader in 1984, wherein he endeared the NU towards the government by accepting Pancasila 
under President Suharto’s New Order regime. However, he fell out with Suharto after the establishment of the 
Indonesian Intellectual Muslims (ICMI), a forum of Muslim intellectuals which Wahid felt was part of Suharto’s 
policy to manipulate Islamic support to maintain power. In response Wahid fostered the Democratic Forum. Wahid 
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Figure 5.1 The securitization of HT in Indonesia 
 
This chapter will explore the manner in which these non state actors have attempted to position 
HT in Indonesia (HTI) towards the political realm and further push for its securitization. The 
chapter will argue that these attempts have been largely unsuccessful due to a host of political 
factors including an unorthodox but somewhat successful HTI strategy of alliances and a politics 
of legitimacy. There is very little in the way of documentation and literature available in terms of 
government policy on HTI. Beyond secondary references to interviews and discussions with 
government officials, most of the information is sourced through HTI publications, academic 
articles, civil-society organizations and the media.  The first section will chart the origins and 
development of HT in Indonesia in the pre and post Suharto period. The second section will look 
at the strategy employed by HTI in order to remain and work within the legitimate bounds of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
mentored the NU into political mainstream as largely a moderate and islamically liberal movement. In 1989, Wahid 
stepped down as chairman of the NU in order to become President of Indonesia. The NU remains the largest Muslim 
organization in not only Indonesia but the world with an estimated following of 30-40 million see Greg Fealy (1998) 
Ulama and Politics in Indonesia: A History of Nahdlatul Ulema 1952 – 1967, NZ:Monash University and Greg 
Barton (2006) Gus Dur: The Authorised Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid, US: Equinox Publishing, pp.119-330  
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constitution. The third section will highlight the conceptual pragmatism employed by HTI aimed 
at neutralizing the notion that it threatens the identity of the Indonesian state and the fourth 
section will explore the attempts by non-state actors to securitize HTI.  
 
5.1 The Origins and Development of HT in Indonesia  
The growth of HT in Indonesia seems to encompass two very distinct periods of the country’s 
history. One pre-1998 under the political repression of Suharto’s ‘New Order’ and the second in 
the post Suharto era of political opening.123 Angus Salim (2005) who remains the primary 
resource on HTI’s development in the formative years demonstrates the quiet prosthelytizing of 
HTI’s original members, indicative of how they envisioned Indonesia as a Muslim country but 
outside the fold of the majaal, far away from the Arab centre and therefore not requiring any 
official party set-up or activism. This contrasts radically with the post-1998 period in which it 
broke with its quietist policy in a dramatic manner.  
 
The origins of HTI seem to be located in Australia and sourced to two religious personalities, 
Abdullah bin Nuh and Abdur Rahman al Baghdadi. Very little is known about how Nuh came 
                                                          
123 General Suharto came into power in 1965 under controversial circumstances after overthrowing President 
Sukarno in a coup d’état.  Suharto ushered in a new pro-Western regime in contrast to the Communist inclined 
government under Sukarno. The events have largely been analysed in the context of the Cold War with strong 
evidence to suggest that the US and its embassy in Jakarta had a strong role in providing intelligence to Suharto in 
order to eliminate the Communist party in Indonesia (Scott, 1985). Unlike the economic and political turmoil under 
Sukarno, the New Order instigated by Suharto saw economic and political stabilisation and a 30 year rule whereby 
Suharto skilfully balanced the army, the intellectuals and the religious movements (Vatikiotis, 2003). However, the 
Asian economic collapse in 1998 brought about an end to Suharto’s reign with his sudden death and ushered in a 
new era of political openness, see  Michael, J. Vatikiotis (2003), Indonesia Politics under Soeharto: The Rise and 
Fall of the New Order, NY:Routledge, pp.92-119, see Peter Dale Scott, ‘The United States and the Overthrow of 
Sukarno, 1965-1967’, Pacific Affairs, 58 (Summer 1985), pp. 7-8, see David Easter, ‘Keep the Indonesian Pot 
Boiling: Western Covert Intervention in Indonesia’, October 1965-March 1966’  Cold War History, 5:1, (February 
2005), p. 58. 
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across HT except for the possibility that it may have been through his son who had studied in 
Jordan (Ahnaf, 2011:34). As an Islamic scholar who specialised in the Arabic arts and letters, 
Nuh was an influential leader of a local Islamist organisation, Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia 
(Indonesian Islamic Da‘wah Council) (Fealy, 2007:49). Disillusioned by the Islamic movements 
in Indonesia during the 1970’s, Nuh came across members of HT from Arab descent that had 
fled persecution in the Middle East. It was one of these members named Baghdadi, a Lebanese 
member of HT from Jordan, who had joined the Palestinian armed struggle against Israel and 
according to some accounts had been captured and tortured by Israeli soldiers (ibid:155). Nuh 
invited Baghdadi to Indonesia in 1981 to teach at his Al-Ghazali pesantren (Islamic boarding 
school) in Bogor, West Java (Salim, 2005: 25).  This seems to have marked the beginning of HT 
in Indonesia. Ahnaf argues that the arrival of Baghdadi to Bogor was of considerable 
significance as the city was deemed one of the hotbeds of Islamic revivalism, centred around the 
student campus of the Bogor Institute of Agriculture (IPB) (Fealy, 2007:35). Baghdadi used the 
pesantren as a base to expand his activities targeting larger institutions such as the Bandung 
Institute of Technology (ITB) and the University of Indonesia (ibid, 2007:155). As the influence 
grew, Fealy comments that both the education and recruitment measures by Nuh and Baghdadi 
became more structured and systematic (ibid).  
Despite the expansion, most commentators have pointed out that the Halaqah (study circles) and 
the dauroh (training programmes) were not only carried in secret in order to avoid the attention 
of the security services but also a manner in which the students were unaware that the ideas of 
HT were being transmitted. According to Fealy, ‘Indeed early recruits to HT recalled that they 
had several years of involvement in Al Baghdadi’s programs before they realised his connection 
to HT’ (2007:155). This strategy was in line with HT’s adopted understanding on the quietist 
203 
 
work needed to be carried out in the Muslim world outside of its majaal where according to 
Salim, a HTI executive board chaired by Nuh was covertly established in the mid 1980’s with 
the first recruits inducted into HTI around 1987-88 (2005:130-1). More pertinently Salim points 
out that the movement remained ‘underground’ and the members were ‘warned’ against an open 
discussion of HT in Indonesia (ibid). HT’s experience of organising cell based structures and 
experience of dealing with the repressive security apparatus in Middle East seems instrumental 
in ensuring its uninterrupted growth without causing alarm. 
 
The seeds of a departure from this position seem to have occurred in 1984 when a leading figure 
of HT on student campuses, Muhammad Al Khattath, started to provide structure to the young 
group and expand its activities (Ahnaf, 2011:50).  Ahnaf argues that it was Khattath’s former 
role as leader of a campus Islamic student association (Badan Kerohanian Kampus/BKK) which 
served as a ‘melting pot’ for various revivalist groups that enabled him to find space for the 
group‘s early operation (ibid). Khattath drew upon this network to run the Campus Da‘wah 
Movement (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus/LDK), which later became an umbrella institution for 
different strands of student revivalist activity (ibid). Under the umbrella of the LDK, HTI‘s 
activists spread to major campuses in other cities in Java including most prominently 
Yogyakarta, Surabaya and Malang (Salim 2005: 25-26). Such co-operation with other Muslim 
bodies was however uncharacteristic of HT as it took great pains to distance itself from any 
association with movements and ideas that contradicted its dogmatic ideology. As an 
explanation, Ahnaf asserts that the inherent differences over strategy and ideology between the 
various Muslim bodies were buried due to a shared interest in overcoming government 
repression (2011:34). However, this does not explain why HT has consistently refused such 
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associations in more extreme cases of repression of the movement such as in the Middle East or 
Central Asia. Arguably, the strategy marked a departure from HT’s conventional position.  
 
Furthermore, in the 1990’s, with Suharto adopting a more friendlier approach towards Islamist 
movements, HTI broke with its underground policy by holding open seminars and publishing 
more of the movement’s literature. This resulted in its first open publication in 1994, the Al-
Islam Bulletin through a network called Kelompok Studi Islam Standard Chartered (Standard 
Chartered Islamic Study Circle or KSICC (ibid). The KSICC was an Islamic study circle held at 
the Wisma Standard Chartered (Standard Chartered Building) in Jakarta. The KSICC allowed the 
exposure of HTI ideas to a different audience, namely mid-career professionals (Osman, 2009:9). 
Although the Al-Islam Bulletin did not state its HTI origin, it seems to have come under the 
authorities radar when after a provocative article written by Khattath criticizing the Central Bank 
of Indonesia, HTI was put under pressure to cease its activities at KSICC (ibid:9-10). 
Consequently, HTI was forced to shift to another body, the Badan Wakaf As-Salam (The As-
Salam Wakaf Association (BWAS) and renamed the Al-Islam bulletin to As-Salam bulletin (ibid: 
10). West Java remained the epicenter of HTI, with Bin Nuh’s pesantran in general as well  as 
the IPB where HTI has dominated the student council since the early 1990s (Fealy, 2007:156). 
As with the case of Uzbekistan, commentators have framed of HTI’s activism within the three 
stage process of transforming society and taking power. In doing so they have made a basic error 
in confusing the strategy and aims of HT in Indonesia with what it considers as its majaal. Fealy 
for instance states that; 
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HT sets out a three stage programme for creating a Caliphate…HTI describes the 
period from the mid-1980s to 2000 as its culturing phase and is now in the second 
phase of openly promoting its ideas within Indonesia’s Muslim community 
(2007:159) 
 
However, Indonesia’s non-majaal status meant that officially in the pre-1998 period, the 
activism of HT was not geared towards targeting immediate power in the country. Instead, the 
objective was to build a strong popular base without agitating political action against the 
authorities. It is understandable why HT’s activities were perceived in this way. The trajectory of 
HT’s activities in Indonesia indicates a transition similar to its three stage process. However, as 
has been pointed out above, the original members seem to have to gone to some lengths in order 
to prevent even the name of HT being used in both the publications and the interaction. Yet, the 
somewhat successful expansion of HTI in West Java seems to have produced its own momentum 
and controlling the fraternity in such a positive environment was not an easy task, as was the 
experience of HT in the UK (see chapter 6). The planned thrust of HT activism beyond the Arab 
epicenter in the post-Nabhani period had brought new challenges on how to calibrate the 
momentum outside of the majaal with that of the majaal itself, especially if it was in the context 
of responsive populations in Muslim countries such as Uzbekistan and Indonesia. In this context 
new tensions and aberrations emerged in which the majaal – non majaal distinction became 
blurred and hence the confusion over its objectives in the discourse on the movement.  The 
provocative article written by Khattath  against which the authorities took exception was the first 
such movement away from HTI’s official isolationist stance and as will be discussed marked the 
beginning of a drift away from the ‘old guard’, feeding into a deliberate strategy by the central 
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leadership to capitalize on open political environments throughout the Muslim and non-Muslim 
world. However, in doing so it provided opportunities for host governments to engage with the 
movement and an attempt to direct its activism in a manner which more authoritarian regimes 
had been unwilling and unable to achieve. Yet at the same time it suspended the position of the 
party in Indonesia in a no man’s land, attempting to rally the public for a Caliphate without the 
necessary popular base and without the officially stated aim of following through on the rhetoric.         
Rumblings of disagreement between the ‘old guard’ and the ‘new guard’ became evident in the 
post-Suharto period when political restrictions were relaxed and a period of democratisation 
initiated. Osman reveals that it took two years before HTI decided to initiate any move in the 
new environment. The principal reason being an internal rift between Baghdadi and others on 
whether HTI should develop a formal organisation in order to disseminate its ideas (2007:6). 
From the 1980’s Suharto had attempted a rapprochement with the Islamic elements by instituting 
measures such as issuing a law guaranteeing religious education in 1988, the establishment of the 
ICMI (Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association) in 1990; the inclusion of Islamic family law 
in 1991; the removal of the ban on headscarves for female students in the public schools in 1991 
and the dissolution of the SDSB (Social Donation with Prizes), a form of lottery (considered 
gambling) with allegedly charitable purposes, in 1993.  Although Munabari (2010) contends that 
HTI did not capitalise on Suharto’s ‘concrete’ measures, it would have been nigh impossible for 
HTI to have responded to them since he also points out that these were subject to an 
understanding that Indonesia would remain largely a secular state and the state principle of 
Pancasila would remain unaffected. Munabari states;  
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[b]oth Suharto and the Muslims seemed to have agreed that such political aspirations as 
the implementation of Piagam Jakarta (Jakarta Charter), the re-embracing of Islam as the 
primary ideology of political parties and mass organisations and the establishment of an 
Islamic state would be ruled out (2010:23) 
 
It was not until July, 2000 that HTI decided to launch and formally use the term Hizb ut Tahrir 
Indonesia (HTI). However, as discussed above, the term Wilaya indicating the role of majaal 
was not attached to the term even though it had now officially declared itself as an official entity 
working in Indonesia. The deciding factor in the internal quarrel seems to have been an envoy, 
Abu Mahmood, sent in 1998 by the amir (leader) of HT globally at the time, Abdul Qadeem 
Zaloom (Komunitas Mantan HT, 28 August 2009) in order to supervise a transition towards 
openness and public engagement. Interestingly in a paper written for a closed workshop124 in 
March, 2011, at Doshisho University, Kyoto, Japan entitled ‘Establishment of Caliphate in 
Indonesia :Recent Challenges and Opportunities’, HTI spokesman Ismail Yusanto argued that 
due to the closure of the Middle Eastern societies to HT and the responsiveness to it in Indonesia, 
the country was ideally suited for the establishment of the Caliphate. According to Yusanto, 
 
The chance or probability having the Caliphate established in Indonesia is highly likely in 
comparison to other Muslim states where Hizb ut Tahrir (HT) is active like in Middle 
Eastern states. The seed of establishing the Caliphate in the Middle East where HT was 
                                                          
124 see Yusanto, I. Islamic World and Globalization-Beyond the Nation State the Rise of New Caliphate (closed 
workshop), CISMOR, Doshiha University, 12th March, 2011 [online] Available at:  
http://www.cismor.jp/en/research/index.php?c=project_en_view&pk=1301361774&type=socie 
&PHPSESSID=bfgjk5b3n6443qthee35nj3sm5 [accessed 20.02.12] 
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founded has found stiff resistance due to extreme repression of the rulers who are agents 
of imperialist states 125 
 
As a mark of this transition HTI re-launched the Al-Islam Bulletin in July, 2000 using for the 
first time the author title of Sayabab (members) Hizb ut Tahrir Indonesia.126The thrust and scope 
of the public activism which followed took Indonesia by complete surprise. On 28 May, 2000, 
HTI held its first international conference at Jakarta’s Sayan Indoor Tennis Stadium, attracting 
an estimated 5000 people and featured two speakers, Ismail Wahwa (member of HT Australia) 
and Sharif ud Din M. Zain (HT Malaysia).127 According to Munabari, even HTI loyalists who 
had been studying under the movement were taken by surprise (2010:24). It was after this that 
HTI started attracting wider attention from the population and the authorities.  
 
From this point forward HTI’s public activities accelerated significantly whilst at the same time 
it took great efforts to build its small influence and profile by remaining engaged with the larger 
and more established Islamic movements in Indonesia. This policy proved somewhat successful 
in the national and global marketing of the movement when HTI held an International 
Conference on the theme of the Caliphate at the Bandung stadium in Jakarta, attracting an 
                                                          
 
125  see Yusanto, I. Establishment of Caliphate in Indonesia :Recent Challenges and Opportunities, 2011 [online] 
Available at:http://syariahpublications.com/2011/03/15/establishment-of-caliphate-in-indonesia-recent-challenges-
and-opportunities/  [accessed 20.02.12] 
 
126  The first issue of the republished Al-Islam featured an article about Hijrah (Migration) Towards the Islamic 
Caliphate. The article highlighted the importance of reviving the Islamic Caliphate. See “Hijrah Menuju Khilafah 
Islamiyah” no. 1, (July 2000), 1-2. 
 
127  see, Salahudin, J. 2002.Tracing the Roots of Hizb ut Tahrir in Indonesia. The Jakarta Globe, [online] 2 April.  
Available at: http://lgtv.thejakartapost.com/index.php/read/news/89361 [accessed 1.02.12] 
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estimated 100,000 people with many more allegedly unable to attend due to lack of capacity128.  
The numbers did not necessarily reflect HTI support but instead as I have argued in my article 
entitled, Hizb ut Tahrir Strategy and the Caliphate Conference in Indonesia, 2007, HTI had 
effectively bandwagoned on the back of the two largest Islamic parties in Indonesia, Nahdlat-al-
Ulama (Islamic Conservative Society) and Muhammadiya.129 Consequently, the size of HTI’s 
membership is difficult to ascertain since estimates vary enormously. For instance, according to 
the 2006 Al Islam Bulletin, Yusanto claimed that HTI had over a million members in Indonesia 
whereas the International Crisis Group (ICG) in 2009 approximated the actual figure at around 
15000 (Ahnaf, 2010:54). Whatever the case, there is a general understanding that the HT chapter 
in Indonesia constitutes the largest body of members globally and its influence in Indonesian 
society is rapidly expanding. According to Sidney Jones from the ICG, HTI has made a 
significant impact in Indonesia describing it as, ‘…a real force here. They are a greater long-term 
threat to Indonesia’.130 
 
The ICG’s evaluation of HTI is premised on the growing influence and voice the movement has 
exhibited over controversial political and religious issues. HTI has skillfully developed a policy 
of leading the larger movements on controversial issues where common agreement exists. 
Moreover, it has used these platforms and issues to penetrate the state and civil bureaucracy. 
                                                          
128 see Islamists Urge Caliphate Revival. 2007. BBC, [online] 13 Aug. available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/6942688.stm [accessed 03.02.12] 
 
129 Hanif, N. Hizb ut Tahrir Strategy and the Caliphate Conference in Indonesia, 2007. Blogger, [online] 15 Aug. 
Available at: http://liberationparty.blogspot.co.uk/2009/10/hizb-ut-tahrir-strategy-and-caliphate.html [accessed 
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This policy came into focus when HTI under Khattath utilized a student body, the Islamic 
Peoples Forum (FUI), in order to organize a One Million Muslim march calling for the 
enactment of anti-pornography laws in 1998.131 Both HTI and another movement, the Islamic 
Defenders Front (IDF) marched to the Indonesian parliament132. Although the objectives were 
not achieved, the significance of the march was in the ability of HTI to exert tremendous 
pressure on the government. Similarly, in 2008 HTI was instrumental in influencing the main 
clerical body the MUI on the adoption of the state’s decree on the 9th of June, 2008, to freeze the 
activities of the Ahmadiyya sect who are considered as heretical and outside the realm of 
orthodox Islam by traditional Muslims for believing that their venerated leader, Ghulam Ahmad 
Mirza was a Prophet after Muhammed (ICG, 2008). To some extent, the Ahmadiyya issue led to 
the endorsement of HTI by the government in that it was seen as compatible with the orthodoxy 
expressed by the religious affairs ministry when it defended the decree and the efforts of the 
Islamic parties (ibid).  In 2009, HTI sought to deepen its ties with the nationwide orthodox 
clerical base in Indonesia by holding an International Ulema (Islamic scholars) Conference in 
Jakarta, which was not widely publicized but managed to attract an estimated 7000 delegates 
with 4000 scholars from within Indonesia.133 
 
                                                          
 
131 see Indonesia Passes anti-Porn Bill. 2008. BBC, [online] 30 October. Available at; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7700150.stm  [accessed 09.04.12] 
 
132  see Anti-Pornography Law Rally in Jakarta. 2006.  BBC, [online] 21 May. Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/5001786.stm [accessed 20.02.12] 
 
133 see Press release: Hizb ut Tahrir Indonesia on the International Ulema Conference, 21 July, 2009 [online] 
Available at: http://www.khilafah.com/index.php/activism/asia/7093-press-release-of-hizb-ut-tahrir-indonesia-on-
the-national-ulama-conference [accessed 09.04.12] 
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To the consternation of US and local liberal/secular civil-society concerns, HTI has been left 
largely unhindered by the government even though many of its organized demonstrations are 
aimed at government policy towards the West, the management of domestic resources and the 
state of public morality, as counter to the interests of the people and against the Sharia.134 
Consequently, HTI has become a growing part of the Indonesian political landscape. Yet despite 
this, the government has refused to move HTI into the political debate let alone take any 
securitization measures against it. The possible reasons for this will be discussed later. However, 
HTI could not have reached the position it has achieved without compromises and a careful 
strategy of legitimization which did not overtly fall foul of the constitutional basis of Pancasila.   
 
5.2 Seeking Legitimacy Avoiding Securitization 
Pragmatism has been at the core of HT strategy in Indonesia, both in terms of its efforts to 
remain legitimate within the realm of official acceptability and as an active component of its 
scheme to expand its influence. This pragmatism has been manifest in both concept and action 
towards the government as well as other movements. This departure from its orthodox position 
in the Middle East and Arab world reflects the influence of primarily the British chapter but 
applied in the context of a Muslim society in an increasingly open political system. The policy of 
HT has been very successful in somewhat neutralizing any potential securitization of the 
                                                          
 
134 See Indonesian Islamists Protest Obama Visit. 2011. Jakarta Globe, [online] 13 Nov. Available at: 
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movement and with its engagement with influential political actors, effectively forcing the 
government to deal with it through normal politics. Although, this has also worked to the 
advantage of the government, because the inclusive nature of the policy applied by the 
government has brought about a fundamental compromise on the Indonesian chapter in many of 
HT’s dogmatic positions, it has also had a reverse radicalizing influence within government, its 
institutions and affiliated movements, with the effect of neutralizing its potential securitization 
effect. More crucially, it also reflects a non-majaal strategy which is built more on long term 
political engagement as compared to the more immediate and emergency measures taken in the 
majaal countries.  
 
HT’s unorthodoxy has led to some disagreement among analysts as to whether the pragmatism is 
real or rhetorical. Ahnaf considers HTI’s compromises to be real, advocating that HT’s 
Indonesian chapter is neither ‘revolutionary’ nor ‘democratic’. Instead his PhD thesis supports 
the idea that in the Indonesian context HT has undergone a shift from its revolutionary doctrines, 
non-participatory and non-co-operative politics towards a strategy that combines anti-system 
campaigns with political participation (2011:7). Based on an analogy with European right wing 
parties, Ahnaf argues that it is a specific strategy which avoids direct action but provides the 
necessary space and cover for uninhibited mobilization and influence with the ability to inject 
upheaval within the system. According to Anhaf, 
 
By this strategy HTI hopes to secure the political freedom to expand social mobilization 
against the existing political system and to seek political entry in order to plant seeds of 
opposition within the system. The likely outcome of HTI‘s success in this endeavor is 
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neither violence nor revolution in the form of the overthrow of the existing government 
and political order, but the establishment of extreme right forces that propagate sectarian 
polarizations (Islamic versus secular blocs) within the democratic system. This may take 
the form of the establishment of a new party or the creation of a pro-Shari‘ah coalition in 
the parliament. HTI‘s success may resemble the success of extreme right parties in 
Western democracies where small right wing parties gain political significance (ibid) 
 
Ahnaf’s assertion is that HTI’s trajectory of compromise is a consequence of the democratic 
transition and environment in Indonesia. The argument is not that democracy destroys or tempers 
‘revolutionary’ movements; rather it encourages them to manipulate democratic opportunities for 
their political ends for this is how they survive the ‘democratic challenge’ (ibid). On the other 
hand Ahnaf is at pains to point out that although democracy may have a pragmatising effect, 
there exists a ‘mutuality’ in the sense that although HTI discourse and strategy may have been 
altered by democracy, it also has the potential of making it more illiberal and hence ‘the 
performance of democracy that strengthens its legitimacy and empowers political moderation is 
therefore antithetical to the right wing politics sought by HTI (ibid). 
 
Munabari on the other hand in his article HTI: The Rhetorical Struggle for Survival (2010), 
argues that no real compromise has occurred in the universal position of HTI. Rather, in the case 
of Indonesia, in order to remove the idea that it is an existential threat to the polity, it has merely 
employed rhetorical tactics in order to avoid political and legal proscription by portraying itself 
as the champion of Indonesia’s national cause. He states; 
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 [H]TI must strategically convey its messages to the public in ways that would allow it to 
circumvent the sociopolitical and legal constraints within Indonesian context without 
having to deviate from its universal platform. Since HTI’s objective to reestablish the 
global caliphate is often regarded by its opponents as a threat to the existence of the 
Indonesia, it has had to employ rhetorical tactics and to project its best image by 
demonstrating that its causes are in line with those of most Indonesians and are in full 
compliance with the country’s laws (2010:207) 
 
The empirical evidence suggests that both are to some extent correct. HTI has indeed tempered 
its public strategy, engaged with the political system and provided a somewhat rhetorical public 
discourse. The net result is that HTI has capably avoided firstly its characterization as an 
existential threat to the state and secondly, the potential to paralyze the ability of the government 
to mobilize the state apparatus against it if it chose to do so. The first aspect is rooted in HTI’s 
conceptual theatrics whilst the second in the development of alliance structures and institutional 
penetration. 
 
5.3 HTI’s Conceptual Pragmatism 
In order to prevent securitization, HTI has decided to publicly calibrate its concept of a Caliphal 
based Sharia order with three intractable areas, which have come to define the Indonesian polity 
i.e. republicanism, Pancasila and democracy. The move by the government to include HTI 
within the political domain coincided with HTI’s endeavor to seek official status. In doing so, as 
in the case of the British chapter (see chapter 6), the need to maintain a de-securitized and 
legitimate position meant that it was forced into doublespeak and unholy alliances.  As Anonim 
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(2008) points out, the effort to gain official recognition masked the inherent contradiction 
between HT’s ideology and Indonesia’s current political system (p.200). The first point of 
departure for HTI was when it sought state recognition in 2007 by applying for recognition as a 
social movement from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Depdagri). It was granted recognition 
and according to the statement of the paper submitted by HTI, there is an explicit recognition of 
both the NKRI (Unitary Republic of Indonesia) and Pancasila. According to the statement; ‘Hizb 
ut Tahrir Indonesia is an Islamic-based da‘wah movement within the Unitary Republic of 
Indonesia based on Pancasila’ (Ahnaf, 2011:74). This statement and action is in direct 
contradiction to HT’s established position that it does not recognize any political entity or 
constitutional framework other than that of the Caliphate and Islamic Sharia. Therefore if one 
compares the Indonesian case with the original position in Jordan whereby although the party put 
in an application for official recognition, it was careful to do so under the legal rules covering 
Islamic parties under the old Ottoman constitution (see chapter 2). However, because it refused 
to recognize the political entity and constitution of Jordan it was duly banned. Therefore, 
although there was concern over HTI’s radical nature, the Indonesian authorities saw no reason 
to ban it. Instead, it seems they were quite keen on including it in the political landscape as a 
social movement. Proof of this is to be found in Ahnaf’s personal approach to Depdagri’s Unit 
of National and Political Unity concerning HTI’s application wherein he recounts; 
 
An officer at the Depdagri argued that the decision to approve HTI‘s application was 
taken with the goal of accommodating social organization. As the government approved 
the legality of other radical Islamic organizations like FPI, HTI should not be different. 
However, the officer also raised a concern about threat of radical Islamic organization like 
HTI (ibid) 
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The fear of being seen as an existential threat and therefore de-legitimized pushed HTI towards a 
rhetorical pragmatism and linguistic caution akin to its chapter in the UK (see chapter 5).  In his 
quantitative analysis on HTI’s discourse, Ahnaf asserts that despite its extreme references against 
democracy, there was a deliberate attempt to avoid confrontation as regards the core components 
of Indonesia’s political system, that of Pancasila and NKRI. He states;  
 
It’s (HTI) discourse on Pancasila was often uncritical and even legitimating…HTI 
carefully legitimated its rhetoric to challenging the policy, a common position of many 
Islamist groups, instead of attacking Pancasila itself (ibid: 84)  
 
Instead, it suggested that Pancasila was compatible with the implementation of Sharia and not a 
threat to it. In its publication Al Wa’ie it argued that the first pillar of Pancasila i.e. ‘belief in the 
oneness of God’ was inclusive of the divine message and therefore accommodated the 
application of Sharia (Al Wa’ie 71:4). However, it was not always able to hide its clear 
opposition to it. In Al Wa’ie, Yusanto argued that ‘Pancasila’ was only a set of impractical 
‘philosophical ideas’ which produced contradictory understandings and implementation by 
Sukarno and Suharto (Al Wa’ie 87:41). It called for the reconsideration of Pancasila as the 
foundation of the state in the parliamentary session convened to discuss the reform of the 
constitution in 2004 (Al Wa’ie 24:8) and in 2007, it opposed a move to reinforce the policy 
applied by Suharto’s which forced all movements and associations to adopt Pancasila as their 
ideological premise (Republika, 13 September 2007).      
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It was similarly the case with the Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (Unitary State of the 
Republic of Indonesia) (NKRI), where HTI not only used conciliatory tone but also affirmative 
language, avoiding opposition to the republican concept. According to Ahnaf, a public attack on 
the NKRI would have resulted in HTI being seen as a national threat because of increasing 
public support for the concept in the wake of fears of non-Muslim secessionist backlash against 
the rise of pro-Sharia regional regulations (2011:86). In order to counter the accusation that its 
agenda for the Caliphate and more specifically the Caliphate conference in 2007 was in 
contradiction to the NKRI, HTI’s chairman at the time Muhammed Al Khattath commented in Al 
Wa’i.e. in an article entitled ‘The 2007 Conference Strengthen’s NKRI’, that HTI defended the 
NKRI on the basis that it was opposed to the threat against national unity posed by separatist 
movements in Aceh, Papua and Maluku (85:6). However, Khattath tried to recalibrate this 
position with the Caliphate by arguing that HTI’s interest was not only in defending the NKRI 
but also in expanding the territory of Indonesia under the Caliphate system (ibid). This apparent 
conciliatory but conceptual contradiction did not hide the fact that HTI did not recognize the 
republican form of the state and despite the fudge, Khattath in Al Wa’i.e. could not conceal his 
advocacy for a radical change in the political system by suggesting that the NKRI is not 
‘unchangeable’ (85:5 and 47:3). Consequently, HTI has refrained from openly calling for the 
abolition of the NKRI or Pancasila.  
  
A similar but mixed discourse was followed on the issue of the constitution. On the one hand in 
Al Wa’ie, HT attacked the republican form of state as well as the constitution as being a ‘human 
product’ which violates the exclusive sovereignty of God (24:8-9). It argued that this violation 
could not be overcome by Chapter 19 of the Constitution despite its statement; ‘the state is based 
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on belief in the oneness of God’, because it was unable to furnish the necessary mechanism on 
the manner in which the state is able to adopt religious laws (ibid). Moreover, HTI was 
dismissive of the political process in Parliament due to its inability to amend the constitution and 
change the form of government (ibid). However, the opposition to amending the constitution 
through the political process was not total since HTI floated the possibility of the procedure 
allowing open access to the public in order to propose an alternative draft of the constitution 
(ibid). Additionally, in an earlier Parliamentary meeting in 2001 which met to discuss some 
reforms, HTI endorsed attempts by a few Islamic parties to partially amend the constitution 
through the re-insertion of the Jakarta Charter (Al Islam, 19). Despite its opposition to 
gradualism, HTI saw this as an opportunity to open wider discussion on the possible re-insertion 
of the clause without explicitly criticizing or challenging the secular basis of the state (Al Islam 
73).   
 
One of the most perplexing discourses by HTI has been on the central theme of democratic and 
political participation. HT’s discourse on the rejection of democracy is well understood and 
documented. However, HTI has thoroughly confused analysts by advocating the idea that it has 
an issue with elections and electoral participation under certain conditions. The default position 
of HTI is that it is against participation of any Islamic groups if they see it as a means of 
reforming the state. In addition to the theological arguments against reformism, HTI sees the 
efforts to bring Islamic movements into the political reformist process as a trap instituted 
primarily by the Western influences in Indonesia to destroy the ideology of the Islamic 
movement (Al-Wa’ie 78: 3). Moreover, its theoretical position as regards reformism is that it is 
only possible within a system which is of the same nature and whose Islamic legitimacy is not in 
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question. Since this is not the case with the Indonesian system despite aspects of Islamic rules 
pertaining to alcohol, marriage etc, HTI accuses the movements of camouflaging an anti-Islamic 
system with an Islamic cover. It states; 
 
Islamic movements that embrace an existing system by islahiyah [reformist] activities 
means that they have compromised with the system...They color the system with Islamic 
color though at the surface level. At the same time they strengthen the fundamental 
aspects of the system that are against Islam with an Islamic cloth (Al Wa'ie, 6:20) 
 
This type of involvement in the political process was considered to be of enormous danger to the 
movement itself, according to HTI; 
  
When an Islamic movement accepts an idea to participate in a kufr [infidel] government 
by becoming a cabinet member and taking part in law making...that means stabbing a 
poisonous knife into his own heart. This type of action by an Islamic movement is suicidal 
(Al Wa’ie, 9:33) 
 
However, despite these absolutist statements, HTI stopped short of calling for a complete 
disengagement with participatory politics. Instead, it allowed involvement in electoral politics 
and political representation as long as it was focused on restricting matters to accounting the 
government on its lack of implementing the Islamic Sharia and where actions were limited to the 
provision of advice and not involvement in policy or law making. The Islamic work da’wa 
included the aspects of moral and spiritual development and therefore the da’wa could be applied 
through Parliament in order to account the government on its handling of public affairs and as a 
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means to pressure the government over the application of Sharia rules (Al Wa’ie 45:29). The 
strategy has included support for individuals and parties in government whose participation has 
led to influencing the government on the adoption of Sharia compliant positions.  This includes 
legislation that can create the space for a wider adoption of legislation such as its advocacy for the 
reinsertion of the Jakarta Charter, revision of Indonesia‘s criminal law (KUHP), banning of deviant 
Islamic sects, curtailing pornography laws, ban on abortion (after Sharia regulatory period) , laws 
requiring the provision of Islamic lessons in all schools to provide Islamic lessons, the enforcement 
of capital punishment in Aceh, and various regulations about moral conduct in local government.  
 
Its influence on these issues was no doubt a result of its careful steps to maintain legal legitimacy 
whilst increasing its influence. However, it did not choose to remain as an extra-parliamentary 
entity which arguably remained a point of contention as regards its legitimacy vis-a-vis the state 
and the political system. In an attempt to remove this perception, it floated the prospect of 
participating in a future general election as a legal political party. As per usual, HTI’s 
explanation of its potential decision has not been straight forward. According to its own 
definition of what constituted a political party, its media spokesman Ismail Yusanto was 
categorical in that HTI fulfills the necessary conditions. According to Yusanto; 
  
Hizb ut Tahrir is an Islamic political party. We have been a political party since the 
beginning… political parties have four interrelated functions such as education, aspiration, 
aggregation (the interest groups) and representation…What we have not done in Indonesia 
is only the fourth function, representation. Other functions have already been applied by 
HTI. The function of education for example is conducted through routine information 
dissemination as well as conferences…The function of aspiration for example is done 
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through writings in the media, delivering the people aspirations and lodged demands 
directly to the House of Representatives, and various demonstrations we have held as well 
as the aggregation function.135 
  
Yusanto argued that HTI’s decision to potentially field candidates was not a unique phenomenon 
to HT as it had done some previously in Jordan in 1951 and 1957 (Munabari, 2010:200). 
However, as is clear from Farouki’s (1996) thesis, there are fundamental differences between the 
Jordanian and Indonesian case which highlight the nature of HTI’s pragmatism on the issue. 
Although in 1989, HT boycotted the Jordanian elections because each party candidate had to 
declare whether or not they were not affiliated to any political party which was opposed to the 
constitution. This stipulation did not exist in the 1950’s (Farouki: 1996:157). However, this 
condition does exist in the current Indonesian system whereby each candidate or party is 
assumed to be in agreement with the foundation of Pancasila in the Indonesian constitution. So it 
is difficult to understand, on what basis, HTI will be able to legitimize such a position according 
to its own ideology. On the other hand, in interviews conducted with HTI members by Munabari 
and Ahnaf, there is a consistency of opinion that HTI has not forbidden its members from either 
fielding themselves as candidates or supporting other candidates. Additionally, according to 
Munabari, HTI argues that it is also possible for the movement to participate if there is 
permission given to contest the constitution and bring it in line with the Islamic Sharia i.e. the 
implementation of the Jakarta Charter (2010:205). Considering this is not a possibility, it is clear 
that HTI’s ambivalent and clouded discourse on the electoral process is part of a process of 
maintaining a legitimacy which maintains the confidence of the authorities and therefore does 
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not constitute an existential threat to Pancasila, the republican constitution or to democracy, 
despite the fact that it remains anti-system in its official discourse. As Munabari comments; 
 
After all, throughout Indonesian history Pancasila has remained the state ideology, and 
aspirations to radically change the state ideology from Pancasila to Islam lie on the very 
fringes of public discourse. Considering that replacing Pancasila with Islam is at best 
unfeasible, and that HTI members are strongly tied to Islam’s very ideology and required 
to strictly comply with its rules, it is most likely that the group’s public statements to the 
effect that it could contest seats in the future general election and that it gives freedom to 
its members to exercise their voting rights are simply rhetorical tactics. These rhetorical 
tactics in all likelihood aim to deliberately prevent HTI from violating the country’s laws 
on the general election, which stipulates that any attempt to discourage people from 
exercising their right to vote is considered illegal and thus subject to punishment 
(2010:205-206)  
 
The controversy over Pancasila and the Jakarta Charter which continues to be debated in 
Indonesia (although on the fringes of discourse) provides the perfect pretext for HTI to remain 
committed to its ideology as long as it remains within the bounds of non-violence and refrains 
from openly promoting the overthrow of the constitution. HTI strategy conforms perfectly with 
the status of Indonesia as non-majaal. There is no call for mutiny in the army as is the case with 
the majaal and its connested countries, especially Pakistan, which reflects a longer term 
approach in Indonesia and one in which efforts to remain outside of the securitization bracket 
becomes paramount for a longer, deeper and more inclusive approach helping to expand its 
influence. As Ahnaf comments;   
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[t]he dominant pattern of HTI‘s discourse on specific instances of Muslim politics is 
supportive of participation. This reflects the prominence of the struggle for gaining 
recognition… is indicative of HTI‘s objective to avoid isolation. HTI often reasserted its 
call for the Khilafah or comprehensive change after delivering its support for Muslim 
participatory politics, but this has to be seen as its effort to sustain anti-systemic identity 
without sacrificing its chance to exert influence (2011:106) 
 
 
5.4 The Efforts of Civil Society Foundations to Securitize HTI  
Whilst HTI’s pragmatism seems to have kept the Indonesian government at bay, powerful voices 
have started to emerge amongst NSAs’ and certain public figures as to the growing influence of 
HTI and the success of its strategy in widening its influence. The emergence of these entities as 
potential securitizing actors has been provoked largely by HTI’s successful strategy of alliances 
and collaborative endeavors amongst government officials, military and religious scholars, which 
may not necessarily have expanded its ideological influence but provides a sound explanation as 
to why it may have become difficult for the Indonesian government to take extraordinary 
measures to curb HTI’s influence and expansion, even if it was convinced to do so. In this sense, 
what HTI has seemingly achieved is the fulfillment of its policy of securing from the levers of 
nusrah (influential actors), protection for the movement and its members to carry out its work in 
an uninhibited manner. However, this next section will demonstrate that, as HTI becomes more 
entrenched, there is a growing call for the government not to remain abstracted from the growing 
influence of HT upon Indonesia’s landscape. 
 
224 
 
As in the case of Uzbekistan, the thrust to securitize ‘extremist Islamic ideology’ has been lead 
primarily by US think tanks in conjunction with Indonesian NGO’s, public figures and the two 
largest Indonesian Islamic movements, the NU and Muhammadiya. Actors such as the Heritage 
Foundation, International Crisis Group (ICG), Rand corporation, Asia Foundation and Ford 
Foundation amongst others have been at the core of an engagement policy with the Indonesian 
academic and political elite for decades, helping to foster a pluralist liberal democratic Islamic 
order built on promoting moderates and isolating ‘extremists’. For instance one of the more 
general monographs produced by the Rand corporation entitled ‘Building Moderate Muslim 
Networks (2007), former Muhammadiya chairman Syafii Marif were cited as a key contributors 
to a text which essentially argued that lessons and tactics learnt during the fight against 
Communism were critical to fighting extremist Islamic ideology and its adherents. The key to 
winning this battle was to empower moderates through their mobilization and provision of public 
and media space whilst denying the extremists the same. However, the role of US liberal 
foundations and their influence over the political, economic and military elite in Indonesia has 
been a cause of intense controversy. Understanding the historical and contemporary role of these 
influential actors in Indonesia sheds considerable light as to why the Indonesian government is 
increasingly coming under pressure to securitize HTI. 
 
In 1970, David Ransom an investigative journalist caused a storm when the publication 
Ramparts ran a series of his articles in which he detailed the link between the US government 
and its intelligence agencies with US philanthropist foundations Ford and Rockefeller in helping 
to purge Communism from Indonesia through the mobilization and financing of the elites and 
opposition. The result was the overthrow of the government of Sukarno and the massacre of 
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Communist party members with the coalescence of the US and the foundations (Scott 1985, 
Easter 2005). Talking more generally about the role of the US in political subversion and the 
emergence of the foundations in Indonesia, Ransom in his article entitled ‘The Berkley Mafia 
and the Indonesian Massacre’ (1970) asserts; 
 
America's Indonesian allies had colluded with an imperialist power to overthrow a 
popularly elected nationalist government, headed by a man regarded as the George 
Washington of his country -- and they had lost. So ruinously were they discredited that 
nothing short of a miracle could ever restore them to power. That miracle took a decade to 
perform, and it came outside the maneuvers of diplomacy, the play of party politics, even 
the invasion of American troops. Those methods, in Indonesia and elsewhere, had failed. 
The miracle came instead through the hallowed halls of academe, guided by the noble 
hand of philanthropy. Education had long been an arm of statecraft, and it was Dean Rusk 
who spelled out its function in the Pacific in 1952, just months before resigning as 
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to head up the Rockefeller Foundation. 
"Communist aggression" in Asia required not only that Americans be trained to combat it 
there, but "we must open our training facilities for increasing numbers of our friends from 
across the Pacific."136 
 
Furthermore in his follow up article in Steve Weissman’s book ‘The Trojan Horse: A Radical 
Look at Foreign Aid’ (1975), entitled ‘Ford Country: Building an Elite for Indonesia’, Ransom 
contends; 
                                                          
136 see Ransom, D. 1970.The Berkeley Mafia and the Indonesian Massacre, Ramparts, 1970 [online] 09 Jul. 
Available at; http://www.pergerakankebangsaan.org/?p=396  [accessed 01.04.12] also Barker, M. 2010. The Ford 
Foundation and the Co-option of Dissent. Swans, [online] 25 January. Available at: 
http://www.swans.com/library/art16/barker41.html  [accessed 01.04.12] 
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The Ford Foundation, under the presidency of Paul Hoffman (and working closely with 
the Rockefeller Foundation), moved quickly to apply Rusk's words to Indonesia. As head 
of the Marshall Plan in Europe, Hoffman had helped to arrange Indonesian independence 
by cutting off aid funds to Dutch counterinsurgency and by threatening a total cutoff in aid 
to the Dutch. As the United States supplanted the Dutch, Hoffman and Ford would work 
through the best American universities -- MIT, Cornell, Berkeley, and finally Harvard -- 
to remold the old Indonesian hierarchs into modern administrators, trained to work under 
the new indirect rule of the Americans. In Ford's own jargon, they would create a 
"modernizing elite."137  
 
A detailed study of this relationship is beyond the scope of this chapter; suffice it to say that the 
relationship between Indonesia, the US and the liberal foundations has been well documented.138 
In 2003, the Ford foundation celebrated fifty years of engagement with Indonesia139 and 
                                                          
 
137 see Weismann, S (1975) Ford Country: Building an Elite for Indonesia, Ramparts, CA: Ramparts Press [online] 
Available at; https://webspace.utexas.edu/hcleaver/www/357L/357LRansomFordCountryTable.pdf [accessed 
01.04.12] see Kathy Kadane, 1990. Ex-Agents Say CIA Compiled Death Lists for Indonesians, Washington Post 
[online] 21 May. Available at: http://www.namebase.org/kadane.html [accessed 18.08.2012], see also John Roosa 
(2006) Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Sunarto’s Coup d’état in Indonesia, Wisconsin: 
Wisconsin University Press, pp.176-201. 
 
138 The literature is generally very critical of the role of US philanthropic foundations as key instruments for the rise 
of anti –Americanism, especially in the Islamic world and Latin America in the context of globalisation and US 
imperialism, see  Kenneth Prewitt, Mattei Doganand Stephan Toeplar (2004) The Legitimacy of Philanthropic 
Foundations: US and European Perspectives, NY: Russell Sage Foundation,  see also Mark Dowie (2001) American 
Foundations: An Investigative History, Massachusetts:  MIT Press, see Inayatullah Islam ‘Anti – Americanism in 
the Muslim World: A Skeptic’s  Guide in Brendon O’ Connor and Martin Griffiths (2006) The Rise of Anti 
Americanism, NY:Routledge, pp.168-190 and Inderjit Parmer, ‘American foundations and the development of 
international knowledge networks’. Global Networks, 2 (2002), pp 13–30.   The literature on Indonesia specifically 
has concentrated more on the Cold War interventionism although the cultural influence of foundations is seen as an 
enduring aspect in the post Cold War era, see Hugh Wilford, ‘The Permanent Revolution?’, New York Intellectuals, 
the CIA and the cultural Cold War in Helen Laville and Hugh Wilford (2006) The US Government, Citizen Groups 
and the Cold War, NY: Routledge, pp.194-209, see Peter F. Geitner, ‘The Ford Foundation in Southeast Asia: 
Continuity and Change in Anne Marie Murphy and Bridget Welsh (2008) Legacy of Engagement in Southeast Asia, 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia, pp.184-191 and John Bresnan (2006) At Home Abroad: A Memoir of the 
Ford Foundation in Indonesia 1953-1973, Indonesia: Equinox Publishing 
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continues to fund programmes designed to ‘modernize the elite’. The US indirect influence 
remained amongst the levers of political power through Widjojo Nitisastro, the last of the 
original ‘Berkley Mafia’ and economic adviser to pro-US presidents in Indonesia, Habibie, 
Megawati and Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001).   
 
In the post cold war era the emphasis shifted to countering Islamic extremism under the rubric of 
fostering civil society. This process accelerated in the post 9/11 period with another US based 
entity, the Asia Foundation in its attempts to influence Indonesia in the same fashion Ford had 
done during the cold war, by shaping the elite and ideological discourse in order to further US 
interests under the guise of social, civil society and counter extremism programmes.140  As 
Andrew Higgins in his article ‘As Indonesia Debates Islam’s Role – The US Stays Out’ points 
out;  
 
Such initiatives mimicked a strategy adopted during the Cold War, when, to counter 
communist ideology, the United States funded a host of cultural, educational and other 
groups in tune with America's goals. Even some of the key actors were the same. The Asia 
Foundation, founded with covert U.S. funding in the 1950s to combat communism, took 
the lead in battling noxious strands of Islam in Indonesia as part of a USAID-financed 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
139 See http://www.fordfoundation.org/pdfs/library/celebrating_indonesia.pdf [accessed 01.04.12] 
 
140 In addition to many other programmes, the Asia Foundation funds and trains individuals on civic writing and 
countering Islamic extremism in centres such as Centre for Religious & Cultural Studies, Gadjah Mada University 
(CSRS UGM) and International Centre for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP) see Asia Foundation project website 
http://asiafoundation.org/project/projectsearch.php?program=conflict-and-fragile-
conditions&countryLimit=7&year=  [accessed 02.04.12] 
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program called Islam and Civil Society. The program began before the Sept. 11 attacks 
but ramped up its activities after. 141       
 
In the post 9/11 period considerable resources were deployed by the US government in order to 
boost the grooming of ‘moderate Muslims’. In the post Bush period under US President Obama, 
a noticeable shift occurred in policy whereby the emphasis was more on denying extremism 
through programmes designed to alleviate poverty and expand education etc rather than 
grooming individuals. According to Higgins; 
 
This is a sharp retreat from the approach taken right after the Sept. 11 attacks, when a raft 
of U.S.-funded programs sought to amplify the voice of "moderates." Hundreds of 
Indonesian clerics went through U.S.-sponsored courses that taught a reform-minded 
reading of the Koran. A handbook for preachers, published with U.S. money, offered tips 
on what to preach. One American-funded Muslim group even tried to script Friday prayer 
sermons142 
 
However, the cold war based strategy had started to collapse after the US invasion of Iraq in 
2003 with the rise of anti- US and pro-Islamic sentiment, producing considerable political and 
ideological problems for the liberal foundations, especially the Asia foundation. An enormous 
amount of hostility was aimed at those Indonesians considered to be agents of cultural 
imperialism. Higgin’s suggests that not only was there a withdrawal by the Asia foundation to 
                                                          
 
141  Higgins, A. 2009. As Indonesia Debates Islam’s Role: The US Stays Out. Washington Post, [online] 25 October.  
Available at; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/24/AR2009102402279.html   
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poverty alleviation programmes as a consequence of the anti- Americanism, there was also a 
backlash by the senior clerics as regards the interference by the foundations on theological 
issues. Providing details of Asia Foundation’s attempt to foster acceptable ‘moderates’, Higgin’s 
states; 
 
Feted by Americans as a model moderate, Abdalla was flown to Washington in 2002 to 
meet officials at the State Department and the Pentagon, including Paul Wolfowitz, then-
deputy secretary of defense and a former U.S. ambassador to Jakarta. But efforts to 
transplant Cold War tactics into the Islamic world started to go very wrong. More-
conservative Muslims never liked what they viewed as American meddling in theology. 
Their unease over U.S. motives escalated sharply with the start of the Iraq war and spread 
to a wider constituency. Iraq "destroyed everything," said Abdalla, who started getting 
death threats. Indonesia's council of clerics, enraged by what it saw as a U.S. campaign to 
reshape Islam, issued a fatwa denouncing "secularism, pluralism and liberalism."The Asia 
Foundation pulled its funding for Abdalla's network and began to rethink its strategy. It 
still works with Muslim groups but avoids sensitive theological issues, focusing instead on 
training to monitor budgets, battle corruption and lobby on behalf of the poor. 143 
 
The rising antagonism against the foreign funded civil society foundations reached a crescendo 
when a landmark fatwa was released on the 29th of July 2005 by Indonesia’s highest religious 
authority the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI). The fatwa was seen as a response to the 
activities of the Liberal Islam Network (JIL) of which Ulil Abshar Abdalla the personality 
mentioned in Higgin’s article above was its leader. The fatwa completely undermined the nature, 
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work and existence of the US policy as well as that of the US foundations in Indonesia. Not only 
were secularism, liberalism and pluralism declared as prohibited in Islam but altogether a total of 
eleven fatwa’s were passed, undermining every aspect of the foundations’ ‘civil society’ work. 
The fatwa’s' included a reaffirmation of the 1980 edict against the sect of Ahmadiyya as well as 
the prohibition of Muslim women marrying non-Muslim men.144  
 
After coming under intense criticism, the MUI tried to explain that its fatwa did not undermine 
the role of Pancasila, the NKRI or threaten religious harmony.  Piers Gillespie (2005) in his 
analysis of the MUI fatwa argues that there were a number of central factors which contributed 
to the timing and nature of the fatwa including a slide in relevance, frustration with neo-
modernist interpretations of Islam and a crisis of legitimacy. However, there was another 
significant factor, namely the growing influence of HTI within the MUI as well as other 
movements and personalities opposed to the role of the US and its foundations in Indonesia.  
 
By 2005, HTI had significantly departed from its Universalist position on the exclusivity of the 
group and that of its work. Whereas in the Middle East or majaal, HT had rebuffed attempts by 
the Muslim Brotherhood to form an alliance on issues such as the Gulf War in 1991 (Farouki, 
1995), coincidentally, in 2005, HTI broke with this policy and actively fomented alliances with 
other Islamic entities. This addition to its strategy proved enormously successful in co-opting 
powerful elements in Indonesian society, influencing the government and undermining the 
efforts of the foundations to securitize HTI as either extremist or outside of the fold of 
                                                          
 
144 see MUI Issues 11 Fatwas. 2005. The Jakarta Post, [online] 29 July. Available at; 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/07/29/mui-issues-11-fatwa.html [accessed 02.04.12]. 
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Indonesian society. Its relationship with and support from the MUI, former NU head Amien 
Rais, high ranking military personnel and government ministers. Consequently, the 
government’s refusal to intervene against HTI has caused alarm amongst the secular and liberal 
defenders of the society and, more pertinently, there is a fear that the movement has infiltrated 
government sectors and gradually eroded the foundations and membership of the moderate NU 
and the Muhammadiyya. The series of events and a host of actions carried out by HTI 
highlighted above do indeed point towards a specific approach by the movement to actively 
influence the internal dynamics of the Indonesian states commitment to Pancasila. 
 
For instance in 2005, Osman (2009) confirms that, HTI completely dominated the fourth MUI 
Congress and convinced the members to sign the ‘Jakarta Charter’ which called for the 
implementation of Sharia. HTI formed an alliance called the FUI (Forum Umat Islam or the 
Forum of the Community), bringing together Islamic educators, organizations and ulema 
(Islamic scholars). Muhammed Al-Khattath was chosen to serve as its general secretary 
(Munabari, 2010:199). Yusanto was also active with Khattath in the FUI as both were editors of 
its fortnightly publication Suara Islam (The Voice of Islam) and therefore played a leading role 
in formulating the guiding principles for the content and editorial policy (ibid). Yusanto being 
the senior editor put his imprint on the publication consistently attacking the government on the 
privatization of natural resources, a theme also paralleled by HTI on the outside as being against 
the principles of the economic system in Islam (ibid). Similarly, Yusanto and Khattath were 
instrumental in the training programmes on Sharia for the members of the various organizations 
within the FUI. HTI had therefore, very skillfully developed the FUI as a legitimate cover to 
disseminate its ideas and influence throughout various organizations and amongst important 
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personalities. It was on the basis of the FUI that Khattath and Yusanto were invited to become 
members of the MUI. According to Ahnaf; 
 
The fact that HTI‘s leaders in that period, especially Muhammad Al-Khattath, played a 
leading role in the founding and operation of the FUI suggests that HTI was using it as a 
vehicle to gain a position in society through a combination of advocacy for Islamic 
policies and the call for the establishment of the Khilafah. Such an impression was also 
confirmed by the fact that HTI‘s leaders frequently appeared in the media delivering FUI‘s 
statements (2011:143) 
 
The disproportionate influence of HTI led to a stricter call for the implementation of the Sharia 
and pressurization on Islamic issues such as the anti-pornography bill in 2006, against US 
interference in Indonesian affairs and the decree on Ahmadiyya.  HTI’s internal affiliation with 
FUI came to an end in 2008 after the Monas Incident when the leader of one of the organizations 
associated with FUI, the FPI (The Islamic Defenders Front) was arrested following an attack by 
some of his members on the National Alliance for the Freedom of Faith and Religion (AKKBB) 
as they were rallying in Jakarta to demonstrate against a government decree endorsing the MUI’s 
position on the Ahmadiyya sect.145 According to Munabari’s interview with Khattath, the 
decision to pull HTI out of the FUI was taken by its leadership in order to protect against any 
assertion that it had any links to violence or violent movements (2010: 200). Based on his 
interview with Khattath, Munabari alleges that HTI’s action seems also to have been precipitated 
by a report from the International Crisis Group (ICG) entitled, Indonesia: Implications of the 
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Ahmadiyya Decree (2008), which highlighted the possibility of HTI’s link to violence because of 
its relationship with the FPI. According to the report; 
 
HTI provides the strategic thinking; the muscle power is provided by the Islamic 
Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) whose members often serve as the security 
guards for FUI demonstrations. This brings HTI, whose members eschew violence, into an 
alliance with a group known for thuggish attacks on casinos, bars and nightclubs as well 
as on “unauthorized” Christian churches and Ahmadiyya mosques and schools.146 
 
The Ahmadiyya Decree has had a divisive impact on the debate regarding religious minorities in 
Indonesia. The Ahmadiyya sect issue is one which provokes widespread sentiment and one which 
differs from the case of other religious minorities such as Christians because of unanimous 
international Islamic edicts from the centers’ of orthodox Islam declaring its members as 
heretical non-Muslims. The virtual silence of the Muhammadiyya and NU on the issue is 
testament to the depth of feeling on the issue. HTI strategy was based around capitalizing on 
such a political opportunity. In response, although the Asia Foundation took a back seat, other 
US based organizations and their affiliates in Indonesia emerged as the primary drivers, such as 
Freedom House, ICG and the Wahid Institute (set up by Abdurrahman Wahid, former President 
of Indonesia and head of NU (Freedom House, 20th Oct.2010). Championing the cause of the 
Ahmadiyya as a violation of international norms on minority religious rights, the organizations 
continued efforts to securitize the increasing influence of Islamist ideological movements on 
                                                          
 
146 see Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyya Decree, 2008. ICG, [online] 7 July. Available at: 
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government policy and pluralism in Indonesia, touting HTI as a central player in the process. 
According to the Wahid Institute; 
 
Government submission to some groups' demands to ban or restrict others due to their so-
called religious deviance has only increased the power of these groups, prompting them to 
take similar action whenever there is a difference of opinion. June 9, 2008 deserves a 
mention here, as an example of the government's surrender to such demands when crowds 
surrounded the Presidential Palace to demand the disbanding of Ahmadiyyah. The 
government fulfilled their demands by issuing the joint decree… This instance marks the 
emergence of rifts within society over difference of religion and belief. With this kind of 
submission the government is only contributing to and investing in the future 
disintegration of the nation. The June 9 case was a continuation from the ‘Bloody Monas 
Tragedy' of June 1…but were led by the HTI (Hizb ut Tahrir Indonesia) figure, 
Munarman (Wahid Institute 2008). 
 
It was however, the ICG’s report mentioned above and in particular its senior advisor in 
Indonesia, Sidney Jones which seems to have focused on HTI as the subject of securitization. 
The Ford foundation’s shadow seems to have been strong since it is one of the primary financial 
backers of the ICG and Jones was its former program officer in Indonesia (Global Research, 
2011) As discussed in the chapter of Uzbekistan, the ICG is no stranger to HT having 
commissioned a number of monographs on its growing influence in Central Asia. Paradoxically, 
those monographs were deeply critical of the regional governments and more accommodating of 
the movement (ICG, 2003).  
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The ICG report asked the question as to why the government had decided to apply the decree in 
2008 when the MUI had given the fatwa in 2005 and the Ahmedis’ have been a community 
living in Indonesia since 1925. In attempting to answer this question it put forward four factors 
in addition to what it termed the capitulation to Islamist ‘thuggery’ two of which address HTI 
directly. According to the report these factors; include, 
 
 the systematic lobbying over the last five years of the bureaucracy, particularly the 
religious affairs ministry, for action against Ahmadiyyah;  
 the search by hard-line groups, including Hizb ut-Tahrir (Hizb ut Tahrir is the 
Indonesian form of the international organization’s name), for issues that would gain 
them sympathy and help expand membership (ICG, 2008) 
 
The report concluded with the ICG accusing the Indonesian government of weakness and 
capitulating to the pressurizing tactics of HTI and its co-Islamists.  It states; 
 
The result was a decree which is a setback for both Indonesia’s image as a country that 
can stand up to Islamic radicalism and President Yudhoyono’s image as a strong leader. 
The outcome suggests a government that has no clear vision of basic principles itself but 
rather seeks compromise between those who speak loudest (ibid). 
 
The exact influence of HTI on the MUI and the government is very difficult to measure. The 
outstanding question was as to why the government had been so accommodating of Islamist 
pressure. The conventional logic in the discourse tends to repeat the notion that the Islamists 
have very little appeal and therefore are largely insignificant. If this is the case then what 
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explains the position of the government. On closer inspection, what is revealed is a growing 
realization on the part of the government and anxiety by the civil-society foundations that the 
moderate anchors the Muhammadiya and the NU are losing ground to the Islamists and facing a 
serious threat to their 70 million or so collective membership base. Evidence of this was 
presented when a broad spectrum of ‘moderate’ scholars held a forum in Jakarta on this very 
question on the 18th of July, 2008. Scholars on the forum argued that extremist elements, namely 
HTI and FUI, had infiltrated the major organizations, paralyzing their capacity to respond to the 
threat of rising radicalization in society. The NU and Muhammdiyya came under particular 
scrutiny as regards their leaderships silencing of the moderates with respect to the issue of the 
Ahmadiyya.  According to the account provided by the Jakarta Post; 
 
Conservative and extremist leaders have insinuated their way into major Islamic 
organizations, leaving these groups unable to counter rising radicalism and religious 
violence in Indonesia, a forum concluded. Muslim scholars, speaking at the discussion in 
Jakarta, criticized Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, the country's two largest 
Islamic organizations, for failing to bring peace among followers of different religions and 
beliefs. They said conservative and extremist leaders supporting the movements and 
activities of hard-line and radical groups, such as Hizb ut Tahrir Indonesia and the 
Islamic People's Forum (FUI), have been taking control of NU and Muhammadiyah, 
as well as other moderate Muslim organizations.147  
 
The admittance by the NU and Muhammadiyya that its leadership and membership was under 
threat was an enormous blow and shock for the US based liberal foundations as they had 
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http://www.thejakartapost.com/node/175229 [accessed 05.04.12] 
237 
 
effectively envisioned the success of their policies in Indonesia around the shaping and 
mobilization pro-US and pro-liberal elements within both the movements. This was explicit from 
the RAND Corporation’s controversial monograph, Building Moderate Muslim Networks (2007), 
which called for the co-option by the US administration of the NU and Muhammadiya in 
furthering liberal interests. Former Muhammadiya Chairman Ahmad Syafii Maarif and 
Muhammadiyah Youth Central Board Chairman Abdul Mu'ti were key contributors to the 
RAND policy report and highlighted the hostility within the liberal sections of these movements 
to the concept of an Islamic state promoting them as ideal candidates to further the liberal 
agenda. According to the report; 
 
Network-building efforts in Southeast Asia should incorporate NGO work with the 
moderate traditionalist Indonesian organization Nahdlatul Ulama, with its 15,000 
affiliated pesantren, and with the modernist organization Muhammadiyah and its network 
of higher education and social welfare institutions. Both Islamist and liberal sectors 
coexist in Muhammadiyah: Islamist elements can be found in the organization's Religious 
Council, which is charged with da'wa, while liberals have a home in the Center for the 
Study of Religion and Democracy, established to promote a liberal agenda within and 
outside the organization (139:2007) 
 
In actuality, it seems that the liberal foundations along with both the NU and Muhammadiya had 
grossly underestimated the impact that HTI and other more radical movements such as the PKS 
(Prosperous and Justice Party)148 had achieved on the Indonesian landscape and the level of 
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protection and support they commanded amongst influential elements of the political, military 
and religious apparatus.  
 
This should have come as no surprise since HTI had made its intention quite clear when it held 
the 2007 Caliphate conference, that it was targeting the NU and Muhammadiyya leadership, its 
membership and the political and military sectors of society. Those invited to speak included the 
leader of Muhammadiya, Din Siyamsuddin and former chairman of the NU, Professor Amin 
Rais. Since HTI did not command much influence at the time, the conference was an attempt to 
bandwagon on the backs of the major groups and therefore the majority of the crowd attending 
the conference originated from their membership of the main two groups.149  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
resignation of President Suharto in 1999 it organised itself as a political movement , calling itself Partai Keadilan or  
Justice Party and to participate in the electoral process. However, after a poor showing in the 1999 elections it 
decided to change its name to the Prosperous Justice Party. It followed the general ideological discourse of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in that it looked to Islamicize society through changing the individual, society then state 
(Tomsa, 2011:5). Ahmed Norma-Permata (2008) in his PhD thesis on the movement argues that although the PKS 
was largely a movement which responded to authoritarianism in Indonesia. Its conception of Justice was therefore a 
removal of authoritarianism and reconstitution of Islamic values through dakwah (propagation) in a wider 
participatory manner. For this reason the democratic political structure was suited to its goal. However, the literature 
points out a transition in its political stance pre-and post 2004 elections in terms of its moderating stance in the latter 
and consequently an internal tension between the radical and moderating elements. The literature points out the 
more moderating stance of the PKS post 2004 where it was more willing to form alliances with non-Muslims,  
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s government, support independent candidates like Amien Rais and even 
symbolic gestures on pluralism (Tomsa, 2011:2). As with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the PKS has not put 
forward any clear idea as to what form its Islamicisized state take. However, despite its more moderating stance post 
2004, episodic bursts of conservatism have unnerved the liberal elements especially in relation to the position of 
sharia in society, opposition to the law on pornography and its radical stance on the Ahmediyya sect. For this reason 
there is scepticism in liberal quarters as to whether political participation has had a moderating influence on the 
PKS. For this reason it is considered along with HTI to constitute a threat to the pluralist conception of Pancasila 
see also Yon Machmudi (2008) Islamising Indonesia: The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiya and the Prosperous Justice Party 
(PKS), Canberra: ANU E, pp.191-216 and Najwa Shihab, Yanyuar Nogroho, ‘The Ties that Bind: Law, Islamisation 
and Indonesia’s Prosperous Justice Party, Australian Journal of Asian Law, 10:2 (Dec, 2008), pp.233-267.  
 
149 see Islamists Urge Caliphate Revival. 2007. BBC, [online] 13 Aug. Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/6942688.stm [accessed 03.02.12] see also Hanif, N. Hizb ut Tahrir 
Strategy and the Indonesian Conference, Blog-Analysis of Hizb ut Tahrir, 15th August, 2007 [online]. Available at; 
http://liberationparty.blogspot.co.uk/2009/10/hizb-ut-tahrir-strategy-and-caliphate.html [accessed 06.04.12] 
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Although Siyamsuddin distanced himself from the idea of the Caliphate and reaffirmed his 
commitment to Pancasila, Amien Rais was more circumspect and developed a close but 
politically based relationship with HTI (Ahnaf 2011, Osman 2009). In fact HTI has met all the 
major political leaders and conveyed their ideology to them including President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono (SBY). According to Osman, ‘Ismail Yusanto recalled that the meeting had occurred 
prior to SBY becoming president and the president had even hugged HTI leaders to convey a 
strong sense of brotherhood the President felt for them’ (2009:26). Other political figures 
included Adyaksa Dault, Minister for Youth and Sports Affairs, who was scheduled to 
inaugurate the Caliphate conference but was warned from doing so by the Indonesian cabinet 
(ibid). He did however host HTI speakers from Sudan and Europe, also attending a banquet a day 
after the conference where he expressed his support for the idea of the Caliphate (ibid).  
 
HTI also fostered relationships with the military, not in order to foment a mutiny or lead an 
immediate coup as in the case of the majaal, but as a protective shield for their members and 
their work. The ex-chief of army staff Tyasno Sudarto and former general Wiranto had met 
openly with HTI and were privately sympathetic to their cause (ibid). More importantly, they had 
provided HTI access to the military wherein they were invited by various institutions to give 
religious talks and sermons (ibid). No doubt the army was also part of the long term planning for 
the expansion of the Caliphate and Muhammad al-Khattath in a rally held at the Al-Azhar 
Mosque in Jakarta on 2nd September 2005 admitted that HTI had sought the help of the army in 
establishing the Caliphate (ibid).  Members had conceded that they were also in touch with 
Indonesia’s National Intelligence Services (BIN) and had sought the same thing from them 
(ibid). Osman goes as far as to claim that there exists a close relationship between the army and 
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HTI which has brought them both benefits in terms of individual goals, especially over the 
province of Papua. He asserts;      
 
The close relationship between HTI and the military has brought immense benefit to HTI. 
In the region of Papua, a province that is seeking independence from Indonesia and thus is 
technically run by the Indonesian military, HTI is given a free reign to preach its ideas. 
For the Indonesian military, HTI’s ideal of trying to unite all Muslims is useful in 
ensuring that Papua remains part of Indonesia (ibid) 
 
In return, as can be seen from its media release, HTI has clearly signaled to the government and 
the military why it is the best candidate for building a coalition of interests with in relation to 
Papua. During a demonstration in Jakarta against Papua’s secession, its leaders advised that, that 
‘the disintegration was not the solution of the poverty that afflicts them. He also pointed out the 
release of East Timor from Indonesia did not make the people prosperous’.150 HTI’s common 
purpose with the military is no doubt very worrying for the foundations. The ICG saw this policy 
as another example of the states protection and effective capitulation over HTI. The 
government’s allowance of HTI to openly act in Papua in order to promote the application of 
Sharia as a weapon against secessionists and Christians was ardently attacked by ICG in its 
report entitled ‘Indonesia: Communal Tensions in Papua’ (2008),  according to which; 
 
Many indigenous Christians feel they are being slowly but surely swamped by Muslim 
migrants at a time when the central government seems to be supportive of more 
conservative Islamic orthodoxy... Papua’s Christians are only too well aware of attacks on 
                                                          
150 see Media Release: Prosperity for People of Papua and Disintegration Decline. 2011. HTI Media Office, [online] 
13 Dec. Available at; http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/info/english.php/contents_en/entry_15709 [accessed 11.04.12] 
241 
 
churches elsewhere in Indonesia and fear what they see as “Islamisation”... Christian 
Pentecostals and charismatics are gaining ground at the same time as hard-line Islamic 
groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir, exacerbating the problem (2008:17-18). 
 
Where HTI has been most successful however is not only in mainstreaming the idea of 
Caliphate, but exploiting the tensions, disunity and disenchantment with the ‘normal’ politics 
carried out by the traditional Islamic movements including that of the PKS. The disillusionment 
of Indonesian society in general with the NU and Muhammadiyya has largely accrued because of 
their inability and willingness to disentangle themselves with the corrupt practices of the state 
and government. Osman argues that; ‘these organizations have lost credibility in the eyes of 
many young Indonesians…the current youths within NU have become nonchalant to the threat 
from Islamist movements such as HTI’ (2009:33). The divisions have been sharpened due to a 
widening rift between members who support a greater role for the Sharia and those who see it as 
a threat to the pluralistic and secular character of the state.151 HTI’s efforts were on display 
during the Caliphate conference with the open split amongst the NU leadership and the most 
notable and controversial effort of HTI in targeting the mainstream was a banner raised during 
the conference  stating that Warga Nahdliyin Dukung Khilafah (NU People Support the 
Caliphate) (Ahnaf, 2011:111). 
 
The rise in growth in the legitimacy of the Islamic State or Caliphate and the growing anxiety 
over the membership of the Muhammadiyya and NU has fast become a security dilemma for the 
liberal foundations and consequently elicited a strong reaction and mobilization of resources 
                                                          
151 see Kristianasen, W. 2010. Indonesia, a Democracy Full Stop. Le Monde, [online] 7 Nov. Available at; 
http://mondediplo.com/2010/11/07indonesia [accessed 07.04.12] 
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against the ‘infiltration’ from another US foundation called Lib4All. The foundation was set up 
in 2003 in the form of a coalition between the Wahid Institute and Holland Taylor, a former 
telecommunications executive and CEO of the Washington based Lib4All. In 2009, the Lib4All 
foundation released a monograph entitled, ‘The Illusion of an Islamic State:  How an Alliance of 
Moderates Launched a Successful Jihad against Radicalization and Terrorism in the World's 
Largest Muslim-Majority Country’. This was an enormous initiative which was backed not only 
by Ahmad Syafii Maarif of Muhammadiyya and Mustafa Bisri of the NU, but by the US 
government, the European Union (EU) and all the major liberal foundations working in 
Indonesia.152 It was marketed as the largest mobilization of moderates in Indonesian history 
against the attempts by extremist movements to subvert the moderate Islamic movement from 
within and change the nature of the state from one based on Pancasila and the NKRI to an 
Islamic one. HTI along with the PKS were identified as the primary dangers in this regard. In his 
chapter ‘The Enemy Within’, Wahid claims that; 
 
Transnational extremist movements and their agents in Indonesia have long been engaged 
in infiltration of the Muhammadiyah. This came to a head at the July, 2005 
Muhammadiyah Congress in Malang, East Java, when extremist agents, including PKS 
and Hizb ut-Tahrir cadres, dominated many forums and succeeded in having a number of 
hard-line movements sympathizers elected to the Muhammadiyah’s central 
board.…Precisely because of this increasingly deep infiltration, moderate Muhammadiyah 
leaders regard the situation as progressively more dangerous, both for the Muhammadiyah 
itself and the Indonesian nation…Besides the Muhammadiyah, extremist infiltration of the 
                                                          
 
152 see Lib4All website http://www.libforall.org/index.html . The understanding that Lib4All has received 
considerable backing is based on the platforms provided by the US government, the foundations and even the 
European Commission for the promotion of the monograph. 
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Nahdlatul Ulama is also systematically underway This research demonstrates that the 
groups most often involved in the infiltration and seizure of NU mosques are the PKS 
and Hizb ut-Tahrir (2009:12-16) 
 
Essentially what Wahid has attempted to do in his chapter is to put HTI in a collective trans-
national camp with Wahabism and the MB in order to promote them as foreign agents, as 
movements and ideas alien to that of the Indonesian strain of pluralist Islam.  This includes the 
idea of the Caliphate as ‘foreign’ and rejected the NU and Muhammadiyya as being theologically 
unsound. Wahid states; 
 
The Nahdlatul Ulama’s central board firmly proclaimed that transnational Islamic 
movements such as al-Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood (represented in Indonesia by the 
PKS) and Hizb ut-Tahrir are dangerous political movements which threaten Sunni 
teachings and have the potential to destroy the nation. The radicals’ ability to dissimulate 
and pretend to accept NU teachings and tradition makes them even more dangerous, 
because this enables them to infiltrate anywhere, anytime. While in regard to the issue of a 
caliphate, the NU’s official forum for discussing Islamic law, the Majlis Bahtsul Masa’il, 
formally declared that there is no theological basis for an Islamic Caliphate, either in the 
Qur’an or the hadith, the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad (ibid) 
 
The monograph was widely promoted throughout Indonesia and amongst Western governments. 
The project was deemed a success with the Lib4All foundation claiming to have affected even 
the outcome of the 2009 general election in Indonesia after a disastrous showing in the polls by 
the Islamic parties. Although that may have been the case, it did not necessarily demonstrate in 
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any clear manner that the efforts to push HTI from the realms of political debate towards an 
existential threat to Indonesia had been successful. On the contrary, since HTI did not participate 
in the elections there was no method of confirming the impact of the monograph and secondly, 
the mere fact that the government had not moved to administer any extra security measures 
against HTI meant that the efforts against the movement had effectively failed.  The Jakarta 
Globe in 2011 considers this to have been a premature assumption when it ran the headline, 
‘Global Islamic Group Hizb ut Tahrir Rising in Indonesia’. It argues that, ‘The movement's 
appeal to an often influential part of society worries experts. Its goal of an Islamic state may be 
far-fetched, but it could still undercut efforts to control extremism and develop democracy in 
countries such as Indonesia, which the US hopes will be a vital regional partner and a global 
model for moderate Islam’.153 The most revealing part of the article was the admission by Jones 
from the ICG, that HTI had been unscathed by the efforts of the foundations. She concedes that, 
‘They are a real force here. They are a greater long-term threat to Indonesia than people who use 
violence’.154 
 
Due to the Indonesian government’s coalition with Islamic movements, and therefore its reliance 
on their support, the influence over government policy has been noticeable. HTI has sought to 
capitalize on this situation and endeavored to increase its membership and ideology on issues 
which arguably attract broad support amongst both the Islamist parties including within the NU 
and Muhammadiyya and undermine the legitimacy of opposition from liberal foundations. Issues 
                                                          
153 see Gray, D. 2011.Global Islamic Group Hizb ut Tahrir Rising in Indonesia. Jakarta Globe , [online] 01 Oct. 
Available at:http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/global-islamic-group-hizbut-tahrir-rising-in-indonesia-
asia/468954 [accessed 06.04.12] 
 
154 Ibid. 
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such as the Ahmadiyya decree and the anti-pornography Act (2008) are such examples. Although 
the recipient of continuous HTI criticism, the Indonesian government has come to see HTI’s 
growing influence as one which can be utilized to affect certain policy goals and because of 
HTI’s relationship with the PKS and MUI it seems unwilling to risk a rupture with Islamists, 
crucial to its electoral platform. Consequently, with the government having removed the 
discussion of HTI from its discourse, the liberal foundations will in the immediate future 
continue to function as the primary securitizing actors.  
 
Conclusion 
The study of HT in Indonesia provides us with the only example of its activism in a Muslim 
majority country under democratic governance. Indonesia has not been allocated as its majaal 
and therefore there exist no emergency measures calling for the military to mutiny against the 
regime and replace the government with a Caliphate.  Instead, using the open political terrain, 
HTI has sought a long term approach through building alliances with Islamic movements and 
extending its influence within the civil and military bureaucracy. In order to remain within the 
bounds of legitimacy and legality, HTI has stopped short of openly challenging the pluralist 
conception of Pancasila as well as the republican foundation of state. Although, HTI remains 
committed to a long term vision of overturning the state and uprooting the democratic system, it 
will only move to do so in the event of the Caliphate being established in the majaal. The 
reliance of the Indonesian government on Islamist coalitions has provided HTI with a protected 
political terrain.  
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With the Indonesian government’s unwillingness to politicize HTI, it has kept it within the 
confines of public debate. Alternatively, non-state actors such as the US liberal foundations 
which have had a long and controversial political history in Indonesia have raised concerns over 
HTI’s growing influence and its impact on the pluralist foundation of the state. With Pancasila 
as the referent object, US and local liberal foundations have mobilized to securitize HTI as a 
result of its influence over the MUI and the government’s position on the anti-porn legislation 
and the Ahmadiyya decree, both seen as undermining the plurality of the state. An alliance has 
also formed with the NU and Muhammadiyya, as a result of the fear from HTI’s infiltration and 
its threat to the moderate base of the movements. The liberal foundations have relied on both the 
NU and Muhammadiya to facilitate their programmes in Indonesia. However, as of yet, their 
securitization moves against HTI have failed to push the government into mobilizing emergency 
measures against it or even include it in public discourse. However, with HTI’s penetration of 
the NU and Muhammadiyya threatening the long standing commitment of the two towards 
Pancasila, the thrust to securitize HTI has taken on renewed significance.   
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Chapter 6 
The Struggle to De-Securitize Hizb ut Tahrir in Britain 
 
This chapter looks at the case of HT outside of both the majaal and the wider Muslim non- 
majaal. Whereas in the former case studies, the Caliphate is either an immediate objective or one 
where the preparation is made for its appearance and natural expansion, Britain falls outside of 
these domains. Instead, the case of Britain demonstrates a very unique example of securitisation 
affecting HT in the non-Muslim context. 
 
It must be emphasised that the thesis is about a comparative study of HT’s securitisation and 
even though the HT’s political theory is designed for engagement in the Muslim world, a case 
study on HT and its securitization in the UK makes it an extremely interesting phenomenon from 
the perspective of how it looks to justify its theory and engagement outside the Muslim context.  
Moreover, as chapter 2 has highlighted, HT has a hostile view towards the West in general and 
towards the UK in particular. It locates the West in the domain of dar al kufr ‘land of unbelief’, 
where apart from the lands conquered by the Arabs (Spain) and by the Ottomans (Central and 
Eastern Europe), the West (including North America and Western Europe) has remained outside 
of Islam’s reach and Western Europe with Britain and France in particular singled out for their 
historical ‘animosity’ towards Islam, demonstrated through the crusades, the invasion and 
subsequent carve-up of the Middle East under the British-French Sykes-Picot treaty in 1924, the 
colonisation of the Arab and Islamic world, the installation and support for dictatorships in their 
attempts to crush Islamic revivalism and the contemporary invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan 
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under the umbrella of international security and terrorism (Nabhani:2004). HT see’s the West 
through the lens of neo-imperialism (cultural, military, political and economic control) with the 
US at its helm. The notion of democracy is refuted as being a smoke screen for capitalist control 
within Western societies and globalisation etc as a mask for rampant capitalism with global 
secularisation as the main goal. Britain due to its historical role and contemporary alliance with 
the US is particularly singled out as the ‘head of the snake’. 
 
However, it is not on the basis of the above that HT dismisses the West as a domain of majaal 
and the need to work to establish the Khilafah within it. Rather it is based on a jurisprudential 
and reasoned basis. Legally it draws upon the argument of Imam Abu Hanifa (founder of the 
dominant Hanafi school of thought in Sunnism) that the Islamic state can only exist where the 
security of the state is in the hand of Muslims and the Sharia is applied comprehensively, even if 
the majority of the inhabitants are non-Muslim (HTB:2000). Therefore, since there is a 
stipulation according to HT that Islam has to be revived immediately because of the sin incurred 
in its delay, the most rational place to resume Islam would be the Arab world, followed by the 
Muslim world in general (ibid). To ensure the security of a Western country in the hands of 
Muslims in a place like Britain and to develop the public acceptance for the Sharia would seem a 
nigh impossibility at this stage for HT. Hence, Britain along with the West in general does not 
form part of the strategy to resume the Islamic Khilafah. For this reason, HT’s existence in the 
UK, its subsequent public profile, its securitisation and subsequent engagement with the UK’s 
political structure forms an interesting anomaly between its theory and practice.     
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Britain forms the largest body and influence of HT in the Western world. Although technically 
outside of its geographical scope of targeting the Islamic Caliphate, the movement has developed 
a considerable presence and influence amongst the Muslim communities in the UK, a situation 
which has brought it into the media limelight and ultimately government concern.  Due to some 
anxiety that its radical ideology may foster violent jihadism, fault lines have generated between 
parties in power, government ministries and the security services as to whether it poses an 
existential concern to British society and whether or not it should be proscribed. The debate has 
gravitated between politicians and groups who want to securitize it as an existential terrorist 
threat requiring emergency action to those who want it managed within the political system and 
those who want it completely removed from public debate.  
 
The case of HT in western societies also throws up an anomaly with respect to the application of 
the securitisation paradigm as to ‘what’ realm of the British state and society is being threatened 
in order to constitute an ‘existential’ threat and therefore what sector (military, societal, political) 
can securitisation analysis be applied to. HT is not looking to export its revolutionary model to 
non-Islamic societies until it has succeeded in establishing the Caliphate and its programme 
although radical, eschews violence (see chapter 2). In terms of referent objects at the substate 
level which act as challengers but have no aspiration to replace or seek the status of states, Buzan 
offers the examples of armed militias in the US in the 1990s who perceived the state as eroding 
their individual liberties and criminals such as the Mafia who organise economic and taxation 
activities outside of state regulation (1998:54). However, the examples Buzan provides relate to 
‘intra-societal’ violence where a ‘sense of pervasive societal violence is a platform national 
politicians can utlize in the classical securitizing move of law and order to the point at which 
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human rights are threatened and by countercrime policies whereby a ‘strongman’ logic begins to 
emerge’ (ibid). In these cases, politicians and other state actors are able to securitize these groups 
as they have the society as a whole as the referent object and extraordinary measures can be 
advoctated by arguing that the situation is out of the control of the police as the key institutional 
security actor within the state. HT’s radical message only applies to a segment of British society 
and although it challenges the British governments relationship with those citizens, societal 
security is not undermined as the identity of the society at large is not threatened. However, as 
the chapter will demonstrate, the securitisation paradigm is very much applicable as an attempt 
has been made to securitise HT as a threat to military security by broadening its impact on the 
larger referent object of society by linking it to terrorism. The chapter will highlight however, 
that not all the ‘elite’ security actors agree on this and the reason why HT’s activism in the West 
and particularly in Britain becomes an important case study for understanding its securitisation in 
a liberal democratic context.  
 
The case of Hizb ut Tahrir in Britain (HTB) draws out an interesting paradox in the securitisation 
process in liberal democratic societies. This is to what extent are the institutions of state as well 
as the government subject to public scrutiny and questioning on issues relating to national 
security and who is the final securitising and de-securitising actor. Buzan argues that national 
security includes domestic activities such as terrorism and those issues deemed unacceptable and 
threatening by a great majority of the populace (1998:146). In this sense, the speech act becomes 
pivotal between securitising actors such as governments and the media in influencing the 
population’s threat perception. However, what if conflicts were to appear amongst the state 
institutions and the government as to the nature of the securitisation of a referent object where 
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one works to securitize the referent object and the other to de-securitize it? Buzan asserts that in 
liberal democracies it is the government which acts as the ‘only’ legitimate ‘agent’ of the nation 
and even when covert actions are taken they ultimately still have to be legitimised through public 
debate as to why the information must be kept secret (1988:144).  However, the case of HTB 
demonstrates the problems inherent within the structure of strong liberal societies concerning the 
speech act and its affect on the securitisation and de-securitisation of referent objects.   
 
This chapter will look at the struggle over Hizb ut Tahrir’s proscription in Britain between the 
government ministries, political parties and other concerns. It will argue that the British Home 
Office (HO) has been working in parallell with Hizb ut Tahrir in Britain (HTB) in order to de-
securitize the movement and provide its executive committee space and protection. This is in 
order to transform the movement into a British specific societal and community police force 
against violent extremism. The first section will chart the evolution of HT in Britain and specific 
concerns which led to its securitization and the threat of proscription. The second section will 
highlight the arguments and struggle within the British government over HTB’s proscription and 
the third section will aim to argue that the actions of HTB’s leadership to avoid proscription have 
been unprecedented and reflect a remarkable coherence with leaked discussions between the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Home Office (HO) concerning its de-
securitization. 
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Figure 6.1 The securitization of HT in the UK 
 
 
Figure 6.2 The De-Securitization of HT in the UK 
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6.1 The Evolution of HT’s Strategy in Britain 
HT’s emergence in the UK came about more of an accident than design (Farouki, 1996:171-
172). Members of HT (from the Middle East) regularly travelled to Europe in order to study and 
work, but remained transient and would generally engage with other Arab students who would 
return home in order to support the party’s work in their own countries (ibid). In the early 1980’s 
however, the increasing suppression of the party by the Middle Eastern governments, led some 
Arab members to seek political asylum in Europe. This permanency ignited an engagement with 
non-Arabs within the wider Muslim community (ibid). At this point, its amir (leader) was a 
Palestinian dissident Fouadh Hussein, who had fled Syria after being imprisoned and tortured by 
its Baathist regime (ibid). Study circles were expanded to include Muslims from Turkey, 
Somalia, Pakistan and Bangladesh, who comprised the largest ethnic groups within the Muslim 
communities in Britain. Most of these new members were British born and possessed very little 
in common with the lands of their fathers or with the Middle East. According to senior members, 
arguments broke out concerning the nature of HT’s role in Britain with the members from South 
Asia arguing that the party’s role and ideas had to be made relevant to the interests of the 
communities in the UK, whilst others argued for maintaining the focus on the Middle East. 
Following this domestic expansion, members started to distribute a newsletter called Al Khilafah 
or The Caliphate and a magazine entitled Al Fajr, (the Dawn) detailing the party’s official 
culture and responses to political issues after which it came to the attention of the UK security 
services. HTB first came to public notice in 1988 when the Board of Deputies of British Jews 
(BDBJ) drew the Attorney General’s attention  to a leaflet inside Al Fajr entitled ‘The Islamic 
Rule on Hijacking Aeroplanes’ written by its leadership in the Middle East arguing that the 
allowance in Islam for the hijacking of planes belonging to Israel and those carrying Israeli’s was 
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an exception to the general rule forbidding such action since there was a state of war which 
existed between the Muslims and the Jewish state (Al Fajr, 1988). Despite this, its activities 
remained outside of the British public focus although within the Muslim communities its 
presence had started to become felt.  
 
The situation changed dramatically during the first Gulf War 1990, when Hussein was replaced 
as amir (leader) by Omar Bakri Mohammed (OBM), a member of Syrian descent who had 
sought political asylum in Britain after having being removed by Saudi Arabia for subversive 
activities (Abedin, 2005). According to senior members, OBM wanted to break with the old 
policy and move HT into general focus by increasing its profile through the media and public 
activity. Consequently, high profile demonstrations and lectures on university campuses 
attacking British and US imperialism in Iraq and calling for the restoration of the Caliphate were 
held throughout the UK (ibid). The fierce anti –West rhetoric tore through community relations 
and unnerved leaders of mosques and moderate movements whose attempts to prevent violence 
from breaking out onto the UK streets was met with calls by HT to join Iraq (not Saddam) in a 
jihad against the West (Farouki: 1996:178). OBM became a particular security concern when he 
urged Muslim’s to attack British, French and US interests worldwide including inciting an attack 
on British prime minister at the time John Major. Bakri stated; 
 
Major is a legitimate target. If anyone gets the opportunity to assassinate him, I 
don’t think they should save it. He is the head of a state which has declared war 
against Islam and our God says fight those who fight you. It is our Islamic duty 
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and we will celebrate his death. I pray to God for someone to kill him. (Daily Star, 
1-3-91, 26-2-91) 
 
As a result calls were made by Ministers of Parliament (MPs) for OBM’s immediate arrest for 
incitement to murder. He was subsequently arrested and detained for forty eight hours before 
being released without charge. From 1993, after the signing of the landmark Oslo Accords 
between the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Israel, the party made rapid gains on 
student campuses with an exponential increase in tensions with Jewish students as radical 
literature started to appear espousing its rejection of the Israeli state and its view that any peace 
with it was forbidden by Islam through leaflets and talks entitled ‘The Only Place is the Battle 
Field between the Muslims and the Jews’ and ‘Peace with Israel – A Crime Against Islam’ 
(Whine; 2004:100). One of the most controversial quotes on the subject cited by HT in the 
context of its position on the rejection of a Jewish entity in Palestine was a hadith (tradition) of 
the Prophet Mohammed in which a battle between the Muslims and Jews was foretold before the 
arrival of the day of judgement, leading in turn to accusations of anti-Semitism. According to the 
hadith; 
 
The last hour would not come unless the Muslims will fight against the Jews and the 
Muslims would kill them until the Jews would hide themselves behind a stone or a tree 
and a stone or a tree would say: Muslim, or the servant of Allah, there is a Jew behind me; 
come and kill him; but the tree Gharqad would not say, for it is the tree of the Jews.155 
                                                          
155 This is from a collection of hadith considered by Sunni Muslims to be authentic. 'The Book Pertaining to the 
Turmoil and Portents of the Last Hour (Kitab Al-Fitan wa Ashrat As-Sa`ah)' of Sahih Muslim. The use of the hadith 
is not particular to HT. The Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other similar movements also apply it in 
the context of Israel. 
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This resulted in the first effort to ban HTB in 1994 when the Board of Deputies of British Jews 
(BDBJ), Jewish student leaders and a number of MPs petitioned the Home Secretary. John 
Marshall, MP for Hendon South informed the House of Commons that HTB were ‘homophobic, 
anti-Semitic and anti-Hindu’ and called on HTB to be prosecuted ‘by the forces of law and 
order’156. In 1994, HTB also came under pressure from the BDBJ, The Jewish Chronicle (JC) 
and the Union of Jewish Students (UJS) on university campuses in London, especially the 
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) where HTB’s front organisation the 1924 
Committee had raised tensions with Jewish students after holding a talk entitled ‘Israel: The 
Apartheid State’ (Independent:1994). After intense pressure from the National Union of Students 
(NUS) and the University of London Union (ULU), SOAS initially banned HTB activity on its 
campus which was subsequently overturned by its UGM resulting in fallout with the NUS and 
ULU. The NUS and ULU however instituted a ‘no platform policy’ for HTB activities which 
was continuously challenged by individual university student union’s (SU) including a revolt by 
the Middlesex SU in 2005 leading to the suspension of its president157. 
 
According to senior members, OBM had been given a free hand by the central leadership to 
develop its policy in the UK. His formulation of high public activity and media engagement 
proved successful in rapidly expanding the membership base as well as internationalising the 
party. The success with which HT had forced itself onto the British Muslim landscape became 
evident when it held a major conference on the Caliphate in July, 1994, at the Wembley arena 
                                                          
 
156 see ‘Racism and Anti-Semitism’, House of Commons debate, Hansard, 31 March 1994, 1115-1120, [online] 
available at: parliament.uk/pa/cm199394/cmhansrd/1994-03-31/Debate-6.html [accessed 29.01 2011] 
 
157 see Shilson, K. 2005, ‘Why I Defend the Right of Hizb ut Tahrir to Speak at Middlesex University’. Times 
Higher Education Supplement [online] 30 Sep. Available at; 
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storyCode=198756&sectioncode=26 [accessed 2.02.2011] 
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attracting over 10,000 people as well as global media attention. Through a transcendent concept 
of loyalty to Islam alone, HT had filled a void in a frustrated generation of British Muslims who 
neither identified with the culture, history and nationality of their parents or with that of the 
British state and society. Moreover, the mystical and subcontinent cultural specific Islam 
practised and inherited from their parents bore very little resemblance to the Arabic based 
intellectual, ideological and political conception of HT (Hamid, 2006). The direction of this new 
generation would have far reaching consequences for the securitization of British Muslims in the 
UK and beyond. Zeyno Baran captures this affect quite succinctly when she writes; 
 
HT has been particularly successful at recruiting frustrated youth who have lost faith in 
the systems of the countries to which they or their parents came. As a senior European 
diplomat has put it, after joining HT, "they turn from being rebels without a cause to 
rebels with a cause." (2005: 74) 
 
However, despite the numerical success of OBM’s policy, according to senior members concern 
by its central leadership over HTB’s political direction in Britain, OBM’s controversial 
statements and the negative blowback from the media policy pushed the central leadership to 
remove him (Hamid; 148:2007).  Additionally, Houriya Ahmed asserts that OBM’s goals in the 
UK violated that of HT’s in that he felt that Nabhani’s revolutionary methodology developed for 
the majaal should be applied fully in the West and that an Islamist state could be established in 
the UK (2009:66). OBM subsequently re-invigorated a movement he had set up whilst in Saudi 
Arabia, Al Muhajiroun (AM), through which he continued his confrontational politics, 
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maintained a media spotlight and filled the radical void after HTB went into a period of retreat 
and re-grouping between 1996-2002 (Hamid:148:2007).  
 
After a two year period of reflection and reassessment HTB re-emerged with a more streamlined 
policy. Ahmed reveals that in 1998, the HT central leadership issued a new strategy document in 
the form of a communiqué to the national executive asking it to focus on how conflicts such as 
the one in the Balkans, Palestine and the Gulf War were being used by the West to oppress 
Muslims and as a war against Islam (2009: 68). As discussed in chapter three, it was in the 
aftermath of 9/11 and especially after the monographs produced by the Nixon Centre (2004) and 
the Hudson Institute (2006) that HT became internationally securitized in the context of the war 
on terror as a ‘conveyor belt for terrorism’. The events of 9/11 re-energised HTB and it returned 
back to the media limelight with a riposte to the war on terror (WOT) as a ‘War on Islam’ with 
an updated communiqué from its central leadership. The communiqué directed an increase in 
activity on the basis that the WOT was a tool to separate the Muslims in the West from the 
ummah (community) in the Muslim world and advised it to increase engagement with the non-
Muslims by portraying the WOT as weapon of Capitalism (ibid). With a spotlight on concepts 
such as violence, jihad (religious war) and terrorism, HTB went onto the offensive in order to 
distance itself from Al-Qaeda (AQ) and its actions. HTB leader at the time Jalal udin Patel states; 
 
As far as the events are concerned, in particular the assaults on the World Trade Center 
and the Pentagon, we said that such attacks are not condoned by the Shari'ah. We 
immediately declared that this is not the proper or even effective method of fighting 
Western imperialism. We do see Western imperialism as the key factor in the continuing 
decline of the Islamic world and we do impress upon Muslims that they have to confront 
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this imperialism. However that confrontation should be well planned and should not 
involve actions that are not only against the Shari'ah but are in fact self-defeating. The 
correct method is to establish a strong, modern and viable Islamic state, i.e. the Khilafah 
state, and the manner by which we can achieve this is to remove the rulers of the Muslim 
world (Jamestown, 2004). 
 
Moreover, by 2002, HTB had begun to fashion itself heavily within the British Muslim political 
context and started to effectively challenge the relationship of the British state with its Muslim 
subjects by building its profile on issues such as the opposition to the invasion of Iraq and 
Afghanistan and in turn shaping Muslim opinion concerning the issue of citizenship, 
multiculturalism and integration (Hamid, 148:2007). This was fostered by what Kirstine 
Sinclair158 describes as the ‘nationalisation’ of HT in the UK developed in 2005 primarily upon 
the most authoritative communiqué from its central leadership to date on policy in the UK 
entitled ‘Strategies of Action in the West’(2010: 71-75). The document focused on the 
permanency of the Muslim community in Britain, “[n]ow it has become a reality to find an [sic] 
Muslim community in the West, and many more Muslims have settled in the West permanently” 
(2010:72). However, it put the British case into context and de-emphasized its importance by 
stating that “[t]he party has not extended its action to the land of the unbelievers’ (ibid). 
Effectively this highlighted the irony of its strategy in the West. Why have an organisational 
presence and strategy in Britain if it does not in any meaningful way directly affect the work in 
                                                          
158 Kirstine Sinclair’s PhD thesis completed in 2010, ‘The Caliphate and Homeland: Hizb ut Tahrir in Denmark and 
Britain’ looks at the conception of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ in Europe within the context of its trans-nationalism. The 
thesis can be found online see 
  http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles//0/D/1/%7B0D1B4B59-9755-44EB-887E 
90595D8D461D%7DKirstine%20Sinclair%20ph%20d%20afhandling.pdf [accessed 02.02.2011] 
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the majaal (area targeted for power)? This question was not asked and instead the role was 
expanded by adding four extra points to those in the 1998 communiqué.  
 
 Political activities in the West. The party aims at establishing a caliphate not in the West 
but in Muslim countries. Members are not to take part in governance in Western countries, 
i.e., to cast their votes in elections or the like, but are obliged to express opposition to any 
kind of maltreatment of Muslims anywhere (the examples given are banning of the veil or 
banning of Friday prayers) and to express criticism of leaders of Muslim countries visiting 
and working with the West. 
 
 Opposition to Western culture. Party members must undertake education of Muslims 
about their culture and strengthen Muslim minority relations in order to counteract the 
negative influences of Western culture: “Muslims in the West are exposed to Western 
culture and civilisation which might influence them. Therefore the party should educate 
Muslims about their religion and maintain intensive relations with the community”  
 
 Consequences of the "War against Terror". Apart from launching attacks on Muslim 
countries after 11 September 2001, the West has pressured Muslim minorities in the West 
by trying to force them to assimilate and not unite in the work for the establishment of the 
caliphate. Hizb ut-Tahrir-members should counter this development and work towards 
greater identification with the ummah among Muslims in the West.  
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 Western weaknesses. The fact that the West is plagued with crime and corruption proves 
that Western inventions such as capitalism, democracy and human rights are not solutions 
to the challenges faced by humanity. (Sinclair, 2010:72) 
 
The document however does not address the grey area of the political relationship between 
HTB’s work in the community and its conflict with the British government’s ability to 
administer its citizens. On face value, the document threatens the relationship of identity, 
ideology and interests between the British government and its Muslim subjects. The new policy 
was in stark contrast to the pre-Bakri one of targeting transient Muslims, where a coherent link 
existed between the work of members in Britain and the political work in the majaal. Addressing 
government policies towards Islam, its ideology and the interests of its Muslim subjects would 
no doubt threaten the interests of the British government and lead inevitably to political conflict 
and partial political struggle between HTB and the British government. This in theory conflicted 
with the official political premise of HT which did not address the interests of the ruling 
apparatus outside of the Muslim world. HTB’s attempts to dissuade Muslims in the UK from 
accepting the democratic process as well as integration into the secular society was clearly seen 
by the government as a threat to the manner in which its interests are linked to the Muslim 
communities.  
 
Incidentally, the first test of the 2005 strategy document occurred in the same year when the 
Labour government under Tony Blair threatened to proscribe HTB under new terrorism 
legislation. This incident marked a watershed in HTB’s history in the UK. As will be discussed 
below, whilst officially carrying out the text of the strategy document, HTB’s executive 
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committee unofficially set about transforming the organisation in order to satisfy the UK 
government’s criteria for avoiding proscription and also to play a crucial role in the 
government’s endeavour to neutralise the tendencies for violent extremism amongst the Muslim 
youth. In doing so, HTB’s strategy morphed from one of trans-nationalism to one of nationalism. 
Dogmatic political and ideological positions were set aside in order de-securitize through finding 
acceptance and support from the community, Muslim and non-Muslim organisations and even 
the British political establishment. As Hamid points out; 
 
HT’s exploitation of the democratic institutions and freedoms that it regularly criticises 
has not gone unnoticed. Under the threat of a ban, HT now posts messages of support 
from human rights organisations that they would theoretically disallow in their imaginary 
Caliphate. They now pledge to fight the law banning them by using the ‘man-made’ legal 
system they had previously criticised and now pursue the support and cooperation of 
Muslim organisations they had previously accused of being sell-outs, regularly seeking 
shared platforms and even circulating petitions with Islamic groups they had criticised in 
the past (Hamid, 2007:154).  
 
6.2 The Battle over HT’s Proscription 
Buzan argues in his book ‘Security: A New Framework for Analysis’ (1998), that security is very 
much a ‘structured’ realm whereby the success of securitization depends considerably on the 
position of power afforded to an actor on account of being accepted as a medium through which 
power is defined (p31). However, such power, Buzan argues is not absolute as no-one can 
provide a guarantee that a claim for security action will be accepted even in authoritarian 
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societies and consequently there is no exclusion for attempts to articulate alternate interpretations 
of security. Buzan states that, ‘the field is structured or biased, but no-one conclusively holds the 
power of securitization’ (ibid). For this reason it is the ‘practice’ of securitization and not its 
actors which must constitute the centre of analysis as Buzan states, ‘To study securitization is to 
study the power politics of a concept’ (ibid: 32). This concept applies very poignantly to the case 
of the British political establishment and the struggle between powerful security actors such as 
the Prime Minister, official opposition, Home Office (HO) and the FCO to provide 
interpretations for moves to either securitize HT or to desecuritize it and move it as an issue 
either into or away from the public domain. As we shall see, both the attempts to securitise, 
politicise and de-securitise HT are political acts where the ‘speech act’ forms the language ie the 
grammar of security, the construction of the existential threat, the point of no return and the 
possible way out become central as subjects of analysis. In the post 9/11 and 7/7 period, the 
analysis of the speech act pertaining to HT in the context of ‘terrorism’ becomes essential to 
understanding the battleground between the powerful security actors and the moves to define it 
as an existential threat. 
 
HT’s activities in the UK have produced considerable controversy ever since its appearance 
publicly in a structured format to oppose Britain’s decision to join the international alliance 
against Iraq in 1990. On many occasions calls were made by politicians, groups and even 
elements of the media for the government to ban HT in the UK, however on each occasion the 
HO refused to commit on the issue and said very little except that it was keeping the party under 
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constant review159. The events of 9/11 radically changed the political terrain with fierce internal 
debates concerning British policy towards non-violent extremist movements in general and HT 
in particular. This debate burst into the public domain a month after the 7/7 bombings in London 
in 2005, when British Prime Minister (PM) Tony Blair responded with a twelve point anti-terror 
plan by which he promised to show the terrorists that the ‘rules of the game were changing’ 
(Prince, 2010). The plan which was a draft proposal for radical changes in the anti-terrorism 
legislation, included for the first time attempts to bring under the rubric of terrorism not only 
those who engaged in the act but included those who ‘incite it or proselytise it’.160 In point 9 of 
the statement PM Blair specifically highlighted his intention to include HT as one of those 
movements that fell under the new changes. According to the text; 
 
We will proscribe Hizb ut Tahrir and the successor organisation of Al Muhajiroun. We 
will also examine the grounds of proscription to widen them and put proposals forward in 
the new legislation. (ibid) 
 
Under intense internal pressure, Blair was however, forced to water down many of his proposals 
including the offence of glorifying terrorism and although he was able to push through a ban 
against some of the named groups, to the dismay of certain right wing think tanks and politicians, 
                                                          
159 see Home Office response to MP question on proscription, Hansard, HC Deb, 16 October 2007, c980W. 
Available: at; 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm071016/text/71016w0011.htm#07101677001847 
[accessed 02.02.2011] 
 
160 see Wintour, P.  2005. ‘Blair Vows to Root Out Extremism’. Guardian, [online] 6 Aug. Available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/aug/06/terrorism.july7 [accessed 02.02.2011] Full text of Tony Blairs 
speech to Parliament can be found on Guardian, [online] 5 Aug. 2005 Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/aug/05/uksecurity.terrorism1 [Accessed 17.09.2013] 
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the proscription of HT was quietly dropped161. Although no official reason was presented as to 
why the government had backed away from its position, according to the mainstream media, 
despite concerns over HT’s perceived extremism, HO lawyers, the FCO and representatives of 
the Association of Police Officers (ACPO) had won the argument after quietly lobbying against 
outlawing the group for lack of credible evidence (Doward, 2006). According to the ACPO; 
 
If there was evidence for proscribing Hizb ut Tahrir, we would support a move to 
proscribe it…But we think a move would be counter-productive and not in the spirit of the 
government’s [anti-terrorism] legislation. It is not an offence to hold extreme views. (ibid)  
 
However, a series of leaked FCO and HO e-mails in 2005 indicated that the climb down by Blair 
was due to deep confusion and splits within the Labour cabinet on how to tackle radical political 
Islam162. Charles Clarke, the Home Secretary (HS) at the time was not convinced that HT should 
                                                          
 
161 see Doward, J. 2006. ‘PM Shelves Islamic Group Ban’. Guardian, [online] 24 Dec. Available at:  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/dec/24/religion.uk [Accessed 05.01.2011]. ‘The Prevention of Terrorism Act 
2005’[online] Available at : http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/2/section/15  [accessed 23.09.2013] merely 
reinstated the illegality of the ‘act’ of terrorism in its definition as outlined in the ‘Terrorism Act of 2000’ [online]  
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/1 [accessed 23.09.2013] . Tony Blair was unable to force 
through his 12 point plan. For Parliamentary debate on Terrorism Bill 2005 see  Hansard Debates, Vo.438 Part 53, 
Wednesday 26th October 2005 [online] 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo051026/debindx/51026-x.htm [Accessed 
26.09.2013] 
 
162 Derek Pasqual an FCO mandarin was responsible for the leaks to Martin Bright a journalist for the UK Observer 
and the New Statesman. Pasqual who was part of the team working on the FCO unit ‘Engaging with the Muslim 
World’ grew increasingly disenchanted and worried about the policy of fomenting engagement with radical Muslim 
individuals and groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. He was charged with leaking sensitive information in 
October 2007.These were however withdrawn during trial by the British government. see Norton-Taylor, R. 2008.  
‘Civil Servant Who Leaked Rendition Secrets Goes Free’. Guardian. [online] 10 Jan. Available at:  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2008/jan/10/pressandpublishing.medialaw  [accessed 07.01.2011]                 see 
Pasquill, D. 2008. ‘I Had No Choice but to Leak’. New Statesman, [online] 17 Jan. Available at: 
http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2008/01/british-muslim-story-case [accessed 07.01.2011]    see also Bright, 
M. 2006. ‘Panic in Whitehall’. New Statesman, [online] Available at: http://www.newstatesman.com/200601300005 
[accessed 07.01.2011]   see also Bright, M. 2006.  ‘Losing the Plot’. New Statesman, [online] Available at: 
http://www.newstatesman.com/200601300005 [accessed 07.01.2011]   
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be banned whilst Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary (FS) was a proponent of proscription. The e-
mails seemed to suggest that whilst Straw deliberated on the positive impact of proscription on 
British relations abroad, Clarke looked at the strength of the evidence available to proscribe HT, 
considering it better to wait until new legislation prohibiting the ‘glorification of terrorism’ was 
effective before making the decision. Straw agreed to Clarke’s request for a delay in the decision 
until the new legislation took effect163. Martin Bright, the journalist to whom the e-mails were 
leaked asserts that the intelligence services were also hesitant to push for proscription without 
sufficient evidence proving that HT had direct involvement with terrorist activity in Britain. The 
issue hinged on the strength of a case for proscription tight enough to withstand a ‘legal 
challenge’ (Bright, 2006). This assessment by the intelligence agencies would no doubt have 
been bolstered by HTB’s unprecedented threat to mount a legal challenge in the UK courts to 
any moves by the government to proscribe it. Moreover, without the evidence, the agencies 
warned that even if the government was successful in pushing through new legislation outlawing 
the ‘glorification of terrorism’, it would be difficult to build a case against HT (ibid). The 
assessment although validating Clarke’s and effectively the HO’s hesitancy did not address the 
critical question for Straw and the FCO which was how the UK government could avoid pressure 
for HT’s proscription without affecting the UK’s relations with governments it had strong 
relations and interests with but who for various reasons including terrorism had banned the 
movement. The exchange strongly suggested that the HO was insistent on protecting its policy 
on HTB from FCO pressure and proposed a solution in that HT in Britain needed to be dealt with 
                                                          
 
163 see Bright, M. 2006. ‘Document 11’ in ‘When Progressives Treat With Reactionaries, The British Governments 
Flirtation With Radical Islam’, Policy Exchange. [online]  Available at: 
http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/pdfs/When_Prog.pdf [accessed 06.01.2011 ]  
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in the British experience and separated from its sister arms internationally, especially the Arab 
countries which were particularly sensitive to FCO interests. According to the e-mail FCO seems 
to have rejected the HO proposal; the e-mail states; 
 
The Foreign Secretary asked about the proscription of HT…HT was banned by the NUS 
and a number of school boards and he felt that we should move against them now. He was 
prepared to look into constructing arguments against HT on foreign policy grounds. 
Clarke said he would prefer putting off proscription of HT until after the proposed 
amendment to the current legislation: it would for example, be much easier to argue that 
HT met the criteria of ‘justifying and glorifying violence’. Clarke said his fear was that the 
government would lose the case for proscription and so wanted to act cautiously…The FS 
would also like as soon as possible, work to be done on HT activities abroad. He would 
like to pursue the foreign policy argument approach and wants to know if there is a case 
that can be made on foreign policy grounds. He feels that the distinction currently drawn 
between HT in the UK and HT abroad is spurious. He recalls that the MeK were 
proscribed in the UK on the basis of their activities abroad. The FS said that the 
proscription of HT could potentially help improve understanding and co-operation with 
states such as Egypt where HT was already banned (ibid).  
 
Jack Straws concerns over the HO’s proposition of ring fencing the UK arm of HT from its 
international activities and its affect on UK foreign relations did indeed produce a reaction from 
former Pakistan President Parvez Musharraf who had proscribed the Pakistani branch of HT in 
2004.  Musharraf, who had asked Blair to ban HT in the UK because of its perceived influence 
over its Pakistani branch, reacted angrily to Blair’s climb-down over HT’s proscription after 
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Blair’s suggestions that Pakistan had not done enough to curb extremism164. However, as will be 
seen later the HO did win through the argument and there was ultimately a distinction drawn 
between the international and domestic chapters of HT. 
 
In essence the argument was whether or not non-violent extremism should be tackled outside of 
the security related context165. In the case of HT, as there existed no evidence of its involvement 
in violent action, and the offence of glorifying terrorism was effectively thrown out by the House 
of Lords from amongst the anti-terrorism proposals, its proscription in the context of anti-
terrorism legislation would have been extremely difficult to employ. This then begged the logical 
question as to why the government was insistent on pushing for the proscription issue when by 
its own admission the governments’ case would likely falter upon a legal challenge by HT? 
According to The Spectator, the reason was explicit within the leaked e-mails wherein Jack 
Straw indicated that the legislation could be used to flush out supporters of HT once there was a 
legal challenge to the government (Bright, 2006).  In fact as will be discussed below, supporters 
of HT were revealed amongst the various individuals and organisations in the UK by the mere 
threat of a legal challenge to the possibility of proscription. The e-mails essentially demonstrated 
the lengths to which the HO was prepared to go in order to shield its policy on HTB from 
politicians and even other government departments. 
 
                                                          
164  See ‘Musharraf: UK Has Failed to Tackle Militants’, 2005. Pak Tribune, [online] Available at 
http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?114467 [accessed 02.02.2011] 
 
165 The context within which the e-mails were leaked related to the frustration of certain mandarins within the FCO 
over certain advisors and their advice to Labour ministers concerning official support for organisation such as the 
Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) and Muslim Brotherhood (MB) clerics such as Sheikh Qardawi. The point at 
issue was whether these bodies and individuals were actually moderate or extreme. 
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Up until Blair’s inclusion of HTB into the 12 point plan, the conveyor belt theory on HT and 
terrorism had been largely ignored by the HO, FCO and ACPO. This was not the first time that 
all three institutions had attempted to keep a protective lid on any discussion or debate 
concerning the proscription of the movement. Many unsuccessful attempts had been made to 
securitize HT and focus the HO’s attention on statements and views of the movement concerning 
other religious groups which clearly seemed to violate UK’s laws on the incitement to racial and 
religious hatred. On each occasion however, the HO refused to act, simply stating that HT was 
under its gaze and it was closely monitoring the movement. The HO and Labour government’s 
secrecy over HT and its consistent dismissal of pressure to move it into public discussion within 
the political system baffled many concerns. Frustrated with the government, the Conservative 
Party opposition leader David Cameron seized an opportunity to bring the proscription of HT 
dramatically into the public domain. On the 4th of July, 2007, in his first ever public exchange 
with Prime Minister Gordon Brown in the House of Commons, Cameron caught Brown off 
guard and launched an attack on the Labour government for not having followed through on its 
pledge to proscribe HT.166 It is pertinent to observe the exchange in the House of Commons as it 
revealed considerable confusion and ignorance even amongst the Labour ranks concerning 
government policy. It confirmed the extent of protectiveness and control the HO maintained over 
its thinking on HT by resisting interference from the main political parties and attempts to 
securitize the movement.  
 
                                                          
166 see Brown and Cameron Clash Over ID, 2004. BBC, [online] 4 July. Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/6267656.stm [accessed 04.02.2011] 
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David Cameron: We need to act against groups which are seeking to radicalise young 
people. Almost two years ago the government said that they would ban the extremist 
group, Hizb ut Tahrir. We think it should be banned. Why has it not happened? 
 
Gordon Brown: I have asked Lord West, the Terrorism Minister, to conduct an immediate 
review… 
 
DC:.. The Prime Minister said that we need evidence about HT. That organisation says 
that Jews should be killed wherever they are found. What more evidence do we need 
before we ban that organisation? It is poisoning the minds of young people. Two years ago 
the government said it should be banned. I ask again: when will this be done? 
 
GB: We can ban it under the prevention of terrorism act and of course the leader of the 
opposition forgets that I have been in this job for five days. I have agreed we will look at 
the issue, but we need evidence, and it cannot be just one or two quotes. 
 
DC: But there has been a two year lapse since the government said that it would ban this 
organisation. I think people find it hard to understand why an organisation that urges 
people to kill Jews has not been banned (BBC, 2004) 
 
It was left to the intervention of the former Labour HO Minister John Reid to espouse the HO 
position according to which two reviews had been carried out by the government wherein it had 
decided not to ban the group for lack of evidence. Apparent in Reid’s dramatic interjection was 
the effective disclosure of a quietist policy towards HT by the HO which it was going out of its 
way to shield from political interference. According to Reid; 
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I therefore ask the Prime Minister to stay absolutely on the course that he has set 
today, and to stick by the law and the evidence and not to be swayed by any 
arbitrary political advantage that he thinks might be gained…Nothing would be 
more disadvantageous than taking on a case without evidence and losing it. That 
would confirm all the accusations made against us by our opponents. (ibid) 
 
As leader of the opposition, Cameron was either not privy to the HO policy on HT or was in total 
disagreement with it167. More curiously, Cameron’s sudden aggressive posture towards HT was 
completely at odds with the Conservative office’s exchange of private correspondence in 2006, 
which it had with Jamal Harwood, a prominent member of the HTB executive committee168. The 
correspondence which had not been publicised was ‘coincidentally’ revealed by Sky News 
immediately after the Commons exchange between Cameron and Brown. The letter was a polite 
response by Cameron’s office to a congratulatory sentiment expressed by HTB for Cameron’s 
comments against Israel in its conflict with Lebanon. The letter addressed to Harwood states; 
 
David is most grateful to you for your comments on relationships between Western 
governments and the Muslim world…He fully takes on board the points put across to him 
                                                          
167  PM Brown’s Official response to David Cameron re-iterated that despite several attempts to proscribe HT, the 
HO had found no evidence that it had violated the Terrorism Act 2000. See Brown, G. RE: Letter to David Cameron 
on Hizb ut Tahrir, PoliticsHome. [online]. Available at: 
http://www.politicshome.com/uk/gordon_browns_letter_to_david_cameron_over_hizb_ut_tahrir.html [accessed 
04.02.2011].  
 
168 The names of HTB’s executive committee at the time can be found in their media pack see  
http://www.hizb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/ht_media_pack.pdf [accessed 02.02.2011] 
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in correspondence from members of the public and it's very helpful of you to have taken 
the trouble to write. Your comments are noted and appreciated169. 
 
Whether or not the letter was deliberately leaked to cause Cameron embarrassment is not clear 
although the timing of the release immediately after the Commons exchange raises some 
questions. It must be stressed that for HTB the exchange represented an unprecedented move in 
its history to engage with the British political establishment. Although the response to its letter 
was published by HTB on its website, the contents of the original letter sent to Cameron’s office 
have not as yet been fully revealed by either party, so it is unclear whether or not other issues 
were discussed. Seemingly embarrassed by the public nature of the revelation, HTB immediately 
criticised Cameron for committing an about turn on his views claiming it to be under the 
influence of the Jewish Zionist lobby. According to the statement released; 
 
Many will find it remarkably hypocritical and opportunistic that less than a year ago, 
Cameron was expressing his gratitude for our comments on Israel's bombardment of 
Lebanon, yet now he calls for our banning, alleging that we call for the killing of Jews. 
We completely reject David Cameron's playing of politics with security and his baseless 
accusation that our organization calls for the killing of Jews. His accusations are not 
surprising given that Hizb ut-Tahrir has been an ardent critic of the Zionist state, while 
                                                          
 
169 see Cameron’s Letter to Radical Group. 2007. Sky News [online] 5 July. Available at: 
http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/Politics/Camerons-Letter-To-Radical 
Group/Article/20070711273737?lpos=Politics_Article_Related_Content_Region_3&lid=ARTICLE_1273737_Cam
erons_Letter_To_Radical_Group [accessed 07.01.2011] 
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Cameron has described himself as a Zionist. Perhaps Mr. Cameron has not, this time, 
jumped onto a bandwagon, but onto a sinking ship170. 
 
Whatever the reason for the sudden thrust from Cameron, there is no doubt that he had been 
convinced about the ‘conveyor belt’ theory linking HT with terrorism and through various public 
speech acts, made continuous attempts to securitize it as an existential threat to the UK. For 
instance on March 4, 2008, in a speech to the Community Security Trust, a Jewish advisory body 
on anti-Semitism, Cameron indirectly linked HT with terrorism by arguing that as an extremist 
movement it was an apologist for terrorists, a phenomenon which the Labour government had 
consistently ignored. Cameron stated; 
 
Terrorists’ apologists should be kept out. Full stop.  Period. We also have to deal with our 
home grown merchants of hate. Here again the government has questions to answer. Hizb 
ut Tahrir is an extremist organisation that poison’s the mind of young Muslims against 
Jews, Christians and other unbelievers. Some of those who have been through its ranks 
have ended up in Al Qaeda. In short it is a conveyor belt to terrorism. Tony Blair declared 
in 2005 that it would be banned. That didn’t happen. Instead it is still active, recruiting 
from campuses and from London street gangs. There’s only one responsible course of 
action. It’s time to close down Hizb ut Tahrir171.  
                                                          
 
170 ‘Cameron’s Letter Exposes His Opportunism in Calling for a Ban on Hizb ut Tahrir ‘’, 2007. Hizb ut Tahrir, 
[online] Available at :http://www.hizb.org.uk/press-releases/camerons-letter-exposes-his-opportunism-in-calling-
for-ban-on-hizb-ut-tahrir [accessed 07.01.2011] 
 
171 see Cameron, D. 2008. Speech to the Communities Security Trust. Conservative News [online] 4 March. 
Available at: 
http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2008/03/David_Cameron_Speech_to_the_Community_Security_Tru
st.aspx [accessed 06.01.2011] 
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Cameron further sharpened public focus on HT by pledging to ban it as part of his manifesto if 
the Conservatives were to achieve power.  He also mobilised high profile and heavy weight 
figures from the intelligence and security community such as former head of Joint Intelligence, 
Shadow security minister, Dame Pauline Neville- Jones to publicise the divide between the 
Conservatives and Labour on dealing with radicalisation in general and HT in particular. Neville 
– Jones became particularly critical of the Labour government’s de-radicalisation policy, 
preventing Islamic extremism or ‘PREVENT’172 for not being robust on non-violent extremism 
and recognition of its failure to recognise a causal link with terrorism. It was this concept which 
effectively separated their policy from Labour’s and one which they would remedy if in power. 
According to Neville-Jones, ‘We will be tough. We will be really tough on the men of violence 
and those who lead them to violence…that’s the real gap between us and the government at the 
moment’173. Therefore, if it was to succeed in its efforts to ban HT, the Conservative Party felt it 
necessary to insist on moving HT away from the quiet HO protection zone and into public 
discussion as an existential security threat. Chris Graylin, former shadow Home Secretary 
subsequently put the HO on notice when in a speech to the Conservative party conference in 
October, 2009 he declared; 
 
                                                          
172 The PREVENT strategy was initiated by the UK government as an outreach programme between government, 
local authorities and local groups designed to combat the threat of terrorism in the UK. The strategy document can 
be found online see The Prevent Strategy, 2008. HM Government. [online]. Available at: 
http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/violentextremism/downloads/Prevent%20Strategy%20A%20Guide%20for%20Local%20Pa
rtners%203%20June%202008.pdf [accessed 04.04.2011] 
 
173 see Jones, P. 2009. Societies Role in Preventing Terrorism. Conservatives, [online] 10 Feb. Available at: 
http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2009/02/Pauline_Neville-
Jones_Societys_Role_in_Preventing_Terrorism.aspx [accessed 04.04.2011] 
275 
 
I will not tolerate more of the chaos of the past few years. The Home Office has another 
key responsibility. The security of our people and of our nation... So I will immediately 
ban Hizb ut Tahrir, and any other group that actively incites hatred and violence174.  
 
This intention to ban HT and move it to the apex of internal securitization was made official 
when the movement was explicitly singled out in the Conservative Party Manifesto 2010 as 
constituting a terrorist threat to the UK. The manifesto states;  
 
Terrorism remains a major threat to our country and some of the biggest threats to our 
security do not come from abroad – they are home grown. A Conservative government 
will ban any organization which advocate hate or the violent overthrow of our society, 
such as hizb-ut-tahrir, and close down organizations which attempt to fund terrorism from 
the UK.175   
 
The Conservative party emerged victorious in the May 5th, 2010 general election albeit 
weakened by the lack of an overall majority and the need to form a coalition government with 
the Liberal Democrats. Having put the HO on notice, it was widely anticipated that the banning 
of HT as specified in its election manifesto was a foregone conclusion. However, at the time of 
writing this chapter, there has been complete silence by the new government on HT. Instead, 
deliberate leaks have been made by the HO to the UK Sunday Telegraph (ST) seemingly aimed 
                                                          
 
174 see Graylin, C. 2009. Speech on Crime and Disorder, epolitix.com, [online] 7 Oct. Available at: 
http://www.epolitix.com/latestnews/article-detail/newsarticle/chris-grayling-speech-on-crime-and-disorder/ 
[accessed 08.01.2011].  
 
175 Conservative Party Manifesto 2010, p105  [online] Available at : 
http://media.conservatives.s3.amazonaws.com/manifesto/cpmanifesto2010_hires.pdf 
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at pre-empting and silencing external pressure and discussion as to why Cameron had not gone 
through with his manifesto promise. According to the leak, Cameron had re-evaluated his 
position after the HO had effectively brought him up to speed on its policy, after presenting 
classified papers to the Coalition ministers on the cabinet’s Home Affairs Committee in June, 
2010. Probably due to the ferocity of Cameron’s approach towards HT prior to taking office, the 
leaks were in actual fact quite significant in that it was the first time the HO had allowed access 
to its policy thinking on extremist movements in general and HT in particular. According to the 
classified papers, a “clear” assessment had been made that individuals “did not progress” to 
violence through such groups (Gilligan; 2010). This position was in direct contradiction to 
Cameron’s thinking which as demonstrated through the speeches above, looked to promote an 
inconvertible link between non-violent extremism and terrorism. The ST states; 
 
One paper entitled “Restricted” and entitled “Government strategy towards extremism” 
says, “It is sometimes argued that violent extremists have progressed to terrorism by way 
of a passing commitment to non-violent Islamist extremism, for example of a kind 
associated with Al Muhajiroun or Hizb ut Tahrir… We do not believe that it is accurate to 
regard radicalization in this country as a linear ‘conveyor belt’ moving from grievance, to 
radicalization, to violence…This thesis seems to misread the radicalization process and to 
give undue weight to ideological factors.176  
 
                                                          
176 Gilligan, A. 2010. ‘Hizb ut Tahrir is Not a Gateway to Terrorism Claims Whitehall Report’. The Telegraph, 
[online] 25 July. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/journalists/andrew-gilligan/7908262/Hizb-ut-Tahrir-is-
not-a-gateway-to-terrorism-claims-Whitehall-report.html [accessed 07.01.2010].  The Home Office explicitly argues 
against the necessary link between radicalisation and violence in its policy paper entitled ‘Understanding 
vulnerability and resilience in individuals to the influence of Al Qa’ida violent extremism - A Rapid Evidence 
Assessment to inform policy’, Home Office, Occassional paper no.98, 2011 [online] Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/.../occ98.pdf  [accessed 26.09.2013]         
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Moreover, there was explicit criticism of Labour’s PREVENT strategy because the countering of 
extremist views which fell short of espousing violence had been done within the security related 
context of terrorism and produced such adverse reactions from the Muslim community that it 
became counter-productive. 177It was therefore according to the HO necessary to de-securitize 
non-violent extremist groups.  Cameron had now according to the classified papers, agreed to 
shift the focus onto combating non-violent extremism including the views of HT at a special 
meeting of the newly set up National Security Council in June, 2010 (ibid). The capitulation of 
Cameron had effectively been a major coup for the HO and the removal of a major hurdle 
towards fulfilling its policy objectives.  
 
However, even this u-turn by Cameron on HT and extremism in general was seemingly tame 
compared to the explosive revelation that there was a more fundamental dynamic embedded 
within HO policy thinking on non-extremist movements including HT and AM which went well 
beyond their mere de-securitization. According to the classified papers, once taken out of the 
security paradigm, the non violent extremist movements themselves could be very useful 
vehicles for channeling views espousing violence. According to a restricted memorandum to the 
Communities Secretary on July, 15th 2010 by Robert Mason, a senior HO official states; 
 
The papers present a “clear assessment that individuals do not progress through non-
violent extremist groups to non-violent groups…Extreme groups may also provide a legal 
‘safety valve’ for extreme views” (Telegraph, 2010) 
                                                          
 
177 (Gilligan, 2010). For a criticism of Labours PREVENT strategy by Parliament see House of Commons, 
‘Preventing Violent Extremism’, Communities and Local Government Committee, House of Commons, sixth Report 
of Session 2009-2010, 30th March 2010 [online]. Available at: 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/.../65/65.pdf [accessed 26.09.2012] 
278 
 
It was the specific development of this line of argument and the protection of its proponents 
inside the FCO-HO which led to civil servant Joe Pasquill decision in leaking information to 
Martin Britght at the The New Statesman. Pasquill who was an official on the FCO’s ‘Engaging 
with the Islamic World Group’, grew increasingly frustrated with FCO Minister, Jack Straw’s 
refusal to negate arguments from his Islamic adviser that groups which he considered as 
espousing and supporting  ‘extremist’ and ‘totalitarian’ ideas such as the Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB) should be part of an engagement process. Pasquill asserts; 
 
I also became increasingly unhappy about the activities of Mockbul Ali, the FCO's Islamic 
issues adviser…His relationship with the foreign secretary, Jack Straw, was thought to be 
close…More seriously, he also described Islamist organizations such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood and its south Asian offshoot Jamaat-e-Islami as mainstream. This is, at the 
very least, a contentious assertion[n] (NS, 2008).  
  
A major implication of this policy related to its affect on the government’s PREVENT strategy 
and its funding of Muslim outreach programmes to various bodies which worked to counter 
extremism. The impression that there existed a HO policy of engagement with extremists 
confined within the deep state was beginning to prompt nervousness in many quarters. A report 
commissioned by the center right think tank Policy Exchange entitled ‘Choosing Our Friends 
Wisely’ (2009)178  attempted to test the HO’s position concerning this strategy. In a written 
response, Charles Farr, Director-General of the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism 
(OSCT) at the HO, denied the claims asserting that “it is not and has never been a part of our 
                                                          
178 see Maher, S. Frampton M. 2009. ‘Choosing Our Friends Wisely’, Policy Exchange, [online] Available at:                    
http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/pdfs/Choosing_Our_Friends_Wisely.pdf [accessed 
15.01.2011] 
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strategy to use extremists against violent extremists” claiming that no such policy existed in the 
HO documents on PREVENT and its sister CONTEST 2 and that the assumptions had been 
based on weak sources.179 However, the credibility of Farr’s denial of an unofficial policy was 
severely undermined when calls were made by Conservative MPs’ for his resignation after he 
had berated the decision of HO Minister Theresa May in June, 2010 to ban radical Indian 
preacher Zakir Naik180 on the basis that it was not conducive to the public good. Details of an e 
mail exchange between Farr and Naik’s lawyer were obtained by the UK Daily Telegraph 
according to which Farr was “willing to put himself on the line” in working to get Naik entry 
into the UK, which in turn prompted a backlash from Nick Boles MP (considered close to 
Cameron) who stated that “This email appears to confirm that civil servants are actively working 
to undermine ministers’ decisions. This is outrageous - If true he [Mr. Farr] should be removed 
from any position where he is responsible for combating terrorism.” 181 
 
                                                          
 
179 (ibid). See letter from Charles Farr to Dean Godson. The Government first created a coordinated counter-
terrorism strategy in 2003. This was revised during 2008 and early 2009, during the course of our inquiry, and the 
‘refresh’ of CONTEST was published in March 2009. CONTEST has four ‘strands’: Pursue, Prevent, Protect and 
Prepare. The Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT), part of the Home Office, is responsible for 
CONTEST and is the Government’s lead unit on counter-terrorism see ‘Project Contest: The Governments Counter 
Terrorism Strategy’, Ninth Report on Session 2008-2009, House of Commons, 29 June 2009 Available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmhaff/212/212.pdf [accessed 23.09.2013].  
 
180 Dr. Zakir Naik is a South African Muslim of Indian descent. Although a medical doctor by profession, he has 
become known as somewhat of an Islamic evangelist concentrating primarily on debates between Christianity and 
Islam.  The point on which he had been officially excluded from the UK was on the basis of incitement against other 
religions and an alleged statement that ‘every Muslim should be a terrorist’, see Hope, C. 2010. ‘Home Secretary 
Theresa May Bans Radical Preacher Zakir Naik from Entering UK’. The Telegraph, [online] 18 June. Available at:  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/7836557/Home-secretary-Theresa-May-bans-radical-preacher-Zakir-Naik-
from-entering-UK.html  [accessed 25.08.12] 
 
181 see Hope, C. 2010.  ‘Theresa May under Pressure to Sack Top Adviser in Row over Ban of Muslim Preacher’. 
The Telegraph, [online] 19 Oct. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-
uk/8071101/Theresa-May-should-sack-top-terrorism-adviser.html  [accessed 15.01.2011] 
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Cameron’s decision not to remove Farr or to clear the air concerning the HO duality in position 
indicated that he had closed ranks with the HO concerning the engagement of extremist 
movements, severely undermining the PREVENT strategy and causing shockwaves amongst its 
beneficiaries. Notable amongst these bodies was the controversial Quilliam Foundation (QF) 
which was set up as a counter extremist think-tank by two former members of HTB, Mohammed 
Hussein and Maajid Nawaz. The QF was launched in April, 2008 with political and financial 
backing from the HO and FCO to the tune of £1m182. The QF listed many high profile political 
backers including former leader of the Liberal Democrats Paddy Ashdown and Conservative MP 
Michael Gove who as chairman of the center right think tank Policy Exchange was heavily 
involved in the debate over extremism in the UK.  Although not overtly in support of a ban on 
HTB, the QF heavily promoted the ‘conveyor belt theory’ linking HT ideology to violence which 
now seemed to conflict with the HO unofficial position on engaging with non-violent extremism 
to pacify violent radicalism.  Fearing the fallout of the HO policy on engaging non-extremist 
movements and potential loss of financial support, the QF in private communications to Charles 
Farr, tried a last ditch attempt to prevent the unofficial change in the government counter-
terrorism policy from following through. However it was to no avail because effectively the QF 
had now become an irritant and an obstacle to the HO. Therefore, unsurprisingly the HO which 
had been the major financial backer of QF withheld its funding prompting former Conservative 
MP, Paul Goodman to announce on his blog that according to his sources the QF was closing and 
that Farr had been instrumental in this decision. According to Goodman; 
 
                                                          
 
182 Kerbaj, R. 2009. ‘Government Gives £1m to Anti-Extremist Think Tank Quilliam Foundation. The Sunday 
Times, [online] Available at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article5549138.ece [accessed 
04.02.2011] 
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Quilliam, the counter-extremism think-tank, was laying off some 80 per cent of its staff.  
It is effectively closing.  The trigger for the decision was the withholding of payments by 
the Home Office. Sources close to Quilliam focus on the role of Charles Farr, Director-
General of the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism… the Home Office insists that 
Ministers have thought the matter through carefully, and weren't satisfied by the case for 
funding Quilliam further.  It says that the think-tank isn't alone, and that other 
organizations funded by the Prevent programme have also seen payments cut or halted.183  
 
The implications of this thinking are quite profound in relation to HT. It means that the de-
securitization of HTB as a ‘legal safety valve’ for extreme views has paved the way for the 
legitimization of channels of engagement with the party and other movements. Having 
persevered in protecting this policy on HTB from successive Labour Prime Ministers, Cameron’s 
capitulation to the HO effectively meant that a potential challenge to its objectives concerning 
HT had all but disappeared. Moreover, the ST leaks did not eliminate the fact that glimpses of 
HO covert policy on HT had only now come to fore. Pertinent questions then emerge as to 
whether or not the HO had already followed through on its understanding concerning 
engagement. Whether there have been unofficial channels open between HTB and the HO is 
unclear although as we will see there is increasing evidence to support the assertion. What is 
evident is that the HO could not have succeeded in resisting the pressure to proscribe HT without 
some form of reciprocal gestures provided by HT through tempering its ideology and actions in 
the UK. In fact there is a remarkable coincidence and coherence between HT’s efforts to avoid 
                                                          
183 see Goodman, P. 2010. ‘Quilliam to Close’. ConservativeHome [online] 16 Dec. Available at: 
http://conservativehome.blogs.com/thetorydiary/2010/12/lansley-and-health.html [accessed on 15.01.2011] 
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proscription in the UK and the sequence of arguments presented by the HO which leads the 
author to believe that due to the fierce battle carried out by the HO to prevent its securitization 
and proscription unofficial channels may have already been open for some time.  
 
6.3 Meeting the Home Office Criteria: Hizb ut Tahrir’s Response to Proscription  
Previous chapters have highlighted HT‘s character extremes between that of radical in the 
Middle Eastern and Uzbek context to that of moderate in the Indonesian case demonstrating its 
pragmatism when challenging the system at hand. A prominent pattern of this is the discrepancy 
between theory and practice. In theory, HT in Indonesia opposed democracy challenged gradual 
approaches for change and criticized party politics. In practice, it engaged with the democratic 
system by building positive interaction with the players of democracy (the Government, the 
House of Representatives and the political parties), justifying elections as a means to propagate 
the shari‘ah and supporting Muslim advocacy for shari‘ah-based policies within the democratic 
framework. Although as highlighted earlier, HT does not seek to challenge the state or system in 
the British context, it has not remained shy of engagement with the political authority and as this 
section will highlight promoted a tendency to under-take a process of overt de-radicalisation for 
the purposes of survival.   
 
An understanding of such behavoiur can be gleamed from the de-radicalization theory proposed 
by Robert C. Tucker, an expert in the transformation of Communist movements. According to 
Tucker one of the hallmarks of movements that have undergone de-radicalization is the 
discrepancy between revolutionism in theory and reformism in practice. De-radicalized 
movements do not necessarily transform into a totally new movement because they maintain 
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some aspects of revolutionary character. But this, in Tucker‘s view, is a tactic to preserve 
internal integrity and prevent disunity. This type of movement tends to reassert its ideological 
revolutionism at the time when it increasingly engages in reformist politics (Tucker 1967:  350).  
He described the process of de-radicalization as follows: 
 
Deradicalization signifies a subtle change in the movement's relation to the social 
milieu. Essentially, it settles down and adjusts itself to existence within the very 
order that it officially desires to overthrow and transform. This is not to say that 
the movement turns into a conservative social force opposed to social change. 
Rather, it becomes "reformist" in the sense that it accepts the established system 
and its institutionalized procedures as the framework for further efforts in the 
direction of social change (Tucker 1967: 348) 
 
Tucker is right in arguing that such a discrepancy is an indication of a movement‘s departure 
from its revolutionary ideology. As the section will demonstrate HTB has settled down and 
adjusted itself into the democratic environment of the UK. Due to Britian’s non-Muslim status, it 
cannot carry out its revolutionary doctrine that requires it to consistently undermine the 
legitimacy of the system, challenge its supporting institutions and mobilize movements to disrupt 
the stability of the system by advocating political detachment or non-participation. Instead, 
whilst suspended in political space, and under the pressure of proscription HTB has been forced 
to engage with the democratic institutions it aims to one day destroy. 
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However, Tucker‘s argument suggesting that this type of movement is becoming reformist or de-
radicalized is inapplicable to HTB. Focusing on the non- revolutionary character of the 
movement is misleading because it ignores the significance of the radical and extreme characters 
of HT compared to those that are moderate. Instead of seeing the movement‘s persistence in 
some aspects of its revolutionism is a way of covering deviations from the movement‘s ideology, 
as suggested by Tucker (1967: 35), HT’s de-radicalisation moves should be studied in the 
context of the process of ‘power politics’ or ‘practice of securitization’ initiated by the British 
political establishment. 
 
Tony Blair’s decision in 2005 to include HT’s British arm as one of the groups to be proscribed 
under the counter-terrorism legislation started an extraordinary process in the movement. In 
response HT undertook actions unprecedented in its history and ones which even departed from 
its own ideological and political premises. Arguably, despite the threat of proscription not 
materializing, the monumental efforts of HTB to stay legal seem to correspond remarkably to 
what was required by the HO in order to preserve its continuous policy towards HT concerning 
its de-securitization. In doing so HTB has maneuvered itself into a position where strong 
arguments could be made by the ACPO, the HO and intelligence services that its non-violent 
political character along with its noticeable influence in the UK communities, especially amongst 
the youth, will be a force in combating violent extremism in British society and therefore meets 
the HO criteria for engagement. In its campaign to pressurize the government on backing down 
over the threat of proscription, HTB produced statements from a number of independent sources 
as support that it had nothing to do with terrorism. Interestingly, this included documents 
released to HTB by the HO upon request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOI) clearly 
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negating HT’s link with violence and strengthening its case against proscription. According to 
the HO documents; 
 
Hizb ut-Tahrir [HT] is an independent political party that is active in many countries 
across the world. HT’s activities centre on intellectual reasoning, logic arguments and 
political lobbying. The party adheres to the Islamic Shariah law in all aspects of its work. 
It considers violence or armed struggle against the regime, as a method to re-establish the 
Islamic State, a violation of the Islamic Shariah. 
[Restricted Home Office Documents 19/8/03, Released to Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain 1/6/05 
under FOI Act] 
 
Hizb ut-Tahrir – Lines to take if extensive coverage is given in the media: Freedom of 
thought and speech key element of our society. Our tradition that there is a place for those 
who disagree with the way we do things – unless they espouse violence as a way to 
achieve their ends. 
[Restricted Home Office Documents 19/8/03, Released to Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain 1/6/05 
under FOI Act] 
 
Moving towards complete de-securitization for the leadership of HT in Britain was not an easy 
task because it needed to convince its own members that HT in the post OBM era still had 
legitimate objectives in Britain and that its ideological base needed to be altered in order to 
pragmatically fight proscription and join forces with other Muslim organizations even if they 
contradicted with its own objectives and ideology. More pertinently, HT in Britain removed all 
impediments in its literature and speech which could potentially be used against it in relation to 
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violence and terrorism. Furthermore, a number of radical steps were taken in order to meet the 
criteria of acceptability in the UK.  
 
The first noticeable change corresponded to the e-mail exchange between the FCO and HO 
concerning the separate characterization of HT in Britain from its international arm in order to 
argue for it as a separate entity. Conventionally, only the regions targeted by HT for the 
establishment of the Caliphate were given a special status termed ‘wilaya’ (area of work). Since 
all other areas fell outside of the ‘area of work’ they did not have any particular title or even 
significance. In the case of Britain however, around the mid 90’s literature was being produced 
in the name of ‘members of HT in Britain’. After 9/11 as the international spotlight focused on 
Islamic movements, despite professing a non-violent political programme, HT’s international 
arms refusal to condemn what it considered as legitimate militaristic action against occupations 
in Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya posed a dilemma for the British chapter. In this instance it 
produced a new British specific brand termed ‘Hizb ut Tahrir Britain (HTB)’ with a new website 
www.hizb.org.uk replacing www.khilafah.com as its main website and new one designed to 
portray a more academic personality www.newcivilisation.org . The website www.hizb.org.uk 
now dealt primarily with the British scene and its specific activity within it. The literature 
pertaining to jihad as well as scriptural texts and arguments relating to the Jews, homosexuals 
and the destruction of Israel were conveniently removed from the websites. Explaining this move 
Abdul Wahid, chairman if HTB’s executive committee stated; 
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In fact, the decision to remove some of our overseas literature from our British website 
was a considered response to the legitimate proposition that people who read it out of its 
context might see it as offensive.184  
 
The validity of Abdul Wahid’s reasoning however becomes void when considering the fact that 
in the age of the internet and digital communication, access to the literature of HT is not merely 
confined to the British site but could be obtained from its official site www.hizb–ut-tahrir.org 
and elsewhere. In reality it was an attempt to re-fashion HT’s ideas to the particularities of the 
British case by removing the impediment of tabani (adoption) which demanded strict coherence 
with the officially adopted thoughts of HT globally185. Hence as Whine (2006) points out, over 
time, through the systematic removal of the official literature which was deemed problematic, 
contradictions started to emerge between the statements of members in the West and those 
outside of it (Whine, 2006). The impact of this process cannot be underestimated. The yardstick 
with which HTB’s members and supporters were measuring their ideas was no longer the official 
tabani but whatever was being presented by the leadership in the UK and its corresponding 
website. One of the first hurdles in re-fashioning its case was to overcome the charge of anti- 
Semitism, especially in the context of Israel. As discussed above, this was one of the major 
pressure points both the FCO and the HO had been continuously presented with in defending its 
position towards non-proscription.  
 
                                                          
184  see Wahid, A. 2005. ‘Hizb ut Tahrir’s Distinction’. Open Democracy, [online] 14 Aug.  Available at:  
http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/criticism_2755.jsp [accessed 16.01. 2011] 
 
185 For a summary of HT’s conception of adoption see Adoption in Hizb-ut-Tahrir, undated. Hizb ut Tahrir, [online]. 
Available at:  http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/PDF/EN/en_books_pdf/adoption.pdf  [accessed 01.02.2011] 
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In origin, the case of HT towards Israel is a nuanced one where although it refuses to recognize 
Israel’s existence or condemn attacks by Palestinian groups against its citizens, its solution to the 
issue of Israel is through the establishment and possible military action of the Caliphal state and 
not jihad or violence prior to its establishment (Farouki, 2000). Therefore, although as a 
movement it prohibits the militaristic method, it characterizes the actions of other groups as 
justified resistance. Consequently, in addition to literature calling for the destruction of Israel, 
official leaflets highlighting scriptural arguments legitimizing the hijacking of Israeli planes as 
acts of war and human bombs as martyrdom actions and not suicide were removed from the 
website in order to avoid the charge of anti-Semitism and terrorism (Whine, 2006). In so doing, 
it effectively withdrew its ideological position on HT’s core religiously potent rallying call 
which it had employed since its inception in order to undermine the legitimacy of the regimes, 
especially in the Arab world. In its place more palatable language and reasoning was deployed in 
efforts to conform to contemporary political language and meanings acceptable in the West. For 
instance, terms such as “illegal occupation”, “annexation”, “state terrorism” and “Zionism” were 
for the first time utilized to characterize the Israeli-Palestinian situation instead of terms such as 
‘Muslim land’, ‘jihad’ and ‘Jews’. Its report entitled ‘Iraq: A New Way Forward’ (2007),  is a 
clear example of its attempts to rationalize the issue of Israel using the term “annexation” to 
describe the 1948 scenario within the international legal context which by default recognizes a 
priori legitimacy and existence of the Israeli state. The report states: 
 
In the context of ensuring long term stability to the region, Israel's annexation of 
Palestine in 1948 should not be recognized….Until it is recognized that the 
annexation of Palestinian land in 1948 was not just illegal but heralded the ethnic 
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destruction of lives, property and lands of millions of Palestinians, the so-called 
imposed 'peace process' will not work and instability in the region will remain. If 
the Zionist regime that governs in Tel Aviv has a right to Palestine, a region it 
annexed in 1948, then Argentina had a right to invade the Falkland Islands in 
1982. Yet Britain sent an armada of naval ships across the globe to reassert British 
sovereignty. Today Palestinians are asked to recognize this illegal annexation.186  
 
As clearly seen the Israeli government is characterized as ‘Zionist’ and not Jewish whilst all 
notions of Israel’s destruction are carefully avoided as is the conventionally used hadith 
(tradition) of the Prophet Mohammed seized on by Cameron and many others foretelling a clash 
between the Muslim’s and the Jews mentioned above. The change in the context, language and 
tone can only be appreciated when compared to the radical view from its international arm which 
states; 
 
There can be no peaceful relations with the Jews: this is prohibited by the Shari'a. It is 
also prohibited to settle for only part of Palestine. There can be neither negotiations, co-
existence, nor normalization of relations with the Jews in Palestine. None of the Jews who 
arrived there after the destruction of the Ottoman Empire have the right to remain there. 
The Islamic legal rule requires that those of them who are capable of fighting be killed 
until none survive. Any others should be forced to leave. Individual Jews who lived in 
Palestine (as part of a dhimma community) before the end of the [Ottoman] Empire and 
who are not guilty of any violent act against Muslims can be allowed to stay. However, it 
                                                          
186 (HTB: 2010:12) see Iraq: A New Way Forward, 2010. Hizb ut Tahrir Britain. [online]. Available at:  
http://www.hizb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2007/03/iraq_a_new_way_forward.pdf [accessed 03.03.2011] 
290 
 
is anticipated that none fit this description. It is impossible to solve the problem of 
Palestine by peaceful means. What is required is actual war, jihad. (Farouki, 28:2000) 
 
The second change corresponds to the argument put forward by Charles Clarke in particular and 
the HO is general over concerns about the strength of the government’s case in proscribing HTB 
in the event of a legal challenge. Henceforth, the decision to ban or not to ban was a political and 
not judicial one. Yet, in another extraordinary act, the leadership in HTB did in fact break with 
its tabani and threaten the government with legal action if any political party in the UK was to 
follow through on proscription as stated by HTB media spokesman, Imran Wahid; 
 
Our members are all for political expression, not for violence. We have been very clear 
about that and we will fight any ban through the legal system. We will continue our work. 
Our work is totally non-violent.187  
 
On face value this would seem to be a reasonable concern. However, when one puts this in the 
context of HT’s well known position on the prohibition of adhering to secular legal principles 
and canons to resolve disputes and with no history of any court challenges to its proscription 
globally, these concerns should have been unfounded.  
 
To date no official explanation has been provided by HTB as to their reasoning for changing 
their theological position on utilizing the secular legal system.188  Ironically, it was the two 
                                                          
187 see Waheed, I. 2005. ‘Blair Extremism Measures: Reaction’.  BBC, [online] 5 Aug. Available at : 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4748963.stm  [accessed 19.01.2011]  
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Muslim umbrella organizations attacked by HTB as clients of the British government, the 
Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) and the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) (because they 
had been co-opted by the Blair government and financed by the HO189), who came out against 
HTB’s proscription on the grounds that there was no evidence of its involvement in violence, the 
move was undemocratic and the possible security implications of driving them underground. The 
MCB immediately issued a press release in which Sir Iqbal Sacranie its leader states, 
 
The MCB holds no brief for Hizb ut Tahrir - they are a group with whom the mainstream 
Muslim community has strong and well known disagreements concerning participation in 
our political process. However, banning Hizb ut Tahrir is certainly not the solution and 
may well prove to be counterproductive. We understand that Hizb ut Tahrir in the United 
Kingdom are an avowedly non-violent group. If there are groups that are thought to be 
contravening our laws, then they ought to be prosecuted in courts of law, not driven 
underground. Our democratic values need to be upheld, not undermined (ibid). 
 
In terms of its political significance to the HO, it is arguably the case that by forcing HTB to 
consider taking the legal process and moving it into the state process, a major step in its de-
securitization had been achieved. However, there still remained the major obstacle and 
vulnerability relating to the anti-Semitism charge, especially since Cameron had re-introduced it 
in a very public manner. Consequently, on behalf of its German arm, HTB decided to challenge a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
188 The author has also requested this unofficially on many occasions from its members according to whom no 
explanation has been provided internally either. 
 
189 See Department of Trade and Industry document entitled ‘Projects Receiving Funding’ 14th February, 2006 
[online] Available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dti.gov.uk/er/equality/funded_projects.htm [Accessed 
26.09.2013] see also ‘Home Office Funds Muslim Council of Britain’, 2006. Freedom of Information Act Centre, 
[online]. Available at: http://www.foiacentre.com/news-MCB-060510.html [accessed 20.01.2011].  
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ban which had been administered by the German government in 2003 under its unique and strict 
anti-Semitism legislation (The ban was on the activities of HT and not on its membership).190 In 
June, 2008, HTB announced that it was challenging the ban in the European Court in Strasbourg. 
If this challenge was to succeed then it would pave the way for its acquittal under European law 
and one which would be very difficult for even the Conservative government to overturn. 
However, it is not entirely clear as to exact premise under which the German ban against HT is 
in operation. HT points out that the ban has nothing to do with anti-Semitism. According to its 
press release, 
 
We note that the German courts did not uphold any of the German Interior Ministries 
accusations of anti-Semitism against Hizb ut Tahrir , however, they have now relied on an 
obscure principle of the ‘idea of international understanding’ to ban all of our activities 
(speeches, study circles, articles, vigils, political meetings, books, magazines, and 
debates.191  
 
Despite this, certain questions come to mind as to why it had taken five years for HT to respond 
to the ban? Why had the challenge taken place from the UK and not from Germany? Was the 
challenge aimed primarily at the German or British context or both? One can only speculate over 
these questions, however, the pressure generated by Cameron over the anti-Semitism issue no 
doubt had a lot to do with the timing of the decision as well as its location considering the media 
                                                          
190 See The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section),Application 31098/08,  Decision Hizb ut Tahrir and 
Others vs Germany,  sitting on 12 June 2012 [online] Available at: 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-111532#{"itemid":["001-111532"]} [Accessed 
26.09.2013] 
 
191  see ‘Hizb ut Tahrir Challenges German Ban in European Court’, 2008. Hizb ut Tahrir Britain. [online]  
Available at: http://www.hizb.org.uk/press-releases/hizb-ut-tahrir-challenges-german-ban-at-european-court 
[accessed 21.01.2011] 
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access available to HTB in London. Furthermore, success in the European Court will no doubt 
contribute to bridling the pressure on the HO and pave the way for official engagement with 
HTB.  
 
Indications that some unofficial channels had already been opened came on June 25, 2006, when 
Claire Short, former Labour cabinet minister and MP for Sparksbrook in Birmingham, extended 
an invite to HTB in order to present their case against proscription to Parliamentarians in the 
House of Commons, which the HTB leadership accepted. Although Short came under intense 
criticism from Labour colleagues and opposition ministers; there was no comment from Blair 
himself. It was in her response to these criticisms where she revealed that HTB had been 
contacting various Parliamentarians in order to lobby their case against proscription. Publicly she 
advocated that it was as a consequence of an approach by HTB in her constituency that she had 
decided to give it an audience in the Commons. According to Short; 
 
Hizb ut-Tahrir have been approaching parliamentarians to explain who they are and what 
they believe…Following such a meeting in my constituency, I volunteered to facilitate a 
meeting at the House of Commons so parliamentarians can decide for themselves whether 
the organization should be banned. 192 
 
The initiation by Short did not seem accidental. In her open letter to the Parliamentarians, an 
explicit link was made with the leaked e-mails by The New Statesman discussed above and 
specifically the rejection by the HO that HTB had any connection with violence or terrorism. 
                                                          
192 see Tempest, M. 2006. ‘Short Urged to Cancel Radical Muslim Forum’. Guardian, [online] 01 March. Available 
at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2006/mar/01/immigrationpolicy.religion  [Accessed on 21.01.2011] 
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Short’s invitation was to facilitate the HO position as well as channels of communication with 
HTB. According to the invitation: 
 
In August 2005, Tony Blair announced his 12-point plan for new anti-Terror measures 
which included a ban on the organization Hizb ut-Tahrir although documents leaked to the 
New Statesman make clear that the literature of the organization explicitly rejects the use 
of violence. Hizb ut-Tahrir has been approaching Parliamentarians to explain who they 
are and what they believe. Following such a meeting in my constituency, I volunteered to 
facilitate a meeting at the House of Commons so that Parliamentarians can decide for 
themselves whether the organization should be banned.193  
 
For HTB this was a seismic shift in its political history and one neither consistent with its 
international arm or with its explicitly stated political programme according to which it was 
prohibited to have any form of contact or engagement with countries who were considered to 
have a history of pro-active conflict with Islam and the Islamic world194.  Britain comes under 
particular focus due its long experience with the Islamic world and the primary state along with 
France considered responsible for destroying the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 as well as working 
hard to prevent the rise of another such entity (see chapter 2). HT states; 
 
                                                          
 
193 see ‘Clare Short Hosts Hizb ut Tahrir’, 2007. Harry’s Place, [online]. Available at: 
htt://hurryupharry.bloghouse.net/ar…_ut_tahrir.php   [accessed 23.01.2011] 
 
194 Hizb ut Tahrir’s proposed constitution for the Caliphate, Britain is treated as a state which has colonial designs in 
the Muslim world and therefore no relations can exist with it. According  to Article 185 of the constitution ‘ States 
with which we have no treaties, states such as England, America and France that practice 
colonialism…consequently every precaution is taken in relation to these states (Nabhani, 1953).  
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The crusader hatred harbored by the Westerners, especially in Europe and more so by 
Britain, and their deeply rooted animosity and wicked malice was the cause of our 
eventual humiliation in our homeland. ..This malice and hatred has existed ever since the 
days of the crusades and it is still perpetuated today. What we face in terms of oppression, 
humiliation, colonization and exploitation - in addition to the political aspect - is in fact an 
act of brutal revenge on the Muslims…In the wake of the First World War; the allies 
occupied all the lands of the Islamic State. Their main aim was to destroy the State for 
good and then ensure that it would never rise again. Once they had destroyed the Islamic 
State, they set about making sure that the Islamic State could not be reestablished in any 
part of its lands. They designed several plans and used several methods to make certain 
that the Islamic State would never return to existence, and they are still working towards 
that objective. (Nabhani, 1997-98) 
 
Britain’s animosity was considered so deep that it was characterized as constituting the head of 
Kufr (non-Islam). According to HT; 
  
Therefore, when the discerning and sincere people say that the British are the head of Kufr 
among all the other Kufr states, they mean exactly that, for they are indeed the head of 
Kufr and they are the arch enemies of Islam. The Muslims should indeed harbor hatred for 
the British and a yearning for revenge over the[m].  (Zaloom, 2000:186) 
 
This shift was all the more astounding considering the fact that during the period within which 
the proscription of HTB was being debated, former HO minister Charles Clarke in a speech to 
the US think tank, Heritage Foundation in October 2005, made it emphatically clear that the 
British government had not changed its position towards the application of the Sharia and that of 
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the Caliphate ever since its direct action in dismantling the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924195. In his 
explicit rejection of HT’s ideology and objective’s Clarke (2005) stated; 
 
There can be no negotiation about the re-creation of the Caliphate; there can be no 
negotiation about the imposition of Sharia law…These values are fundamental to 
our civilization and are simply not up for negotiation’.196  
 
The acceptance of Shorts invitation and the openness of the meeting at the House of Commons 
was therefore a coup of some significance for the British political establishment. In the absence 
of official channels of engagement, a meeting with Short will have helped to alleviate internal 
pressure on both the government and the HTB leadership. This constraint would have been more 
so on HTB considering its party’s stance towards any sort of engagement with the British 
political establishment which in principle should have led to instability and revolt amongst its 
members. The nervousness in the HTB executive was evident as it instituted a complete blackout 
of information concerning the meeting on its website. In a measure of its effectiveness in 
reconstituting the mindset of its cadres, no such revolt occurred even after the news of the 
meeting had become known. There was no media coverage of the event and its details remained 
                                                          
195 Clarke’s position is mentioned in the literature of HTB as echoing former British Foreign secretary’s speech in 
1924 in the House of Commons on the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate according to which he states “The point at 
issue is that Turkey has been destroyed and shall never rise again, because we have destroyed her spiritual power, 
the Caliphate and Islam.” see Asghar, A. 2005. ‘Caliphate and the Myth of Violence’, New Civilisation. [online] 
Available at: http://www.newcivilisation.com/index.php/main/newciv/current_issue/winter_05/full_article/73/0/P2/  
[accessed 23 January 2011] 
 
196 Clarke, C. 2005. ‘Contesting the Threat of Terrorism’. Heritage Foundation. [online] Available at 
http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/contesting-the-threat-of-terrorism [accessed 23 .01. 2011] 
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censored on the website.197 According to the only account of the meeting, twelve 
Parliamentarians were present including political heavy weights such as Lord Lawson and Lord 
Avebury. The account states that Parliamentarians were agitated by Short’s consistent defense of 
HTB spokesman Imran Waheed each time he was pressed over HT’s position on violence 
towards Israel and the Jews in the immediate term and if they were to succeed in establishing the 
Caliphate. The account states; 
 
Clare Short would consistently interject telling parliamentarians they ‘shouldn’t interrupt’. 
One MP, Ian Austin, got visibly agitated by Short’s kid-gloves approach. Short’s body 
language was outwardly warm towards Imran Waheed and her outburst at the beginning 
against the Jewish Chronicle was matched by another startling observation that, ‘many 
orthodox Jews are against the Israeli state’. This rattled the increasingly vocal audience 
with an angry refutation from Liberal Democrat peer Baroness Falkner. (ibid) 
 
This very public engagement also moved some way towards addressing criticism over concerns 
that there existed a deficit of trust in the movement since it operated under a veneer of secrecy. 
Throughout its history, HT had become known for maintaining a strict vigil over the covert 
nature of its internal structure despite its activities being open. HT followed a Leninist cell 
structure and a hierarchical chain of command, which it is claimed by its members to have 
protected it from infiltration by the security services, especially in countries within which it was 
                                                          
197 The only place where some exposure was available was on a website blog called Harry’s Place where Peter 
Thatchell, a former MP and now gay rights activist attended the meeting and put forward his version of events after 
having written a public letter to Claire Short urging her strongly not to give HTB a public platform due to its 
position on homosexuality, Israel and democracy amongst other issues. See 
http://www.petertatchell.net/religion/hizb.htm [accessed 23.01.2011]  
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banned198. HTB had held the same policy in the UK, largely due to its conception of enmity 
towards the British mentioned above and also because not only did it consider the British the best 
in intelligence and subversion, but one which was actively working to sabotage the Islamic 
movement, a subject it had extensively written about in its political leaflets and adopted in its 
book Political Views of Hizb ut Tahrir (1962). 
 
However, in March, 2004, HTB broke with its secrecy policy in the UK by demonstrating its 
willingness to move towards transparency when it announced the election of its executive 
committee along with the names and occupations of the candidates199.  The election resulted in 
the affirmation of four prominent members under the leadership of Jalal-ud-Din Patel, Imran 
Waheed (Media spokesman), Jamal Harwood (Chairman) and Sajjad Khan (Political advisor). 
All three had already maintained positions and influence prior to the election and now became 
the key architects of HTB’s de-securitization policy and engagement with the British political 
establishment. In order to broadly publicize its new transparency, HTB took the decision to allow 
journalistic access to the inner workings of its structure. This was another radical departure from 
the HT aversion to journalists who were considered tools of the intelligence and therefore not 
trustworthy, especially non-Muslim journalists. According to senior members, HT had since its 
inception prohibited any access to its structure from Muslim and non-Muslim journalists. With 
the threat of proscription looming, in order to demonstrate that it had nothing to hide in terms of 
its ideological training of its members, a freelance journalist Shiv Malik was allowed to sit in 
                                                          
198 For a fuller understanding of its structural make-up please see Farouki, T. (1996), A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al 
Tahrir and the Search for a Caliphate’, London: Grey Seal pp114-152. 
 
199 The original link to the press release under www.1924.org  has been removed due to the closure of the site. It can 
now be found on the following site http://www.omanforum.com/forums/showthread.php?t=5814  
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amongst its members during study circles and meetings., The gesture however backfired and put 
pressure on their de-securitization strategy as it seemed they had not done their homework. 
Malik was a vehement opponent of Islamism and Islamist movements, despite which, he had 
been successful in gaining close access to radical individuals and movements before writing 
material which had disparaged and angered them. HTB had not escaped Malik’s wrath as he put 
them back in the security limelight after major publications such as the UK Independent and the 
UK Guardian published his articles endorsing  the ‘conveyor belt theory’ by linking them with 
7/7 bombers in London and the British Tel Aviv bombers, labeling HTB as the ‘biggest security 
threat to British society’200. However, it was only after Malik’s exposure of members of HTB 
working high up in British companies and having been successful in the removal of one of its 
member’s, Dilpazier Aslam, as a trainee journalist at the Guardian, that HTB responded by 
accusing the UK Independent of fomenting a ‘witch-hunt’ against members of the party201.  
Ironically however, in a debate entitled ‘Should Hizb ut Tahrir be Proscribed?’ where both 
Malik and HTB spokesman Waheed were invited to speak, Malik after highlighting the 
inconsistencies in HTB’s literature and public speech argued that he would oppose the ban. 
According to the UK Guardian, 
 
Shiv Malik, the journalist who wrote the "infiltration" story, said that what had 
been presented to the audience was not the full picture. He quoted one leaflet 
                                                          
200 see Malik, S. 2005. ‘The Radical Islamic Group that Acts as a ‘Conveyor Belt for Terror’, The Independent, 
[online] Available at  http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/the-radical-islamic-group-that-acts-as-conveyor-
belt-for-terror-501827.html  [Accessed 24.01.2011] 
 
201 see Waheed, I. 2005.  ‘RE: Letter- How Militant Islamists are Infiltrating Britain’s Top Companies’, Hizb ut 
Tahrir Britain. [online] Available at:  http://www.hizb.org.uk/press-releases/letter-re-how-  [accessed 24.01.2011] 
See also Malik, S. 2005 ‘How Militant Islamists are Infiltrating Britain’s Top Companies’. The Independent [online] 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/how-militant-islamists-are-infiltrating-britains-top-companies-
506410.html [accessed 24.01.2011] 
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posted on the HT website in 1999 and now removed which referred to "the Jews ... 
a poisoned dagger thrust into the heart of the Islamic Ummah". But Mr. Malik said 
that it might surprise people that he, too, opposed a ban202.  
 
The episode with Malik however, did not deter HTB from pursuing a policy of structural 
transparency and it continued to inform through its website the composition of its leadership and 
portfolios in the UK. However, Malik’s episode provided confirmation that another major shift 
had become apparent in HTB. Thinking regarding internal security amongst its members and 
leadership had all but evaporated as there was no resistance to either the public declaration of its 
leadership committee or access to the internal operations of its UK structure. The lowering of the 
intellectual and physical guard had no doubt produced an intelligence vulnerability never before 
experienced in its history. Two former affiliates of HTB exposed this vulnerability in dramatic 
fashion. The first was Mohammed Mahbub Hussein, who suddenly exploded on to the scene 
with a book entitled ‘The Islamist’ (2007), a memoir highlighting his short period of activism 
with HTB in the early 1990’s. The timing of the book was significant as it focused enormous 
attention onto HTB during the period of its transformation. Hussein had over the years co-opted 
the mandarins in the HO as well as elements of the Labour leadership with whom he had become 
close. This relationship seems to have been put to use with the publication of the book which 
political commentator and author Ziadin Sardar claimed ‘to have been drafted by a Whitehall 
mandarin as a PR job for the Blair government’203.  Hussein’s agenda and the HO link became 
                                                          
 
202 see Campbell, D. 2005. ‘Bid to Impose Ban Debated’. Guardian, [online] 23 Sep. Available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/sep/23/terrorism.politics [accessed 24.01.2011] 
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all the more clearer when it transpired that Hussein had been in close communication with an old 
friend, Maajid Nawaz, who was now a member of the leadership committee in HTB. Nawaz, a 
British born Muslim, who along with two others had been imprisoned in Egypt for four years 
after being accused of being part of a banned party whilst studying on an exchange 
programme204. Upon his release and return and spending a year in the UK championing the 
cause, including an interview on the BBC news flagship programme ‘Hard Talk’, Nawaz left 
HTB. The reason given by Nawaz for his departure rocked the HTB rank and file. In a 
contradictory account, Nawaz claimed that he had stopped believing in the political ideology of 
HT whilst in prison in Egypt, which did not explain why he had continued as a high profile and 
active member a year after his return to the UK. Whatever the truth, the most significant aspect 
of his departure was his communion with Hussein on an anti-HT/extremist platform. The hand of 
Hussein and the HO/FCO in grooming Nawaaz was further confirmed when they were both 
granted a sum of £1m annually in order to fund the anti-extremist QF (see above).205  In essence 
this seemed to be a two pronged strategy by the HO/FCO aimed towards HTB’s transformation, 
one of fostering engagement and the second of pressure from the QF including influencing 
sympathetic elements still within HTB. Having had a position in the executive council and 
therefore intricate inside knowledge of HTB, Nawaaz’s abdication was no small coup for the HO 
and FCO. After such a serious breach, it would have been expected that serious questions would 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
203 see Sardar, Z. 2007. ‘Review: The Islamist by Ed Husain’. The Independent, [online] Available at: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/reviews/the-islamist-by-ed-husain-journey-into-islam-by-
akbar-ahmed-451160.html#Scene_1 [accessed 24.01.2011] 
 
204 see ‘Imprisoned Britons Return Home’. 2006. BBC, [online] 28 Feb. Available at:  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4760322.stm [accessed 24.01.2011] 
 
205 See communication between FCO and Gaeme Breen on FCO funding for Quilliam Funding requested under the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) [online] Available at: 
https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/fco_involvement_with_the_quilliam [accessed 26.09.2013]. 
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have been raised about the veracity of the executive committee and some sort of quarantine or in 
Shouse security reshuffle may have occurred especially with Waheed, Harwood and Khan, 
already having attempted a rapprochement with the British political establishment. However, no 
such reflection took place and instead the leadership remained intact and moved forward in order 
to consolidate HTB’s transformation.  
 
As discussed above, the FCO had indicated that HTB’s proscription might help sensitive 
relations with countries in the Middle East such as Egypt. The HO resolution to this suggestion 
was that HTB could be separated from it international arm and effectively fashioned into a 
British specific case which does not give Britain cause for concern regarding its foreign 
relations. If this was to be achieved, HTB would have to reciprocate a fundamental shift in its 
overall political strategy towards the Middle East and Arab world which in theory forms the 
heartland of its desired goal to establish the Caliphate. In fact the HTB leadership had come 
some way for these criteria to be met. Three critical steps were taken which over time 
deconstructed the Arab case in the mind and activism of its membership in the UK.  
 
The first was the composition of the executive committee and the process by which its members 
were chosen. Elections were held regularly after candidates were put forward through successive 
ballots (Jamestown, 2004). According to inside sources, due to the overwhelming concentration 
of Bangladeshi and Pakistani members, the Arabs had very little chance of getting selected for 
the committee and therefore possessed virtually no influence. The second was the change in 
emphasis concerning the international political issues. One of the policy objectives which HTB 
put for the Muslims in the UK was connecting it with their issues internationally (HTB, 2011). 
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As highlighted above, in the pre-Bakri era, with the concentration of power amongst the Arabs, 
the focus was on contacting transient Muslims from the Arab world and making sure the political 
focus was securely on issues relating to the Middle East and especially the Palestinian question 
(Farouki, 1996: 172-176). According to senior members, all other areas were periphery and the 
ethnic make-up of the members was of little consequence to this policy. However, in the late 
1990’s there occurred a sudden shift in focus onto Pakistan and Bangladesh with its membership 
mobilized to support not only the concentration on these areas in Britain but an encouragement 
to travel in order to aid the activities in these countries206. The international media machinery it 
had developed in the UK including the content on its website projected this shift heavily.  
 
Further impetus was given to this focus when in the year 2000 the HT leadership declared 
Pakistan to be a wilayah (potential for power) producing a flurry of conferences, talks and 
demonstrations in support of its activities from the UK207. Although some news and analysis 
concerning the Middle East was put onto the website, all demonstrations and conferences were 
centered on events outside of the Middle East and primarily on Pakistan and Bangladesh with 
occasional outbursts on Central Asia (www.hizb.org.uk). Consequently, unless focus on the 
Middle East was unavoidable, as in the case of the current momentous changes in Tunisia, 
Egypt, Yemen, and beyond, there existed no sustained activity from HTB targeting the Middle 
East regimes and the core issue of Palestine which would ultimately have been carried by the 
                                                          
206 According to Maajid Nawaaz, many members including himself made the journey to Pakistan on the advice of 
HT.  see Nawaaz, M. 2009. ‘A Chilling Return to the Land Where I Once Sowed Hate’. The Observer. [online] 21 
June.  Available at  http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jun/21/hizb-ut-tahrir-pakistan-islamism 
[accessed 26.01.2011]. 
 
207 Maajid Nawaaz’s assertion is that although Pakistan fell outside of the traditional Arab realm for HT, it was 
because of its nuclear power status that the decision had been taken by the HT leadership to upgrade its status to a 
wilaya see Smith, N. 2009. ‘British Islamists Plot Against Pakistan’. The Times, [online]  Available at 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6638483.ece  [accessed 26.01. 2011] 
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international media and inevitably put pressure on Britain’s foreign interests. HTB’s very tame 
response to the unprecedented events in Tunisia, Yemen and Egypt as well as to the release of 
the Palestinian Papers by Al Jazeera which in theory strengthened HT’s case against the US 
brokered peace process is a case in point.208  
 
The drawdown of attention on the Arab world connects to the second step which relates to its 
influential Arab members who due to the Arabic language had greater access to the HT literature 
(most of which remains still in Arabic) and the Islamic sources (classical texts) and therefore had 
naturally taken leadership over the non-Arab members. The Arab members were also naturally 
more connected with the international arm and specifically the issues related to the Middle East. 
However, beyond the effects of the internal election process, it seems deliberate moves were 
made by the HTB leadership to marginalize and ultimately remove the Arab influence from its 
membership. According to internal sources, despite the existence of a token media spokesman 
for the Arab world, the Arab structure was being dismantled and a new directive was given to 
contact Muslims in their communities from different regions of the world including from 
Somalia, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan and India. However, no mention was made of 
contacting people from the Arab world. With no new recruits from the Arab world, inevitably 
over time the structure would cleanse itself from the Arab membership and its issues. By 
marginalizing and over time removing the Arab influence, the HTB leadership would no longer 
be subject to internal pressures to accommodate and focus on sensitive political issues which 
                                                          
 
208 (ibid). As chapter 2 demonstrates, the revolutions in the Middle East also exposed the severe weakness of HT’s 
influence in the region. The Palestinian Papers were alleged confidential documents leaked to Al Jazeera which 
seem to demonstrate that the Palestinian Authority had been unofficially working with Israel and contrary to the 
official position had given way on many of the core issues relating to Palestinian question such as land, right of 
return etc, see The Palestinian Papers, 2011. Al Jazeera, [online] Available at: 
http://english.aljazeera.net/palestinepapers/ [accessed 03.02.2011]  
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would ultimately draw the ire of the Middle Eastern regimes and no doubt securitize the case of 
HTB and in turn put pressure on the FCO to reverse its understanding with the HO on HTB’s 
proscription. With its membership predominantly British born third generation Muslims who had 
very little in common with and therefore desire to return to the countries of their forefathers and 
with the overseas and transient Arab influence marginalized, the HTB leadership was able to 
take the third step which was to fully fashion its role and structure to the settled role of British 
Muslim communities.  
 
A focused policy on the communities in Britain only emerged after the events of 9/11 in 2001 
albeit in a very confused state in terms of the relationship with the British state. Over the decade 
the policy evolved within the framework of de-securitization mentioned above and slowly moved 
away from aiding the emergency position and work in the Arab world to becoming a mainstream 
party working amongst Muslim communities in the UK (HTB: 2011). Although many of its 
policy proposals in respect to the Muslim communities such as non-participation in the British 
political system, opposing UK foreign policy in the Muslim world, the belief in Sharia and the 
Caliphate were at odds with the British governments own policy towards its Muslim subjects, the 
critical point of interest for the HO was its usefulness in preventing British Muslims turning to 
violence and accepting the authority of the state. The HTB leadership responded to this 
predicament through a public debate on the HO consultation document concerning community 
cohesion and race equality entitled ‘Strength in Diversity’ (2004)209  After years of revolutionary 
zeal in rejecting the duty of citizenship in Britain because it was considered an enduring enemy 
                                                          
209 see ‘Strength in Diversity’, 2004.  Home Office, [online] Available at: 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/error404?errorurl=http://imblive:8080/documents/cons-strength-in-diverse-170904/    
[accessed 27.01.2011] 
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of Islam and the Muslim’s, HTB was now moving to convince the HO not only that had it moved 
away from much of its radical rhetoric and activity but also that it had adopted a new posture 
which was building model citizens amongst the Muslim communities. HTB put forward its own 
idea of relations between the State, Muslims and non-Muslims which argued that although 
Muslim’s were not bound to accept the secular value system or the nationalism proposed by the 
HO as constituting Britishness, Islam commanded Muslim’s to live as model citizens in a non-
Muslim state where they were duty bound to obey the State law as well as protect the lives 
property and wealth of all other citizens. HTB states,  
 
We feel that if being a citizen in the west means abiding by the rules of the state, and 
paying our dues, such as paying taxes, Muslims do not have any issue with this. The 
problem arises when Muslims are forced to accept the secular value system of the west, 
and it being portrayed as the only means by which harmony can exist between Muslims 
and their fellow non-Muslim citizens… Indeed, we believe that Muslims adhering to the 
sublime values of Islam can lead to harmony between Muslims and non-Muslims and the 
improving of community relations, especially in northern towns characterized by polarized 
communities.210  
 
In terms of domestic relations and community cohesion, this was the strongest assurance 
provided by HTB to the HO, that it posed no security threat to the state and that despite its 
disagreement with the secular ideology and its foreign policy, it would stand against acts of 
domestic terrorism and ideas which did not conform to living in the UK as a model citizen 
                                                          
210 (HTB, 12:2004). See ‘Strength in Diversity: A Response from Hizb ut Tahrir’, 2004. Hizb ut Tahrir Britain. 
[online]. Available at :  http://www.scribd.com/doc/19628572/Strength-in-Diversity-A-response-from-Hizb-
utTahrir-Britain [accessed 27.01.2011] 
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including as discussed above moving away from inciting tensions relating to the Jews and the 
armed concept of jihad. However, in its response HTB had recognized that it did not have 
leadership over the Muslim communities in the UK but did point out that it had fostered a long 
standing relationship within it (ibid). Moreover, the document maintained a sufficiently radical 
message to separate it from the liberal and moderate entities which the government had financed 
and fostered and who had proven incapable of stemming the tide of radicalism and extremism 
especially amongst the youth in Britain for which they had been specifically co-opted211. Having 
marketed itself as radical yet non-violent and committed to creating model Muslim citizens, HTB 
pitched itself as the prime candidate for replacing the failure of the MAB, MCB as well as the 
UK government flagship counter-terror program CONTEST 2 and PREVENT212, in its 
effectiveness to engage and neutralize those influenced by ideas of violence against the British 
state and society. According the most current phase of its UK policy The Future of Muslims in 
Britain (2011), HTB asserts; 
 
Initially they (UK Government) wanted a unified body that could be engaged with, 
manipulated and used to carry their agenda to Muslims in Britain, in order to encourage 
westernization. In 1997, they hoped that the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) would play 
                                                          
 
211 see Whitaker, R. 2005. ‘Intelligence Chiefs Warn Blair of Home Grown Insurgency’, The Independent, [online] 
Available at:  http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/intelligence-chiefs-warn-blair-of-homegrown-
insurgency-501835.html [accessed 27.01.2011] 
 
212 PREVENT forms an integral part of the controversial UK inter-departmental counter-terrorism programme 
termed CONTEST, instituted after the events of 9/11. Although CONTEST was conceived in 2001, it was not 
officially rolled out until 2003. Aimed at preventing a terrorist attack on UK soil, it targeted four main sectors; 1. 
Persue: To stop terrorist attacks 2.Prevent: To stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism 3.Protect: to 
strengthen protection against a terrorist attack and 4. Prepare: to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack. Since then 
the strategy has undergone various reviews. After the last review in 2011, the PREVENT aspect has been the most 
controversial one because of its relationship to the monitoring of Muslim communities, de-radicalisation and the 
funding of Muslim organisations. For a more detailed overview see the PREVENT strategy UK Home Office 
website  http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism/review-of-prevent-strategy/ [accessed 25.08.12]   
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this role, but by 2001 they had hit several obstacles. It became clear that the MCB did not 
have the penetration into the community they had hoped for. Also they found that some 
elements within the MCB were not as compliant as they would have liked and for a period 
even boycotted them. In 2001, the government embarked upon project ‘Contest’, which 
aimed to diversify the number of ‘government-friendly’ Muslims in the UK…Tariq 
Ramadan, Hamza Yusuf, MPAC-UK and others they hoped they would use to achieve 
their aims. However, this agenda also proved un-successful. This plan was later replaced 
with the ‘Prevent’ strategy, also known as ‘Contest-2’ which aimed to create a reformed 
British version of Islam… they threw money at Muslims at a local community level, in an 
attempt to bribe and manipulate the community, by applying conditions to this funding - 
including encouraging Muslims to spy on one another. However, as details of the spying 
emerged and as Muslims rejected the idea of reformation, the Prevent strategy became 
discredited (HTB, 6:2011) 
 
The HO’s policy of patience and resolve in de-securitizing and transforming HTB has produced 
considerable dividends. Through a steady combination of mild external pressure, open channels 
of engagement and vehement resistance and protection from the forces demanding proscription, 
the HO has provided the space for the HTB leadership to reshape its objectives and organization 
in order to potentially play a critical role in preventing radicalism especially amongst young 
British Muslims turning to violence in the Muslim communities. Under its current policy, HTB is 
now far removed from the objectives of its international arm having successfully marginalized 
and neutralized the ideologues, especially the Arab component whose original role in Britain was 
solely to focus on the direct work to establish the Caliphate in the Middle East.  
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That focus has now been completely changed to protecting the identity of Muslims in Britain 
with a superficial link to issues in the Muslim world and more pertinently a radical shift away 
from the case of the Middle East. The absence of any major revolt amongst the rank and file to 
its leadership’s political engagement with the British political establishment and the movement 
away from supporting its work in the Middle East is a strong measure of its leadership’s success 
in watering down and in some cases disconnecting it from the core aspects of HT’s ideology and 
political programme. If this direction holds, with succeeding generations of Muslims in Britain 
becoming further removed from their original roots, any meaningful link with the Middle East 
and wider Muslim world will dissipate and issues concerning the Muslims in the UK are likely to 
dominate the party’s organization and focus. However, beyond its role in preventing radical 
Muslim youth turning to violence, its anti-democratic ideals such as the Caliphate, full 
implementation of Sharia and non-participation in the democratic political process will remain 
problematic for the British government and continue to affect its ability to administer its 
relationship with its Muslim subjects. Again the HO has consistently rejected calls to proscribe 
groups adhering to these ideals as it would have a direct effect on HTB. Frustration with the HO 
and calls for HTB’s proscription is however unlikely to diminish because the HO has not taken 
into confidence all the major political actors concerning the details of its policy objectives and 
situation with HT. The most direct proof of this was provided by former Labour Education 
Minister Ed Balls, when in a sarcastic letter to Cameron he outlined the difference of dealing 
with the HTB issue when out of government and when in government. Asking Cameron as why 
he had not lived up to his election pledge to proscribe HTB and to provide him with an updated 
situation under secret ‘Privy Council’ terms, Balls states; 
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At Prime Minister’s Questions earlier today, Clive Efford MP asked why you and your 
government had not yet proscribed Hizb ut-Tahrir despite previous commitments to do so. 
.. Isn’t it the case that the issue has turned out to be more complicated in government than 
the grandstanding and simple sound bites you made in opposition? 213 
 
Conclusion 
The study of HT in Britain provides us with a unique case of a struggle over its de-securitization 
within a Western democratic context. The consistent blockages by the HO of attempts by 
successive political leaders to bring HT into the public debate through the use of the speech act 
and to even securitize it by calling for its proscription, opens up the question of locating the 
authority of securitizing actors when separation of powers exist within liberal democracies.  
 
The political and media freedom afforded to HT and the benefit it has derived from it in terms of 
internationalizing the movement and the Caliphate, has produced a realization of the importance 
of the UK to its globalization as a brand but a consistent conundrum on the limits of its activity 
outside of the majaal and Muslim world. The desire to protect its global media reach in the UK 
has led to an extraordinary series of actions designed to avoid proscription and securitization. It 
is within this desire and unorthodoxy on the behalf of HT that the HO has unearthed for the first 
time in its history the potential of engaging, directing and even penetrating HTB for domestic 
and potentially international objectives. With the leadership of HTB having reciprocated 
overtures by the British political establishment for engagement and the setting up of Hizb ut 
Tahrir Britain as a distinct brand as opposed to its international arm, the efforts to maintain 
                                                          
213 Balls, E. 2011. ‘When Will You Ban Hizb ut Tahrir’. Labourlist, [online] 19 July. Available at: 
http://www.labourlist.org/ed-balls-letter-to-cameron---when-will-you-ban-hizb-ut-tahrir- [accessed 04.02.2011] 
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legality and legitimacy have to an immense watering down of its rhetoric and language. 
Moreover, HTB has forgone the internal security vulnerabilities where for the first time in its 
history, disenchanted members who held influential positions decided to switch sides and work 
for western governments. To what extent engagement with and infiltration of HTB has occurred 
is difficult to establish. However, the level of protection afforded to it by the HO is telling when 
even Prime Ministers have been stopped from successfully securitizing the movement.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 
7.1 Summary of Findings 
In this thesis, through a comparative case study of HT in different political contexts, I have 
attempted to solve the puzzle as to how and why HT has been securitised as an existential threat 
by some governments and not by others.  I have argued that HT does not constitute an existential 
threat to the political security of states and regimes outside of its majaal in the Arab world and 
more specifically in the Middle East. Moreover, HT’s three stage process towards establishing 
the Caliphate does not apply outside of its majaal. Rather the moves to securitize or de-securitize 
HT in areas outside of its majaal are the consequence of subjective security imperatives.   
 
This orientation presents a different view to the existing studies on HT which fails to 
differentiate between HT’s majaal and non-majaal and consequently applies its three stage 
method of establishing the Caliphate as a blanket process to analysing its activism 
internationally. Moreover, in some instances the studies have developed an artificial and 
ideologically suspect discourse on terrorism which provides no concrete evidence in order to 
reassess HT’s established commitment to non-violent activism.  
 
The existential nature of the threat from HT explains the reason why governments in HT’s 
officially stated majaal, the Middle East and Arab world have largely proscribed the movement 
and mobilised extreme emergency measures in order to eradicate its influence. In theory, the 
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universal application of HT’s three stage method in the discourse should produce a similar 
mobilisation globally. However, enormous differences emerge in the treatment of HT by various 
regimes and NSAs’ in the wider Muslim world and even in the West.  
 
These differences can be explained through the application of the ‘securitisation’ model 
developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, also known as the Copenhagen school. This 
framework can be applied to the activism of HT under different types of political contexts in 
HT’s majaal as well as outside of its majaal both in the Muslim world and in the West. The 
model looks at security through the subjective process of the ‘speech act’ whereby referent 
objects are securitised through successfully moving an issue through from the realm of normal 
politics to that of ‘special politics’ in order to mobilise special measures. In the case of HT, in 
addition to governments, NSAs’ have also been at the forefront of as critical security actors. 
Moreover, authoritarian regimes have securitised HT outside of the orthodox ‘speech act’ 
framework by finding an audience for its legitimacy within the security and military apparatus 
and thereby conducting ‘special politics’ outside of the general audience.  In other words 
although authoritarian regimes do not require the ‘speech act’ necessarily in order to mobilise 
special measures as in the case of democracies, however, both require legitimacy, even though 
the source of it may differ. 
 
7.11 The Majaal 
Despite its transnational nature, HT has defined a specific geographical location for targeting the 
establishment of the Caliphate which is termed the majaal. This is the Arab world and more 
specifically the Middle East. This is premised on the notion that they are Muslim societies which 
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have as their language, Arabic, considered central to understanding the Islamic thought and texts. 
All other Muslim countries are deemed part of the expansive space for the Arabic based 
Caliphate and not an immediate concern for the assumption of power. This means that according 
to its stated strategy, the majaal is the only realm where HT forms an existential threat to the 
sovereignty, ideology and state. This is not the case in any other location except where the 
territory is seen as a strategic addition such as Turkey or Pakistan or where there is a popular 
Islamic revolution wherein HT will evaluate the readiness and commitment of the society to 
‘shoulder the burden’ of the Caliphate, as it did in the case of the Iran in 1979.    
 
In the case of the Arab world and Middle East, the securitization of HT has occurred largely 
through the acquiescence of the security and military apparatus. With political security (state 
sovereignty and ideology) the referent object of securitization, the regimes have responded to 
HT’s open challenge to the organisational stability of the state and its ideology. However, since 
the public audience has not consented to the securitization, the ‘securitisation moves’ by the 
regime and the breaking of ‘normal rules’ has occurred through the use of the security apparatus. 
Jordan has remained HT’s pivot, since the second stage of interaction was declared successful in 
the society in the 1960’s. Since then, multiple military coup d’états have been unsuccessfully 
attempted in combination with Iraq, Syria, Turkey and possibly North Africa.  
 
Beyond Jordan however, the requirement for a popular base has not been deemed necessary and 
the three stage process inapplicable. This existential nature of the threat has brought about a 
severe response through the mobilisation of emergency measures designed to eliminate the 
movement and its members. Up until the momentous changes in the Middle East in April 2011, 
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especially in Tunisia, Syria and Egypt, government measures have had a devastating impact on 
the membership and the ability of the movement to function in the societies. Despite this the 
majaal has remained the geographical cauldron for the establishment of the Caliphate. 
 
7.12 Non Majaal – Muslim Countries 
Outside of the arena of the majaal, HT’s strategy disengages from agitating a collision between 
the public and the ruling authorities or from fomenting a change from the levers of power. 
Instead, the strategy is to develop a strong public awareness about its ideology and objectives 
with the expectation that when the Caliphate is established in the core countries (majaal), its 
expansion will be natural and welcomed. Although this forms a certain challenge to the identity 
and ideological orientation of the state, it does not constitute an existential threat to the 
sovereignty or organizational stability of the state.  
 
Uzbekistan and Indonesia are the two case studies analysed in the Muslim world outside of the 
majaal. The case studies have been selected for two reasons. Firstly, because of their differing 
political set ups and the enormous contrast in their responses to HT. Secondly due to the success 
of the activism although for extremely different reasons. Whilst, Uzbekistan exhibits a 
totalitarian regime, Indonesia since the 1990’s has fostered a democratic imperative. HT has 
been proscribed in Uzbekistan as a terrorist movement and the ‘speech act’ employed to mobilise 
‘special measures’ against it, outside of political debate and ‘normal politics’ but through the 
audience of the security apparatus. The referent object for securitisation has been political 
security but includes Islamist movements in general with HT at the apex. Consequently, extreme 
measures have been taken against HT resulting in the widespread persecution and imprisonment 
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of its members and its framing under the rubric of international terrorism. In terms of objective 
security terms, HT has not taken any steps to threaten the organisational stability of the regime or 
mount any coup d’états, confirming that it has maintained its position as functioning outside of 
the majaal both in terms of a core state for the establishment of the Caliphate or strategic 
territory linking it to another core state.   
 
In contrast, the Indonesian government has registered HT as a valid social movement, bestowing 
upon it both legitimacy and legality. Despite the openness of the political terrain, HTI has until 
now kept itself out of the political process because of its opposition to secular democracy in 
principle and to Pancasila, the organising principle of religious pluralism based on Buddhist 
principles. However, it has not overtly challenged the organising principles of societal identity 
and state but its literature is clear as to its rejection. Instead HT has based its opposition to 
Parliament and the legislature on the basis of a quirk in Indonesian modern history whereby the 
implementation of the Islamic Sharia was narrowly dropped by the founding fathers. The 
Indonesian states acceptability of HT’s thrust towards the inclusion of Sharia or what has come 
to be known as the Jakarta Charter, as an organising principle of state and society is because the 
issue has been accepted as a legitimate discourse. Moreover, HT has worked to deepen and 
expand its influence in society through a process of networking, alliances and bandwagoning 
with other Islamist movements such as the Muhammadiyya and NU as well as working through 
officially sanctioned clerical bodies such as the MUI. Due to the government’s alliance with 
Islamic actors and the military’s use of Islamist movements (including HTI) to counteract 
secessionist tendencies amongst Christian and other non-Muslim parties in places such as Papua 
and Aceh, there has been an unwillingness by the government to bring the issue of HTI into 
317 
 
political debate and with the sections of the military providing a security umbrella, HTI seems to 
have found a protected political terrain. The allowance of the International Caliphate Conference 
in 2007 and HTI’s involvement in the MUI decree on the Ahmadiyya seem to indicate the level 
of government sanction.     
 
In the case of both Indonesia and Uzbekistan, NSAs’ have become influential security actors. 
The positions of the NSAs’ however differ vastly concerning firstly their referent object for 
securitisation and secondly their influence on the ruling authorities.  In the case of Uzbekistan, 
the key security actors are mainly Western policy think tanks and academics. Motivated largely 
by US security imperatives in Eurasia, their discourse has largely categorised HT within the post 
9/11 terrorism framework as either an ideological ‘conveyor belt’ of terror or having the 
potential for terrorism if put under extreme security conditions as is the case of Uzbekistan. 
Although no such evidence of HT’s link with terrorism has to date been presented, the close 
advisory relationship between primarily US think tanks, Western academics and the regime has 
produced collaborative security moves in turn providing legitimacy to the regimes ‘speech act’ 
and its mobilisation of special measures against HT. The discourse on the Tashkent bombings, 
Akromiya and the events in Andijon stand out as key examples of the collaboration on 
securitization. The misunderstanding and misapplication of HT’s majaal and its three stage 
process has been central to securitizing HT as an existential threat to the organisational stability 
and sovereignty of Uzbekistan. 
 
This is in stark contrast to Indonesia where Western based liberal foundations, who have had a 
controversial history in the country, have not moved to securitize terrorism or political security 
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as the referent object but ‘identity’ in the form of Pancasila and the secular republic. With the 
government unwilling to securitize HT as an existential threat to Pancasila and republicanism, 
Western liberal foundations have joined forces with like minded domestic organisations and 
influential individuals to securitize HT and other Islamists as a fifth column dedicated to 
overturning the pluralist order in Indonesia. Three areas of HT’s activism are seen as particularly 
threatening. The first is HT’s mobilisation against Western liberal and economic influence and 
its adoption by authoritative actors such as the MUI, secondly, the threat to the pluralist 
organisation of Indonesian society as represented by its influence over the passing of the 
Ahmadiyya decree and thirdly, the threat to the moderate position and  penetration of the rank 
and file of Indonesia’s largest Islamic movements, the NU and Muhammadiyya, who have 
worked closely with Western liberal foundations and are seen as the first line of defence against 
radical Islamist movements.  
 
The most potent securitisation move was made by the US based Lib4All foundation in 2009 
where in an alliance with former Indonesian President and liberal advocate, Abdur Rahman 
Wahid released a monograph entitled ‘The Illusion of an Islamic State:  How an Alliance of 
Moderates Launched a Successful Jihad Against Radicalization and Terrorism in the World's 
Largest Muslim-Majority Country’, the aim of which is to warn of the danger from HTI and 
other Islamist movements to the Indonesian state. The initiative has found support amongst the 
corridors of power in Washington and the European Union. However, contrary to expectations, it 
has not led to any major shift on the part of the government or the population at large towards 
HT as it continues to play an increasing role in Indonesian political life. 
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7.13 Non- Majaal – Non-Muslim Countries 
The case of Britain has been taken as a case study outside of the majaal and the wider Muslim 
world as it presents an interesting chapter in the history and current strategy of HT. It is also 
important because it forms the hub of its international media projection and comprises the largest 
and most active membership in the Western hemisphere. Since Nabhani did not put much effort 
in devising a clear strategy outside of the majaal and the wider Muslim world, the idea of 
developing one outside of this realm was seen as beyond the scope and remit of HT. Since no 
coherent basis and history exists between the ideology of these societies and that of Islam and 
HT, no connection was developed between the objectives of HT and any future existence of the 
members outside of the majaal and wider Muslim world. However, since the 1990s, the HTB 
broke rank and under the leadership of Omar Bakri Mohammed when he embarked upon a 
trajectory and strategy akin to that of HT in the Muslim world. HT’s radical but highly 
intellectual approach tapped into a swell of frustration amongst second and third generation 
Muslims originating from Pakistan and Bangladesh, unable to relate to the society in Britain or 
with their countries of origin. The high intensity activism in Muslim communities and on 
university campus rocked community cohesion, radicalised a whole generation of Muslim 
students and brought it under the security radar of the British government. The anti-Israel and 
homophobic rhetoric brought HT into direct collision with university authorities, many of which 
restricted its activities whilst the media attention which ensued brought about an international 
focus on the movement, a position which it exploited by holding large conferences such as the 
International Caliphate Conference, at Wembley arena in 1994.  
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The removal of OBM in 1995 however, demonstrated the problem HTB faced in trying to 
calibrate a strategy outside of its established arena. Despite a change in the intensity post OBM, 
its ability to market itself internationally and work relatively freely in the UK proved to be a 
magnet for maintaining its organisational capability. It also revealed a policy embedded within 
the political establishment whereby the mandarins in UK Home Office (HO) consistently refused 
to proscribe the movement despite consistent pressure from the political leadership and various 
other domestic and international quarters. 
 
This position became evident in the post 9/11 and especially post 7/7 bombings in London when 
first Tony Blair whilst in office attempted to proscribe HTB on the basis of the ‘conveyor belt’ 
theory and then David Cameron whilst in opposition called for its proscription. On both accounts 
the HO intervened and blocked any attempts to securitize it. The threat of proscription however 
produced a startling shift in HTB. Its leadership broke all conventions by removing and watering 
down any inflammatory material on its website, threatening to take up legal challenges and most 
astonishing of all opening up channels of communication with members of the UK political 
establishment. With HT having characterised Britain as an avowed enemy of Islam, the Muslims 
and particularly HT because of John Glubb Pasha and by extension Britain’s crusade against the 
party in Jordan (see chapter 2), the British chapter’s reciprocation constitutes a shift of enormous 
magnitude as does the position of the British political establishment. With former members such 
as Mehboob Hussein having revealed close connections with the HO, what is evident is a 
complex deep state policy of fostering engagement with HTB of which even government leaders 
have not been fully briefed, has overridden objections from the FCO and one which has 
successfully deflected attempts to securitize the movement.    
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7.2 Implications of Findings 
The correct reading of HT’s discourse and history on the three stage process and the majaal 
enables us evaluate where it intends to establish the Caliphate, which countries are connected 
territories and where HT has no immediate plans to institute measures to take political power. 
Such is the case in countries like Pakistan where recent international focus has descended due to 
HT’s implication in fomenting mutiny within the army and in planning a coup d’état.214 The 
analysis without exception has translated the events in Pakistan as an attempt by HT to remove 
the government and establish the Caliphate directly through the levers of the armed forces. 
Although, Pakistan was added to the majaal in the 1990’s, primarily because of its demonstration 
of nuclear capability, it does not conform to the criteria of a core country because of the absence 
of the Arabic language. Moreover, the arrests of army officers linked to HT merely confirm that 
Pakistan is a connected territory and is likely to form part of a link with a core Arab country 
(most probably Jordan). There is no evidence to suggest that HT has abandoned the Arab world 
and more pertinently, the Middle East in preference to those outside of this realm, especially 
since the popular base considered to have been achieved in Jordan and the Palestinian territories 
does not exist in Pakistan. Therefore, although HT in Pakistan poses an existential threat, the 
manifestation of this threat is dependent upon HT’s position in the Middle East.  
 
The case with the recent changes in the Middle East termed the Arab spring is very different. 
With the political terrain open for the first time in HT’s 60 year history, new opportunities have 
emerged in the connecting countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and potentially Syria. 
However, although the rise of Islamist parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood and En Nahda 
                                                          
214 Army Tries Five Officers Over Links with Hizb ut Tahrir.2011. Daily Times, [online] 2 Feb. Available at; 
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2012\02\12\story_12-2-2012_pg1_5 [accessed 14.05.12] 
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should in theory aid HT’s resurgence, the rejection of the Caliphal model and the full application 
of Sharia by these movements along with HT’s own historical dismissal of their moderate and 
secular politics means that the securitisation of HT as an existential threat is likely to remain 
although the ‘speech act’ may become more prominent in this regard. There is some precedent in 
the case of the Palestinian territories with the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood offshoot Hamas 
in 2006, which suggests that HT’s dogmatic position towards the complete application of the 
Sharia, rejection of national statehood and the non-recognition of the Israeli state will elicit its 
securitisation in the post Arab spring just as it has in the Palestinian territories.     
 
Outside of the objective security framework and the majaal, HT seems to have become 
vulnerable to securitisation moves in the democratic context. This is because it values its access 
to the public space and the need to retain legitimacy has become paramount. This vulnerability is 
demonstrable in the case of the UK, whereby HT’s discourse and political position since the 
sword of proscription has threatened access to its public space. As a result, the British authorities 
have been able to manoeuvre its leadership away from hard-line positions and push it towards 
engagement. Similarly, in the case of Indonesia, the need to achieve legitimacy and secure the 
public space has forced HTI into avoiding confronting directly the issue of Pancasila and the 
secular republic whilst breaking its exceptionalist stance in forming alliances with moderate 
Muslim movements and even the government. What this vulnerability suggests is that HT has 
found it more difficult outside of its normal state of being securitised by governments to 
maintain a coherent radical position in the democratic contexts. It also exposes a problem for HT 
outside of the majaal and in the wider Muslim world on how to manage an expanding position in 
a country and the members expectations once politically engaged if no parallel dynamic and 
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success is being achieved in the majaal. Without the authority to move towards taking power, the 
activism becomes suspended in a void. It is in this vacuum that HT has particularly become more 
vulnerable to subjective securitisation and even part of a wider geo-political security dynamic. 
 
7.3 Limits of the Study 
This study primarily relies on the observable aspects of HT as reflected in its open or public 
documents and activities. One factor that cannot be covered in this method is the inner dynamics 
of HT that might reveal a fully accurate picture of the movement‘s orientation. Information on 
this can be gained by an extensive study of core activists or policy makers of the organization, 
subject to their sincerity in providing information. Unpublicized internal statutes and circulars 
are also essential in understanding the movement‘s strategy and orientation. Gaining such access 
and information is not easy, however, because it requires an intense degree of involvement and 
trust. I did manage to gain the trust of a number of HT’s senior members. Short meetings with 
these leaders, however, are insufficient for digging deeper into the organizational strategies and 
plans of action. Compared to this ideal, this study is relatively limited. Nevertheless, I believe 
that it has been able to provide an analysis of the discourse and practice of HT that reveals the 
character of the organization and its activism at the level of the actual. It provides a close 
analysis of its trajectory based on the pattern of its activities; and it offers a better understanding 
of the nature of the movement than many studies that are based merely on an inductive analysis 
of isolated activities, or are based on a superficial reading of the doctrines of the organization. 
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This study has taken on multiple case studies in order to determine the multiple pathways taken 
by HT and the ruling systems in different political contexts. Although this provides a useful 
comparative perspective, the depth of each study is considerably restricted as a result. If the 
study was limited for instance to the case of Jordan or Uzbekistan, it would have provided a 
more detailed evaluation of the political, social, military and economic context pertaining to the 
securitisation of the movement. But while the stretched nature of the research has likely not done 
justice to each case study, a full appreciation of the subjective concept of ‘security’, and of the 
notion of HT’s majaal and the differences it makes in its activism within varied political 
constructs, would not have been possible without a comparative case study approach and one 
that offers radically differing political contexts. 
 
Finally, due to the intensely securitised nature of HT in countries such as Uzbekistan and the 
Middle East, access to activists and government personnel was severely restricted, if not wholly 
absent. Similarly, the ‘deep state’ nature of the relationship between the UK government and HT 
automatically diverted the analysis into the realm of inference more than direct evidence. In all 
cases except Indonesia, overwhelming reliance on public documents and activities severely 
degraded the quality of information and considerably limited the scope of the study. 
 
7.4 Suggestions for Future Research 
Questions’ concerning the position and role of HT as well as other Islamist movements, within 
the wider geopolitical interests of major powers, is also relevant when analysing them within the 
inter-subjective concept of securitisation. Looking at the contemporary research on Islamism, I 
would suggest that further research investigate the securitisation and de-securitisation dynamic 
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as an explanation of its role in a struggle over geopolitics. This study will benefit a variety 
disciplines including security studies, Islamic studies, political geography and IR amongst others. 
It is possible to argue for instance that Islamism’s securitisation or de-securitisation is part of a 
political struggle for influence in those regions where the interests of the major powers intersect 
and where HT and other movements command an increasingly influential presence such as in 
Eurasia. Consequently, the struggle ‘over’ Islamism as a potential weapon of policy beyond the 
realm of objective security would be of interest to future studies.  
 
This thesis has already highlighted elements of this ‘puzzle’ in the resistance of the US to 
proscribe HT, despite pressure from influential domestic policy think tanks and from the Russian 
government. With HT seen as threatening the stability of Russia’s and China’s near abroad, the 
refusal of the US to follow suit has created an atmosphere of mistrust over its intentions and 
forced both Russia and China to close ranks by forming an alliance to combat the ‘threat’. 
Russian suspicion concerning US intentions towards Islamism in its ‘soft underbelly’, the 
Caucuses and Central Asia is encapsulated by the legendary Soviet-Russian journalist and 
Russian expert on the US, Valentin Zorin. Commenting on the appointment in the US of former 
CIA operative Fiona Hill as CIA National Intelligence Officer to Russia and Eurasia and her 
testimony to Congress on Islamism and HT in Eurasia, he states; 
 
Ms. Hill testified to the US Congress against including HuT in the State Department list 
of terrorist organizations… Ms. Hill had failed to inform the American people that HuT 
was operating not only in Central Asian states but in Russia as well…she did not even 
mention that HuT was outlawed in Russia… Ms. Hill knew very well what was the real 
significance of putting or not putting this or that organization on the State Dept. Terror 
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List. If HuT remained officially kosher in the eyes of the US Law then the CIA and the 
DIA had no legal problems establishing relations with and within this organization, 
declared "terrorist" by the Russians…What happened next is well known. The HuT 
cells were activated in the Fergana Valley less than two years after Hill's testimony to 
the Congress… As to the puppet masters, there was no doubt in Karimov's mind that they 
resided in London and Washington…Putin provided him with necessary details and 
names. The old party fox would never kicked the Americans out of his country if he were 
not absolutely convinced in their involvement in the coup.215  
 
Zorin’s article, based on his extensive journalistic experience with US policy towards the 
Chechen’s and other Islamic factions in Eurasia opens up a ‘Pandora’s box’ as to the reality and 
perception of the securitization process on Islamism and geopolitics in the region. In addition to 
what the thesis has already explored, it would be interesting to find out as to what extent HT has 
been securitised, politicised or de-securitised as part of a geopolitical imperative.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
215 Zorin, V. The All American Girl from the CIA and Hizb ut Tahrir, 2006, left.ru [online]. Available at; 
 http://left.ru/inter/2006/hill.phtml [14.05.12] 
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